The latest scandal in the purchase of a dozen
August Westland helicopters, dubbed by TV talk show honchos as Bofors-2 the
vexing question why there are so many scams in our defence purchases? The
biggest reason is globally there is a lot of money in it. According to a 2009
estimate, the world spent annually $1.6 trillion - 2.6 percent of world GDP –
on things military including arms, equipment and services. A third of this
amount was probably spent on buying arms and munitions. And India is the
biggest buyer of them all; according to SIPRI statistics for the years 2007-11,
India with a ten percent share tops world’s top 20 importers. But that is no
consolation to the tax payer who is expected to pay 40 percent of this year’s budgeted
Rs 193,000 crores defence expenditure on imports.
Showing posts with label Arms Trade. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Arms Trade. Show all posts
Saturday, 23 February 2013
Wednesday, 13 February 2013
Quick take: Corruption in Westland helicopter deal
By Col R Hariharan
Some disturbing questions are raised as Westland helicopter deal hits the headlines once again.
The arrest of Giuseppe Orsi, the chief executive of Italy’s largest aerospace group Finmeccanica in Italy as part of an investigation into alleged corruption in international defence deals has once again put the focus back on yet another case of corruption in India’s defence procurement.
According to media reports the arrested CEO is alleged to have paid $670 million crores) in bribes for the sale of 12 Augusta Westland helicopters to India. However, both the company and the arrested CEO have denied paying any bribes. Earlier reports had indicated the possible involvement of a Swiss-based consultant in this murky deal.
Some disturbing questions are raised as Westland helicopter deal hits the headlines once again.
The arrest of Giuseppe Orsi, the chief executive of Italy’s largest aerospace group Finmeccanica in Italy as part of an investigation into alleged corruption in international defence deals has once again put the focus back on yet another case of corruption in India’s defence procurement.
According to media reports the arrested CEO is alleged to have paid $670 million crores) in bribes for the sale of 12 Augusta Westland helicopters to India. However, both the company and the arrested CEO have denied paying any bribes. Earlier reports had indicated the possible involvement of a Swiss-based consultant in this murky deal.
Saturday, 7 April 2012
What is the state of readiness of our troops - 4
Continuing the series of articles on the subject, are agents of arms dealers the real culprits for the glitches in our defence procurement? Contrary to many analysts, I hold the view the legitimate agents provide a valuable interface to understand the needs of the user and identify the right sources for procurement. They should be paid a legitimate commission like any other agents in the commercial world. As they are legitimate, transaction will be above board and accountable. They will be paying income and service taxes and their accounts will be open for inspection at any time. This will bring transparency in the transaction.
In 1986, Government of India removed agents as the middle men and decided to directly deal with arms manufacturers. The species of honest middlemen was kept out and under the table wheeler-dealers tookover. And immediately thereafter the Bofors scam hit the national headlines. There seem to be no stopping of scams.
I am reproducing an article, courtesy DNA India, "Confessions of a former arms dealer" written by a former naval officer in support of my argument. The article shows how a legitimate agent can provide valuable service to the armed forces. When we reform the system (WHEN? is the 64 dollar question), this aspect should also be paid attention.
Confessions of a former arms dealer
Benoy Bhushan, April 4, 2012
Friday, 6 April 2012
What is the state of readiness of our troops - 2
The unseemly controversy surrounding the Army Chief General VK Singh does not seem to be dying out. It got further complicated when a front page scoop in the Indian Express by the editor-in-chief, hinted at New Delhi's panic reaction when two army units moved towards New Delhi the day General VK Singh's case came up for judgement in the Supreme Court. Although, the sensational story was of dubious construction, and vehemently denied by the Prime Minister and the Defence Minister, the damage has been done to the reputation of the Army Chief and the Army - the innuendoes questioning their patriotism was obvious.
In this context, I am reproducing another article by General VP Malik, former Chief of Army Staff, that appeared in the Tehelka today, courtesy Tehelka Magazine for your reading.
Army should not look like it's losing its values
VP Malik, Former Chief Of Army Staff
As A former Chief of Army Staff, I have no hesitation in admitting that the
unprecedented events of the last few days have deeply damaged the reputation of
a very precious institution. One is tempted to say in despair, what is left?
Monday, 12 July 2010
Nuclear capability of India and China: an analysis
By Col. R. Hariharan
A comparison of nuclear capability of India and China cannot be made in isolation. It has to be derived in the backdrop of their strategic vision, global ambitions and political and social ethos that condition their perceptions. Their strategic vision dictates the development of their nuclear capability (including nuclear policy, concepts, weapons capability and delivery systems) appropriate to the geo-strategic environment.
Strategic setting
Ever since the global economic downturn started around 2008, China’s economic clout had been increasing. And the Obama administration soon after it came to power made special efforts to woo China to seek help in stemming its own economic decline. Apparently China’s global ambitions were strengthened by this. So it was not surprising that it showed reluctance to play ball with Obama administration’s efforts to turn it into a partner in international affairs.
However, one of the important reasons for Chinese reluctance is the suspicion about the U.S. intentions in Asia, where the U.S. had been developing strategic convergence in its relations with India. This was made clear in China’s Defence White Paper 2008 that spoke of ‘increasing US military presence in Asia-Pacific.’ China is wary of a US sponsored creation of an anti-Chinese axis extending from India to Japan. Though this was not referred to by General Ma Xiaotian, the Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the PLA, while speaking at the Shangri La Dialogue 2010 he said “we believe that maintaining security in the Asia-Pacific region serves China's interest, and it is also China's responsibility.” Apparently, the Chinese Navy’s increasingly assertive posture in South China Sea is only an affirmation of this policy.
