Friday, 3 October 2025

Trump's MAGA effect on Sri Lanka

Col R Hariharan

Sri Lanka Perspectives September 2025 | South Asia Security Trends, October 2025 | https://www.security-risks.com    

The highlight of the month of September is President Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s visit to attend and speak at the UN General Assembly. AKD posed for the photograph with US President Donald Trump showing his thumb up and First Lady Melania Trump at the dinner reception hosted by the US President for world leaders attending the UN General Assembly on Sept 23. The UN voted for recognising Palestine as a member; Sri Lanka had no problem with this as it had already recognised it. But Sri Lanka did not follow most of the members who walked out when Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu rose to address the The highlight of the month of September is President Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s visit to attend and speak at the UN General Assembly. AKD posed for the photograph with US President Donald Trump showing his thumb up and First Lady Melania Trump at the dinner reception hosted by the US President for world leaders attending the UN General Assembly on Sept 23. The UN voted for recognising Palestine as a member; Sri Lanka had no problem with this UN General Assembly, indicating its diplomacy is nuanced.

AKD’s UN address focused on the urgent need to end the war in Gaza. More than 20,000 Lankans are working in Israel. Many more are poised to take up employment in Israel, as caregivers and as workers in agriculture and construction sectors. Sri Lanka is also a destination for an increasing number of Israel tourists. AKD is to be commended that in spite of this, he minced no words in expressing Sri Lanka’s distress at the  ongoing catastrophe in Gaza. “It has been turned into an open prison full of pain and suffering.” He referred to his fight against corruption describing it as “an obstruction to development and global well-being and a cause of poverty." He gave a memorable quote: Fighting corruption is dangerous. But not fighting it presents even graver risks.”

With Trump’s MAGA (Make America Great Again) being implemented vigorously, the strategic turbulence in the Indo-Pacific with US-India relations at the bottom after two decades. Its after effects are sure to affect small island nations like Sri Lanka in the Indian Ocean. The impact of MAGA and its strategic turbulence likely to be faced is discussed in detail in this issue of Sri Lanka perspectives. 

AKD ended the month with a trip to Japan. Both in the US and Japan, he addressed Sri Lankan migrants. His speech emphasised the achievements of his year-long rule “would go down in Sri Lankan history as one in which no ethnic conflict arose”. He claimed “the past year, the government has already fulfilled a significant part of the people’s expectations for change, by rebuilding the collapsed economy to ensure stability, strengthening the rule of law, establishing corruption-free governance and making the state machinery more efficient.” Sri Lanka had succeeded in safeguarding balance in its diplomatic relations. It was refreshing to see the JVP leader emphasising “Our country is home to diverse ethnic and religious communities, each with its own unique culture. Therefore, our country is a country full of diverse people. This diversity is one of our greatest strengths, and to move the nation forward, it is essential to foster unity among all people.” 

Trump’s MAGA impact on Sri Lanka

Trump’s MAGA fallout—particularly  his second-term policies—has triggered a cascade of strategic and economic shifts across the Indo-Pacific, with direct and indirect consequences for Sri Lanka and India.

The Trump administration's freeze on USAID funding, initiated on January 20, 2025, is impacting a wide range of development and humanitarian projects in Sri Lanka. Some of the key projects affected include Women In Need (WIN) whose 85% operations are funded by USAID. WIN supports survivors of domestic violence through counselling, legal aid and provides emergency shelters. Their Crisis Centre in Ratnapura which served 950 women in 2024 runs the risk of being shut down entirely. Four emergency shelters, despite being full and jointly supported by the Ministry of Women and Children’s Affairs run the risk of closure. 

USAID was the largest single donor to Sri Lankan NGOs and CSOs, contributing around Rs 15 billion in 2024. Hundreds of local NGOs face operational paralysis. Elon Musk, appointed by Trump to dismantle USAID, has alleged that $7.9 million was spent on training Sri Lankan journalists to avoid binary-gendered language.

Sri Lanka’s response to the abrupt halt of USAID funding has been a mix of  strategising and seeking alternative sources of funding. The USAID funding for Sri Lanka amounted to $53 million as of September 2025. The USAID had supported over 565,000 direct beneficiaries; in addition, USAID-funded projects had supported 400+ staff.

The government has not announced any plan to replace the USAID aid crunch. This is understandable as budgetary constraints and political priorities give limited scope for reworking. The government is unable to respond to local NGOs' suggestions to step in critical sectors like domestic violence support, education and food security. Another important aspect is the loss of key technical assistance provided under USAID to parliamentary committees. These included the Committee on Public Finance, limiting its functioning.

There are limitations for other UN agencies like the UNDP, FAO and UNAIDS to step in as their own funding has been under crunch for some time as POTUS has also curbed US funding to UN agencies.

The EU and Japan have traditionally supported Sri Lanka’s development, but no major new pledges have been announced to fill the USAID vacuum, though they have expressed concern.

Some Sri Lankan companies are stepping up with Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) initiatives, especially in education and nutrition. Sri Lankan diaspora groups in Canada, the UK, and Australia have been mobilizing funds for specific NGOs, particularly those working on gender-based violence and youth empowerment. These efforts are neither centrally focused nor coordinated at national level by the government.

Some of the USAID projects - especially those linked to DEI (Diversity, Equality and Inclusion), media and civil society training are politically sensitive. They are likely to die down unless the government steps in; any such intervention has to probably figure in IMF approved economic recovery plans.

There are limitations to economic aid from India, China and Japan which have their own reworked priorities and conditionalities due to Trump’s MAGA in action. For Sri Lanka it is going to be a big economic challenge; it may be compelled to take a re-look at some of its development projects and rework them.

In the coming weeks, we can expect the turbulence in strategic relations in the Indo-Pacific to settle down. The writing on the wall is clear for Sri Lanka: its balancing act between India, China and the US is going to get tougher with a more clearly defined Pakistan-US relations with its effect on India and China. We can expect AKD to carefully tread his foreign policy issues, focus  on  internal issues to clean up issues of governance, particularly law and order. We can expect him to bring to book more political leaders, already shorn off their self-acquired privileges.

