Strategic Competition in the Indo-Pacific – Focus: Sri Lanka Q & A

Col R Hariharan VSM (Retd.)

[Here are my answers to E-mail questions  from a Sri Lanka research scholar   on the big power strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific theatre with special focus on Sri Lanka.]

 

Strategic churn up in Indo-Pacific

 

1 a. How do you assess the strategic competition between China, India, and the US in the Indo Pacific, especially around Sri Lanka?

  b. Can Sri Lanka play an active role in the Indo-Pacific by balancing major powers?

While examining the strategic competition between China, India and the US, with focus on Sri Lanka, in the Indo-Pacific we need to remember the island state’s unique geostrategic location. Sri Lanka dominates the sea lanes of communication, mid-way.

Sri Lanka in combination with the choke points of Bay of Bengal - Malacca Straits and Lombok and Sunda Straits can bring maritime traffic in Indo-Pacific to a halt. Realising this, the US, EU and its Western allies as well as China and Japan have invested in maintaining good relations with Sri Lanka. China has emerged as the most powerful naval power in the Indo-Pacific region. China had been claiming almost the whole of South China Sea intruding into the EEZ of neighbouring countries like Vietnam, Philippines, Indonesia etc. This has been a cause of concern, not only for China’s neighbours, but also for the major users of Indo-Pacific seas.  The four-nation Quad framework of Australia, India, Japan and the US represents is part of their efforts to keep the supply chains of Indo-Pacific open.

Ever since President Xi Jinping came to power in 2013, Sri Lanka and India’s western neighbour Pakistan, have become important destinations for China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Route (MSR). China has tried to cultivate its relations with Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka’s strategic importance for Indo-Pacific security of China has increased as US-China relations have become significantly more confrontational and competitive under President Trump.

The US under Trump saw a departure from decades of engagement-focused US policy, replaced by a more assertive and often unilateral approach aimed at pressuring China on trade, technology, and geopolitical influence. While some high-level talks v have continued, and areas of potential cooperation are still being explored (as evidenced by recent US Secretary of State meetings), the underlying dynamic has shifted towards a deeper, more durable superpower rivalry. This has led to increased uncertainty and turbulence in the relationship, with implications for global trade, security, and diplomatic efforts. It is going to be increasingly difficult for a small country like Sri Lanka to manoeuvre in this turbulent environment building up in the Indo-Pacific region.

2. How does the India and US strategic cooperation in regards to Indian ocean affect Sri Lanka, directly or indirectly? Do you think this cooperation helps create balance in the region, or does it increase pressure on smaller countries like Sri Lanka?

President Trump has disturbed the balanced relationship US had tried to achieve in the country’s foreign policy as a whole. His involvement in support of Israel in its wars in Gaza and against Iran has sent shock waves in the carefully crafted US relations with the Arab world. As a result, in South Asia the US-Pakistan relations are being reset.

We can see the beginnings of Cold War 2.0 waged by the US under Trump and NATO allies against Russia, China and North Korea. Trump has weaponised US tariff rates to reassert and ostensibly strengthen US dollar.   

Both POTUS and NATO have sent clear signals that they would not allow BRICS alliance (with Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa as founders) to gain the leadership of the Global South.

In this strategic churn up, India is in the process of readjusting its political and strategic priorities. This is best illustrated by Operation Sindoor, carried out by India against Pakistan in May 2025 in response to Pak-inspired terrorist attack on civilian tourists in Pehalgam in Jammu and Kashmir. India’s military response has demonstrated a high degree of military precision and coordination across India’s armed forces striking targets linked to Pakistan based terrorist groups without crossing the border. India has demonstrated terrorist locations of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) deep inside Pakistan, if and when necessary. It showed a shift in India's counter-terrorism doctrine towards more calibrated offensive action.

Operation Sindoor also involved diplomatic and strategic messaging to the international community. India has demonstrated that Pakistan must be accountable for terrorist acts in India by carrying out temporary suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty, closure of the Attari-Wagah border, and suspension of bilateral trade with Pakistan.

On the other hand, India was probably disappointed when US adopted a "neutral stance" rather than offering unequivocal support for India against terrorism. In a belated action, the US has proscribed The Resistance Front responsible for the terrorist attack in Pahalgam. At the same time, Trump and his government are sending signals that the US was sliding back to treating parity between India and Pakistan.