This power assertion has strong strategic connotations to its ASEAN neighbours in particular as China is likely to be embedded in their security architecture inn the coming years as indicated by Professor Zhuang Jian Zhong, Standing Vice Director, Center for National Strategic Studies, Shanghai Jiaotong University, at the Shangri La Dialogue 2010.
After the Indo-US civilian nuclear bill became a reality, US-India economic relations were poised to grow fast. However, this did not happen as Obama administration had its own hangups on India. However, US-India relations have recently been warming up for the first time after President Obama came to power. The reality is that this has come about only after the impasse in the US-China relations. Now US-India economic relations are poised to grow rapidly only because Indian economy, less dependant upon export market than China, is clocking a steady 8 % growth.
Moreover, even if the US pulls out of Afghanistan, it would perhaps like to retain Pakistan a strategic ally in the region. The Army is likely to continue to decide Pakistan’s strategic posture in the coming years. Perhaps this is the underlying reason for the $ 10 billion U.S. assistance to the Pakistan army. It should not be forgotten that Pakistan, a close ally of China, achieved its nuclear capability aided and abetted by China. These considerations are likely to influence the US form encouraging India to play a major strategic role in Afghanistan and beyond in the west. With such considerations, in the US foreign relations horizon China would continue to occupy a larger space than India in the coming years, regardless the ups and downs of US-China relations.
India dominates South Asian region physically and economically. Soft power of Indian culture spills over the region as well. During the cold war era, it had built strong relationship with Soviet Union, which still has a large residual content in Russia, particularly as a supplier of defence equipment and weaponry. India’s geographic location enables it to be a dominant power in the Indian Ocean region. So it is not surprising that China had been cultivating India’s smaller neighbours who have latent fear of Indian domination. China’s close relation with Pakistan is well known. Nepal and Sri Lanka are increasingly coming under Chinese influence. Except for Pakistan, present emphasis of China’s relationship-building with other neighbours of India appears to have more political and economic than military content.
Nuclear setting
Given India’s comparatively smaller economic and military clout, unlike China, India appears to nurse only regional ambitions. Unlike China, which signed the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a recognised nuclear weapons state, though India did not sign NPT, its nuclear capability got recognition only after it tested nuclear weapons in 1998. So India has fundamental limitations in augmenting its nuclear weapons capability although it is said to have enriched Uranium stockpile to produce another 30 warheads. India’s nuclear arsenal is estimated between 40 and 80 warheads. This is less than the number of warheads Pakistan has and probably one fifth of China’s holdings. Moreover, with limited nuclear tests carried out, questions about their operational performance have been raised.
But the main limitation of India lies in is weak nuclear delivery capability. India at present has only short and intermediate range ballistic missiles. Its naval missile development is aimed at refining its intermediate range capability only. Its first-ever nuclear submarine INS Arihant, now undergoing sea trials, is likely to become operational in 2012, if it keeps to its schedule. Thus at present it has no operational ballistic missile submarine. Its submarine fleet is aging and due to stilted naval procurement programme its fleet is likely to be reduced to half according to one estimate. So India’s nuclear weapon delivery at present is limited to nuclear-capable aircraft and surface ships of the navy only. At present this restricts the reach of India’s nuclear capability to South Asia and Tibet.
After its nuclear tests in 1998, India adopted a "no first use policy." But according to its nuclear policy even though there will be no first-use of nuclear weapons by India, "nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage." But how far these words can be given form remains to be seen. With India’s limited missile capability, second strike capability will have to be based upon its air force and surface ships. Thus India will continue to be vulnerable nuclear missile strikes beyond the intermediate range.
Only in 2003, India established the Strategic Nuclear Command. This join services organisation is responsible for holding all of India’s nuclear weapons, missiles and other assets. It has also executive responsibility for enforcing nuclear policy. However, it is the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) under the Prime Minister that will authorise response to any nuclear strike. Quick decision making under pressure had never been the strong point of CCS. Whether it can do so in real time to order a retaliatory nuclear strike is a moot question.
India’s key weakness is not only in strategic decision making process but tardy implementation of decisions. India has failed to use time as an irreplaceable resource. Thus the state controlled defence research and development programmes regularly fail to keep up their schedules. Defence procurement had become a hotbed of corruption and the bureaucratic procedure appears to be more focused on stemming corruption than on timely procurement of weapon systems. This has not improved despite the complaints of service chiefs; this has considerably weakened the modernisation of armed forces.
On the other hand, China has developed a clearly articulated long term vision for improving its strategic capability in conformity with its global ambitions. It has developed its large scale weapons research, development and manufacturing capability. It has become a major weapon producer and this gives it a powerful clout to favourably spread its influence.
China adopted No First Use nuclear policy well before India in 1964, with the affirmation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons “at any time or under any circumstances.” Though China has reaffirmed its NFU policy in 2009, China’s credibility to do so is low. For instance, there were reports that China had considered nuclear strikes against the Soviet Union in the event of a conventional Soviet attack. It has capability to deliver nuclear weapons from air craft, surface ships and submarines as well as missiles.
Its military modernisation programme is well on the way with focused development to improve its missile and naval capability while turning the huge PLA into a modern force with better mobility and fire power.