Tailpiece – LGBTIQ Tourism: Sri Lanka Tourism has officially endorsed a project initiated by rights organisation EQUAL GROUND to promote LGBTIQ tourism, recognising its potential to diversify tourism markets and position Sri Lanka as a safe, inclusive, and welcoming destination for all travellers. Archbishop of Colombo Cardinal Malcom Ranjith has criticised the move.

[Col R Hariharan VSM, a retired MI specialist on South Asia and terrorism, served as the head of intelligence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka 1987-90. He is associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies. Email: haridirect@gmail.com, Website: https://col.hariharan.info    


Monday, 29 September 2025

Three Questions on Trump's MAGA effect on India

Col R Hariharan

[Three questions raised by a media scribe are answered here]

Is the US working against Indian interests?

This question cannot be answered in the binary of yes or no. It has to be answered in the backdrop of the robust defence partnership that has grown during the last two decades between India and the US. Both the countries have signed several key agreements that enhance military cooperation, interoperability and strategic alignment between them. These include

·      LEMOA (Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement) allowing both countries to use each other's military facilities for replenishment, enhancing operational reach and logistics support. 

·      COMCASA (Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement) signed in 2018, facilitates secure communications between U.S. and Indian military systems, enabling interoperability during joint operations. 

·      BECA (Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement) signed in 2020, allows sharing of geospatial intelligence and satellite data for improved targeting and navigation. 

·      ISA (Industrial Security Agreement) signed in 2019, enables the transfer of classified technology and information to Indian private defence firms, boosting co-development and co-production.

·      Last year, India signed SOSA (Security of Supply Arrangement), which ensures priority access to defence goods and services during emergencies, strengthening supply chain resilience. The two countries have signed an MoU on Liaison Officers that enable deployment of Indian officers to U.S. commands (starting with U.S. Special Operations Command), improving coordination and information sharing. They have also signed a 10-Year Defence Framework for long-term roadmap for defence cooperation, focusing on joint production, technology transfer, and strategic alignment. 

·      The Autonomous Systems Industry Alliance (ASIA) is a collaborative initiative for Underwater Domain Awareness (UDA), reflecting growing interest in maritime security. Besides these, India and US cooperation in space have moved beyond astronaut training and commercial transactions. 

·      A joint Earth-observing satellite using dual frequency synthetic aperture radar is scheduled for launch from India's Satish Dhawan Space Center under the NASA-ISRO NISAR agreement.

·      India is also a member of the Quad - quadrilateral framework - consisting of Australia, India, Japan and the US which came into existence in the wake of Covid pandemic, to enhance supply chain cooperation following Chinese domination of chip and rare earths industries.

These agreements have enabled India to acquire from the US MH-60R Seahawks, Apache helicopters and P-81 maritime patrol aircraft, enhancing India's airlift, logistics and surveillance capacities. India's maritime surveillance and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific has now become reality. GE has become the supplier for engines for LCA Tejas light combat aircraft. Co-production deals are underway for Javelin anti-tank missiles and Stryker combat vehicles. In fact, India is the first non-treaty partner to whom the US has offered the Sea Guardian UAS under the Missile Technology Control.  

This is perhaps the reason why PM Narendra Modi reacts after a lot of deliberation to POTUS Donald Trump's provocative comments and moves affecting good relations with India. These include slapping 50+50 % tariff for energy trade with Russia and increasing visa fee to $100,000 and cutting down on visas for foreign students.

PM Modi probably understands Trump's guiding lights better than others. Trump is guided by "Make America Great Again" (MAGA) - a nationalist framework that emphasizes American sovereignty, economic self-interest, and a rejection of globalist "entanglements". His foreign policy, which is marked by transactionalism, unilateralism and a focus on domestic revival over international commitments. As a result, promoting domestic manufacturing and imposing tariffs to protect American industries has been adopted as his state policy.

He has reduced the US involvement in multilateral organisations like the UN, WHO and even NATO. He advocates military deterrence while avoiding foreign wars. Trump also emphasises traditional values and national pride as fundamental to his policy pronouncements. As a result, the Trump-Vance Doctrine seeks to avoid open ended military commitments forcing its foreign allies to spend more on defence.  He treats foreign relations as deals rather than diplomatic initiatives. As a result short term gains and personal leverage have replaced his moves even with long-term allies like Japan and NATO members. 

Trump has adopted tariff driven trade policy, imposing sweeping tariffs on imports to rebalance trade deficits and revive American industry. This has not only affected US relations with allies but has skewed global supply chains.  As a commentator says in the Centre for International Governance Innovation, Trump's foreign policy increasingly centers around his own image, shifting from MAGA to MTGA (Make Trump Great Again) to assert his dominant personality replacing ideology driven US foreign policy doctrines like Bush's neoconservatism or Obama's multilateralism. His repeated claims of mediating in the recent Op Sindoor conflict between India and Pakistan despite India's stout denial, bringing peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan and Cambodia and Thailand also vouch for his quest for the Nobel Peace Prize. 

"Is Washington seeking to contain India strategically? What do you make of the developments in the region and beyond?" 

These questions have to be examined in Trump's ideological backdrop discussed earlier. In my view, there are three prongs to Trump's US policy approach to India: 

a. Use of US trade talks with India as a bargaining chip to compel India to whittle down its close relations with Russia and eliminate threat posed to American unilateralism by multilateral alliances like BICS. 

b. Restrict India's ambitions to South and Central Asia by using Deep State to trigger anti-India sentiments in its neighbourhood. I see a pattern in the popular uprisings noticed particularly in Bangladesh and Nepal, though in Sri Lanka it was different.  Reviving US-Pakistan strategic relations is also part of this strategy apart from US ambitions to gain control over Afghanistan and Iran (as also the abolishing US' waiver given to India over Chabahar port from US sanctions slapped on Iran).