India’s new found assertive stance can cause some concern to India’s smaller neighbours like Maldives and Sri Lanka. We can expect India to take measures to reassure them by infrastructure and energy links as well as promote joint economic activity.

These developments indicate that Indo-Pacific region is heading for turbulence as the churn up in the wake of POTUS tariff war against China, Japan, South Korea and India. Coupled with this, the US and EU have hyped the sanctions regime against Russia, as a part of Ukraine war.

These developments are likely to affect South Asian countries which are dependent on cheaper energy resources and tourism from Russia. Sri Lanka’s tea export and readymade garment industry are also likely to be affected.  We can expect China to pressurise Sri Lanka for finalising the Freed Trade agreement as well make existing Chinese infrastructure projects like Colombo port city, Matala airport and Hambantota port profitable.

3. How do you see the current partnership between India and Sri Lanka under the broader Indo-Pacific strategy?

Sri Lanka is separated by peninsular India by about 40 kms of sea only. This makes Sri Lanka the vanguard of India’s maritime security in Indian Ocean Region (IOR). As a corollary, Sri Lanka’s security is physically linked to India’s security. This makes it imperative both countries to maintain good relations. There are both positives and negatives in their shared history, ethnicity, culture and languages impacting their relations. Both the countries have been conscious of this; India under Prime Minister Narendra Modi has taken measures to scale down “Big brother” attitude towards Sri Lanka, which had affected the relations in the past. India’s unconditional economic help when Sri Lanka went bankrupt in 2022 is a good example of the state of win-win relations existing at present.  

The Marxist Janata Vimukthi Peramuna had in the past demonstrated anti-Indian and pro-Chinese attitudes. However, the JVP-led National Peoples Power (NPP) alliance government now in power now under President Anura Kumara Dissanayake (AKD), has shown pragmatism in its approach in handling foreign policy and economic recovery. Don Lal Kantha, minister for agriculture, speaking in parliament during the budget session explained it as part of NPP economic philosophy. He called it ‘aarthika prajaathathrawadaya’ (Economic Democracy).”

4.  a. Why does India view China’s growing influence in Sri Lanka as a threat?

     b. In your view, how can Sri Lanka manage its relationship with China without creating tension with India?

 

As stated earlier, Sri Lanka first priority is to survive the onset of strategic turbulence likely to hit the Indo-Pacific region, between an assertive India and aggressive China. During 2024-2025,   President Dissanayake has successfully done some tight rope walking to manage the rival pulls and pressures of India and China. 

Comparing AKD’s visits to China and India

President Dissanayake visited China from 14-17 January 2025. The joint statement issued after his meeting with President Xi Jinping is interesting when compared with the joint statement issued after President Dissanayake’s visit to New Delhi in December 2024. Prime Minister Narendra Modi had “affirmed India’s continued commitment to support Sri Lanka in its economic stabilization efforts for its economic recovery and economic growth.” PM Modi further assured President Dissanayake that India's approach would be investment-based and grant-oriented to reduce the debt burden on Sri Lanka and to assist them in generating economic opportunities that are long-term and sustainable and will eventually contribute to growing the absolute size of the Sri Lankan economy. (Emphasis added).

In contrast, the joint statement issued in Beijing gives a glimpse of how China views its relationship with smaller countries like Sri Lanka. China focused on "mutual trust, support, respect, win-win cooperation, and common development" while reiterating "its commitment to an independent foreign policy of peace." It expressed its “firm support for Sri Lanka in safeguarding its independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.” Sri Lanka, while reaffirming this, reiterated "its commitment to an independent, non-aligned foreign policy." Sri Lanka expressed "its commitment to the one-China principle, recognizing the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government representing the whole of China, and Taiwan is an inalienable part of China's territory" along with strong opposition to "Taiwan independence." Sri Lanka pledged not to allow anti-China or separatist activities on its territory.

For the first time, Sri Lanka “reassured its support to China regarding its policies with Xizang (Tibet) and Xinjiang.” The explicit emphasis on Tibet and Xinjiang for the first time shows China’s anxiety in seeking reassurance from a Buddhist country like Sri Lanka. Some of the other agreements of interest signed during the visit are discussed below.

