India at 74: Coming to terms with national security

By: Col R Hariharan| India Weekly |Sunday August 15, 2021

https://www.indiaweekly.biz/india-at-74-coming-to-terms-with-national-security/

ON February 26, 2019, a dozen Mirage 2000 fighter jets of the IAF crossed the Line of Control (LoC) penetrated to deep inside Pakistan to carryout a pre-dawn strike at the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) terrorist camps in Balakot in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province and in Muzaffarabad and Chakothi in POK. Operation Bandar, as the Balakot mission was called, was India’s muscular response to punish JeM which had killed 40 CRPF troops in an IED attack on a bus carrying them at Pulwama in Jammu and Kashmir on February 14, 2019.

Though India’s response came 12 days after Pulwama attack, it was well planned to cover political, diplomatic and military aspects. This was evident in the way the air force had planned meticulously planned to ensure total surprise. IAF Mirage2000 strike was supported by airborne early warning and control aircraft (AEW&C) radar systems designed to detect and track aircraft, missiles and ships and air defence cover by Sukhoi 30MkI aircraft. Heron drone conducted real time surveillance of the LOC. In order to achieve total surprise, Mirage fighters were inducted directly into operation from Gwalior base with  Ilyushin 78 aircraft providing mid-air fuelling facility. It was a demonstration of IAF’s capability to operate a complex air operation in the modern C3S and I command and control system in place.

Indie clarified that the operation was not targeted against the people of Pakistan. Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale called it “an intelligence led operation.” He said “credible intelligence was received that JeM was attempting another suicide terror attack in various parts of thecountry.” He termed the action as a “non-military pre-emptive action” specifically targeted at JeM camps.

The Balakot air strike is unprecedented on many counts in India’s history.  Never before, not even after the 26/11 Lashkar e Taiba (LeT) terrorist attacks in Mumbai, India has demonstrated its ability to take decisive retaliatory action beyond its borders. Thus, it represents an important milestone in India’s quest to articulate its national security strategy.

It also showed the benefit of taking the first steps in reforming the national security framework. In May 2018, the newly created Defence Planning Committee (DPC) under the chairmanship of the National Security Advisor and with the three service chiefs, foreign secretary, secretary (expenditure) in the finance ministry as members met for the first time.  The DPC was to consider the draft national security strategy (NSS) and the long pending issues of reforms in national security, particularly in creating integrated commands to promote jointness, creation of triservice commands for cyberspace, space and special operations. The DPC is also tasked to prepare drafts of a strategic defence review, an international defence engagement strategy, a road map to build a defence manufacturing echo system, a strategy to boost arms exports and prioritised capability development plans for armed forces.

The National Security Advisory Board (NSAB), an expert group of non-officials, under the National Security Council (NSC) is also reported to have prepared a draft NSS on the directions of the PMO. This will also be reviewed by the DPC.

While all these are all welcome moves, how far and how fast they will yield results is the big question, because the nation has demonstrated it lacks a strategic culture.

Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru did not identify national security with military threats, but saw it in a broader perspective of the need to develop its political, economic technological and military capabilities in that order.

The debacle in the war with China in 1962, was perhaps a short-lived wake up call, to the nation revelling in its role as a peacemaker. However, the conceptual vacuum in its national security strategy showed up glaringly, when Pakistan triggered the 1965 war it ended in a stalemate, because India lacked strategic goals. Cold War compulsions and the increasing synergy between the US and China, came to the fore in the wake of 1971 war that saw the birth of Bangladesh. Though the country lacked a well-articulated security doctrine, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi leveraged the cold war animosities to India’s strategic advantage to come out victorious. India’s ill-fated military intervention in Sri Lanka from 1987-90 again demonstrated the price the nation had to pay for the strategic confusion in the minds of national leadership.

The Kargil war in 1999 showed up the glaring weaknesses in the nation’s intelligence apparatus, when Pakistani troops stealthily managed to occupy commanding heights to harass the troops. It took extraordinary courage and bravery of the Indian soldier, to emerge victorious after paying a heavy price with 527 lives. The Kargil Review Committee under strategist K Subrahmanyam laid bare not only the weakness in the intelligence process but in a whole range of security issues – decision making at the top, national security management, integrated operations and military modernization.

The Committee had recommended a full time National Security Adviser (NSA), Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), a National Intelligence Agency (NIA), National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) and deputing military officers to the Ministry of Defence. But till it was dusted up in 2011 by the Naresh Chandra Committee, there was no progress. Bureaucratic resistance ensured tardy implementation of the recommendation.

The resistance of the Ministry of Defence to implement the One Rank One Pension (OROP) even after the government had given the go ahead, created avoidable bitterness among veterans. The appointment of the CDS in December 2019, nearly two decades after the idea was mooted showed the low priority national security issues occupy in the government scheme of things.

The Galwan incident on June 20 last year in which Indian troops and Chinese troops clashed along the line of control in Eastern Ladakh resulting in the death of 20 Indian soldiers has underlined the urgency of coordinated national security response. It showed our weaknesses in timely procurement of modern weapon systems, construction of border roads and in assessing potential threats. So we are still a long way in coordinating our national security strategy.

We are in for a long haul in dealing with China. China’s approach to India will be transactional, selective and based on the hard reality of its national self-interest rather than ephemeral notions of harmony and bonhomie.