China is reported to hold the lowest number of nuclear warheads among the five nuclear weapons states. Though exact number of China’s nuclear arsenal is not known, the figure of around 130 nuclear warheads deployed in missiles and aircraft as given by the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists is probably correct. Probably 70 more are in storage. China has a variety of indigenously developed ICBMs including DF -5 ICBM which has a range of about 15000 Km has been in service since 1980. About 80 warheads are deployed in the ballistic missiles of DF-3, DF-4, DF-5 and DF-21. Of these China is estimated to have 25 DF-5 missiles. Under the military modernization programme, China is improving the missile portability, and performance capability. It has the potential to develop multiple warhead carrying capability in some of the missiles as well.
Though the PLA navy is ranked as the third largest in the world, it had only a defensive capability limited to its coastal region with only brown water capability. However as a result of modernisation efforts, it has now attained green water capability. That would mean it has offensive capability limited to about a thousand miles from its shores. It continues to suffer from weaknesses command C4 systems.
In keeping with increased strategic priorities Chinese navy is in the process of transforming into a blue water navy, though it is still a long way to go. It has developed Type 094 ballistic submarines armed with JL 2 SLBMs with a range of 8000 Km; this would make the western hemisphere within its range. It has developed a large submarine base in Hainan which has been cause of concern to the U.S. and India.
Since the last decade, Chinese naval presence in international waters has been on the rise. It has carried out joint exercises with over a dozen countries including India and Pakistan. In its first international foray, it is operating a flotilla on anti piracy duties in Gulf of Aden. Probably in during the coming decade we will be seeing large scale power assertion of Chinese navy in Indian Ocean region.
Chinese has been instrumental in contributing to the development of Pakistan’s nuclear and missile capabilities, flouting international agreements. The two countries have close strategic links. This could result in the further growth of Pakistan’s nuclear capability in the future. The recent Chinese announcement to give two more nuclear power stations to Pakistan ostensibly under a 1991 contract is a case in point. Though the Bush administration had objected to it earlier, the US appears to have chosen to ignore it now due to political expediency dictated by its Pak-Af posture. Thus China enjoys enormous advantage with its proxy presence in Pakistan.
Conclusion
China enjoys definite advantage over India in three key aspects of exercising nuclear capability: decision making process weapons systems, and delivery options. However, Chinese capability is mostly based on its ICBM systems operating from both land and sea. Its green water capability is being augmented with the development of 094 ballistic submarines armed with SLBMs. This could overcome its limitations in blue water operations. Thus China’s nuclear capability is in tandem with its global ambitions.
Comparatively, India’s nuclear capability is circumscribed by the limits of its regional ambitions. This situation is unlikely to change unless India improves its ability to handle strategic security challenges. To give form to it, better nuclear weapons and missile capabilities are essential. In particular, it has to develop a strong anti-missile capability. India has a long way to go in doing so. India’s strength would depend upon building a win-win relationship with China; at the same time India has to develop closer strategic relations with the US without sacrificing its regional interests. Indo-Russian relations, a little stagnant at present, also need to be nurtured. More than all this it has to speed up modernisation of armed forces. In the coming years, Indian Ocean region is likely to become the scene of power assertion. This would imply the need for making Indian navy a powerful entity so that India does not lose its strategic advantage in the region.
Courtesy: South Asia Analysis Group July 12, 2010
A comparison of nuclear capability of India and China cannot be made in isolation. It has to be derived in the backdrop of their strategic vision, global ambitions and political and social ethos that condition their perceptions. Their strategic vision dictates the development of their nuclear capability (including nuclear policy, concepts, weapons capability and delivery systems) appropriate to the geo-strategic environment.
Strategic setting
Ever since the global economic downturn started around 2008, China’s economic clout had been increasing. And the Obama administration soon after it came to power made special efforts to woo China to seek help in stemming its own economic decline. Apparently China’s global ambitions were strengthened by this. So it was not surprising that it showed reluctance to play ball with Obama administration’s efforts to turn it into a partner in international affairs.
However, one of the important reasons for Chinese reluctance is the suspicion about the U.S. intentions in Asia, where the U.S. had been developing strategic convergence in its relations with India. This was made clear in China’s Defence White Paper 2008 that spoke of ‘increasing US military presence in Asia-Pacific.’ China is wary of a US sponsored creation of an anti-Chinese axis extending from India to Japan. Though this was not referred to by General Ma Xiaotian, the Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the PLA, while speaking at the Shangri La Dialogue 2010 he said “we believe that maintaining security in the Asia-Pacific region serves China's interest, and it is also China's responsibility.” Apparently, the Chinese Navy’s increasingly assertive posture in South China Sea is only an affirmation of this policy.
This power assertion has strong strategic connotations to its ASEAN neighbours in particular as China is likely to be embedded in their security architecture inn the coming years as indicated by Professor Zhuang Jian Zhong, Standing Vice Director, Center for National Strategic Studies, Shanghai Jiaotong University, at the Shangri La Dialogue 2010.
After the Indo-US civilian nuclear bill became a reality, US-India economic relations were poised to grow fast. However, this did not happen as Obama administration had its own hangups on India. However, US-India relations have recently been warming up for the first time after President Obama came to power. The reality is that this has come about only after the impasse in the US-China relations. Now US-India economic relations are poised to grow rapidly only because Indian economy, less dependant upon export market than China, is clocking a steady 8 % growth.
Moreover, even if the US pulls out of Afghanistan, it would perhaps like to retain Pakistan a strategic ally in the region. The Army is likely to continue to decide Pakistan’s strategic posture in the coming years. Perhaps this is the underlying reason for the $ 10 billion U.S. assistance to the Pakistan army. It should not be forgotten that Pakistan, a close ally of China, achieved its nuclear capability aided and abetted by China. These considerations are likely to influence the US form encouraging India to play a major strategic role in Afghanistan and beyond in the west. With such considerations, in the US foreign relations horizon China would continue to occupy a larger space than India in the coming years, regardless the ups and downs of US-China relations.