Energy security and Hambantota Oil Refinery

During AKD’s visit to Beijing an agreement was signed with Sinopec Group for establishing a state-of-the art oil refinery at Hambantota. The refinery estimated to cost $ 3.7 billion, will have a capacity of 200,000 barrels daily, mainly for export. It also reflected the significance of Hambantota as a strategic economic hub for China.

 Sri Lanka’s opted for a high-cost oil refinery project might appear contrary to its goal of achieving energy self-sufficiency through renewable energy sources by 2030. However, it gives Sri Lanka the option to diversify its energy sources, reducing its dependence on imported refined petroleum products. It can also stimulate economic growth in the region and create jobs. Most importantly, the large-scale Chinese investment project strengthens Sri Lanka’s strategic partnership with China with potential for more investments in allied industries.

As against this, India’s approach towards Sri Lanka’s energy security is more holistic. The emphasis is on the need for reliable, affordable and timely energy resources to meet the basic needs of the people. The Indian and Sri Lankan leaders had agreed to take steps towards the implementation of the solar power project in Sampur, continue discussion on supply of LNG from India to Sri Lanka, establishing a high-capacity power grid connecting India and Sri Lanka.

Both countries also agreed to cooperate with the UAE to implement a multi-product pipeline from India to Sri Lanka to supply affordable energy. They had also agreed to jointly develop offshore wind power potential in Palk Straits, paying attention to environmental protection. Both the leaders had agreed to continue with the development of Trincomalee tank farms and develop Trincomalee as a regional energy and industrial hub. 

Financial and Technical Assistance

China granted Sri Lanka RMB 500 million for Economic and Technical Cooperation. They also agreed to create an Investment and Economic Cooperation Working Group to enhance bilateral trade and encourage investments. The CBSL and the PBoC renewed their Bilateral Currency Swap Agreement in December 2024. This agreement, originally signed in 2021, allows for a currency swap facility of RMB10 billion (approximately USD 1.4 billion). The renewed agreement extends the facility for another three years. The financial cooperation agreement aims to enhance economic stability and support trade between the two countries.

As against this, India ‘s Reserve Bank of India (RBI) and CBSL entered into a bilateral currency swap agreement on July 24, 2020. This was part of the SAARC Currency Swap Framework 2019-23. Under this agreement CBSL can draw up to $400 million in multiple tranches to meet short term forex requirements. The CBSL and RBI are also discussing securing an additional $1 billion under a special swap agreement.

BRI and Maritime cooperation

Greater commitment for integrated development of infrastructure projects – Colombo Port City and Hambantota Port – which are expected to draw more investments and offer economic opportunities. China also wants Sri Lanka’s participation in the BRI Green Development Coalition in view of climate change. They have agreed to collaborate in disaster prevention, mitigation and emergency management and rescue. They are to negotiate a MoU on Ocean Cooperation towards a Blue Partnership for sustainable use of ocean resources. This will mean more Chinese “research ships” visiting Sri Lanka’s neighbourhood.

Security cooperation with China and India

China and Sri Lanka in their joint statement recognised “judicial, law enforcement and security cooperation as an important component of bilateral cooperation, and stand ready to jointly crack down on cross-border crimes such as telecom fraud and online gambling. China is ready to do its best to support capacity building in Sri Lanka's judicial, law enforcement and security areas and provide assistance with police supplies.” This is interesting as it may lead to the establishment of Chinese police stations in Sri Lanka. According to a Brookings report “between 2016 and 2022, four local Chinese public security bureaus established 102 overseas police service stations in 53 countries across North and South America, Europe, Africa, and Asia.

India’s security cooperation with Sri Lanka is on a different level. The New Delhi joint statement says the two countries “reaffirmed their commitment to work together in countering traditional and non-traditional threats as well as to ensure a free, open, safe and secure Indian Ocean Region. India being Sri Lanka’s closest maritime neighbour, President Disanayaka reiterated Sri Lanka’s stated position of not permitting its territory to be used in any manner inimical to the security of India as well as towards regional stability.”

