Crystal gazing India-China relations

 2022 closed with a fresh setback to the fractured relations between India and China after Indian troops threw out 300 strong Chinese troops who had crossed the Line of Actual Control at Yang Tze in Tawang Sector of Arunachal Pradesh on December 9. How will the relations between the two Asian giants be in 2023?

India Legal/ Magazine / Special / January 7, 2023 

https://www.indialegallive.com/magazine/crystal-gazing-india-china-relations-galwan-lac-ladakh/

By Col R Hariharan

After the clashes at Yang Tze, Union Defence Minister Rajnath Singh told the Parliament, the Chinese intruders “attempted to unilaterally change the status quo” along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). In the scuffle that broke out some soldiers on both sides were injured. 

India-China relations started rapidly going south ever since China started massing troops along the LAC in Eastern Ladakh. It culminated in a clash between the Chinese and Indian troops at Galwan along the LAC in Eastern Ladakh in June 2020 in which 20 Indian troops were killed. The Galwan clash was perhaps a moment of truth for Prime Minister Narendra Modi who had invested heavily in building a mutually beneficial relationship with China. As prime minister, he had visited China five times and met with President Xi Jinping 18 times. Even after the ten-week long stand-off between Indian and Chinese troops in Doklam along the border with Bhutan in June 2017, he had met Xi twice in informal summits in Wuhan (April 2018) and Mahabalipuram (October 2019). They had agreed to maintain peace and tranquillity between the two countries, along their disputed border.  

After the Galwan clash, in January 2021, External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar had said three so-called “mutuals”—mutual respect, mutual sensitivity and mutual interests—are the determining factors for the bilateral relationship. “Any expectation that they can be brushed aside and that life can carry on undisturbed despite the situation at the border, that is simply not realistic.”

In the new year, Jaishankar’s latest broadside on China in his first media interaction in Vienna after the Yang Tze intrusion showed that India is in no mood to kiss and make up with China unless it conforms to agreed norms of conduct. He minced no words in reiterating that China was responsible for the tense situation between the two countries on the LAC. “We had agreements with China not to mass forces in our border areas and they have not observed those agreements, which is why we have the current tense situation for flouting the border agreements.” He added, “we had an agreement not to unilaterally change the LAC, which they have tried unilaterally do.”  

Evidently, the Indian MEA’s “calling a spade a spade” remarks can be considered a comment on China’s foreign minister Wang Yi’s Christmas day statement couched in diplomatese. Wang said: “China and India have maintained communication through the diplomatic and military-to-military channels, and both countries are committed to upholding stability in the border areas. We stand ready to work with India in the direction toward steady and sound growth” of the relations.

Evidently, Wang Yi was trying to play down the Yang Tze incident as the military commanders on both sides met after the incident and agreed to adhere to norms of conduct. In Eastern Ladakh, India and China held the 17th round of Corps Commander level talks on December 20 at Chushul/Moldo border. Nothing much was achieved; both sides agreed to maintain dialogue through military and diplomatic channels and work out mutually acceptable resolution of the remaining issues in Eastern Ladakh at the earliest.

Is this how relations between the two Asian giants will be in 2023? At the macro level, 2023 is not going to be like yester-years. As Thomas Friedman, thinker and author of the global best seller The World is Flat says, the world is not flat anymore. “The world is fast, fused, deep and open.” He explains fast as the speed of technological change in the pace of change. “Fused” is not merely the world is interconnected, but it is interdependent. The world is also fused by climate. Friedman explains “Deep” as the most important word of this era because “we have put sensors everywhere.” Lastly, he says the world is getting radically open. With a smartphone, every citizen is now a paparazzi, a filmmaker, a journalist and publisher with no editor or filter.

Friedman’s words are being validated by the way warfare has morphed into hybrid warfare—involving not merely the troops, but trade and commerce, industries, communications and at national and international levels. And China is mastering hybrid warfare. The dislocation of the chip industry in China and its fall out on global supply chains is an example of this. 

As both India and China are big countries, the advantages of coexistence and if possible, cooperation outweighs confrontation. India is an unavoidable Asian neighbour sharing the longest land border with China. Culturally, economically and militarily, India is a dominant power in South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region. More importantly, in spite of India’s self-reliance goals, India-China trade rose 34% to $115.83 billion in the year ending March 2022. 

China also cannot afford to ignore India as it is rated fourth in global military power rankings. Economically, India has the fifth highest GDP. India is also an important member of the Quadrilateral framework with three other-nations—Australia, Japan and the US—aimed to keep global waters free. Though the Quad framework is sketchy, India has assiduously cultivated strategic relations with the member countries.

Internationally, India shares the views of China on global warming and on the need for a more equitable world order where countries share resources equitably. India continues to be a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and the BRICS initiative of five powers who want change. India has maintained its close friendship with Russia in the face of Western sanctions slapped after its war in Ukraine. India has maintained its strategic autonomy by importing Russian oil and evolving monetary instruments for trade with Russia, defying the sanctions regime.