India dominates South Asian region physically and economically. Soft power of Indian culture spills over the region as well. During the cold war era, it had built strong relationship with Soviet Union, which still has a large residual content in Russia, particularly as a supplier of defence equipment and weaponry. India’s geographic location enables it to be a dominant power in the Indian Ocean region. So it is not surprising that China had been cultivating India’s smaller neighbours who have latent fear of Indian domination. China’s close relation with Pakistan is well known. Nepal and Sri Lanka are increasingly coming under Chinese influence. Except for Pakistan, present emphasis of China’s relationship-building with other neighbours of India appears to have more political and economic than military content.
Nuclear setting
Given India’s comparatively smaller economic and military clout, unlike China, India appears to nurse only regional ambitions. Unlike China, which signed the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a recognised nuclear weapons state, though India did not sign NPT, its nuclear capability got recognition only after it tested nuclear weapons in 1998. So India has fundamental limitations in augmenting its nuclear weapons capability although it is said to have enriched Uranium stockpile to produce another 30 warheads. India’s nuclear arsenal is estimated between 40 and 80 warheads. This is less than the number of warheads Pakistan has and probably one fifth of China’s holdings. Moreover, with limited nuclear tests carried out, questions about their operational performance have been raised.
But the main limitation of India lies in is weak nuclear delivery capability. India at present has only short and intermediate range ballistic missiles. Its naval missile development is aimed at refining its intermediate range capability only. Its first-ever nuclear submarine INS Arihant, now undergoing sea trials, is likely to become operational in 2012, if it keeps to its schedule. Thus at present it has no operational ballistic missile submarine. Its submarine fleet is aging and due to stilted naval procurement programme its fleet is likely to be reduced to half according to one estimate. So India’s nuclear weapon delivery at present is limited to nuclear-capable aircraft and surface ships of the navy only. At present this restricts the reach of India’s nuclear capability to South Asia and Tibet.
After its nuclear tests in 1998, India adopted a "no first use policy." But according to its nuclear policy even though there will be no first-use of nuclear weapons by India, "nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage." But how far these words can be given form remains to be seen. With India’s limited missile capability, second strike capability will have to be based upon its air force and surface ships. Thus India will continue to be vulnerable nuclear missile strikes beyond the intermediate range.
Only in 2003, India established the Strategic Nuclear Command. This join services organisation is responsible for holding all of India’s nuclear weapons, missiles and other assets. It has also executive responsibility for enforcing nuclear policy. However, it is the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) under the Prime Minister that will authorise response to any nuclear strike. Quick decision making under pressure had never been the strong point of CCS. Whether it can do so in real time to order a retaliatory nuclear strike is a moot question.
India’s key weakness is not only in strategic decision making process but tardy implementation of decisions. India has failed to use time as an irreplaceable resource. Thus the state controlled defence research and development programmes regularly fail to keep up their schedules. Defence procurement had become a hotbed of corruption and the bureaucratic procedure appears to be more focused on stemming corruption than on timely procurement of weapon systems. This has not improved despite the complaints of service chiefs; this has considerably weakened the modernisation of armed forces.
On the other hand, China has developed a clearly articulated long term vision for improving its strategic capability in conformity with its global ambitions. It has developed its large scale weapons research, development and manufacturing capability. It has become a major weapon producer and this gives it a powerful clout to favourably spread its influence.
China adopted No First Use nuclear policy well before India in 1964, with the affirmation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons “at any time or under any circumstances.” Though China has reaffirmed its NFU policy in 2009, China’s credibility to do so is low. For instance, there were reports that China had considered nuclear strikes against the Soviet Union in the event of a conventional Soviet attack. It has capability to deliver nuclear weapons from air craft, surface ships and submarines as well as missiles.
Its military modernisation programme is well on the way with focused development to improve its missile and naval capability while turning the huge PLA into a modern force with better mobility and fire power.
China is reported to hold the lowest number of nuclear warheads among the five nuclear weapons states. Though exact number of China’s nuclear arsenal is not known, the figure of around 130 nuclear warheads deployed in missiles and aircraft as given by the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists is probably correct. Probably 70 more are in storage. China has a variety of indigenously developed ICBMs including DF -5 ICBM which has a range of about 15000 Km has been in service since 1980. About 80 warheads are deployed in the ballistic missiles of DF-3, DF-4, DF-5 and DF-21. Of these China is estimated to have 25 DF-5 missiles. Under the military modernization programme, China is improving the missile portability, and performance capability. It has the potential to develop multiple warhead carrying capability in some of the missiles as well.
Though the PLA navy is ranked as the third largest in the world, it had only a defensive capability limited to its coastal region with only brown water capability. However as a result of modernisation efforts, it has now attained green water capability. That would mean it has offensive capability limited to about a thousand miles from its shores. It continues to suffer from weaknesses command C4 systems.
In keeping with increased strategic priorities Chinese navy is in the process of transforming into a blue water navy, though it is still a long way to go. It has developed Type 094 ballistic submarines armed with JL 2 SLBMs with a range of 8000 Km; this would make the western hemisphere within its range. It has developed a large submarine base in Hainan which has been cause of concern to the U.S. and India.