The two countries agreed to explore the possibility of concluding a framework Agreement on Defence Cooperation. India had also agreed to extend assistance in providing defence platforms and assets to augment Sri Lanka’s defence capabilities with tailor made training programmes.

Enterprise support

China has agreed to continue supporting Sri Lankan tea, gems, and other enterprises. This programme “would propel exports of Sri Lankan goods.” The leader’s discussion “included various ways to push forward digital transformation, green development, and logistics to offer Sri Lanka an opportunity to introduce modernized activities within industries.

During President AKD’s New Delhi visit, he expressed Sri Lanka’s interest in exploring the establishment of people-centric digitization as in India to improve governance, service delivery and social welfare. Accordingly, India agreed to help in expediting implementation of Sri Lanka's Unique Digital Identity (SLUDI) project and assist Sri Lanka to roll out Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI). India had also agreed to promote digital financial transactions by extending the use of UPI digital payments to benefit both countries.

Role of US and China in India-Pakistan Confrontation Q & A

Col R Hariharan VSM (Retd)

[Here are my answers to a few questions from the media on the subject on June 15, 2025.]

 

1. Why could tension between India and Pakistan strengthen America's strategy to contain China in Asia?  Does India-Pakistan conflicts like the recent Op Sindoor open a strategic window for the US against the communist regime?

I don't think tension between India and Pakistan strengthens US strategy to contain China in Asia. It will involve the US wholeheartedly politically, militarily and internationally supporting India against Pakistan which is a close political, economic and military ally of China. On the contrary, American conduct during Op Sindoor has been to call for peace on both the warring nations - without calling on Pakistan to disband Jihadi terrorist camps which triggered Op Sindoor which triggered the war. 

China has also been careful in commenting on Op Sindoor though it had expressed its support to Pakistan. Its call to India and Pakistan to seek peaceful means to solve issues is a case in point. 

We should not attach too much importance to the US role in bringing peace after Op Sindoor as India had planned to neutralise terrorist hideouts and PAF support bases which retaliated. The US probably advised Pakistan to sue for peace after the PAF air bases were hit because they are handy for USAF to use if needed as its ally Israel's war against Iran was looming in the horizon.

 

2. Why and how does the US aim to contain China in Asia and how does it plan to use its ties with India to achieve the mission?

In my perception the order of US priority in its relations with China will be: 

a. To bring US-China trade to equitable levels. Already talks are on and intermediate solutions have been found. 

b. To control and find alternative sources for essential imports like computer chips, rare earths, solar panels etc from China to reduce over dependence on China. India could become an alternate source just like Ukraine with which US has signed a pact for rare earths mining.

c. To ensure US and allies in SE Asia & ANZUS continue to enjoy freedom of navigation in South China Sea and overt Chinese threat against Taiwan, Japan and South Korea are minimised. 

d. Build closer relations with India and smaller South Asian allies to keep Indian Ocean waters free from build up of PLA-N threat. 

e. India is the only US ally with the longest land border with China. So we can expect the US to provide intelligence and space based support in India's military confrontation with China. However, this will depend upon India continuing to buy essential military equipment/ technology in becoming increasingly dependent upon China from the US. The delay in GE engines for Tejas aircraft and Apache helicopter deliveries are cases in point. The US will continue to pressurise India for purchase of military hardware. 

 

3. Was Trump's abrupt announcement of ceasefire between India and Pakistan meant to ensure that China did not get credit for defusing the situation at some point of time? 

No. I don't think so. I view it in the overall context of Trump's failure to persuade two major conflicts he had promised both Putin and Zelensky to end the war in Ukraine as well as making no headway in the Palestine conflict going on between Israel (supported by US) and Hamas, actively supported by Iran and sentimentally supported by the Muslim world. 

Over the years, US Deep State has created assets in Pakistan Army and among political parties despite Pakistan's  aberrations like giving refuge to Afghan Taliban e leaders while the US troops were  fighting in Afghanistan,  the Osama affair and Pak involvement exporting jihadi terrorism in India. In the last two decades, the US had been building better relations with India to check China's increasing strategic influence using Belt & Road Initiative. This has become relevant to US as India is emerging as a global economic and military power with potential conflict with China on the border issue. India has welcomed the move to build closer relations with the US and its South East Asian allies. Despite its limitations, the QUAD framework is an example of this. 