We need to be hard headed to benefit from the quadrilateral framework being formed to prevent predatory moves of China in the Indo-Pacific. While participating in such frameworks it is good to remember what Chanakya said long ago: “There is some self-interest behind every friendship. There is no friendship without self-interest. This is a bitter truth.”

[The writer is a retired military Intelligence specialist on South Asia with rich experience in terrorism and insurgency operations. He is the former intelligence chief of IPKF in Sri Lanka].

 

 

 

 

 

 

Sidelights on making of India-Sri Lanka Accord 1987: Book Review*

Col R Hariharan

South Asia Analysis Group Paper No.6666|19 August 2020

http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/node/2665

 

*[Haksar on India’s Sri Lanka Policy, authors: Prof V Suryanarayanan and Dr Ashik J Bonofer, 2020, Published by Centre for Asia Studies and Book Venture, Chennai-600035, India. Price: Rs 200. The book is being launched on 21 August 2020]

 

Professor V Suryanarayanan, one of the country’s leading specialists on South and Southeast Asian studies, along with Dr Ashik Bonofer co-author, has done a signal service by writing the book “Haksar on India’s Sri Lanka Policy”.  Professor Suryanarayanan acknowledges, Sri Lanka is not the major focus of the book, as PN Haksar (1913-1998), one of the leading strategic thinkers of his times, was not associated with India’s Sri Lanka policy; it was in the domain of G Parthasarathy, diplomatic stalwart and contemporary of Haksar.

 

Prof Suryanarayan quotes from Jairam Ramesh’s book “Intertwined lives: PN Haksar and Indira Gandhi,” ‘Haksar contributed heavily to the making of Indira Gandhi, especially in the first six or seven years of her Prime Ministership…They formed an awesome duo: she with her charismatic appeal, he with intellectual gravitas. Ultimately, she took all the decisions no doubt, but she was heavily influenced by him at every turn.’ The authors draw heavily upon Jairam Ramesh’s book to identify how PN Haksar viewed India’s role in Sri Lanka. Moreover, they have used Professor’s contacts with a large number of policy makers, diplomats, political leaders, academics and analysts of India and Sri Lanka, to provide valuable insights into how India’s Sri Lanka policy was shaped, culminating in the India-Sri Lanka Accord in 1987 and its aftermath.

 

There are many vignettes of information in the book on the main players who shaped India’s Sri Lanka policy. The summing up of India’s Sri Lanka policy during Indira-GP years in page 37 is interesting. “India was determined not to permit a military solution of the ethnic problem in Sri Lanka. This was adhered to by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1987. The mediatory-militant supportive policy was based on this assumption.” In hindsight we can say how the self-contradictory policy of mediation on one hand and supporting militants on the other, hardened the stakeholders in evolving a solution. Probably, political expedience of the aftershocks of JR Jayawardane’s misconceived July 1983 pogrom strategy that probably influenced Rajiv Gandhi. Of course, it is debatable. Equally important is the disastrous impact of the Accord that led to India’s passive role in Sri Lanka after its bitter experience in “active” phase of the Accord and the LTTE’s assassination of Rajiv Gandhi. They made Tamil militants persona non grata in India. Its direct result was India’s passive support to the elimination of LTTE in Eelam war 2009, removing an external influence affecting India-Sri Lanka relationship.

 

On both sides of the Palk Strait, the Accord is one of the most maligned bilateral instruments signed between India and Sri Lanka. Even, the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) sent to ensure the implementation of the Accord, with a half-baked and back-dated mandate, courted its share of ignominy, even after losing over 1300 soldiers in operations against the LTTE, which no one wanted. Many of us who took part in it are living through its effects to this day, the fall out of skewed policy implementation of those days. 

 

Many of critics with the benefit of hindsight, say the Accord was conceived in haste, drafted badly and executed poorly. While these comments may have germs of truth, we need to understand the external and internal environment of the time, in which it was conceived. India’s internal political scene was churned up with the passing away of Mrs Indira Gandhi, and the regional security scene was affected by the death throes of Soviet Union, fast losing the Cold War. 

 

But in 2020, time has come for even the Accord’s worst detractors, including Tamil and Sinhala fringe elements, to recognise its good points. It led to the introduction of the 13^th amendment to Sri Lanka Constitution. The Amendment created provincial councils to provide a level of autonomy to Tamils. The Accord also made Sri Lanka recognise Tamil language, identity, culture and areas of habitation.

 

When the 13^th Amendment - the fig leaf of Tamil aspirations - is running the risk of withering away, many Sri Lanka Tamils want India to take action to force Sri Lanka to fulfil Tamil aspirations, by resolving what they call the national question. They seem to miss the semantics of the Sinhala majority who call it the minority ethnic question. The semantic difference is in reality a strident call of the majority for a unitary state; the reality is now Sri Lankan Tamils have to help themselves, before asking India to help them out. They have to come together, evolve a viable strategy relevant to the current political and strategic situation and then seek India’s support in persuading Sri Lanka to deal with the attention it deserves.   

 

To sum up, after the Rajapaksas have gained two thirds majority in parliament in the recently held general election, Sri Lanka Tamils are facing the bleak prospect of losing even the limited autonomy they gained after the India-Sri Lanka Accord was signed in 1987. After losing two generations of people in 25 years of fruitless bloody war for realising their dream of independence, Tamils are facing the real world of majority rule.