How should India perceive growing U.S.-Pakistan bonhomie and perceived U.S. attempts to increase foothold in South Asia, including in Afghanistan? Is that something that New Delhi should be concerned about?

India should be wary of developments in US-Pakistan bonhomie. Perhaps, time for India to read the red lines on Pakistan in every foreign policy palaver with the US. I see the US initiative in Pakistan as more than keeping India engaged. It will help America tackle Iran (as the possibility of Iran-Russia-China triumvirate emerging stronger cannot be ruled out). As a part of it, the US probably hopes to regain control of Bagram airbase as a trade off for helping Taliban-ruled Afghanistan to regain international recognition. It will also cut down India's independent quest to repair relations with the Afghan Taliban. I see the recent strategic cooperation agreement between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan as part of the US initiative to help the US' anti-Iran strategy.   

India should adopt a policy not subject to the vagaries of Trump's US policy. India should not hyphenate its approach to the US to the latter's Pakistan policy. One can expect the scaling down of US rhetoric on India as concessions are given to US trade in the talks. Already, $100,000-visa is a little watered down by the US. It has announced that it is not for renewals. We can expect conditions for student visas also to be watered down as universities are clamouring. It is good to remember under POTUS Trump, foreign policy is irrevocably linked to making "deals". 

 

Wednesday, 3 September 2025

Ranil’s arrest triggers politics of accountability

 Col R Hariharan

Sri Lanka Perspectives August 2025 | South Asia Security Trends, September 2025 | https://www.security-risks.com    

The after effects of years of lawless politics and lack of accountability among the political class and government servants are coming home to roost Sri Lanka after the National Peoples Power (NPP) government led by President Anura Kumara Dissanayake (AKD) arrested former President Ranil Wickremesinghe on criminal charges for alleged misuse of public funds on August 22. The arrest of Wickremesinghe had triggered a rare display of unity among leading opposition political parties who came together to address a press conference on August 24, with a slogan “Let’s Defeat the Constitutional Dictatorship.” Many political leaders who had been opposing the former president addressed the media conference. These included National Freedom Front leader Wimal Weerawansa, former President Maithripala Sirisena and Sri Lanka Muslim Congress Leader Rauff Hakeem.

Wickremesinghe’s arrest is unprecedented as never before a former president has been arrested on criminal charges. His arrest comes in the wake of the arrest and prosecution of several high-profile former ministers booked or arrested since the NP government came to power. Mahindananda Aluthgamage, former sports minister, and Nalin Fernando, former trade minister, have been sentenced 20 years and 25 years imprisonment respectively for corruption involving Rs 53 million. Rajitha Senaratne, former fisheries minister, has been arrested for awarding a questionable contract in 2013. Former State Minister Shasheendra Rajapaksa has been arrested by the Commission to Investigation Allegations of Bribery or Corruption (CIABOC) on 6 August, in connection with an alleged attempt to obtain compensation through another individual for a building damaged on Government land in, which was set on fire during the nationwide protests of 2022. At least four former ministers or senior officials are in remand custody. These include former Sri Lankan Navy Commander Admiral Nishantha Ulugetenne in custody in connection with the disappearance of a man in 2010.

Former President Wickremesinghe’s case relates to his two-day stopover (on September 22 and 23, 2023) in the UK along with his wife. President Wickremesinghe after addressing the UN General Assembly, was returning back home with Mrs Wickremesinghe. They stopped over in the UK to enable Dr Maithree Wickramasinghe to receive the award of an honorary professorship by the University of Wolverhampton. It was in recognition of her extensive research on gender equity and equality. The stop over cost amounting to SL Rs. 16.6 million, was paid from public funds. The government has alleged Wickremesinghe had misused public money for the couple’s private visit to the UK. It has slapped charges against him under In Sections 386 and 388 of the Penal Code and Section 5(1) of the Public Properties Act criminalising the wrongful use of public property. The charges under these sections can lead to imprisonment and fines. Curiously, the arrest came even before the result of the government’s probe into the authenticity of the invitation letter to Mrs Wickremesinghe was available.

AKD’s strategy behind Ranil’s arrest

Sri Lanka’s political history is strewn with examples of misuse of power and violations of law by presidents, prime ministers and persons in high authority particularly after during the period the Eelam war. By arresting the former president, though on a comparatively lesser charge of misuse of public funds, AKD has sent a clear message that he means to clean up the administration regardless of high office held by political leaders.  Commenting on Wickremesinghe’s arrest, President Dissanayake denied opposition accusations that the arrest was a witch-hunt or an act of revenge but an essential step to restore public trust. He said, “Wealth, power or lineage should not matter—all are equal before the law. No matter the criticism, we will not turn back. If my government and I fail to fulfil this duty, then no government will ever succeed.”

Already AKD has arrested several former ministers and political leaders to pay for their past sins. Even after this, why did he choose to arrest the Former President? Is the arrest of Wickremesinghe  AKD’s ‘show of strength’ message to the opposition leaders? He probably chose Wickremesingheinstead of either Mahinda or Gotabaya Rajapaksa because their arrest is likely to trigger a nasty country-wide protest. Ranil, despite being prime minister six times and interim president when the national economy went bankrupt, is a comparatively soft target. The UNP which he leads, is weakened now and probably does not have the strength to inspire the mobs to take up the sticks in his defence.

Whatever be AKD’s strategy, Wickremesinghe’s arrest signals a shift toward holding even the most powerful figures accountable. The arrest of Wickremesinghe could change the fortunes of the UNP. Already, the UNP and SJB leaders have met several times and according to Sri Lanka media formed a joint committee to fight the NPP government’s arrests. Of course, one should not be surprised if UNP and SJB merge if the present talks between the leaders come through.  Wickremesinghe, out on bail after four days, is trying woo other political parties, particularly the Rajapaksas, to form a common front against the NPP government’s high handedness.

If the prosecution of Wickremesinghe and other ministers is transparent and fair, it could restore some public confidence in Sri Lanka’s judiciary and law enforcement. But the big question is IF.