So, Trump has used his assets in Pakistan and good relations he enjoys with PM Narendra Modi to end the three-day war between them. Coincidentally for Trump, India seems to have planned a quick end to Op Sindoor  mainly to teach a lesson to Pakistan not to give support to Jihadi terrorists for their operations in India.  

 

4. Given the way the recent India-Pakistan air conflict became an arms race event between the West and China, does the US seriously consider extending arms (F-35s), intelligence and technological support to India in its conflicts with Pakistan to indirectly teach China a lesson? Or would the US keep things covert?

I have answered this question partially on US priorities in earlier questions. I think F35 is too costly for India, lessening its appeal as against the F16 which the US had been already trying to push in India. On intelligence and other tech support, particularly on maritime warfare, some sort of cooperation exists between India and US. During ops it can be expected to go up.,

 

5. The US still is an arms provider to Pakistan (read F-16s). There are also talks of  US eyeing Pakistan's mineral resources. Is it realistic for the US to side with India in a conflict with Pakistan to corner China? The recent developments suggest that the US was not really favouring India at least openly. 

Already this has been answered in earlier questions. POTUS Trump is a transactional strategist. So, his decision making will be dictated by (what in his perception) is good for America. India should not be surprised by his actions in critical times. 

 

6. Is the US's China containment policy more focused on restricting Beijing's access to the Indian Ocean Region, which is key in terms of strategic location and a major trade route? Does India play a significant part in controlling PLA-N activity in Indian Ocean?

This is a major subject. China’s visible presence has made India’s ‘Neighbourhood First’ policy more relevant not only to India’s national security, but also its trade and commerce. Conscious of this, PM Modi revamped maritime cooperation doctrine with the launch of the SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) initiative March 12, 2015, to build better relations with island nations of IOR - Sri Lanka, Maldives, Mauritius, and Seychelles.  India has recently revamped the SAGAR initiative. 

The Indian Navy maintains vigilant watch over key Indian Ocean choke points through a combination of persistent deployments, advanced surveillance platforms, and strategic partnerships. Indian warships are deployed to watch round the clock choke points in Strait of Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb, Strait of Malacca and Sunda Strait for potential threats. In addition to this, surveillance assets using P-81 Poseidon aircraft conduct daily long range maritime patrols, offering high resolution radar and electro-optical surveillance. The GSAT-7 Rukmini satellite provides secure naval communication and enhances maritime awareness across Indian Ocean Region.

India conducts joint patrols and naval exercises with regional and extra regional partners like the US, France, Australia, and Japan. These collaborations improve interoperability and extend India's surveillance reach. India has created the Andaman Nicobar Command and INS Baaz to monitor choke points, the Malacca Strait. These serve as intelligence outposts for rapid deployment.

 

7. Does the US also gain, if China remains focused on India-Pakistan tension towards its western front, drawing Xi’s attention from the strategic South China Sea and Strait of Malacca trade route to the east and south?

The answer to the question lies in the four dimensions of China - Pakistan relationship. These are:

a. Internally, China's weakest borders are Xinjiang and Tibet, because Hans are in minority. Historically they had been independent or enjoyed various levels of autonomy. Since 1958, CCP has tried to curb them through Hanisation. China considers Jihadi terrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan as existential threats to its frontier regions. So, it considers cultivating relations with Pakistan & Afghanistan essential for China's war against terrorism. Pakistan has suppressed Uyghur independence activists from using Pak territory for their operations in Xinjiang.

b. Pakistan provides an alternate sea access to China's east by-passing choke points of Indian Ocean dominated by India and its Western allies. So, China has used BRI to build multimodal connectivity to Xinjiang through Pakistan so that China's shipping resources reduce their risk.

c. Strategically it suits China to cultivate Pakistan which is hostile to India since its creation and China has long pending territorial and boundary disputes with India since they went to war in 1962. This was evident during Op Sindoor, during which India had to keep a watch on China as Pakistan military is largely armed by China and China was providing satellite communication support during Pakistan's military operations. 

d. Globally, China's emerging as a strategic challenger to the US' global influence. At the same time, India is also growing as a global economic and military power, though not in the same league as China and the US. This has led to the US and its Western and Eastern allies wooing India for building better relations to protect their supply chains and strengthen their strategic posture in South and East Asia. China would like to cut down India to size so that it does not become a potential challenger to China in Asia, with or without the help of US and its western allies.  

