China's BRI Loans Becoming 'Big Headache' for South Asian Nations - Ex-Indian Intel Officer

 Sputnik News| April 4, 2022 | 

https://sputniknews.com/20220404/chinas-bri-loans-becoming-big-headache-for-south-asian-nations---ex-indian-intel-officer-1094460651.html

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a series of overland and maritime connectivity and infrastructure projects being developed across the globe with the financial backing of China. Nearly 140 countries in Europe, Asia, and South America have signed up for the BRI so far. Chinese investments in BRI projects could reach $1.3 trillion by 2027.

A former military intelligence (MI) specialist in the Indian Army has blamed the "liberal loans" extended under the Beijing-backed Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), or the One Belt One Road (OBOR), for worsening the economic crisis in Sri Lanka.

"China's offer of liberal loans for Sri Lanka's ambitious infrastructure projects, with marginal profitability, are one of the reasons why the country finds itself saddled with unviable foreign debt", Colonel R. Hariharan, an expert at the Indian security think tank Chennai Centre for Chinese Studies (C3S) who served as an intelligence chief of the Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) to Sri Lanka, told Sputnik.

At present, the Colombo International Container Terminal (CICT) is being developed by Beijing's state-backed China Merchant Port Holdings, a Hong Kong-headquartered company. Hariharan also highlights that Colombo was "forced" to award a controlling stake and a 99-year lease in the Hambantota port to the same Chinese company in 2017 for its inability to repay a previous debt.

Another state-backed enterprise, the China Harbour Engineering Company (CHEC), is developing the state-of-the art Colombo International Financial City on land reclaimed from the sea near the Sri Lankan capital.

"Servicing these loans is becoming a big headache of governments across South Asia, be it Sri Lanka, Nepal, Maldives, or Pakistan", reckons Hariharan. "Other countries like India and Japan have given aid on concessional terms whereas China's commercial lending carries higher interest".

Hariharan notes that another drawback of Chinese loans under the BRI relates to the lack of emphasis on empowerment of local communities, who could build economic resilience in times of crisis such as the one Sri Lanka currently faces.

"The Chinese companies mostly employ Chinese labour. So, in a way, benefits of the project in the near-term flow back to China. Other countries employ local contractors", the think tank analyst says.

Estimates of the Chinese loans as well as sovereign bond payouts owed to China are between 15-20 percent of Colombo's overall foreign liabilities, as per the Indian expert.

While Sri Lanka is obliged to pay a $1 billion repayment on sovereign bonds in July, debt repayments to the tune of $7 billion are due at the end of the year. In comparison, data from Sri Lanka's Central Bank pegged the current foreign exchange reserves at $2.3 billion, as reported by Reuters.

Since February, India has extended two credit lines of $1 billion and $1.5 billion to Sri Lanka to purchase essential items to help overcome the crisis. Nearly $1.4 billion has been separately provided by Delhi since January in the form of current swap and loan deferments.

On the other hand, Beijing is yet to take a final call on Sri Lanka's debt restructuring request or an economic assistance package, the Chinese Ambassador to Colombo Qi Zhenhong said at a press briefing on 21 March.

The request was made by Sri Lankan President Gotabaya Rajapaksa during Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi's trip to Colombo in January of this year.

Saying that Beijing may ultimately grant Colombo a "loan package" to help it tide over its economic difficulties, he expresses concerns about the terms of any future assistance from Beijing, given Sri Lanka's plummeting attractiveness for investors.

"Sri Lanka has been losing the lure of China lately", he says.

'Poor Fiscal Management' by Sri Lankan Government to Be Blamed as Well

The Indian expert says that the Sri Lankan government's "poor fiscal management, [alleged] corruption, and financial indiscipline" were also factors behind the "huge borrowing" and sent out the wrong signal to investors, thus compounding the crisis.

Sri Lanka's public debt rose from 94 percent of GDP in 2019 to 119 percent in 2021, amid dwindling forex reserves which affected its tourist-reliant economy during the COVID-induced travel curbs.

Dwindling currency reserves, ballooning public debt, and current account deficit caused the value of the Sri Lankan rupee to plunge by more than 36 percent last month, resulting in runaway inflation.

Lack of fuel supplies resulted in 10-12-hour power cuts besides shortages of food items, triggering street protests across the country.

The economic crisis soon spiralled into a political issue, with the entire federal cabinet resigning on Sunday.

Only President Gotabaya Rajapaksa and Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa haven't stepped down from their positions, as the country awaits a new cabinet which may comprise politicians from all of the nation's political factions in a bid to assuage rising public anger over economic mismanagement.

'China Heavily Invested Across South Asia Now'

Hariharan says that it's not only Sri Lanka, but servicing the Chinese loans extended under the BRI is becoming a problem for other South Asian nations such as Nepal, Pakistan, and the Maldives, with all of them being part of the BRI.

India has been critical of the BRI, with Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar in February warning smaller nations to be careful of "debt-trap" diplomacy. The remarks were made by Jaishankar during an appearance at the Munich Security Conference.

"Undoubtedly, China has bigger financial clout than India. But China's BRI commitments are huge and already it is invested in South Asia for around $60 billion", he notes.

In Nepal, local media outlets have been pointing out that none of the nine agreements signed between Kathmandu and Beijing during Wang Yi's visit last month concerned the BRI.

"While stressing the country's economic priority, the prime minister during his meeting with the Chinese foreign minister and state councillor said that a loan is not what Nepal prefers at this point and sought more projects from China under grant assistance", Govinda Pariyar, the publicity chief of Nepali Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba, quoted the Nepalese leader as telling Wang.

In the Maldives, around 80 percent of overall debt payments were owed to China, as per 2021 budget data reported by ex-president and current parliamentary speaker Mohamed Nasheed.