Since the last decade, Chinese naval presence in international waters has been on the rise. It has carried out joint exercises with over a dozen countries including India and Pakistan. In its first international foray, it is operating a flotilla on anti piracy duties in Gulf of Aden. Probably in during the coming decade we will be seeing large scale power assertion of Chinese navy in Indian Ocean region.
Chinese has been instrumental in contributing to the development of Pakistan’s nuclear and missile capabilities, flouting international agreements. The two countries have close strategic links. This could result in the further growth of Pakistan’s nuclear capability in the future. The recent Chinese announcement to give two more nuclear power stations to Pakistan ostensibly under a 1991 contract is a case in point. Though the Bush administration had objected to it earlier, the US appears to have chosen to ignore it now due to political expediency dictated by its Pak-Af posture. Thus China enjoys enormous advantage with its proxy presence in Pakistan.
Conclusion
China enjoys definite advantage over India in three key aspects of exercising nuclear capability: decision making process weapons systems, and delivery options. However, Chinese capability is mostly based on its ICBM systems operating from both land and sea. Its green water capability is being augmented with the development of 094 ballistic submarines armed with SLBMs. This could overcome its limitations in blue water operations. Thus China’s nuclear capability is in tandem with its global ambitions.
Comparatively, India’s nuclear capability is circumscribed by the limits of its regional ambitions. This situation is unlikely to change unless India improves its ability to handle strategic security challenges. To give form to it, better nuclear weapons and missile capabilities are essential. In particular, it has to develop a strong anti-missile capability. India has a long way to go in doing so. India’s strength would depend upon building a win-win relationship with China; at the same time India has to develop closer strategic relations with the US without sacrificing its regional interests. Indo-Russian relations, a little stagnant at present, also need to be nurtured. More than all this it has to speed up modernisation of armed forces. In the coming years, Indian Ocean region is likely to become the scene of power assertion. This would imply the need for making Indian navy a powerful entity so that India does not lose its strategic advantage in the region.
Courtesy: South Asia Analysis Group July 12, 2010
Wednesday, 2 June 2010
Recommended Reading
Is the nation in a coma?
Mohan Murti writing in the Business Line dated:31/05/2010 gives a sample of European opinion on India’s stunted democracy in action. But to answer the question in the title, it is not India but its politicians are in a coma.
URL: http://www.business line.in/cgi- bin/print. pl?file=20100531 50300900. htm&date=2010/05/ 31/&prd=bl&
India’s Rise and the Promise of U.S.-Indian Partnership
William J. Burns, US Under Secretary for Political Affairs, spoke on emerging dimensions of US-India relations at the Council of Foreign Relations on June 1, 2010. I wish I could be as optimistic about US-India relations as he is.
URL: http://www.state.gov/p/us/rm/2010/136718.htm
A Tragic court martial
Former Indian army chief General Shankar Roychowdhury discusses the much hyped investigation into the Kargil defence procurement scam which ended with a whimper. It showed the soft underbelly of India’s lethargic arms procurement system and its impact on strategic security of the nation. http://www.deccanchronicle.com/node/140630/print
Not to be missed reading on this issue is the companion piece Former navy chief hits back at govt with RTI that appeared on the blog Soldierscorner on August 27, 2009 available at URL http://soldierscorner.blogspot.com/
India no more a big brother to Sri Lanka
Upul Joseph Fernando in his regular column My Serendip in the Daily Mirror, Colombo discusses the downsizing of India's role in Sri Lanka. Interesting analysis on the role of Congress party in this.
URL http://www.dailymirror.lk/print/index.php/opinion1/12029.htmlWednesday, 02 June 2010 00:00
Mohan Murti writing in the Business Line dated:31/05/2010 gives a sample of European opinion on India’s stunted democracy in action. But to answer the question in the title, it is not India but its politicians are in a coma.
URL: http://www.business line.in/cgi- bin/print. pl?file=20100531 50300900. htm&date=2010/05/ 31/&prd=bl&
India’s Rise and the Promise of U.S.-Indian Partnership
William J. Burns, US Under Secretary for Political Affairs, spoke on emerging dimensions of US-India relations at the Council of Foreign Relations on June 1, 2010. I wish I could be as optimistic about US-India relations as he is.
URL: http://www.state.gov/p/us/rm/2010/136718.htm
A Tragic court martial
Former Indian army chief General Shankar Roychowdhury discusses the much hyped investigation into the Kargil defence procurement scam which ended with a whimper. It showed the soft underbelly of India’s lethargic arms procurement system and its impact on strategic security of the nation. http://www.deccanchronicle.com/node/140630/print
Not to be missed reading on this issue is the companion piece Former navy chief hits back at govt with RTI that appeared on the blog Soldierscorner on August 27, 2009 available at URL http://soldierscorner.blogspot.com/
India no more a big brother to Sri Lanka
Upul Joseph Fernando in his regular column My Serendip in the Daily Mirror, Colombo discusses the downsizing of India's role in Sri Lanka. Interesting analysis on the role of Congress party in this.