Sri Lanka: Three things for NPP to ‘Come of Age’

 Col R Hariharan

Sri Lanka Perspectives June 2025 | South Asia Security Trends, July 2025 | https://www.security-risks.com

For the ruling National Peoples Power (NPP) group led by President Anura Kumara Dissanayaka (AKD), the local government (LG) elections held during May 2025 was one of the coming-of-age tests at national level. By the third week of June, NPP managed to gain control of 192 LG councils although it had secured majority only in 151 of them. According to media reports, though the NPP had no majority in 40 councils, it managed to take control with the support of local coalition partners or post-election agreements. In one council the NPP managed to take charge of the administration with some understanding of the opposition. No doubt, NPP’s political success in this manoeuvre would increase its confidence to face mainstream political parties led by veteran leaders.

But for JVP-led NPP to sustain its quest for national status as a matured group, success in national elections is not enough. Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP) founded by former President Mahinda Rajapaksa is a very good example of the fleeting nature of public adulation. It suffered  drubbings in both the presidential and parliamentary elections. Even in the LG elections it could secure majority only three councils, underlining that the Rajapaksas are yet to regain public trust. 

The Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB) performed a little better, capturing the administration in 21 local bodies. The Ilankai Tamil Arasu Kachchi (ITAK) with a score of 13 local bodies, seems to have regained some of its support base. The Ceylon Workers Congress emerged successful only in three councils. Other parties/groups have taken control of 13 councils. The NPP will have to look hard at 22 local councils where it where it could not form the administration although it had the highest number of seats.

But electoral success in three national elections is only the first step for NPP’s sustainability in the national political mainstream. It has to make a difference by delivering clean administration because It is a long time since Sri Lanka had one. National political parties had accepted political corruption as the done thing. The Aragalaya agitation had shown that people are not prepared to accept it and, in the rebound, elected the NPP conglomerate in three successive elections. They expect it to deliver a corruption free administration.

 AKD has realised this as early as December 2024.  The President addressing the heads of government departments thundered “The confidence of citizens in institutional systems has been shattered, and institutions themselves have lost faith in their own authority. This deterioration is due to the corrosive effects of this political culture….While we may not reverse this situation entirely in a year or two, we are committed to making a meaningful effort.”

However, as Lord Acton’s cliché goes "Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely," AKD should worry about the after effects of NPP gaining power at the local level, particularly in large municipal councils like Colombo, Galle, Kurunegala, Puttalam and Nuwara Eliya. It is not going to be an easy task for AKD because the Local government system corroded by corrupt practices offer easy pickings for NPP’s neophyte members. The NPP would do well to educate the first-time members on their conduct and accountability to the public.

Systemic challenges

For too long, governance in Sri Lanka has been affected by systemic aberrations. AKD’s good intentions are not enough to improve governance due to systemic challenges. During the month, there were two examples of systemic aberrations right under the “nose” of the President. The first related to the release of convicted bank fraudster Athula Thilakaratne under the Presidential Pardon on Vesak Poya Day, on May 12, though he did not figure in the President’s list of pardoned prisoners. News reports of the incident triggered widespread public outcry and questions in Parliament from the Opposition.

Although the Prisons Department justified the release the convict was eligible for release under general guidelines and it was nor politically motivated, the incident dented AKD’s credibility. The President’s Media Division (PMD) had to issue a statement clarifying that Thilakaratne’s name was not on the official list of inmates approved for pardon by the President. It explained that the President can grant pardon only upon receiving a vetted list of eligible inmates from the Ministry of Justice, based on recommendations from the Department of Prisons.

Preliminary investigations by the CID have indicated that some more convicts were also released after they were falsely classified as recipients of the Presidential Pardon. After this, the CID questioned the Commissioner General of Prisons and widened the scope of investigations to include prison officers involved in the process, as part of an ongoing official inquiry.