Similarly, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has said that in the case of Pakistan, a fifth of its public debt is owed to China, which amounts to around $18.4 billion.

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the flagship project of the BRI, traverses the length of Pakistan and ends at the port of Gwadar.

During his visit to Beijing this year, Pakistan's interim Prime Minister Imran Khan is reported to have requested that Chinese President Xi Jinping roll over debt to the tune of $4.2 billion owing to Islamabad's inability to service the loans. Reportedly, the request was agreed to during Wang's trip to Pakistan last month.

Under CPEC, Beijing has extended loans to develop infrastructure and connectivity projects, including power plants, highways, and railway lines.

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Why Maldives matters to China?

China-aided projects in the Maldives have given rise to a lot of security concerns for India, the US and its allies. China is paying to woo India’s Indian Ocean island neighbours, particularly the Maldives and Sri Lanka.

By Col R Hariharan | Column| India Legal | February 11, 2022

https://www.indialegallive.com/why-maldives-matters-to-china/

 

China’s use of the PLA regiment commander involved in the 2020 Galwan clash as a torchbearer for the Winter Olympics had drawn flak from not only India but also its QUAD ally—the US. India regretted the incident as China’s attempt to politicise the Games, while the US described it as “shameful” and deliberately “pro­vocative.” The use of the PLA commander at a global meet is not merely China’s provocative gesture to needle India. It is a small sample of the “war by other means” (“non-contact war” in military jargon) China is currently progressing in the Indo Pacific theatre.

While China’s misuse of the PLA commander in the torch relay garnered enough publicity, probably few noticed the torchbearer, who exchanged the flame with the final torchbearer Thomas Bach, president of the International Olympic Committee. He was Abdulla Shahid, foreign minister of Maldives and president of the 76th session of the UN General Assembly. It was probably a heart-warming moment for the Maldives, one of the tiniest countries in the world with barely 300 sq m of land, to see its foreign minister given this honour at an Olympic Games. No doubt Shahid’s position as the current president of the UN General Assembly helped the Chinese decision. But it showed the close attention China is paying to woo India’s Indian Ocean island neighbours, particularly the Maldives and Sri Lanka.

Maldives is a chain of 26 atolls, stretching from Ihavandhippolhu Atoll in the north to Addu Atoll in the south, spanning 90,000 sq km of territory across the Equator, and has few resources. Maldives archipelago is located on the Chagos-Lakshadweep Ridge, a vast submarine range in the middle of the Indian Ocean. It is located 750 km South­west of India and Sri Lanka. Historically, Maldives has ethnic, religious and cultural connectivity with India and Sri Lanka. Maldives’ language Dhivehi is a dialect of Sinhala and with a script derived from Arabic. In fact, Minicoy the southernmost and second largest island in the union territory of Lakshadweep, has around 12,000 Mahl people of Maldives ethnicity. 

Maldives-India relations have been close since colonial rule ended in 1965 and Maldives became a republic. It was India that responded first to President Maumoon Gayoom’s call for assistance to thwart a coup attempt in 1988. After Mohamed Nasheed came to power in 2008, Maldives signed a defence cooperation agreement with India in 2009. Under the agreement, India would install 26 radars on all the atolls to link up with the Indian coastal command. Indian Navy and the Maldives National Defense Force (MNDF) carry out joint surveillance and patrolling activities. India had been swift to provide help and succour during the 2004 tsunami and when the country faced a drinking water crisis in 2014.

After Prime Minister Narendra Modi adopted “neighbourhood first” policy when he came to power in 2014, India-Maldives relations got a further boost. India is involved in a number of projects like the Greater Male Connectivity project, cargo vessel services and capacity building and training of MNDF and Maldivian civil servants in India and the Gulhifalhu Port Project. Indian defence forces and MNDF regularly hold joint exercises. Even during Abdulla Yameen’s rule which was skewed in favour of China, he played down his anti-India rhetoric to visit New Delhi and sign the Indo-Maldivian Action Plan for defence. India has supplied a Dornier surveillance aircraft to Maldives to keep an eye on Chinese vessels as well as casualty evacuation from isolated islands and prevent poaching and drug smuggling in Maldivian waters. The US military base located at the atoll of Diego Garcia in Chagos archipelago, 1713 km from Maldives, was used during the US operations in Afghanistan. Its strategic importance has increased after the Quadrilateral framework for Indo-Pacific security came up.

The Indian Ocean’s strategic importance has gone up after President Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was launched in 2013 to increase China’s strategic outreach across continents. The 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR) forms the oceanic part of BRI infrastructural connectivity. It enables China to secure passage for its international maritime trade to pass through bottlenecks in the Indian Ocean. Maldives and Sri Lanka are important pivots for the success of the MSR, more so after the Quad framework started taking shape.

President Xi Jinping was the first Chinese head of state to visit Maldives since the two countries established diplomatic relations in 1972. His visit to Maldives on May 15, 2014, on his way to Sri Lanka and India, underlined the island nation’s importance in Xi’s strategic outreach under BRI.

Though Chinese companies had been involved in project contracting in Maldives since 1985, it made a quantum jump after President Yameen, with a strong pro-China stance and marked hostility towards India came to power in 2013. Not only has Yameen responded to Xi’s invitation to join the MSR during his visit but also signed a free trade pact with China a few months later.

During Yameen’s tenure as President till 2018, a number of Chinese infrastructure and investment projects were executed. Male-Hulhumale bridge conceived in 2007, was constructed by China Harbour Engineering Company at a cost of $210 million. Similarly, Beijing Urban Construction Group replaced Indian contractor GMR, to complete the stalled Male international airport expansion project at Hulhumale in 2018.