URL http://www.dailymirror.lk/print/index.php/opinion1/12029.htmlWednesday, 02 June 2010 00:00
Tuesday, 30 March 2010
STRATEGIC SNIPPETS: India
Hat-trick for missile technologists, armed forces: India’s defence researchers had a successful week end when the nuclear capable Agni-I medium range missile(700 km) missile and two ship-based Dhanush and Prithvi-II missiles were successfully test fired. Agni-I is a 14-metre tall single stage, solid-propelled missile capable of carrying a payload of 1,000 kg. The 8.5-metre-tall Prithvi-II is a surface-to-surface missile while the 11-metre long Dhanush is a ship-to-surface and ship-to-ship system. Both are single-stage, liquid propelled missiles capable of carrying a 500-kg payload. Both missiles are under production and have been inducted into the Army, the Air Force and the Navy. Read the full story in the Hindu of March 29, 2010 at URL http://www.hindu.com/2010/03/29/stories/2010032961901100.htm
Commerce Ministry suggests 100% FDI in defence: The Ministry of Commerce has sent a note to the cabinet secretariat suggesting that global defence companies be allowed to set-up manufacturing units with 100% FDI . But will the Ministry of Defence agree? See The Hindu Marh 25 news item at http://www.hindu.com/2010/03/25/stories/2010032561000100.htm
Arjun wins against the Russian T-90: In this analytical piece defence analyst Ajai Shukla tells of the superior performance Indian designed T-90 tanks in trials carried out along with Russian T-90, which appears to the Ministry of Defence. See his March 25 hlog at http://ajaishukla.blogspot.com
The cost of Antony’s halo: In this critical piece in Business Standard of February 23, 2010 Ajai Shukla explains how defence minister AK Antony’s excessive obsession with corruption in defence procurement is costing the nation thousands of crores of rupees, delays procurement of essential weapons and puts the nation’s security at peril. See the full article at URL: http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/ajai-shuklacostantony%5Cs-halo/386534/
Commerce Ministry suggests 100% FDI in defence: The Ministry of Commerce has sent a note to the cabinet secretariat suggesting that global defence companies be allowed to set-up manufacturing units with 100% FDI . But will the Ministry of Defence agree? See The Hindu Marh 25 news item at http://www.hindu.com/2010/03/25/stories/2010032561000100.htm
Arjun wins against the Russian T-90: In this analytical piece defence analyst Ajai Shukla tells of the superior performance Indian designed T-90 tanks in trials carried out along with Russian T-90, which appears to the Ministry of Defence. See his March 25 hlog at http://ajaishukla.blogspot.com
The cost of Antony’s halo: In this critical piece in Business Standard of February 23, 2010 Ajai Shukla explains how defence minister AK Antony’s excessive obsession with corruption in defence procurement is costing the nation thousands of crores of rupees, delays procurement of essential weapons and puts the nation’s security at peril. See the full article at URL: http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/ajai-shuklacostantony%5Cs-halo/386534/
Monday, 22 February 2010
UN Arms Trade Treaty & Tackling Armed Non-State Groups
By Col R Hariharan (Retd.)
[Excerpts from this article were included in a presentation made by the author at a conference “Towards a United Nations Arms Trade Treaty by 2012” organised by the Control Arms Foundation of India at New Delhi on February 16 & 17, 2010.]
Introduction
The United Nations is poised to bring an international agreement on global arms trade and finalise ‘a strong and robust’ Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) at the conference to scheduled for July 2012. Already 153 nations have voted in favour of the resolution towards this while 19 countries including India abstained while one voted against it.
Can ATT help to check the rising tide of terrorism and other forms of violence by armed non state groups (ANSG)? This question is of immediate relevance to South Asian nations, particularly India and Pakistan, who are facing sustained ANSG inspired violence for a few years now.
This article tries to answer this question and examine some of the priority areas for action for using the ATT advantageously in the fight against ANSG violence in South Asia.
Rising scourge of terrorism
Terrorism has become the number one scourge of 21st century. According to the January 2010 strategic comment of the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) there is likelihood of violent extremism remaining high in 2010 due to continued geo-political conflict in Afghanistan and Kashmir.
This is evident from the ever increasing number of lives lost due to violent extremism of armed non-state groups (ANSG) in India and Pakistan – the two nations most affected by the ANSG. In the year 2009, a total of 13,801 people lost their lives in these two countries due to ANSG related activities (see Table 1 for details). This means on an average of 38 lives are lost daily representing 3.8% of estimated loss of 1000 lives every day world wide due to ANSG related activities.
Source: South Asia Terrorism Portal February 2010
In real terms, the damage caused by ANSG activities is much more than fatalities. Given the practice of joint families in Asia, 13,800 fatalities would affect the lives of about 138,000 members of their families forever. As most of these fatalities are among the people of younger age group, their death in the most productive period represents substantial loss of human resources of nations.
Control of armed extremism comes at a high cost to the state draining its resources. The state is compelled to expand, train and arm police, paramilitary and security forces to fight extremists. Often states have to divert funds from social welfare sector to sustain counter terror operations. , Terrorist also damage infrastructure and dislocate normal life of people. Poor people, particularly daily wage earners are the most affected by such disruptions. ANSG actions also create social unrest and friction within the community.
Arms trade and ANSG activities
Global military expenditure, which had gone down at the end of Cold War, had has been steadily increasing since 1994. It has now reached Cold War levels to $ 1.427 trillion.
According to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Year Book 2009 data, out of the world military expenditure of $ 1.4 trillion in 2008, the U.S. accounted for 48% of total expenditure while Europe followed with 20%. Out of this a substantial amount relates to expenditure incurred in procuring weapons to tackle ANSG.
At the heart of all ANSG activities is the muscle power arms give. And ANSG are the key driving force for thriving illegal arms trade world wide. This home truth was not unknown to the international community. As early as 1994, the UN Disarmament Commission had noted “wherever there is violence, terrorism, subversion, drug trafficking, common and organized crime and other illegal criminal actions, their link to illegal acquisition of arms has been demonstrated.” This statement is truer now than ever before.