 

For them, the book under review provides a useful understanding of the background to the making of Sri Lanka policy in India. They need to understand the complexities of foreign policy making and factor it in their strategy.  

Col R Hariharan, MI specialist on South Asia and insurgency and terrorism, served as head of MI of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka (1987-90). Email: haridirect@gmail.com Website: https://col.hariharan.info

From the Director: The book gives perhaps the most authentic account of what happened in Sri Lanka and the circumstances that led to the Indian involvement.

 

Arms & The Man

In an effort at cost-cutting, the Army is considering a Tour of Duty concept to induct young people for three years on a “trial basis”. Critics say this could erode its professional capabilities.

By Col R Hariharan |India Legal | May 23, 2020 |

https://www.indialegallive.com/special/arms-the-man-100292

The Indian Army is facing an unprecedented shortage of manpower. In June 2019, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh informed the Rajya Sabha in a written reply that there were 45,634 vacancies in the Army as on January 1, 2019. This included 7,399 vacancies in the officer cadre. Would they be made up in the near future? Unlikely, if we go by past experience.

Of course, there has been no dearth of volunteers eager to join the Army at recruiting rallies because joining it is a way of life for many. In rural India, it is still considered an honourable profession. But invariably, most of the youths fail to clear the minimum physical fitness and literacy standards set for various branches of the Army.

There are many reasons for this. The Army has uncompromisingly tough physical fitness and medical standards for recruitment. In the case of officers, there are psychological and leadership aptitude tests in which many fail.  Continuous deployment of troops in difficult terrain away from their families for prolonged periods makes it less attractive than a civilian job in an increasingly urbanised setting. Better opportunities for promotion and perks in private undertakings siphon off well-qualified youth from job markets. High achievers are attracted by civilian government jobs which offer better opportunities for quick promotion and perks than offered by the Army.

Manpower deficiencies in the Army are nothing new. It is a hardy, perennial experience in the entire career of many commanding officers. Manpower deficiency is only the tip of the iceberg of problems that the armed forces are trapped in, along with the tangle of political indifference, revamping the national security apparatus and military and civil red tape. Over the years, a number of committees have examined various iss­ues affecting the armed forces. However, implementation of their recommendations had been tardy, subject to lack of the political leadership’s commitment, financial crunch, bureaucratic indifference and the military’s own internal rivalries.

In 2016, Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar constituted an 11-member committee of experts under Lt Gen DB Shekatkar (Retd.) to recommend measures to enhance combat capability while re­balancing defence expenditure of the armed forces. The Shekatkar Committee made 99 recommendations in its report submitted in December 2016. These ranged from optimising the defence budget to the need for a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS). These recommendations, if implemented, could result in saving up to Rs 25,000 crore in defence expenditure over the next five years. 

A recent news report that the Army was considering a proposal titled “Tour of Duty” (ToD) to induct young men and women as officers and soldiers for three years on a “trial basis” has to be viewed in the overall context of the Army’s structural reforms undertaken to implement the Shekatkar Committee recommendations. The ToD concept was to tap “resurgence of nationalism and pat­riotism” among youth who wish to experience military life for a temporary duration rather than taking it up as a profession. The report added the “game changer” proposal was being examined by top commanders and its main aim was to bring people closer to the force by giving them an opportunity to experience military life. “If approved it will be a voluntary engagement and there will be no dilution in selection criteria. Initially, 100 officers and 1,000 men are being considered for recruitment as part of test bedding of the project,” said Col Aman Anand, PRO, Army.

Not unexpectedly, the ToD news report received both brickbats and bouquets from senior veterans. Lt General Raj Kadyan, Deputy Chief of the Army Staff, has been sharply critical of ToD. He said the ToD officer aspirant’s likely pre-commission training period was three to six months as against three and a half years of an NDA cadet or one and a half years’ training given to cadets through the Indian Military Academy (IMA). So ToD officers are “likely to end up at best as semi-trained leaders”. This is not wholly correct.

After the Army’s 1962 debacle, to meet the manpower needs of sudden expansion of the forces, the Army introduced emergency commission (EC). EC officers were given basic training for six months and inducted into the units. I, as an EC officer, was a witness to their stellar performance on the front lines as young officers in both the 1965 and 1971 wars. Many of them sacrificed their lives in these wars.  It was no less than that of permanent commissioners.

General Kadyan also said that because of the difference in training period, jawans are unlikely to respect a ToD officer the way they do a normal officer. Their faith and confidence in him and his judgement in times of crisis will be a lot less. It is difficult to accept this argument because ToDs will be exposed to a tough training regimen in their units, which is a unit commander’s responsibility. A modern jawan is smart enough not to be impressed by just labels or pedigree. Thirdly, he said that the attitude and commitment of the ToD officer, a “transient”, will not be the same as that of the normal officer. Of course, it will not be the same, but the ToD has a greater urge “to prove himself” as EC commissioned officers would vouch. This can motivate him to perform better.

Lastly, the General said that the im­pact of the ToD concept on the Army will be adverse, eroding its professional capabilities. Fortunately, the Army’s professional capabilities are not dependent upon the performance of a handful of ToD officers but on the units and formations as a whole. The Army has a culture of taking things in its stride and turning them into what it needs.