An unnamed Chinese company acquired Feydhoo Finolhu, a tiny islet with half a square mile area, located three nautical miles from the Maldivian capital, Malé, on a 50-year lease for a price of $4 million in December 2016. However, the Finolhu beach resort with 125 private villas with a wharf for ferrying guests built on the property is now fully functional. Similarly, the CJL Investment promoted a joint venture of Guangdong Beta Oceans and a Maldivian partner, has taken the Kunaavashi island in Vaavu atoll, 35 nautical miles from Malé, on a 50-year lease to build a resort. An Australian company is now managing the La Vie Hotels and Resorts there. 

However, the opaque process of Chinese aided projects and widespread corruption in Maldives have given rise to a lot of security concerns to India, the US and its allies. A case in point is the Joint Ocean Observatory project at Makhunudhoo, the western most is­land, finalised in 2017 by China’s State Oceanic Administration. India was concerned that China would use it to observe more than ocean conditions. At India’s urging, Maldives dropped the project in 2019.

The 2018 election was marred by President Yameen’s misuse of state resources, police interference during opposition campaigns and manipulations by electoral officials in favour of Yameen’s Progressive Party of Maldives (PPM). After former president Nasheed was disqualified on an unproven 2015 terrorism charge, the Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP) nominated Ibrahim Mohammed Solih. He secured 58% of the votes, with Yameen scoring less than 42%. Now Maldives is ruled by a coalition of MDP, the Jumhooree Party, the Maldivian Reform Movement (MRF) led by former president Maumoon Gayoom and the conservative Adhaalath Party.

Solih came to office with a debt of $1.4 billion accumulated by the Yameen government, mainly to the Chinese. He is trying to work out ways to service this debt. He has tried to improve accountability, weed out corruption, tone up the judiciary and improve gender equity with some success. He is yet to tackle the lingering Islamist extremist threat. Solih has signed a defence deal with the US and another agreement with Japan to strengthen the MNDF coast guard. Both India and the US have helped the Maldives with vaccine supplies and medical equipment to fight the Covid-19 pandemic; so, did China. China’s foreign minister Wang Yi made a whistle stop trip to Maldives in January 2022 and looked at some of the BRI projects. 

Yameen was sentenced to five years imprisonment in a case of money laundering in November 2019. However, the Maldives Supreme Court has set aside his conviction. Days after his release, the PPM, the main opposition party, launched the “India Out” campaign. Though Yameen has explained that it was aimed at only the presence of Indian security forces in Maldives, it is probably a political curtain raiser for the year 2022.

China has firmed up its presence in Maldives. With India reasserting its presence in the Indian Ocean region now, how China will step up its role in Maldives during 2022 is an open question.

The Writer is a Military Intelligence specialist on South Asia, associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies

 

Sri Lanka Perspectives May 2021: China firming up its act in Sri Lanka

Col R Hariharan | May 31, 2021| South Asia Security Trends, June 1, 2021 | 

www.security-risk.com

Many would consider the passing of the controversial Colombo Port City Economic Commission Bill by Sri Lanka parliament, with a comfortable margin on May 20, as a victory for President Gotabaya Rajapaksa. President Rajapaksa’s personal reputation was at stake, after Supreme Court scrutiny had found both constitutional and procedural anomalies with the draft. In the end, the government accepted all the amendments suggested by the Supreme Court, though it bypassed suggestions for referendum and two thirds majority for certain sections, to rush it through the parliament.

The Act empowers the President to create a commission for the special economic zone to manage the SEZ, accord tax and duty concessions for investors. Concerns of ‘foreigners’, euphemism for Chinese, being inducted into the Commission were assuaged after the President Rajapaksa appointed President’s Counsel Gamini Marpana to head the Port City Commission with six other Sri Lankans including Treasury Secretary SR Attygalle as members.

The Economic Commission, which was mooted as an independent body, will now function under the country’s regulatory authorities and constitutional bodies including the parliament. The companies in CPC will have to operate under Sri Lankan laws and judiciary and conform to financial and customs regulations applicable to elsewhere in the country. This has taken some sheen off the original proposal, depriving the CPC much of the hype to become an international financial hub on the lines of Dubai or Singapore. Reconciling the demands of the SEZ to attract investment with the constraints imposed by the Act, must be worrying the Rajapaksas.

The project is being developed by CHEC Colombo Port City Pvt Ltd (CCPC) with an initial investment of USD 1.4 billion. Reclamation of 269 hectares of land was completed by January 2019. The development of common infrastructure underway now is expected to be completed by the end of the year. According to a PwC report, in the next 20 years, real estate development, including commercial, financial, hospitality, residential and social infrastructure, is expected to be completed. 

In this period, a total of 160,000 jobs are expected to be created. After that in the operational stage when the project matures, in all 210,000 jobs are estimated to be created. The PwC report also envisaged the value addition to the GDP due to the project at infrastructure, lease of land and construction stage at USD 4.16 billion and USD 13 billion respectively.

During the debate in parliament PM Mahinda Rajapaksa spoke of USD 15 billion investments flowing into the project in the next five years.  He also touched upon the huge potential for creating 200,000 jobs during the construction phase of the project. These claims have given rise to huge expectations about the project among the people, though many have expressed their concern over sovereignty of the project, because of increasing Chinese domination seen everywhere.

The CPC Economic Commission act coming into being may be considered a victory for China as it gains yet another strategic foothold in the heart of Colombo. In the larger context of China’s global image building under President Xi Jinping, the CPC project promoted by the state-owned China Heavy Engineering Corporation (CHEC), is set to showcase the success of the Bridge and Road Initiative (BRI). 

Quoting what it claims to be a cabinet paper submitted by Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa on May 17, Nimal Ratnaweera writing in the web-based Colombo Telegraph, averred “Over the next two years, the Government plans to sell hundreds of acres of prime state-owned land in Colombo Fort and its adjacent Slave Island area, including property currently being used by the Sri Lanka Air Force and Sri Lanka Army.”