Modern day ANSG are technologically savvy. The ANSG are more sophisticated than before in their operational style. Their reach transcends international borders, thanks expanding networking of nations due to globalisation. They are often internationally networked. For instance the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) had fraternal links with Jihadi terrorist groups operating in many countries, Maoists, United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) and the PKK of Turkey.
With increasing migration of people, even small ANSG can find overseas support for their activities increasing their damage potential. They take advantage of globally networked lifestyle of the 21st century to expand their activities and enlist popular support through front organisations. They have shown their ability to use modern information and communication resources using the Internet and satellite technology to conduct operations of huge impact with a small number of people in another country as demonstrated by the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai. They have used criminal gangs to further their activities both in India and Sri Lanka. Mumbai criminal kingpin Dawood Ibrahim gang’s involvement in Jihadi terrorist strikes in Mumbai in 1996 is a case in point.
ANSG are involved in a whole gamut of other illegal activities to propagate their cause, win over and train recruits, collect funds for their activities, intimidate officials, terrorise the public, dislocate governments, run parallel State, take over and run charitable and social organisations as their fronts, run profitable business ventures under cover names to siphon off profits through illegal money laundering channels.
Operations of some of the trans-national ANSG show a remarkable ability to influence public policy misusing instruments of democracy to their advantage. They have not hesitated to use political lobbying to further their ends.
In order to carry out these activities they use arms as a source of power. So they illegal procurement and traffic of weapons becomes a key activity of ANSG. And in the process they are involved either directly or indirectly in traffic of other kinds including narcotics and illegal immigrants using forged documents and passports.
A mind mapping terrorism dramatically shows the wide range of activities connected with it (See Table 2 below). Most of these activities involve violation of civil and criminal laws by using the power of illegal arms.
Illegal arms transfers and traffic have been flourishing through third country operations of nations like the U.S, China, Pakistan and the erstwhile Soviet Union. This has sustained ANSGs insurgencies worldwide i.e. Palestine, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Colombia, India, Iraq, and Myanmar. Afghan insurgency during Soviet occupation in late 90s gave a great fillip to illegal arms transfers in South Asia. They also gave muscle power to war lords of narcotic syndicates of South and Southeast Asia and Latin America. This combination of drug and arms trades has further made international illegal arms trade a lucrative business. In South Asia, ANSG had generally been sourcing illegal weapons from a number of countries worldwide. Specific geographic areas sourced for illegal arms are given in Table 3 below:
International strategies to combat terrorism
After 9/11 Al Qaeda attacks in the U.S., globally there is greater consciousness in strengthening counter terrorism measures globally. As a result internationally coordinated actions to curb ANSG activities, cut off their international links for financing, propaganda, and trafficking links. The evolving strategies include the following:
The proposed UN Arms Trade Treaty can provide teeth to make some of these strategies more effective. The ATT enables nations to perform better in combating ANSG and contributes to improving quality of life of the people (see Table 4 below):
Priorities for action
The UN will be finalising the ATT at its July 2012 session as it enjoys overwhelming support of members. People everywhere, particularly those belonging to the 19 nations had abstained in the past, should prioritise their actions to ensure the ATT successfully sails through in the UN in 2012. Some of these priorities are are listed in Table 5 below:
[Excerpts from this article were included in a presentation made by the author at a conference “Towards a United Nations Arms Trade Treaty by 2012” organised by the Control Arms Foundation of India at New Delhi on February 16 & 17, 2010.]
Introduction
The United Nations is poised to bring an international agreement on global arms trade and finalise ‘a strong and robust’ Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) at the conference to scheduled for July 2012. Already 153 nations have voted in favour of the resolution towards this while 19 countries including India abstained while one voted against it.
Can ATT help to check the rising tide of terrorism and other forms of violence by armed non state groups (ANSG)? This question is of immediate relevance to South Asian nations, particularly India and Pakistan, who are facing sustained ANSG inspired violence for a few years now.
This article tries to answer this question and examine some of the priority areas for action for using the ATT advantageously in the fight against ANSG violence in South Asia.
Rising scourge of terrorism
Terrorism has become the number one scourge of 21st century. According to the January 2010 strategic comment of the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) there is likelihood of violent extremism remaining high in 2010 due to continued geo-political conflict in Afghanistan and Kashmir.
This is evident from the ever increasing number of lives lost due to violent extremism of armed non-state groups (ANSG) in India and Pakistan – the two nations most affected by the ANSG. In the year 2009, a total of 13,801 people lost their lives in these two countries due to ANSG related activities (see Table 1 for details). This means on an average of 38 lives are lost daily representing 3.8% of estimated loss of 1000 lives every day world wide due to ANSG related activities.
| Table 1-Fatalities due to violent extremism 2009 | |
| | |
| Civilians 2307 | Civilians 722 |
| SF personnel 1011 | SF personnel 431 |
| ANSG persons 8267 | ANSG persons 1073 |
| Total killed 2009 á 11585 | Total killed 2009 â 2226 |
| Total killed 2008 á 6716 | Total killed 2008 ↔ 2611 |
In real terms, the damage caused by ANSG activities is much more than fatalities. Given the practice of joint families in Asia, 13,800 fatalities would affect the lives of about 138,000 members of their families forever. As most of these fatalities are among the people of younger age group, their death in the most productive period represents substantial loss of human resources of nations.
Control of armed extremism comes at a high cost to the state draining its resources. The state is compelled to expand, train and arm police, paramilitary and security forces to fight extremists. Often states have to divert funds from social welfare sector to sustain counter terror operations. , Terrorist also damage infrastructure and dislocate normal life of people. Poor people, particularly daily wage earners are the most affected by such disruptions. ANSG actions also create social unrest and friction within the community.