As against these arguments, exposure to the Army’s training, discipline and management skills under difficult conditions would help the ToDs who would later join civilian occupations. This would be a welcome addition to corporate culture and civil society. But yes, the Army has its own internal elitist crony system based on pedigree—military schools, NDA entries, IMA graduates and short service officers. ToD cadres are likely to end at the base of this pecking order. However, performance usually outweighs this system unlike the caste system we are accustomed to which forms an unenviable part of our socio-political culture.

Shorn of such lofty concept, the ToD seems to be yet another aspect of the current cost-cutting exercise that the armed forces has undertaken, while making up manpower deficiencies. According to an analysis in The Print, the cumulative cost for a three-year ToD service officer, including pre-commission training, pay and allowances, is expected to be Rs 80-85 lakh as against Rs 5.12 crore and Rs 6.83 crore, respectively, for an SSC officer after 10 and 14 years of service, respectively.

Already, General Bipin Rawat, CDS, has taken up a number of cost-cutting initiatives like extending the retiring age of armed forces personnel below the rank of officers to 58 and asking the forces to get rid of their overwhelming dependence on exorbitant foreign weapon systems and support “Make in India”. Commenting on the ToD concept, the CDS said it was at a nascent stage and under the Army chief’s consideration. According to the media report, he said, if it works out, it is good, but added that its viability needs to be studied. He reportedly said: “It will require a year of training. The ToD will be in Kashmir and the Northeast…. One year of training cost… equipping him and doing everything for him and then losing him after four years. Is it going to balance out? It will require a study.” This reflects the CDS’s reservations about this concept.

But the core issue in military manpower is only one: will the soldier be able to meet the emerging battlefield expectations of performance? President Abdul Kalam, during his maiden visit to J&K in June 2004, visualised the “future soldier” when he spoke to the troops: “When I see you, I visualise in a few decades that the configuration of the soldier in the planet will undergo a change, with the focus on him carrying a payload with lighter and high performance weapons, high calorie food and intelligent clothing to meet temperature variance and self-contained networked communication system. These features will assist mobility and survivability in the battlefield. Mobility, lethality and survivability will be provided through the integrated helmet, body protection and weapon instrumentation.” 

Kalam saw the integrated helmet with a computer system, sensor display, night vision instruments, communication systems, video cameras and image intensifier. Body protection was achieved through smart clothing with ballistic protection, reduced weight, smart shoes and NBC suits with mine sensors. He told the soldiers: “I can imagine that a few years from now, you will have intelligence-gathering apparatus and computer and communication systems being made part of your apparel.”

Kalam’s futuristic vision is no fiction. The Indian Army conceptualised the F-INSAS (Future Infantry Soldier As a System), a futuristic modernisation plan, between 2007 and 2012. In 2015, due to high costs, it decided to implement it in two components: one to arm the future infantry soldier with the best available assault rifle, carbines and personal equipment such as helmets and bulletproof vests and the second, battlefield management systems. The Indian soldier’s helmet will be made of a lighter-weight composite material so that it balances out the additions of visor, camera and internal communication system, but still protects him from 9mm carbine rounds and shrapnel. It is possible that armoured clothing could include a shear-thickening capability that not only disperses the impact of a gunshot or blast, but potentially harnesses and transfers that energy for its own internal energy system.

There is no end to modernisation as many countries have realised. It is an expensive process as technology and tactics keep it dynamic. Can the Indian Army upgrade the entry level of its soldier to absorb and deliver the requirements of fighting in the modern battlefield? Only the country, not merely the Army, can answer this question.

—The writer is a military intelligence specialist on South Asia, associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies and the International Law and Strategic Studies Institute

Defence Forces: A Low Priority?

The distrust between the two was evident when an army officer’s father approached the Supreme Court for succor. Will the plummeting ties blunt the cutting edge of the armed forces?

Col R Hariharan |My space | Civil military relations|                                        

India Legal February 26, 2018

http://www.indialegallive.com/viewpoint/defence-forces-a-low-priority-44273

Civil-military relations in India have been on a downslide for a long time.  They touched a new low when the Supreme Court was approached by a serving officer’s father to protect his son from prosecution while performing his official duty. The Court asked the J&K government and the centre that “no coercive action shall be taken” against Major Aditya Kumar based on an FIR filed in connection with the death of three civilians in alleged Army firing in Shopian last month. That the Army convoy was on bonafide military duty in an area under the AFSPA is a matter of detail.

The Court was responding to a petition filed by Lt Col Karamveer Singh challenging the action taken against his son who was named wrongly under sections 303, 307 and 3336 of the Ranbir Penal Code. The Court also issued a notice to seeking the response of the state and centre within two weeks. Incidentally, the Ranbir Penal Code or RPC is a criminal code applicable in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). IPC is not applicable under Article 370 of the Constitution.

In addition, the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) has taken cognizance of a complaint by three children of Army officers alleging violation of human rights of the army personnel in recent incidents in the state. NHRC has sought a “factual report” from the Ministry of Defence in four weeks. The children have also appealed to the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) against the violation of human rights of soldiers, adding an unsavoury international dimension to the issue.