The Colombo Telegraph, known to be critical of the Rajapaksas, said it learnt “the bulk of these properties have been reserved for China Harbour Engineering Corporation, through an intermediary local firm created specifically for the purpose of easing the path for transfer to the Beijing-owned entity and other affiliated investors.”

The report further added the state owned Selendiva Investments “has been tasked with transforming several underperforming state-owned assets into ‘viable, profitable and marketable’ assets.” The Urban Development Authority was seeking approval to move ahead with three investment portfolios: The Colombo Fort Heritage Square, The Immovable Property Development and The Government-owned Hospitality Sector under Selendiva Investments.

The earlier Sirisena-Wickremesinghe government was known to have listed many of these government properties in a bid to transform Colombo City into a commercial and financial capital. According to the Colombo Telegraph, “that diversification was to be streamlined under a competitive bidding process for interested investors.”

But given the speed at which the Chinese operate, the competitive bidding process may be given the go by as it happened recently. Close on the heels of the enactment of the CPC Economic Commission, the cabinet decided to award the contract to build the 17 km Kelaniya-Athurugiriya elevated highway project, estimated to cost USD 1 billion to the CHEC, without competitive bidding. The Chinese company will build, own and transfer the major highway after 17 years, adding yet another feather in the BRI cap of President Xi.

While Chinese investors would probably bid for "choice property" in the CPC, will the investors from the West and India be keen to invest in the CPC? Any international investor other than local or from China, is likely to have two concerns before opting for CPC.

First, the ability of the government to provide a safe and corruption free environment with good governance both within and outside the economic zone. Sri Lanka government under Rajapaksas carries a legacy of total disregard for international concerns since the end of Eelam War in May 2009. These include issues of governance, rule of law, restoring ethnic peace and human rights, which continue to figure in the UN Human Rights Council deliberations. Sri Lankan judiciary has not covered itself in glory in quite a few cases. The state of law and order has been subject to severe political influence. Corruption is endemic.  The mess created in handling the Covid-19 pandemic speaks poorly of the administration’s ability to handle critical situations facing the country.

Cumulatively these issues could make international rating agencies think twice before recommending CPC as a favourable investment destination.

The Rajapaksas have become increasingly dependent upon China to bail  them out, not only in the UNHRC and the Security Council, but to ward off financial crunch. They are paying the price for it by taking decisions favouring the Chinese, to the detriment of other nations. They cancelled the memorandum of cooperation the previous government had signed with India and Japan to jointly develop the Eastern Carrier Terminal (ECT) of Colombo port, on the specious ground of Sri Lankan sovereignty. Such concern was markedly absent when it came to the CPC project, actively and publicly promoted by the CHEC. 

The Rajapaksas also decided against signing USD 480 million investment plans of the Millennium Cooperation Corporation (MCC) on similar grounds, though in his earlier term as President, Mahinda Rajapaksa had mooted the proposal.  Both the US and India are unlikely to forget such conduct, when they deal with Sri Lanka. With both the US and India recasting their relations with China, Sri Lanka could face the flak of their reaction.

Lastly, one wonders how President Rajapaksa would stick to his assurance to India’s concerns on security, with the Chinese literally breathing down his neck. The situation reminds us of the visuals of the Singapore-registered cargo ship MV X-press Pearl burning off the West coast of Sri Lanka for over two weeks, polluting the environment around, while Sri Lanka, India and international fire fighters douse the fire. They learnt rather too late that the ship was carrying 25 tons of a toxic chemical: nitric acid.

Tail piece: The year 2021 is Chinese year of the Ox, considered good for those born in the Snake Year, like President Xi Jinping (born in 1953); Mao Zedong was also Snake year-born. So far it seems to be working for him in Sri Lanka.  He is winning the war without firing a shot in Sri Lanka.

[Col R Hariharan, a retire MI specialist on South Asia and terrorism, served as the head of intelligence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka 1987-90. He is associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies. Email: colhari@gmail.com  Website: https://col.hariharan.info]

 

 

China gets tough with Bangladesh

By Colonel R HARIHARAN | May 17, 2021 | News | Rediff.com

https://www.rediff.com/news/column/colonel-r-hariharan-china-gets-tough-with-bangladesh/20210517.htm

We can expect to see more Chinese wolf warrior diplomats on the prowl, in India's neighbourhood, though its mailed fist is not so visible while dealing with India, observes Colonel R Hariharan (retd).

 

China's 'wolf-warrior diplomacy' -- that started with a public spat between State Councillor Yang Jiechi, China's top foreign policy official, and US Secretary of State Antony Blinken at their meeting in Alaska in March -- showed its fangs recently in Dhaka.

The first-ever Quad summit initiated by the US attended by India, Japan and Australia held in March 12 seem to have triggered the wolf warrior reaction.

On May 10, Chinese Ambassador to Bangladesh Li Jiming speaking at a public platformed warned that Bangladesh's relations with China will 'substantially get damaged' if the country joins the Quad, a US-led initiative.

Li added,obviously it will not be a good idea for Bangladesh to participate in this small club of four countries.

He undiplomatically added from the public forum, 'So, we don't like to see any form of participation by Bangladesh to this small group of elite countries"'

Li called the Quad a 'narrow purposed' geopolitical clique, intent on working against China's resurgence and its relationship with neighbours.

'Quad says it's for economic purpose and security and so on. But that is not true. We know that it is aimed at China,' Li added after the first-ever Quad summit of leaders of the US, India, Japan and Australia held in March.