Arms trade and ANSG activities
Global military expenditure, which had gone down at the end of Cold War, had has been steadily increasing since 1994. It has now reached Cold War levels to $ 1.427 trillion.
According to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Year Book 2009 data, out of the world military expenditure of $ 1.4 trillion in 2008, the U.S. accounted for 48% of total expenditure while Europe followed with 20%. Out of this a substantial amount relates to expenditure incurred in procuring weapons to tackle ANSG.
At the heart of all ANSG activities is the muscle power arms give. And ANSG are the key driving force for thriving illegal arms trade world wide. This home truth was not unknown to the international community. As early as 1994, the UN Disarmament Commission had noted “wherever there is violence, terrorism, subversion, drug trafficking, common and organized crime and other illegal criminal actions, their link to illegal acquisition of arms has been demonstrated.” This statement is truer now than ever before.
Modern day ANSG are technologically savvy. The ANSG are more sophisticated than before in their operational style. Their reach transcends international borders, thanks expanding networking of nations due to globalisation. They are often internationally networked. For instance the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) had fraternal links with Jihadi terrorist groups operating in many countries, Maoists, United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) and the PKK of Turkey.
With increasing migration of people, even small ANSG can find overseas support for their activities increasing their damage potential. They take advantage of globally networked lifestyle of the 21st century to expand their activities and enlist popular support through front organisations. They have shown their ability to use modern information and communication resources using the Internet and satellite technology to conduct operations of huge impact with a small number of people in another country as demonstrated by the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai. They have used criminal gangs to further their activities both in India and Sri Lanka. Mumbai criminal kingpin Dawood Ibrahim gang’s involvement in Jihadi terrorist strikes in Mumbai in 1996 is a case in point.
ANSG are involved in a whole gamut of other illegal activities to propagate their cause, win over and train recruits, collect funds for their activities, intimidate officials, terrorise the public, dislocate governments, run parallel State, take over and run charitable and social organisations as their fronts, run profitable business ventures under cover names to siphon off profits through illegal money laundering channels.
Operations of some of the trans-national ANSG show a remarkable ability to influence public policy misusing instruments of democracy to their advantage. They have not hesitated to use political lobbying to further their ends.
In order to carry out these activities they use arms as a source of power. So they illegal procurement and traffic of weapons becomes a key activity of ANSG. And in the process they are involved either directly or indirectly in traffic of other kinds including narcotics and illegal immigrants using forged documents and passports.
A mind mapping terrorism dramatically shows the wide range of activities connected with it (See Table 2 below). Most of these activities involve violation of civil and criminal laws by using the power of illegal arms.
| Table 2 – Mind Mapping of Terrorism |
| Ideology, Leadership, Control, Arms: procurement-production-trafficking, Child recruitment, Training, Extortion, Violence, Organised crime, Political & NGO fronts, Smuggling, Money Laundering, Human trafficking, Benami assets, Drug & Arms Dealers, Smuggling, Threats, Corruption, Coercion, Brainwashing, Forgery, Rumours, Black propaganda, Surveillance, Murder, Kidnapping, Indoctrination, Intimidation, Lobbying, Suicide bombing, IED, Assassination, Infiltration, Human rights violations, |
Illegal arms transfers and traffic have been flourishing through third country operations of nations like the U.S, China, Pakistan and the erstwhile Soviet Union. This has sustained ANSGs insurgencies worldwide i.e. Palestine, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Colombia, India, Iraq, and Myanmar. Afghan insurgency during Soviet occupation in late 90s gave a great fillip to illegal arms transfers in South Asia. They also gave muscle power to war lords of narcotic syndicates of South and Southeast Asia and Latin America. This combination of drug and arms trades has further made international illegal arms trade a lucrative business. In South Asia, ANSG had generally been sourcing illegal weapons from a number of countries worldwide. Specific geographic areas sourced for illegal arms are given in Table 3 below:
| Table -3 Geographic areas involved in illegal arms trade |
|
|
|
|
|
International strategies to combat terrorism
After 9/11 Al Qaeda attacks in the U.S., globally there is greater consciousness in strengthening counter terrorism measures globally. As a result internationally coordinated actions to curb ANSG activities, cut off their international links for financing, propaganda, and trafficking links. The evolving strategies include the following:
- Coordination: At international level cooperation to combat terrorism through coordinated action through international treaties at global, regional and national levels.
- Cooperation: Networked data resources on ANSG activities and identities are being evolved.
- Synergy: Nations are being helped train their security forces on techniques, and modernise their state systems to facilitate greater synergy in action.
- Control strategies: International protocols are in place or being evolved for controlling weapons of mass destruction, illegal trafficking in arms, narcotics and humans and money laundering. The proposed UN Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) would come under this category.
- Preventive strategies: Encouraging ending of existing insurgencies, defusing potential conflict areas and educating public through participatory activities.
The proposed UN Arms Trade Treaty can provide teeth to make some of these strategies more effective. The ATT enables nations to perform better in combating ANSG and contributes to improving quality of life of the people (see Table 4 below):
| Table – 4 Arms Trade Treaty’s contribution in fighting ANSG |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Priorities for action
The UN will be finalising the ATT at its July 2012 session as it enjoys overwhelming support of members. People everywhere, particularly those belonging to the 19 nations had abstained in the past, should prioritise their actions to ensure the ATT successfully sails through in the UN in 2012. Some of these priorities are are listed in Table 5 below:
| Table -5 Priorities for action |
|
|
|
|
|
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)