Apathy, confusion and contradiction sum up the present state of civil-military relations.  While the centre has not been able to overcome its indifference, state governments are no better.  The mess in J&K is a testimony to the mindless way in which the BJP-PDP coalition government headed by Mehbooba Mufti is functioning.  For too long, this coalition of convenience had been running with the hare and hunting with the horses at the same time.  Driven by the sole desire to continue in power, Mehbooba has been adopting a soft approach to lynch mobs and Pak Fifth Columns targeting the security forces, while “cooperating” with the centre in the operations against infiltrating terrorists. And the BJP in the state, with its double-speak, bears equal responsibility for this.

The J and K government's handling of the "killing" of three stone throwers by an army convoy escort on January 27 in Shopian is a case study of botched civil-military relations.  Though the army escort fired to protect the convoy from the mob which damaged army vehicles and injured seven soldiers, including a JCO seriously, Mehbooba wasted no time in registering an FIR against Major Aditya and his unit on charges of murder, attempt to murder and endangering life. 

Former army chief General VP Malik tweeted that the incident affected the morale of security forces working on the ground. He also found political leaders’ silence inexplicable.  However, a media report quoted Mehbooba as saying “I do not accept that the Army gets demoralised by such actions. The Army is an institution and has done a wonderful job. But a black sheep can be anywhere…. If some Army officer has committed a mistake, an FIR has been lodged and it is the duty of the government to take it to a logical conclusion.”

Mehbooba had also mentioned that she had reported the matter to Union Minister of Defence Nirmala Sitharaman. The minister broke her stoic silence on the CM’s statement only when she visited J&K when terrorists carried out two more attacks on security forces a few days later. While an attack on CRPF camp was thwarted in time, the one on family quarters in Sunjuwan garrison was prolonged and four soldiers and one civilian were killed.  The defence minister during her visit referred to the FIR on army personnel and reassured: “The government and MoD will stand by the Army, which is working under severe duress in J&K. We will not let our soldiers down.” Her words would have carried more credibility, had the state government immediately withdrawn the FIR issued against Major Aditya and his unit.  Evidently, the CM is looking for a politically opportune moment to withdraw the FIR or just ignore Sitharaman. In the meanwhile, Major Aditya will be kept on tenterhooks for the next few months or years, while the state pushes the case to its “logical conclusion,” whatever it is.

In the light of these happenings, the army has no option but to develop a thick skin to survive as a fighting force in the present political environment.  Troops fighting terrorists on the one hand will also now have to fend off the state government harassment.  Former IG of BSF Bhola Nath’s tweet neatly summed up situation: “My country, you throw ink, egg or shoe at any leader, you will get arrested on the spot immediately. But if you throw stones on forces, army….Army men may be arrested! Do we see such act of stone throwing on Forces in any other countries?” How much these mindless pinpricks will affect the fighting edge of the armed forces, while the civil administration hunts for black sheep among troops, is an open question.

The spontaneous flood of sympathy for the army in the social, print and electronic media was welcome, it does not appear to have shaken up the apathy of the political class. Their callousness was evident when a National Conference member of the J and K assembly shouted “Pakistan zindabad” during the assembly session, even as the bodies of dead soldiers were being prepared for funeral. For political class, it was business as usual.

The military fraternity, which is usually only seen and not heard, has become vocal about the Shopian incident because it adds to their angst about the government’s failure to live up to its promises on issues affecting national security and military’s professional capability. The low priority defence forces enjoy in the national scheme of things became evident when the prime minister and defence minister did not attend the army chief’s Army Day reception to the president for the first time ever.

Let alone the “One Rank One Pension” issue that left some residual bitterness and Pay Commission woes of the armed forces, many other proposals for making up the deficiencies in the armed forces’ command and control set-up and fire power continue to be caught in bureaucratic red tape and the compulsions of make in India. Ashley Tellis,  a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace has eloquently summed up the current state of affairs: “The structures that are dysfunctional, that have stopped the military from making smart choices, are still there…It's not the way to run a military of a major power. It has to be among the worst procurement processes of any major power.”

Our potential adversaries - China and Pakistan - have evolved two extreme models of civil-relations, which recognize the armed forces’ role in shaping the nation’s destiny. President Xi Jinping in his quest for consolidation of power has made “civil military integration” (CMI) his priority. It is one subject he refers as frequently in his speeches as the Bridge and Road Initiative and “the Chinese dream.” The State Council’s Information office on China’s military strategy in May 2015 envisages the creation of “an all element, multi-domain and cost- efficient pattern of CMI.”  China is systematically implementing the plan to optimise its military and civil capabilities in tandem to create a smooth organisational structure that would holistically strengthen the country’s national security.  

The Pakistan army has always been involved in civil administration.  Even now when an elected government is in power, the army continues to call the shots on how the civil administration behaves. The services chiefs brief the parliament on security matters from and decisions are taken through “consensus.”

As a democracy, India can take cue from the US and UK where civil military relations are founded on the bedrock of what Samuel Huntington calls “objective civilian control.” Our leaders would do well to follow the US Secretary of defence James Mattis’ advice: “The key  to healthy civil-military relations is trust on both the civilian and military sides of the negotiation: the civilian must trust the military to provide its best and most objective advice but then carry out any policy that civilian decision makers ultimately choose. The military must trust the civilians to give a fair hearing of military advice and not reject it out of hand, especially for transparently political reasons. Civilians must understand that dissent is not same as disobedience.” 