The Chinese ambassador's 'warning' on Quad comes shortly after China's State Councillor and Defence Minister General Wei Fenghe's more diplomatic remarks, when he made a fleeting visit to Dhaka in the last week of April.

After meeting with Bangladesh President Abdul Hamid, General Wei added that to jointly maintain regional peace and stability, the two sides should make joint efforts against powers outside the region setting up military alliances in South Asia and practising hegemonism, an obvious reference to the Quad.

Bangladesh Foreign Minister A K Abdul Momen reacting to the Chinese envoy's unsavoury comments called it 'very regrettable'.

Bangladesh, Momen said, maintained a non-aligned and balanced foreign policy and it would decide what to do following that principle.

'We are an independent and sovereign State. We decide our [own] foreign policy. But yes, any country can uphold its position,' he said.

Momen said China can state its position and Bangladesh always welcomes what others say.

'We will listen to what they say. But we will decide what is good for us.'

The Bangladesh foreign minister added they recall with respect what others say, but did not expect such behaviour from China.

Bangladesh and China turned their relationship into a strategic partnership in October 2016 with a deal signed between Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and Chinese President Xi Jinping.

As part of the Belt and Road Initiative, the two countries have signed deals worth about $21 billion for upgrading infrastructure, particularly in transport, power and IT sector.

China has emerged as Bangladesh's largest development partner in recent years. Its lending has surged since 2018.

Perhaps, this conditioned the Bangladesh foreign minister to be careful in expressing his nation's unhappiness at the Chinese ambassador's comments, close on heels of advice from the Chinese defence minister a few weeks earlier.

The Daily Star of Dhaka in its editorial minced no words, calling the Chinese representative's comments as 'undiplomatic, uncalled-for and therefore unacceptable.'

The newspaper reminded that China was welcome to express their opinion, 'it shouldn't extend to telling us what we can or cannot do as an independent nation.'

It is not surprising that the Chinese foreign ministry has defended its ambassador's 'warning' against Dhaka's participation in the anti-China 'club' would result in substantial damage to its relations with China.

Asked for her reaction to the Bangladesh foreign minister's comments, Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying told the media that she had not seen the remarks.

'China and Bangladesh are very good neighbours. We have been developing bilateral relations based on mutual trust and peaceful co-existence, and we have been firmly supporting each other, on issues bearing on respective core interests and major concerns,' Hua said.

'We all know what kind of mechanism the Quad is. China opposes certain countries' efforts to form an exclusive clique, portray China as a challenge, and sow discord between regional countries and China,' Hua added, justifying the ambassador's remarks.

The Chinese Communist party tabloid Global Times, hailing the Alaska spat in April as China's 'wolf-warrior diplomacy', had pompously declared 'The arrogant Western world led by the US is no longer eligible to deal with the world's second-largest economy with a condescending attitude.'

This is probably the backdrop to the wolf warrior mindset used to browbeat small neighbours of Quad countries, particularly in India's neighbourhood.

Sri Lanka is yet to recover from Chinese Defence Minister General Wei Fenghe's visit to Colombo after his Dhaka visit, when the government was locked in passing the controversial Colombo Port City project Bill in parliament.

The project developed with China's assistance is a prestigious one of the Belt and Road Initiative.

Undoubtedly. the Chinese defence minister's visit was to apply pressure on Sri Lanka, when it is taking a crucial decision affecting China.

General Wei called on President Gotabaya Rajapaksa and Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa and discussed ways to further cement bilateral ties.

After the meeting, General Wei remarked peaceful development and win-win cooperation is the global trend and the 'right way' forward.

In an unstated reference to the Quad, he said certain major countries were keen to form cliques and factions and seek regional hegemony, which goes against peoples shared aspiration and severely harms the interests of regional countries.

Analyst Maria Siow writing in the South China Morning Post on April 17, 2021 posted the question 'Himalayan Quad: Is China about to start its own security bloc with Nepal, Pakistan and Afghanistan?' The rhetorical question has some relevance considering that peaceful borders and territorial integrity are China's core concerns.

The moot point is how does such a strategic alliance add value to China, which is already well entrenched, either overtly or covertly, in the body politics of all the three neighbours of India.

While China is the lynch pin of Quad, there is no common motivating factor for Nepal, Pakistan and Afghanistan to form a security bloc, unless it is India.

As Andrew Small, author of the book The China-Pakistan Axis: Asia's new geopolitics says China-Pakistan relations 'are based on shared hostility towards India, thrive on many common interests. A long history of secret deals between the two armies overrides the problems of Islamic extremism.’

But this is not the case with Afghanistan or Nepal.

Their strategic narratives in relation to India are substantially different and complex, dictated by prevailing geo-strategic realities.

China's own strategic end goals widely differ in respect of the three countries.

China's substantial economic assistance and loans as members of the Bridge and Road Initiative is perhaps the common factor among them. Nepal is a case in point.

Chinese Ambassador Hou Yanqi had been trying to settle the differences between Prime Minister K P Sharma Oli and former prime minister Prachanda who are locked in a factional fight within the Communist party of Nepal.

Though she has not succeeded so far, there is less visible success of China is in whittling down Nepal's dependency on Indian investments.

A Xinhua report last September quoted Nepal government statistics to say the country had received FDI pledges from China amounting to $220 million in fiscal 2019-2020 against pledges of $116 million in 2018-2019, in spite of the Covid pandemic in 2020.

It was two thirds of the total investments committed by foreign investors, according to the industry department.

Quoting a Nepal government official, it said Chinese investment pledges in some hydropower projects, which are more capital-intensive industries, contributed to a surge in overall Chinese investment commitments.

We can expect to see more Chinese wolf warrior diplomats on the prowl in India's neighbourhood, though its mailed fist is not so visible while dealing with India.

Colonel R Hariharan, a retired military intelligence officer, is associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies and the South Asia Analysis Group.