The second instance pertains to the appointment of Tysers Insurance Brokers Ltd (TIBL) — a UK-based firm with questionable reputation —as the broker of record by the National Insurance Trust Fund (NITF) operating under the Ministry of Finance. In February 2024, Fraud Section of the US Department of Justice (DOJ), Criminal Division is said to have filed a case against TIBL under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). The TIBL reportedly entered into a deferred prosecution agreement, agreeing to pay a substantial fine and forfeit assets to resolve the charges. According to the DOJ, TIBL was also engaged in a multimillion-dollar bribery scheme to influence Ecuadorian Government officials.

The Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption (CIABOC) is probing the case based on a formal complaint from an advocate. It will be interesting to know how the foreign brokerage managed to overcome the government’s strict vetting process as required by the Insurance Regulatory Commission of Sri Lanka (IRCSL)

Bringing a closure on genocide allegations

Even as POTUS Trump was making the UN largely irrelevant, Sri Lanka Government rolled out the red carpet for the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) Volker Türk’s visit to the country from June 23 to 26. Sri Lanka had made human rights commitments at the UNHRC to investigate allegations of war crimes and human rights violations. However, they have been on the backburner in the past few years. However, Sri Lanka’s commitments will come up once again during the September session of the UNHRC. At the session, when the High Commissioner Turk will submit his findings on Sri Lanka during his visit, along with reports from key members of the Core Group on Sri Lanka – the UK, Canada, and Germany.

During his visit, the UN High Commissioner met with not only the President and PM but with opposition leaders and religious heads as well. He visited the mass grave at Chemmani, near Jaffna. His statement thereafter says it all: “My visit yesterday to the recently re-opened mass grave at Chemmani was a compelling reminder that the past haunts the lives of many in Sri Lanka…I heard from many mothers during my visit to Jaffna and Trincomalee, as well as victims of enforced disappearances in the south. A woman from a southern province, whose husband disappeared in 1989, for example, she still goes from town to town searching, and that the tears of Sinhalese, Tamil and Muslims are the same… Acknowledgement and truth-telling are important steps towards healing and closure, as are justice, reparation and non-recurrence.”

We do not know what AKD had promised the UN High Commissioner or what stand Sri Lanka will take in UNHRC session in September. But his own JVP party had lost 10,000 to 20,000 people suspected of being JVP sympathizers in 1971 insurrection. In the second JVP insurrection between 1987and 1989, an estimated 60,000 to 80,000 young people suspected of JVP sympathies were killed by the State. Over 20,000 people disappeared after being taken into custody. Of course, Eelam Wars had left its own mass graves and forced disappearances.

How can AKD and NPP afford to ignore this gory history? NPP/JVP will never come of age unless they make accountability for war crimes and human rights articles of faith. Firstly, they can take follow up action on the data already collected on enforced disappearances. Secondly, resurrect prosecuted during the wars/insurrections but abandoned thereafter. For instance, the Chemmani mass grave came to light during the 1998 trial of Sri Lanka soldiers for the rape and murder of Krishanthi Kumaraswamy. One of the convicted soldier Somaratne Rajapakse testified 300-400 Tamil civilians were executed and buried in Chemmani after the military recaptured Jaffna in 1995-96. There one too many such abandoned/pardoned cases.

Tailpiece – Bringing back the Super Cop: Senior Superintendent of Police (SSP) Shani Abeysekara has been reappointed as the Director of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) with the approval of the National Police Commission (NPC). Abeysekera’s return to the helm of the CID comes after nearly five years, shows the government is serious about independent investigations. His initial stint as Director of CID (2017-19) was characterised by several high-profile probes that drew both praise and criticism. Among the most notable investigations under his leadership were the murder of journalist and Sunday Leader Editor Lasantha Wickrematunge, the disappearance of cartoonist Prageeth Eknaligoda, and probes into the controversial Avant-Garde maritime arms scandal and the 2019 Easter Sunday terror attacks. He earned accolades for investigating these cases as they involved several influential figures.

[Col R Hariharan VSM, a retired MI specialist on South Asia and terrorism, served as the head of intelligence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka 1987-90. He is associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies. Email: haridirect@gmail.com, Website: https://col.hariharan.info]