Unless the government shows greater interest and changes its patchy response to military issues, it may blunt the cutting edge of the armed forces. That would be a monumental tragedy for the country.

  -The writer is a military intelligence specialist on South Asia, associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies and the International Law and Strategic Analysis Institute

Twitter: @indialegalmedia Website: www.indialegallive.com Contact: editor@indialegallive.com

A Policy to Secure India

With increasing threats to the country, the need of the hour is a national security policy document, establishment of a separate ministry and greater centre-state coordination

By Col R Hariharan | Courtesy: India Legal | 5 February 2018

www.indialegallive.com

American poet John Godfrey Saxe poem “The Blind men and the elephant” in the 19^th century, aptly depicts India’s approach to national security. The opening verse – “It was six men of Indostan/To learning much inclined/ Who went to see the Elephant/(Though all of them were blind)/That each by observation/Might satisfy his mind,” may well be a description of our lack of holistic understanding of the issue of national security.

Though a national security council was constituted as early as 1998, we still lack a national security policy document. Sadly, this is the state of affairs in a country that faces a wide range of conventional and non-conventional threats from external and internal sources. The 26/11 terrorist attacks in Mumbai that paralysed the nation for three days showed up the chaotic state of internal security management. The 1991 Kargil war showed the aberrations in our handling of hybrid threat. Both the incidents triggered a series of actions after some conventional knee-jerk responses to revamp the national security structure. In typical Indian style, there were many thoughts and ideas on various issues, but their laid-back implementation shows a lack of urgency.

Our halting response to Pakistani terrorist attacks on Pathankot Air Force station in January 2016 and on an army camp in Uri in September 2016 exposed the fact that national security is still a work in progress, perhaps forever, because we do not have a policy in this regard.

This formed the theme of a speech by J and K governor NN Vohra recently. He is perhaps the best qualified to analyse the issue, not only because of his 13-year long stint in Jammu and Kashmir  both as an interlocutor and as governor years, but because has been involved in the security management arena for over three decades.. His rich experience in the highest echelons of decision making in New Delhi, including as principal secretary to the PM as well as secretary in home and defence ministries, added value to his address.

The advent of terrorism in India has made the effective management of national security as “the most crucial challenge faced by the Union” Vohra said. Unless, there is a peace and normalcy, it would not be possible to achieve meaningful growth and development for promoting the welfare of our people.

Has our country been able to evolve a comprehensive national policy and the required infrastructure to safeguard it on all fronts? Vohra’s answer - “so far we have neither secured the required Union-State understandings, nor developed a pan-India approach, which would meet the requirements of a National Security Policy” is a damning indictment of the present state of affairs.

Constitutionally, states are “vested with powers to make all require laws to take all necessary executive decisions for ensuring internal security within their jurisdictions” while the centre has “the much larger responsibility of protecting against war and external aggression and internal disturbances.” However, in the last nearly three decades, issues relating to the management of internal and external security have got “deeply and inextricably intertwined.”

According to Vohra, after Pakistan’s proxy war in Jammu and Kashmir obliterated “the scope for segregating the management of issues relating to internal and external security.”  According to him, it would no longer do to merely focus on defending our frontiers. This is because sources of security threats have extended far beyond our immediate neighbourhood to countries in Southeast Asia, Middle East and the western hemisphere and relate to innumerable targets and activities within our country.

Vohra bemoans the failure of the states to become self-reliant in effectively managing internal security. They need to take urgent steps to carry out long pending police reforms. As a consequence, states have been relying on the centre for deploying central armed police forces and even the army for restoration of normalcy in the disturbed areas. He also takes states to task for failing to set up Police Complaints Authority and State Security Commission, segregate law and order from investigative functions and to set up separate intelligence and anti-terrorist units.

He is equally hard on them for not providing unstinted support to the centre’s efforts to safeguard national security, particularly in taking pre-emptive action to deal with emerging internal disturbance. This has probably resulted in the centre refraining from deploying central armed police forces unless the state requests it.  He cites the case of demolition of Babri Masjid as a case in point. 

He finds the UK Intelligence Services Act (1994) providing for a parliamentary intelligence and security committee to examine the administration and policies of intelligence agencies, worthy of emulation. Intelligence agencies are holy cows and their functioning and accountability continues to be grey areas. This is one area requiring urgent action as their role in areas that impinge upon national security has increased. But the moot point is, will they be amenable when parliament has members with questionable security baggage in the house?

When the dividing lines external and internal security are increasingly blurred, an understanding between the centre and states is essential for successful security management. Vohra points to the tortuous course taken to establish the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) in the wake of 26/11 attack as an example of the lack of understanding between the centre and states on the imperatives of national security. Unfortunately, with different political parties in power at the centre and in states, such a suggestion is viewed with distrust and suspicion.

It is well known that political parties in power, particularly in states, use the police for their own political advantage, rather than to aid good governance.  Vohra points to the findings of the inter-ministerial committee on Mumbai serial blats, which revealed the unwholesome nexus between corrupt politicians, dishonest public servants and organized crime and criminal mafia of the Dawood Ibrahim gang. This enabled several tons of RDX to be brought for the blasts. Obviously, unless states implement police reforms, not only will rule of law be vitiated, national security will also be threatened.