 

வளரும் சீனா-பாகிஸ்தான் பாதுகாப்பு உறவுகள், எவ்வாறு இந்திய-பாகிஸ்தான் உறவை பாதிக்கும்?

கர்னல் ஆர். ஹரிஹரன் | மார்ச்சு 4, 2021 | சென்னை சீன ஆய்வு மையம், பிரசுர எண் 10-2021 | https://cutt.ly/BzwtkLp

லடாக் எல்லையில் இந்திய, சீன ராணுவங்களுக்கு இடையே பத்து மாதங்கள் தொடர்ந்த பதட்ட நிலை, உயர் மட்ட ராணுவ அதிகாரிகளிடையே பதினோரு சுற்று பேச்சு வார்த்தைகளுக்கு பிறகு, ஓரளவு தற்போது குறைந்து வருகிறது. இந்த முடிவை அமைதியை வேண்டும் பெரும்பாலான மக்கள் வரவேற்றுள்ளனர். 

ஆனால், தற்போதைய அமைதி தொடர்ந்து நீடிக்குமா என்பது சந்தேகமே. ஏனெனில், சீன அதிபர் ஷீ ஜின்பிங் மீது மோடி அரசு வைத்திருந்த நம்பிக்கையை சென்ற ஆண்டு லடாக் எல்லையில் நிகழ்ந்த மோதல்கள் சிதைத்து விட்டன. 

சென்ற ஆண்டு, அதிபர் ஷீ இந்தியாவின் நல்லுறவை மெத்தனமாக மதித்து, ஒப்பந்தங்களுக்கு மாறாக சீனப்படைகளை எல்லையில் குவித்து இந்தியாவை பயமுறுத்தி பார்த்தார். ஆனால், இந்தியா அதை முறியடிக்க எடுத்த பல முனை முயற்சிகளால், சீனா எல்லையில் இரு தரப்பு படைக்குறைப்புக்கு ஒப்புக் கொண்டது. 

இதை இந்தியாவின் வெற்றி என்று கொண்டாடுவது தவறு. ஆனால், இந்த எல்லை சம்பவம், இந்தியாவால் சீனாவுக்கு உண்டான மானப் பிரச்சனை என்பதை சீனா எளிதில் மறக்காது. 

ஆகவே, அடுத்த முறை, சீனா எவ்வாறு நமது நாட்டின் பாதுகாப்புக்கு அழுத்தம் கொடுக்கும் என்ற கேள்விக்கு விடை காண்பது கடினம். ஏனெனில், கடந்த ஓராண்டில் உலக அளவில் பாதுகாப்பு சூழ்நிலையில் பல மாற்றங்கள் ஏற்பட்டுள்ளன. 

இமையத் தட்டில், இந்தியப் படைகளுக்கு வலிமை சேர்க்க, அரசு பல முயற்சிகளை தொடர்ந்து மேற்கொண்டு வருவது முக்கியமாகும். அவற்றில், எல்லைப் பகுதியில், இது வரை கிடப்பில் போடப்பட்டிருந்த சாலை விரிவாக்க திட்டங்களை முடித்து வருவது குறிப்பிடத்தக்கது. 

அது போலவே, இந்திய விமானப் படைக்கு ரஃபேல், தேஜஸ் ஆகிய போர் விமானங்கள், மற்றும் எதிரி விமானங்களைத் தாக்கும் அஸ்த்ரா ஏவுகணைகள் ஆகியவற்றை அளித்து போர்த்திறனை அதிகரித்துள்ளது. அது போலவே, முன்னணியில் உள்ள படைகளுக்கு, புதிய பலம் வாய்ந்த பீரங்கிகள், போர் முனையை கண்காணித்து உடனுக்குடன் தாக்குதல் நடத்தக்கூடிய அமெரிக்க ட்ரோன் தானியங்கிகள் ஆகியவற்றை அளித்துள்ளது. 

இதெல்லாவற்றையும் விட, இந்திய-பசிபிக் கடல் பிராந்தியத்தில் வளர்ந்துவரும் சீன ஆதிக்கத்தை எதிர் கொள்ள, இந்தியா, அமெரிக்கா, ஜப்பான் மற்றும் ஆஸ்திரேலியா ஆகிய நாடுகள் கூடி அமைத்துள்ள குவாட் கட்டமைப்பின் செயலாக்கம், அந்த நாடுகளுக்கு இடையே போர் முனை ஒத்துழைப்பை அதிகரித்து வருகிறது. 

ஆகவே, அடுத்த முறை சீன-இந்திய "மோதல்",  எல்லையில் தோன்ற வேண்டிய அவசியம் இல்லை. அதை வேறு எந்த ரூபத்தில் சீனா எதிர் கொள்ளும்  என்று அனுமானிக்க வேண்டிய கட்டாயம் இந்தியாவுக்கு ஏற்பட்டுள்ளது.

அத்தகைய முயற்சி வெற்றி அடைய, சென்ற ஆண்டு சீன-பாக் உறவில் ஏற்பட்டுள்ள நெருக்கத்தை, சீனா தனக்கு சாதகமாக பயன்படுத்தலாம். அதற்கு, இரு நாடுகளும் ஒருங்கிணைந்த தமது செயல்பாடுகளை பாதுகாப்பு, வெளியுறவு, மற்றும் பன்னாட்டு வணிகம் ஆகிய துறைகளில் உபயோகித்து, இந்தியாவுக்கு நேரடியாகவும், மறைமுகமாகவும், அழுத்தம் கொடுக்கலாம். 