Ideally in 2023, both China and India should take steps to bury their hatchets and take baby steps to build their relations. But the real world is different from the ideal. China is in no hurry to resolve the border dispute as it can be used as a pressure against India. So, we can expect sporadic incidents of manageable proportions in the dozen “trouble spots” along both Ladakh and Arunachal borders.

President Xi is relentlessly pursuing the realisation of the Chinese dream. He has consolidated his control over the CCP; under his leadership China’s policymaking apparatus now rests not with the government, but with the Communist Party. This has strengthened the Party’s role in policy formulation and its strict implementation. General Secretary Xi heads the party’s eight central commissions and the Central Taiwan Small Group, dramatically increasing his decision-making power. With his tenure extended for a third term, Xi’s writ will remain unchallenged for quite some time. In 2023, we can expect President Xi to dominate both the national and international scene. This gives him a huge advantage over other global leaders.  

Based on President Xi’s speeches at the CCP Congress in 2022, we can identify China’s focus areas for action in 2023. Among these, Global Security Initiative (GSI), the Global Development Initiative (GDI) and Made in China 2025 (MIC 2025) are of special interest as they provide a central global role to China. The US considers the GSI as a challenger to the Quad initiative. GSI aims at staying committed to comprehensive, cooperative, sustainable security, respecting sovereignty, territorial integrity of all countries. India’s neighbours are likely to be invited to join the GSI; already, unconfirmed reports indicate China has approached Nepal to join the initiative. 

GDI is to improve China’s role as a leader in the global development agenda. President Xi proposed the GDI at the UN General Assembly in 2021. It seeks to expedite the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The GDI has received the support of over 100 countries. More than 60 countries have joined the Group of Friends of GDI. Of course, internally China will be busy with overall economic recovery to improve its economic performance in 2023. China is expected to follow proactive fiscal policy and prudent monetary policy to facilitate this. 

In his first comments after the latest round of talks between Indian and Chinese military commanders, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said that China is ready to work with India for the “steady and sound growth” of bilateral ties and the two countries are committed to upholding stability at the border areas. Wang Yi’s palliative words on “growth” of bilateral ties after the latest round of talks on December 20 have failed to make any progress in resolving the remaining issues along the LAC.

We may well end the year 2023 writing about the 30th round of talks; you never know what Emperor Xi can pull out of his hat! 

—The writer is a retired military intelligence specialist on South Asia associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies

Reinventing Taliban 2.0

 

Though the regime is trying to present a soft image of itself, this has not allayed the fear of thousands of citizens, who thronged to Kabul airport to flee. With the coffers empty, international acceptance and aid are crucial.

 

Col R Hariharan |Columns| August 21, 2018 | https://www.indialegallive.com/

 

Afghanistan when it marched trium­phantly into Kabul on Aug­ust 15. The Latin phrase veni, vidi, vici (I came, I saw, I conquered) attributed to Julius Caesar following his victory at the Battle of Zela in 42 BC may well apply to the Taliban’s victory in Afghanistan.

In barely a month, Taliban’s 70,000-odd trained fighters and followers overran the 3,00,000 strong Afghan army. The army, trained and armed by the US and its NATO allies at a cost of $83 billion, melted away without a fight in most places.

The Taliban is now better armed than ever before, thanks to the arms it has seized from the Afghan armed forces. Its success has shown that even after the two-decade long US-led “Global War on Terror”, the ideology of jihadi terrorism remains stronger than before. Taliban’s successful comeback has triggered a new era of uncertainties in Afghanistan. The country’s future now looks confused, chaotic, bleak, bloody and full of uncertainties.

International and internal stakeholders, who have been playing a large part in shaping the events, are trying to come to terms with the Taliban in power. Though the record of democratic rule in Afghanistan had been sullied by endemic corruption and cronyism, people enjoyed the benefits of living in a free society. There had been marked progress in the status of women in society as more and more of them participated in politics and the work place—with freedom to travel. Women were elected to parliament and public offices and formed nearly 39 percent of the work force.

After the capture of Kabul, Taliban has declared an Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and speaks of going ahead with its efforts to form an “inclusive, Islamic government”, an oxymoron of sorts. This has evoked the image of the Taliban which ruled the country from 1996 to 2001. Guided by the Deobandi interpretation of Sharia, it banned music, television, films and the internet. Art forms like painting a­nd photography were forbidden as idolatry. Even recreational sports were banned. Women were not allowed to work; they had to observe purdah and a male relative had to acc­ompany them when they came out of the house. If any woman broke the rules, she was whipped or executed.