Vohra emphasises that to “move towards assured national security management” it is essential to implement reforms and improvements in the entire criminal justice system. Speedy delivery of justice plays an important role in this and the judicial reforms are essential as well. The moot point is how the states can be compelled to carry out police reforms? Will the political parties set aside their differences and come as one in the interest of national security?

What should be the elements of national security for India? Professor Prabhkaran Paleri in the book National Security: Imperatives and challenges (2008) lists as many as fifteen elements of national security, ranging from the military security and energy security to more obscure ethnic security and genome security.

In fact, Vohra is in sync with Paleri when he says “It has …. become extremely essential to safeguard almost every arena and to particularly secure arrangements relating to food, water, energy, nuclear power, science and technology, environment, ecology, finance, business, commerce, banking, cyber space and other important quarters.”

In conclusion, NN Vohra has suggested three viable actions:

• ·       The centre in close consultation with states should evolve and promulgate the National Security Policy and draw up a time bound action plan and establish a national frame work.
• ·        The centre should establish the National Security Administrative Service to run security related organisations and “progressively” the security management apparatus of the states.
• ·        As Union Home Ministry is burdened with the management of disparate subjects and overburdened, a national security affairs ministry should be set up.

In a nutshell, it is Prime Minister Narendra Modi who should get his act together. But despite enjoying a comfortable majority, his government is facing flak from a desperate Opposition on every initiative. If he can convince them to join hands to craft a national security policy, the nation will be thankful to him.

-The writer is a former military intelligence specialist in South Asia, associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies and the International Law and Strategic Studies Institute.

Myanmar: Fall of an Icon

Though there was global condemnation of Aung San Suu Kyi’s stilted response to the refugee crisis, many forget that she has to work within the constraints of the constitution which gives the army a powerful role to play

By Colonel R Hariharan |Courtesy: India Legal, 6 November 2017 www.indialegallive.com

A recent article in The New Yorker titled, “What Happened to Myanmar’s Human-Rights Icon?”, reflects the question haunting admirers of Aung San Suu Kyi. She was seen as the global upholder of universal human rights and is Myanmar’s de-facto president (officially state counsellor). However, she has not lived up to their expectations over the Rohingya issue. More than half a million of these ethnic Muslims fled from Rakhine state in Myanmar to seek refuge in Bangladesh to escape military persecution. Despite the cleansing, Suu Kyi not only took a month to make an official statement, but it lacked remorse at the horrendous human tragedy being enacted under her watch.

The exodus of Rohingyas started when the army launched large-scale operations after 150 Rohingya insurgents attacked 24 police posts and a military base, killing 12 security personnel on August 25, 2017. In the military operations that followed, the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army lost 59 insurgents and over 1,000 Rohingyas were reported killed and many women raped. Human Rights Watch, citing satellite images, said 214 Rohingya villages were completely destroyed.

Bangladesh’s foreign minister AH Mahmood Ali called it a “genocide” waged by Myanmarese troops, while UN Human Rights Commissioner Zeid Ra’ad al-Hussein called it “a textbook example of ethnic cleansing”.  

DECADES OF CONFLICT

Even if the alleged army atrocities fail to fall under the UN’s definition of genocide, the army probably carried out “ethnic cleansing”. The Rohingyas, concentrated in the northern Rakhine state, have seen armed ethnic conflict since Myanmar’s independence in 1948. So the army probably hit upon ethnic cleansing as a “final solution” to rid the country of this minority, who were always considered illegal Bengali settlers.

There is no doubt that Suu Kyi’s stilted response to the human tragedy has affected her image globally. Her charm and personal sacrifices during her long struggle to restore democracy against a ruthless military dictatorship drew admiration the world over. The western world which has been selectively waging “wars” for regime change in many authoritarian countries made her the poster girl for their “cause”. They had put her on a pedestal and showered her with honours, including the Nobel Peace Prize. And Suu Kyi was modest to remind her admirers that “she was no saint of any kind”, but only a politician. She added “politicians are politicians, but I do believe there are honest politicians and I aspire to do that”.

So it is no wonder that when she became the de-facto ruler of Myanmar, there were high expectations from her admirers both at home and abroad. They seemed to forget that in addition to being the head of a troubled state, she had a difficult role to play as leader of the ruling National League for Democracy and needed to retain her popular support.

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS

However, Asian powers who had their ears to the ground, were probably more realistic because Suu Kyi faces multiple problems in functioning as head of state. When the army decided to end its 50-year hold on power, it ensured that the constitution was rewritten by 2008 to give it a legitimate presence in legislature and a role in governance. One-fourth of the seats in parliament are reserved for the army. Also, the army calls the shots on internal and external security issues as the constitution has reserved the posts of three ministers--home, defence and border affairs--for the army.

So Suu Kyi has some deft political tight-rope walking to do and functions within the constitutional straitjacket. According to the constitution, she is not eligible to be elected president because she is married to a foreigner. So the position of state counsellor (above the president) was created extra-constitutionally to keep her at the top of the power structure.