இரண்டு நாடுகளும் தங்களுக்க சாதகமான சூழ்நிலையை உண்டாக்க, இந்தியாவுக்கு தங்கள் அமைதிக்கரத்தை நீட்டுவதை ஒரு உத்தியாக கையாளலாம். அவ்வாறுதான், இரு நாடுகளும் இந்தியாவுடன் பல்வேறு கால கட்டங்களில் இரட்டை வேடம் போட்டதாக சரித்திரம் கூறுகிறது. 

உதாரணமாக, அதிகம் பாராட்டப்பட்ட மோடி-ஷீ மகாபலிபுரம் சந்திப்பு நிகழும் போதே, லடாக் எல்லையில் சீனப்படைகளை ஊடுருவச் செய்து, ஷீ இந்தியாவின் தயார் நிலையை ஆழம் பார்த்தது  நமது நினைவில் நீங்காது. ஆகவே,  வரும் செப்டம்பர் மாதம், ஷீ இந்தியா வருகிறார் என்ற செய்தியை சந்தேகக் கண்ணோடு பார்க்க வேண்டிய கட்டாயம் ஏற்பட்டுள்ளது. 

அது போலவே, பாக் அதிபர் ஜெனரல் முஷாரப், இந்தியப் பிரதமர் வாஜ்பாய் அவர்களுடன் நல்லிணக்கம் காட்டி அமைதி பேச்சுவார்த்தை நடத்தி அது முறிந்தது. ஐந்தாண்டு அமைதிக்கு பின், 2008ல் பாகிஸ்தான் ஐ. எஸ். ஐ உளவுத்துறையை உபயோகித்து, ஜிஹாதி தீவிரவாதிகளை மும்பையில் ஊடுருவி 26/11 தாக்குதல்கள் நடத்தி பேரிழப்பு ஏற்பட்டுத்தியதை எளிதில் மறக்க முடியாது. இன்றும், அந்தத் தாக்குதலை திட்டமிட்ட தீவிரவாத தலைவர்கள், சுதந்திரமாக பாகிஸ்தானில் உலவி வருகிறார்கள் என்பது கசப்பான உண்மை. 

இத்தகைய சூழ்நிலையில், கடந்த பிப்ரவரி 3ம் தேதி, பாக் ராணுவத்தின் தலைவரான ஜெனரல் கமார் பாஜ்வா ஒரு ராணுவ பயிற்சி மையத்தில் பேசுகையில், பாகிஸ்தான் அமைதியை விரும்பும் நாடு என்றும், அதற்காக பிராந்திய மற்றும் உலக அளவில் பல தியாகங்களை புரிந்துள்ளது என்று குறிப்பிட்டார்.

தொடர்ந்து பேசிய பாஜ்வா, நெடுங்காலமாக  உள்ள ஜம்மு காஷ்மீர் பிரச்சனையை குறிப்பிட்டு, காஷ்மீர் மக்களின் அபிலாஷைகளை நிறைவேற்றி, பிரச்சினையை தீர்க்க வேண்டிய அவசியத்தை வலியுறுத்தினார். 

ஜெனரல் பாஜ்வாவின் பேச்சு இருநாடுகளிலும் அமைதி வேண்டி காத்திருக்கும் மக்களிடையே பெரும் வரவேற்பைப் பெற்றது. 

இரண்டு நாட்கள் கழிந்த பிறகு பாக் பிரதமர் இம்ரான் கான் பேசும் போது, இந்தியாவை குறிப்பிட்டு "வாருங்கள், எங்களுடன் காஷ்மீர் பிரச்சனையை தீருங்கள். அதற்கு, முதலாவதாக, நீங்கள் மீண்டும் சட்டத் திருத்தம் 370ஐ நடைமுறைப் படுத்துங்கள். அதன் பிறகு, எங்களுடன் பேச்சுவார்த்தையை நடத்துங்கள். பிறகு, ஐ. நா. கட்டமைப்பின் தீர்மானத்தின் படி, காஷ்மீர் மக்களுக்கு அவர்கள் உரிமையை அளியுங்கள்" என்று கூறினார். 

இதை, வரவேற்ற பல இந்திய ஊடக ஆய்வாளர்கள், பாக் பிரதமர் அமைதிப் பேச்சுவார்த்தைக்கு தயாராகிறார் என்று கணித்தனர். அதற்கு ஏற்றவாறு, மேலும் இரண்டு நாட்களுக்கு பிறகு, பாக் பிரதமர் தனது இலங்கை விஜயத்தின் போது, பாகிஸ்தான் இந்தியாவுடன் சுமூக உறவையே நாடுவதாகவும், அதற்கு காஷ்மீர் பிரச்சனை ஒன்றே தடையாக நிற்பதாகவும் குறிப்பிட்டார்.

இதையடுத்து, ஊடகச் செய்திகள் பாகிஸ்தான் இந்தியாவிலிருந்து மீண்டும் பஞ்சு இறக்குமதி செய்வதற்கான முயற்சிகளில் ஈடுபட்டுள்ளதாக குறிப்பிட்டன. இந்தியாவுடனான வியாபார உறவை பாகிஸ்தான் ஒட்டு மொத்தமாக, இந்தியாவின் பாலாகோட் விமான தாக்குதலுக்குப் பின்பு, நிறுத்தி இருந்தது. இது சுமூக சூழ்நிலையை ஏற்படுத்த பாகிஸ்தான் காட்டும் இன்னொரு சமிக்ஞையா? 

இந்திய பாதுகாப்பு அமைச்சகம் பிப்ரவரி 25ந் தேதி அளித்த அறிக்கையில், இந்திய-பாகிஸ்தான் ராணுவங்களின் போர் முறை பொது இயக்குனர்கள், "ஹாட் லைன்" என்ற நேரடி தொலைபேசி மூலம் தொடர்பு கொண்டு, காஷ்மீர் எல்லையைப் பற்றிய தங்கள் கருத்துக்களை, பரிமாறிக் கொண்டதாக கூறியது.