Many Sri Lankans  still recovering from the 2022 economic crisis view the misuse of public funds as a betrayal of public mandate. The arrest has reignited public debate on elite privileges and their misuse of taxpayer money. This could help the NPP in provincial elections, if it can complete at least a few successful prosecutions.

President and MPs to lose salary?

Even before watchdog civil society organizations using this case to demand broader reforms in governance and transparency, another of AKD pledges to cut down on perks of former presidents is likely to become a reality. The Supreme Court’s ‘advice’ on the President’s Entitlement (Repeal) Bill has been sent to the Speaker. The Bill, with modifications if any as per Supreme Court advice, is likely to be enacted in parliament by mid-September. The Supreme Court advice has been drafted after disposing of several petitions challenging the government move to repeal the bill. Articles 36(2) and 36(4) of the Constitution safeguard the rights and privileges of former presidents and their widows. It will be interesting to see how the ruling NPP coalition will handle as these privileges cannot be done away without a constitutional amendment.  

According to the Sunday Times, a draft bill to abolish the pension given to MPs after five years is now with the Attorney General. This will also be facing legal challenges once gazetted. The Association of Retired Parliamentarians (ARP) is among those gearing up to challenge the bill. The association’s secretary, former JVP MP Pemasiri Manage, estimated that the bill will impact about 500 former MPs and about 150 widows of former MPs. To qualify for a non-contributory pension, an MP should have served at least 5 years in the legislature. The same condition applies to the widow and children of a deceased MP. For 5 years of service, the MP is eligible for one third of the current monthly allowance as pension. For 15 years or more, he is eligible for two-thirds of monthly allowance.  Monthly pension per eligible MP or widow will receive between Rs 50,000 and Rs 150,000. Annual cost of pension is estimated to exceed Rs 500 million.

Tailpiece - Enforced disappearances:

The Government has initiated investigations into more than 10,000 cases of enforced disappearances reported across the country. These include incidents reported before the year 2000 that were not formally examined. The Office on Reparations and the Office on Missing Persons have introduced a new procedural framework to streamline these efforts, according to Minister of Justice and National Unity Nanayakkara.

[Col R Hariharan VSM, a retired MI specialist on South Asia and terrorism, served as the head of intelligence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka 1987-90. He is associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies. Email: haridirect@gmail.com, Website: https://col.hariharan.info]      

Monday, 4 August 2025

Sri Lanka: Unfinished history of July

Col R Hariharan

Sri Lanka Perspectives July 2025 | South Asia Security Trends, August 2025 | https://www.security-risks.com    

The month of July is remembered in Sri Lanka for many eventful things that changed the course of history. But two events - the Black July Pogrom carried out on July 23, 1983 and the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord (ISLA) signed between President JR Jayawardane and Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi on July 29, 1987, stand out among them.  Both the events have a ‘Cause and Effect’ relationship as Tamil refugees fleeing the Black July Pogrom in thousands to Tamil Nadu resulted in India taking serious interest in Sri Lanka Tamils identity struggle that led to ISLA. Their quest to save Tamil identity, language and traditional habitation, resulted in ISLA. It still continues to be the core of Tami politics in Sri Lanka.   

Sri Lanka Tamil refugee’s plight also gained the Tamil cause a perpetual place in Tamil Nadu politics, till the LTTE mindlessly assassinated former prime minister Rajiv Gandhi four years later. Now, it has been reduced to influence only around ten percent of the voters in Tamil Nadu.

The Black July pogrom carried out by Sinhala goons with official connivance marked the transition of Tamil minority’s political struggle to get their equitable rights to armed insurgency for Eelam, a separate homeland. Sinhala mobs egged on by their leaders torched Tamil houses and business in Colombo and elsewhere.   At least 150,000 Tamils were rendered homeless and as many as 200,000 of them fled the island nation. Over a time, 800,000 Sri Lankan Tamils settled abroad in Canada, the UK, Australia and Europe. The Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora had a profound impact on Tamil communities globally to sustain the political and armed struggle for Eelam, a separate homeland for Sri Lankan Tamils. Diminishing number of diaspora Tamil organisations using the name of Velupillai Prabhakaran and the symbols of LTTTE, still carry the torch for Eelam. However, Eelam cause seems to have lost the magic to mainstream Tamil population after two generations of them sacrificed everything in the Eelam wars.

Though the Eelam War ended a decade and a half ago, it has scarred three generations of Sri Lankan Tamils, Sinhalas and Muslims. It still continues to influence internal politics, and to a lesser extent Sri Lanka’s international politics. It continues to colour Sri Lanka’s relations with India, which has an influential Tamil population.  

The ISLA enabled Tamil minority to gain limited autonomy with the creation of provincial councils after 13th Amendment to the constitution was passed in November 1987. The Amendment gave powers of self-governance to the Councils on education, agriculture, health and housing. However, powers over land and policing were not devolved to the Councils. Tamils have been insisting on devolving these powers and successive Sri Lanka governments have tried to avoid it by using various political strategies. This has created a crisis of confidence among Tamils, whenever the question of a solution for ethnic reconciliation is raised. Successive Indian prime ministers including PM Narendra Modi have been raising this issue in their official meetings with their Sri Lankan counterparts.

Sri Lanka probably lost around 300,000 people of all hues (including around 170,000 civilians “disappeared” according to International Truth and Justice Project) in two and half decades of civil war. Successive Sri Lanka governments, particularly after the LTTE’s defeat in 2009, have been grappling with political fallout of the ethnic war both internally as well as externally.

Tamil minorities at home are still aggrieved over unaccounted deaths and disappearances, every time a mass grave is unearthed. Chemmani, the latest mass grave, has yielded more than 90 skeletons. As Pitsanna Shanmugathas writes in  www.jurist.org “The grim findings at Chemmani have reignited global attention on one of the world’s most severe cases of unresolved enforced disappearances.” He cites the International Commission of Justice (ICJ) statement of July 27 to confer Sri Lanka the dubious distinction having “one of the highest numbers of cases of unresolved enforced disappearance worldwide, with estimates ranging between 60,000 and 100,000 individual cases” during the civil war. This will add to Sri Lanka’s lack of international accountability for war crimes raised at the UNHRC, hanging like an albatross around the neck of successive governments.