Myanmar has been facing an existential struggle against some 16 ethnic insurgencies since independence. This has justified the army’s tight grip over three vital ministries dealing with national security. Unless the insurgency groups give up arms and join the political mainstream, the army cannot be weaned away from its stranglehold on power. So Suu Kyi’s top priority has been to negotiate permanent peace with the insurgent groups. She had organised the 21^st Century Panglong Conference, a peace meet, with insurgent groups in August 2016. During the second meeting in May 2017, there was some breakthrough. However, four insurgent groups, particularly the Kachin Independence Army and Arakan Army (a Rakhine-based group), did not join the process. So, it continues to be a work in progress.

Suu Kyi probably knows the Rohingya issue will be a test of her leadership skills. However, her actions will always be conditioned by the the army’s control over the three vital ministries. Of course, the army still retains the option to slap martial law and seize power again. So she cannot take any action that could be construed as a provocation by the army, which is watching her with a wary eye.

ROHINGYA IDENTITY CRISIS

Though Suu Kyi is immensely popular at home, she has to watch out for any popular backlash in handling the Rohingya crisis. Most of the  majority population, which is Buddhist, including those who condemn the army’s atrocities against the Rohingyas, do not accept them as part of the national mainstream. Unlike the majority Bamar community, Rohingyas are Muslims and are racially different from the people of Myanmar – they are dark and speak a dialect similar to the Bengali spoken in Chittagong.

Officially, the term “Rohingya” does not exist; they are referred to as Bengalis, indicating their illegal immigrant status. They are not listed among the eight officially recognized indigenous ethnic groups, though their presence was tolerated till the army enacted the Burma Citizenship Law in 1982. It laid down 1823 (before the Anglo-Burmese war) as the cut-off year for recognition of eligibility for citizenship. This rendered a million-plus Rohingyas stateless. Unless the citizenship law is suitably amended, it will be difficult to absorb them in the national mainstream.

Geographically, their concentrations are in Mayu River valley along the Bangladesh border and isolated from the rest of Rakhine state by the Arakan Yoma mountain range. So Rohingya habitations have remained backward, untouched by what little development has taken place in the state. Ethnic and religious differences periodically spark Rohingya-Buddhist riots. In 2012 and 2013, these degenerated into anti-Muslim riots and spread to the rest of the country.

TERROR LINKS 

After partition of Myanmar, Rohingyas conscious of their distinct identity, wanted their areas of habitation to be merged with East Pakistan. With Pakistan’s support, Rohingya Mujahideen extremists carried out sporadic attacks for the cause for about ten years from 1950, without much success. In 1970-80, a number of Islamist movements came up. However, the army ruthlessly crushed them. Among them, the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation, which was formed in 1982, developed contacts with Islamist extremist groups linked to the al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Bangladesh.

These terrorist links added virulence to the Rohingya insurgency since 2016-17. On October 9, 2016, Rohingya terrorists in large numbers attacked three Myanmar police posts located along the Bangladesh border. They killed nine officials and looted firearms from the posts. Two days later, they again attacked and killed three soldiers. International Crisis Group (ICG), a well-known think-tank, in a report on Rohingya militancy last December said it had interviewed members of Harakah al-Yakin (Faith Movement), a Rohingya militant group in Bangladesh, and they had taken responsibility for the attacks. According to the ICG report, the group had links with Rohingya expatriates in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. It also added that Afghan and Pakistani fighters had secretly trained groups of Rohingya villagers in Rakhine state. Indian intelligence agencies have also accessed similar information, identifying different groups and their leaders.

The Rohingya issue had always been a source of friction between Myanmar and Bangladesh. However, Sheikh Hasina’s Awami League government has been carrying out intense operations to eradicate jihadi terrorism infesting the country. So Bangladesh is extremely wary of giving asylum to Rohingya refugees flooding the country lest jihadi groups also infiltrate the country. However, due to popular sympathy for the plight of fellow Muslims, Bangladesh is accommodating them within its limited resources with help from international agencies.

INDIAN ROLE

India also does not want to allow the Rohingyas to cross over, fearing infiltration of terror groups in the sensitive North-east region. Politically, it is untenable for New Delhi to give refuge to them because the ruling BJP won the Assam elections with a promise to cleanse the state of lakhs of illegal Bangladeshis.

However, as a humanitarian gesture, India is assisting Bangladesh in taking care of over eight lakh Rohingyas there and has even allocated Rs 500 crore to Dhaka for this purpose. India also organized 7,000 tons of food grain and other basic essentials such as oil and salt for the refugees. The EU, along with Kuwait, is convening a donor conference to collect donations for them. The Pope will also be visiting Bangladesh and Myanmar in November to provide succour to them.

Meanwhile, Suu Kyi had appointed an 11-member advisory commission headed by former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in August 2016 to help resolve the Rohingya issue. The commission’s recommendations for rapprochement include adopting a holistic approach rather than just a military one, dialogue between both communities and creating a path for citizenship for the Rohingyas.

However, Suu Kyi has to create a climate of confidence for these refugees to return home. To begin with, a credible investigation of the alleged atrocities of the army has to be carried out. Rohingyas living in IDP (internally displaced person) camps in Myanmar have to be extended all assistance to rebuild their shattered lives in their villages. This is the minimum that can be done to trigger the peace process.

Can Suu Kyi pass this acid test? One thing is clear – it will be a long haul before this tragedy is over.

The writer is a military intelligence specialist on South Asia, associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies and the International Law and Strategic Studies Institute.