அதன் பின், இரு தரப்பும் மற்றவர் கருத்துக்களை புரிந்து கொண்டு, எல்லையில் அமைதிக்கான சூழ்நிலையை மீண்டும் தொடர முடிவெடுத்தனர். அதன்படி, ஏற்கனவே நடைமுறையில் உள்ள ஒப்பந்தங்களை கண்டிப்பாக எல்லைக் கோட்டில் 24/25 பிப்ரவரி இரவில் இருந்து நடைமுறையாக கடைப்பிடிக்க முடிவு செய்ததாக, அந்த அறிக்கை கூறுகிறது. 

அதைத் தொடர்ந்து, எல்லையில் பிரச்சனைகள் ஏற்பட்டால், அவற்றை நேரடி தொலைபேசி மூலமும், அல்லது எல்லையில் உள்ள ராணுவ தளபதிகள் "கொடி" சந்திப்பின் மூலமாகவும் தீர்க்கலாம் என்று முடிவு செய்யப்பட்டுள்ளதாக அறிக்கை கூறுகிறது. 

ஆனால் இத்தகைய உயர்மட்ட ராணுவ நேரடி தொலைபேசித் தொடர்புகள் 2013, 2018 ஆகிய ஆண்டுகளில் நடந்தன. அவற்றில் இரு நாட்டு ராணுவத் தலைவர்களும் அமைதி காக்க ஒப்பந்தம் செய்து கொண்டாலும், அவை குறுகிய கால கட்டத்தில் நீர்த்துப் போயின. 

அதற்கு முக்கிய காரணம், தீவிரவாதிகளை உபயோகித்து இந்திய ராணுவப்படையினரை, அணு அணுவாக அழிப்பதை பாகிஸ்தான் தனது அடிப்படை போர் உத்தியாக உபயோகிப்பதே ஆகும். பாக் ராணுவம் அந்த நாட்டு வெளியுறவு, முக்கியமாக இந்திய உறவை, தனது செயல்பாடுகளின் கட்டுப்பாட்டுக்குள் வைத்துள்ளது. ஆகவே அதன் ஒப்புதல் இல்லாமல் பாக் அரசு, தீவிரவாதிகளை இந்தியாவுக்கு எதிராக உபயோகிப்பதை நிறுத்த முடியாது. 

இந்தச் செய்திகள், இந்திய பாகிஸ்தான் உறவில் அமைதிப் பேச்சுவார்த்தையின் துவக்கத்தை காட்டுகின்றனவா? பாகிஸ்தான் தலைமை ஏன் அமைதியை பற்றி தற்போது பேசுகிறது? அதை எவ்வளவு தூரம் நம்பலாம்? இப்படி நம் முன் பல கேள்விகள் எழுகின்றன. 

அவைகளைப் புரிந்து கொள்ள, இரு நாடுகளின் உறவின் சரித்திர பின்னணியை புரிந்து கொள்வது மிக அவசியம். தற்போது, சீனாவின் தலையீடு பாகிஸ்தானின் அரசியல், பொருளாதார வளர்ச்சி மற்றும் பாதுகாப்பு ஆகிய துறைகளில் 2013ல் இருந்து தொடர்ந்து அதிகரித்து வருகிறது. சி. பி. இ. சி எனப்படும் "சீன-பாகிஸ்தான் பொருளாதார பெருவழித் திட்டம்", சீனா உலக அளவில் கையெடுத்துள்ள "பெல்ட் அண்ட் ரோடு" (பி. ஆர். ஐ) இணைப்பு திட்டத்தின் மிகப் பெரிய அங்கமாகும். 

அதில் தற்போது தொய்வு ஏற்பட்டுள்ள நிலையில், இந்திய பாக் எல்லையில் ஓரளவு அமைதி நிலவினால்தான், சீனா அதில் முன்னேற்றம் காண முடியும். இந்த ஆண்டு ஜூலை மாதம் சீனாவில், சீன கம்யூனிஸ்ட் கட்சியின் நூறாம் ஆண்டுவிழா கொண்டாடப்படும். அந்த வேளையில் பி. ஆர். ஐ திட்டத்தின் மணிமகுடமான சி. பி. இ. சி திட்டத்தின் வெற்றிகாண வேண்டிய நெருக்கடி அதிபர் ஷீ ஜின்பிங்குக்கு ஒரு சவாலாக உள்ளது. 

அந்த சவாலை சந்திக்க, பாகிஸ்தானில் சீனா பல்வேறு உத்திகளை கையாண்டு வருகிறது. சி. பி. இ. சி. கட்டமைப்பின் தலைமையை பாக் ராணுவத்தின் கையில் மாற்றியதற்கு சீனாவின் அழுத்தமே காரணமென்று கூறப்படுகிறது. 

ஆகவே, இத்தகைய சூழ்நிலையில், இந்தியா பாக் எல்லையில் முழு அமைதி, பேச்சுவார்த்தை மூலம் ஏற்படுத்த முடியும் என்று எதிர்பார்ப்பது பகல் கனவாக முடியலாம். இது வரை, இந்திய பாதுகாப்பு மற்றும் வெளியுறவு துறைகள் விழிப்புணர்வுடன் செயல்பட்டு வருகின்றன. அந்த நிலைப்பாடு தொடரும் என்று எதிர்பார்க்கலாம். 

[கர்னல் ஆர் ஹரிஹரன் ராணுவ நுண்ணறிவுத் துறையில் தெற்காசிய மற்றும் தீவிர வாதம் ஆகிய பிரிவுகளில் போர் முனை அனுபவம் பெற்றவர். ஈமெயில்: haridirect@gmail.com வலைதளம்: https://col.hariharan.info]