The Chemmani mass grave and ISLA brings back memories of Neelakandan Tiruchelvam, civil rights lawyer, another July martyr. He was murdered by the LTTE on June 29, 1999 for his work along with GL Peiris for President Chandrika Kumaratunga’s 1995 constitutional reform. The devolution plan, known as GL-Neelan Package (also known as the New Deal) was released in August 1995. It went beyond the 13th Amendment. Political schism within Sinhala and Tamil politicians watered down the recommendations.

Neelan, the brilliant constitutional lawyer and TULF parliamentarian, spoke in parliament as soon as Chemmani witness Rajapakse indicated the mass burial at Chemmani. In his speech on July 22, 1998 on the need to properly investigate the mass grave allegations, he gave a blueprint for the investigation. This is valid for investigating all the 19 mass graves in the country. The mass burials pose technical problems greater than exhumation of individual graves. As Shanmugadas points out in his article “Citing the UN Model Protocol, he[Neelan] stressed that a burial recovery should be handled with the same exacting care given to a crime-scene search” and that “disinterment by untrained persons should be prohibited.” He suggested that the work be supervised by a “consulting anthropologist” to prevent the loss of valuable information and the risk of generating false data.

Neelan outlined the three UN-recommended phases of investigation: the collection of “antemortem data” from relatives and witnesses; the “archaeological phase” involving professional excavation and careful documentation of remains; and the “laboratory phase” focusing on analysis through X-rays, trauma identification, and possible DNA testing. We hope, Sri Lanka government investigating the Chemmani mass grave is following Neelan’s suggestion so that the investigation carries greater credibility.  

Recalling Sri Lanka’s July martyrs will not be complete without mentioning the assassination of Appapillai Amirthalingam, the leader of the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) and leader of the opposition  from 1977 to 1983, on July 13, 1989. A week earlier, I had personally warned him of LTTE plot to assassinate him. He invited me to visit his house to check the security arrangement. On the fateful day a week later, I was scheduled to meet him at 4 PM, he asked me to postpone it, as he can meet me during the reception the Indian High Commission was holding in Taj Samudra. We never met because he was gunned down at his home by LTTE gunmen. That is another story. 

[Col R Hariharan VSM, a retired MI specialist on South Asia and terrorism, served as the head of intelligence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka 1987-90. He is associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies. Email: haridirect@gmail.com, Website: https://col.hariharan.info]      


Monday, 21 July 2025

Strategic Competition in the Indo-Pacific – Focus: Sri Lanka Q & A

Col R Hariharan VSM (Retd.)

[Here are my answers to E-mail questions  from a Sri Lanka research scholar   on the big power strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific theatre with special focus on Sri Lanka.]

 

Strategic churn up in Indo-Pacific

 

1 a. How do you assess the strategic competition between China, India, and the US in the Indo Pacific, especially around Sri Lanka?

  b. Can Sri Lanka play an active role in the Indo-Pacific by balancing major powers?

While examining the strategic competition between China, India and the US, with focus on Sri Lanka, in the Indo-Pacific we need to remember the island state’s unique geostrategic location. Sri Lanka dominates the sea lanes of communication, mid-way.

Sri Lanka in combination with the choke points of Bay of Bengal - Malacca Straits and Lombok and Sunda Straits can bring maritime traffic in Indo-Pacific to a halt. Realising this, the US, EU and its Western allies as well as China and Japan have invested in maintaining good relations with Sri Lanka. China has emerged as the most powerful naval power in the Indo-Pacific region. China had been claiming almost the whole of South China Sea intruding into the EEZ of neighbouring countries like Vietnam, Philippines, Indonesia etc. This has been a cause of concern, not only for China’s neighbours, but also for the major users of Indo-Pacific seas.  The four-nation Quad framework of Australia, India, Japan and the US represents is part of their efforts to keep the supply chains of Indo-Pacific open.

Ever since President Xi Jinping came to power in 2013, Sri Lanka and India’s western neighbour Pakistan, have become important destinations for China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Route (MSR). China has tried to cultivate its relations with Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka’s strategic importance for Indo-Pacific security of China has increased as US-China relations have become significantly more confrontational and competitive under President Trump.

The US under Trump saw a departure from decades of engagement-focused US policy, replaced by a more assertive and often unilateral approach aimed at pressuring China on trade, technology, and geopolitical influence. While some high-level talks v have continued, and areas of potential cooperation are still being explored (as evidenced by recent US Secretary of State meetings), the underlying dynamic has shifted towards a deeper, more durable superpower rivalry. This has led to increased uncertainty and turbulence in the relationship, with implications for global trade, security, and diplomatic efforts. It is going to be increasingly difficult for a small country like Sri Lanka to manoeuvre in this turbulent environment building up in the Indo-Pacific region.

2. How does the India and US strategic cooperation in regards to Indian ocean affect Sri Lanka, directly or indirectly? Do you think this cooperation helps create balance in the region, or does it increase pressure on smaller countries like Sri Lanka?

President Trump has disturbed the balanced relationship US had tried to achieve in the country’s foreign policy as a whole. His involvement in support of Israel in its wars in Gaza and against Iran has sent shock waves in the carefully crafted US relations with the Arab world. As a result, in South Asia the US-Pakistan relations are being reset.

We can see the beginnings of Cold War 2.0 waged by the US under Trump and NATO allies against Russia, China and North Korea. Trump has weaponised US tariff rates to reassert and ostensibly strengthen US dollar.   

Both POTUS and NATO have sent clear signals that they would not allow BRICS alliance (with Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa as founders) to gain the leadership of the Global South.

In this strategic churn up, India is in the process of readjusting its political and strategic priorities. This is best illustrated by Operation Sindoor, carried out by India against Pakistan in May 2025 in response to Pak-inspired terrorist attack on civilian tourists in Pehalgam in Jammu and Kashmir. India’s military response has demonstrated a high degree of military precision and coordination across India’s armed forces striking targets linked to Pakistan based terrorist groups without crossing the border. India has demonstrated terrorist locations of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) deep inside Pakistan, if and when necessary. It showed a shift in India's counter-terrorism doctrine towards more calibrated offensive action.

Operation Sindoor also involved diplomatic and strategic messaging to the international community. India has demonstrated that Pakistan must be accountable for terrorist acts in India by carrying out temporary suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty, closure of the Attari-Wagah border, and suspension of bilateral trade with Pakistan.

On the other hand, India was probably disappointed when US adopted a "neutral stance" rather than offering unequivocal support for India against terrorism. In a belated action, the US has proscribed The Resistance Front responsible for the terrorist attack in Pahalgam. At the same time, Trump and his government are sending signals that the US was sliding back to treating parity between India and Pakistan.

India’s new found assertive stance can cause some concern to India’s smaller neighbours like Maldives and Sri Lanka. We can expect India to take measures to reassure them by infrastructure and energy links as well as promote joint economic activity.

These developments indicate that Indo-Pacific region is heading for turbulence as the churn up in the wake of POTUS tariff war against China, Japan, South Korea and India. Coupled with this, the US and EU have hyped the sanctions regime against Russia, as a part of Ukraine war.

These developments are likely to affect South Asian countries which are dependent on cheaper energy resources and tourism from Russia. Sri Lanka’s tea export and readymade garment industry are also likely to be affected.  We can expect China to pressurise Sri Lanka for finalising the Freed Trade agreement as well make existing Chinese infrastructure projects like Colombo port city, Matala airport and Hambantota port profitable.

3. How do you see the current partnership between India and Sri Lanka under the broader Indo-Pacific strategy?

Sri Lanka is separated by peninsular India by about 40 kms of sea only. This makes Sri Lanka the vanguard of India’s maritime security in Indian Ocean Region (IOR). As a corollary, Sri Lanka’s security is physically linked to India’s security. This makes it imperative both countries to maintain good relations. There are both positives and negatives in their shared history, ethnicity, culture and languages impacting their relations. Both the countries have been conscious of this; India under Prime Minister Narendra Modi has taken measures to scale down “Big brother” attitude towards Sri Lanka, which had affected the relations in the past. India’s unconditional economic help when Sri Lanka went bankrupt in 2022 is a good example of the state of win-win relations existing at present.  

The Marxist Janata Vimukthi Peramuna had in the past demonstrated anti-Indian and pro-Chinese attitudes. However, the JVP-led National Peoples Power (NPP) alliance government now in power now under President Anura Kumara Dissanayake (AKD), has shown pragmatism in its approach in handling foreign policy and economic recovery. Don Lal Kantha, minister for agriculture, speaking in parliament during the budget session explained it as part of NPP economic philosophy. He called it ‘aarthika prajaathathrawadaya’ (Economic Democracy).”

4.  a. Why does India view China’s growing influence in Sri Lanka as a threat?

     b. In your view, how can Sri Lanka manage its relationship with China without creating tension with India?

 

As stated earlier, Sri Lanka first priority is to survive the onset of strategic turbulence likely to hit the Indo-Pacific region, between an assertive India and aggressive China. During 2024-2025,   President Dissanayake has successfully done some tight rope walking to manage the rival pulls and pressures of India and China. 

Comparing AKD’s visits to China and India

President Dissanayake visited China from 14-17 January 2025. The joint statement issued after his meeting with President Xi Jinping is interesting when compared with the joint statement issued after President Dissanayake’s visit to New Delhi in December 2024. Prime Minister Narendra Modi had “affirmed India’s continued commitment to support Sri Lanka in its economic stabilization efforts for its economic recovery and economic growth.” PM Modi further assured President Dissanayake that India's approach would be investment-based and grant-oriented to reduce the debt burden on Sri Lanka and to assist them in generating economic opportunities that are long-term and sustainable and will eventually contribute to growing the absolute size of the Sri Lankan economy. (Emphasis added).

In contrast, the joint statement issued in Beijing gives a glimpse of how China views its relationship with smaller countries like Sri Lanka. China focused on "mutual trust, support, respect, win-win cooperation, and common development" while reiterating "its commitment to an independent foreign policy of peace." It expressed its “firm support for Sri Lanka in safeguarding its independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.” Sri Lanka, while reaffirming this, reiterated "its commitment to an independent, non-aligned foreign policy." Sri Lanka expressed "its commitment to the one-China principle, recognizing the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government representing the whole of China, and Taiwan is an inalienable part of China's territory" along with strong opposition to "Taiwan independence." Sri Lanka pledged not to allow anti-China or separatist activities on its territory.

For the first time, Sri Lanka “reassured its support to China regarding its policies with Xizang (Tibet) and Xinjiang.” The explicit emphasis on Tibet and Xinjiang for the first time shows China’s anxiety in seeking reassurance from a Buddhist country like Sri Lanka. Some of the other agreements of interest signed during the visit are discussed below.

Energy security and Hambantota Oil Refinery

During AKD’s visit to Beijing an agreement was signed with Sinopec Group for establishing a state-of-the art oil refinery at Hambantota. The refinery estimated to cost $ 3.7 billion, will have a capacity of 200,000 barrels daily, mainly for export. It also reflected the significance of Hambantota as a strategic economic hub for China.

 Sri Lanka’s opted for a high-cost oil refinery project might appear contrary to its goal of achieving energy self-sufficiency through renewable energy sources by 2030. However, it gives Sri Lanka the option to diversify its energy sources, reducing its dependence on imported refined petroleum products. It can also stimulate economic growth in the region and create jobs. Most importantly, the large-scale Chinese investment project strengthens Sri Lanka’s strategic partnership with China with potential for more investments in allied industries.

As against this, India’s approach towards Sri Lanka’s energy security is more holistic. The emphasis is on the need for reliable, affordable and timely energy resources to meet the basic needs of the people. The Indian and Sri Lankan leaders had agreed to take steps towards the implementation of the solar power project in Sampur, continue discussion on supply of LNG from India to Sri Lanka, establishing a high-capacity power grid connecting India and Sri Lanka.

Both countries also agreed to cooperate with the UAE to implement a multi-product pipeline from India to Sri Lanka to supply affordable energy. They had also agreed to jointly develop offshore wind power potential in Palk Straits, paying attention to environmental protection. Both the leaders had agreed to continue with the development of Trincomalee tank farms and develop Trincomalee as a regional energy and industrial hub. 

Financial and Technical Assistance

China granted Sri Lanka RMB 500 million for Economic and Technical Cooperation. They also agreed to create an Investment and Economic Cooperation Working Group to enhance bilateral trade and encourage investments. The CBSL and the PBoC renewed their Bilateral Currency Swap Agreement in December 2024. This agreement, originally signed in 2021, allows for a currency swap facility of RMB10 billion (approximately USD 1.4 billion). The renewed agreement extends the facility for another three years. The financial cooperation agreement aims to enhance economic stability and support trade between the two countries.

As against this, India ‘s Reserve Bank of India (RBI) and CBSL entered into a bilateral currency swap agreement on July 24, 2020. This was part of the SAARC Currency Swap Framework 2019-23. Under this agreement CBSL can draw up to $400 million in multiple tranches to meet short term forex requirements. The CBSL and RBI are also discussing securing an additional $1 billion under a special swap agreement.

BRI and Maritime cooperation

Greater commitment for integrated development of infrastructure projects – Colombo Port City and Hambantota Port – which are expected to draw more investments and offer economic opportunities. China also wants Sri Lanka’s participation in the BRI Green Development Coalition in view of climate change. They have agreed to collaborate in disaster prevention, mitigation and emergency management and rescue. They are to negotiate a MoU on Ocean Cooperation towards a Blue Partnership for sustainable use of ocean resources. This will mean more Chinese “research ships” visiting Sri Lanka’s neighbourhood.

Security cooperation with China and India

China and Sri Lanka in their joint statement recognised “judicial, law enforcement and security cooperation as an important component of bilateral cooperation, and stand ready to jointly crack down on cross-border crimes such as telecom fraud and online gambling. China is ready to do its best to support capacity building in Sri Lanka's judicial, law enforcement and security areas and provide assistance with police supplies.” This is interesting as it may lead to the establishment of Chinese police stations in Sri Lanka. According to a Brookings report “between 2016 and 2022, four local Chinese public security bureaus established 102 overseas police service stations in 53 countries across North and South America, Europe, Africa, and Asia.

India’s security cooperation with Sri Lanka is on a different level. The New Delhi joint statement says the two countries “reaffirmed their commitment to work together in countering traditional and non-traditional threats as well as to ensure a free, open, safe and secure Indian Ocean Region. India being Sri Lanka’s closest maritime neighbour, President Disanayaka reiterated Sri Lanka’s stated position of not permitting its territory to be used in any manner inimical to the security of India as well as towards regional stability.”

The two countries agreed to explore the possibility of concluding a framework Agreement on Defence Cooperation. India had also agreed to extend assistance in providing defence platforms and assets to augment Sri Lanka’s defence capabilities with tailor made training programmes.

Enterprise support

China has agreed to continue supporting Sri Lankan tea, gems, and other enterprises. This programme “would propel exports of Sri Lankan goods.” The leader’s discussion “included various ways to push forward digital transformation, green development, and logistics to offer Sri Lanka an opportunity to introduce modernized activities within industries.

During President AKD’s New Delhi visit, he expressed Sri Lanka’s interest in exploring the establishment of people-centric digitization as in India to improve governance, service delivery and social welfare. Accordingly, India agreed to help in expediting implementation of Sri Lanka's Unique Digital Identity (SLUDI) project and assist Sri Lanka to roll out Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI). India had also agreed to promote digital financial transactions by extending the use of UPI digital payments to benefit both countries.

Friday, 4 July 2025

Role of US and China in India-Pakistan Confrontation Q & A

Col R Hariharan VSM (Retd)

[Here are my answers to a few questions from the media on the subject on June 15, 2025.]

 

1. Why could tension between India and Pakistan strengthen America's strategy to contain China in Asia?  Does India-Pakistan conflicts like the recent Op Sindoor open a strategic window for the US against the communist regime?

I don't think tension between India and Pakistan strengthens US strategy to contain China in Asia. It will involve the US wholeheartedly politically, militarily and internationally supporting India against Pakistan which is a close political, economic and military ally of China. On the contrary, American conduct during Op Sindoor has been to call for peace on both the warring nations - without calling on Pakistan to disband Jihadi terrorist camps which triggered Op Sindoor which triggered the war. 

China has also been careful in commenting on Op Sindoor though it had expressed its support to Pakistan. Its call to India and Pakistan to seek peaceful means to solve issues is a case in point. 

We should not attach too much importance to the US role in bringing peace after Op Sindoor as India had planned to neutralise terrorist hideouts and PAF support bases which retaliated. The US probably advised Pakistan to sue for peace after the PAF air bases were hit because they are handy for USAF to use if needed as its ally Israel's war against Iran was looming in the horizon.

 

2. Why and how does the US aim to contain China in Asia and how does it plan to use its ties with India to achieve the mission?

In my perception the order of US priority in its relations with China will be: 

a. To bring US-China trade to equitable levels. Already talks are on and intermediate solutions have been found. 

b. To control and find alternative sources for essential imports like computer chips, rare earths, solar panels etc from China to reduce over dependence on China. India could become an alternate source just like Ukraine with which US has signed a pact for rare earths mining.

c. To ensure US and allies in SE Asia & ANZUS continue to enjoy freedom of navigation in South China Sea and overt Chinese threat against Taiwan, Japan and South Korea are minimised. 

d. Build closer relations with India and smaller South Asian allies to keep Indian Ocean waters free from build up of PLA-N threat. 

e. India is the only US ally with the longest land border with China. So we can expect the US to provide intelligence and space based support in India's military confrontation with China. However, this will depend upon India continuing to buy essential military equipment/ technology in becoming increasingly dependent upon China from the US. The delay in GE engines for Tejas aircraft and Apache helicopter deliveries are cases in point. The US will continue to pressurise India for purchase of military hardware. 

 

3. Was Trump's abrupt announcement of ceasefire between India and Pakistan meant to ensure that China did not get credit for defusing the situation at some point of time? 

No. I don't think so. I view it in the overall context of Trump's failure to persuade two major conflicts he had promised both Putin and Zelensky to end the war in Ukraine as well as making no headway in the Palestine conflict going on between Israel (supported by US) and Hamas, actively supported by Iran and sentimentally supported by the Muslim world. 

Over the years, US Deep State has created assets in Pakistan Army and among political parties despite Pakistan's  aberrations like giving refuge to Afghan Taliban e leaders while the US troops were  fighting in Afghanistan,  the Osama affair and Pak involvement exporting jihadi terrorism in India. In the last two decades, the US had been building better relations with India to check China's increasing strategic influence using Belt & Road Initiative. This has become relevant to US as India is emerging as a global economic and military power with potential conflict with China on the border issue. India has welcomed the move to build closer relations with the US and its South East Asian allies. Despite its limitations, the QUAD framework is an example of this. 

So, Trump has used his assets in Pakistan and good relations he enjoys with PM Narendra Modi to end the three-day war between them. Coincidentally for Trump, India seems to have planned a quick end to Op Sindoor  mainly to teach a lesson to Pakistan not to give support to Jihadi terrorists for their operations in India.  

 

4. Given the way the recent India-Pakistan air conflict became an arms race event between the West and China, does the US seriously consider extending arms (F-35s), intelligence and technological support to India in its conflicts with Pakistan to indirectly teach China a lesson? Or would the US keep things covert?

I have answered this question partially on US priorities in earlier questions. I think F35 is too costly for India, lessening its appeal as against the F16 which the US had been already trying to push in India. On intelligence and other tech support, particularly on maritime warfare, some sort of cooperation exists between India and US. During ops it can be expected to go up.,

 

5. The US still is an arms provider to Pakistan (read F-16s). There are also talks of  US eyeing Pakistan's mineral resources. Is it realistic for the US to side with India in a conflict with Pakistan to corner China? The recent developments suggest that the US was not really favouring India at least openly. 

Already this has been answered in earlier questions. POTUS Trump is a transactional strategist. So, his decision making will be dictated by (what in his perception) is good for America. India should not be surprised by his actions in critical times. 

 

6. Is the US's China containment policy more focused on restricting Beijing's access to the Indian Ocean Region, which is key in terms of strategic location and a major trade route? Does India play a significant part in controlling PLA-N activity in Indian Ocean?

This is a major subject. China’s visible presence has made India’s ‘Neighbourhood First’ policy more relevant not only to India’s national security, but also its trade and commerce. Conscious of this, PM Modi revamped maritime cooperation doctrine with the launch of the SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) initiative March 12, 2015, to build better relations with island nations of IOR - Sri Lanka, Maldives, Mauritius, and Seychelles.  India has recently revamped the SAGAR initiative. 

The Indian Navy maintains vigilant watch over key Indian Ocean choke points through a combination of persistent deployments, advanced surveillance platforms, and strategic partnerships. Indian warships are deployed to watch round the clock choke points in Strait of Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb, Strait of Malacca and Sunda Strait for potential threats. In addition to this, surveillance assets using P-81 Poseidon aircraft conduct daily long range maritime patrols, offering high resolution radar and electro-optical surveillance. The GSAT-7 Rukmini satellite provides secure naval communication and enhances maritime awareness across Indian Ocean Region.

India conducts joint patrols and naval exercises with regional and extra regional partners like the US, France, Australia, and Japan. These collaborations improve interoperability and extend India's surveillance reach. India has created the Andaman Nicobar Command and INS Baaz to monitor choke points, the Malacca Strait. These serve as intelligence outposts for rapid deployment.

 

7. Does the US also gain, if China remains focused on India-Pakistan tension towards its western front, drawing Xi’s attention from the strategic South China Sea and Strait of Malacca trade route to the east and south?

The answer to the question lies in the four dimensions of China - Pakistan relationship. These are:

a. Internally, China's weakest borders are Xinjiang and Tibet, because Hans are in minority. Historically they had been independent or enjoyed various levels of autonomy. Since 1958, CCP has tried to curb them through Hanisation. China considers Jihadi terrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan as existential threats to its frontier regions. So, it considers cultivating relations with Pakistan & Afghanistan essential for China's war against terrorism. Pakistan has suppressed Uyghur independence activists from using Pak territory for their operations in Xinjiang.

b. Pakistan provides an alternate sea access to China's east by-passing choke points of Indian Ocean dominated by India and its Western allies. So, China has used BRI to build multimodal connectivity to Xinjiang through Pakistan so that China's shipping resources reduce their risk.

c. Strategically it suits China to cultivate Pakistan which is hostile to India since its creation and China has long pending territorial and boundary disputes with India since they went to war in 1962. This was evident during Op Sindoor, during which India had to keep a watch on China as Pakistan military is largely armed by China and China was providing satellite communication support during Pakistan's military operations. 

d. Globally, China's emerging as a strategic challenger to the US' global influence. At the same time, India is also growing as a global economic and military power, though not in the same league as China and the US. This has led to the US and its Western and Eastern allies wooing India for building better relations to protect their supply chains and strengthen their strategic posture in South and East Asia. China would like to cut down India to size so that it does not become a potential challenger to China in Asia, with or without the help of US and its western allies.