The Taliban has inherited a fragile and aid-dependent economy. Employ­ment is concentrated in low-productivity agriculture (44 percent of the total workforce works in agriculture and 60 percent households derive some income from agriculture). Private sector development and diversification is constrained by a difficult business environment. Weak competitiveness drives a structural trade deficit, equal to around 30 percent of GDP, financed almost entirely from grant inflows and employment, and includes opium production, smuggling and illegal mining.

The government’s coffers are empty after the US government froze $9.5 billion assets of Afghanistan Central Bank. So, international acceptance is crucial for the Taliban regime; then only can it expect the country receive international aid commitments of $784 million (estimated by the World Bank) promised for the year.  European Union’s (EU) foreign policy chief has said the EU will cooperate with the Taliban-led government only if it respects fundamental rights, including those of women and prevents the use of Afghanistan’s territory by terrorists. Even China has said it will decide on extending diplomatic recognition to the Taliban only after the formation of the government, which it hoped would be “open, inclusive and broadly representative”.

This is perhaps one of the main reasons for the force presenting a soft image of itself—Taliban version 2.0. Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid spoke to the press a day after the takeover of Kabul and made a slew of promises, clearly aimed at living down the Taliban’s poor image. His promises included honouring women’s rights within the norms of Islamic laws, forgiving those who resisted them and those who served with the earlier government. He also said private media would continue to remain independent.

Mujahid said: “I would like to assure the international community, including the United States, that nobody will be harmed.” He emphasised: “We don’t want any internal or external enemies…. War has ended… (the leader) has pardoned everyone, we are committed to letting women work in accordance with the principles of Islam.” He added: “All those in the opposite side are pardoned from A to Z. We will not seek revenge.”

Answering a question on how the Taliban of today was different from the one that was defeated two decades ago, Mujahid said: “If the question is based on ideology, and beliefs, there is no difference”. But if it’s based on “experience, maturity and insight, no doubt there is a marked difference”. He asserted: “The steps today will be positively different from the past steps.

However, the words of Mujahid did not allay the fears of thousands of citizens who thronged Kabul international airport to catch a flight to get out of the country. There is widespread scepticism among the people whether the present incarnation—Taliban 2.0— would keep its promises.

The most sceptical are women, who suffered the most during the earlier spell of Taliban rule. In the last two decades, women have been enjoying unprecedented levels of freedom to dress, learn, travel and choose their own lifestyle. Music and artistic pursuits, banned by the Taliban, have been thriving under democracy.

Already reports of Afghan women being forced to marry Taliban fighters and being publicly flogged are trickling down. In Kabul, Taliban guards are asking women to cover themselves up and move around only with a male chaperone. In Herat, houses of women members of parliament were searched and their cars taken away. Taliban workers went round tarring the faces of women on posters displayed in shops in Kabul.

Though President Ashraf Ghani fled the country before Kabul fell, there are women leaders staying on. Salima Mazari, one of the three female district governors in Afghanistan, had been on a crusade since 2019 to protect Charkint district from the Taliban, though half of it is under Taliban control. Mazari has now been arrested by the Taliban. In an interview to AP, she had said: “In the provinces controlled by the Taliban, no women exist there anymore, not even in the cities. They are all imprisoned in their homes.” This sums up the reality of Taliban’s attitude to women’s existence under Sharia rule.

Taliban version 2.0 will also help the formation of an “inclusive government” which is not an easy exercise. There are internal differences within the Taliban leadership. Former President Hamid Karzai and Abdullah Abdullah who was to lead the High Council for National Reconciliation for Afghan peace talks, have already met Anas Haqqani, leader of the powerful Haqqani faction of the Taliban, in control of Kabul. They are hoping it would lead to negotiations with Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar Akhund, the First Vice Emir, who has reached Kabul. He is the co-founder of the Tali­ban in Afghanistan and deputy to the founder, Mullah Mohammed Omar. Baradar led the Doha negotiations with the Americans and signed the Doha Agreement in February 2020 for the withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan. Baradar is expected to be the president of Afghanistan in the new government.

After Ghani fled the country, Vice President Amrullah Saleh declared himself the legitimate president of the country and announced the formation of the anti-Taliban front. He is now located in Panjshir Valley, the heartland of Nor­thern Alliance, which allied with the Americans to fight the Taliban. Social media videos show the presence of Saleh along with Defence Minister General Bismillah Mohammadi and Tajik leader Ahmad Massoud, son of the late legendary Ahmed Shah Massoud.

Panjshir Valley is yet to be captured by the Taliban. So much would depend upon how the Taliban tackle the brewing opposition there. Anti-Taliban sentiments are also reported in a few other provinces.

Though the Taliban has captured most of Afghanistan and established control, government formation is likely to take time. Much would depend upon the Taliban’s ability to articulate an acceptable image to gain international recognition.

The writer is a military intelligence specialist on South Asia, associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies and the International Law and Strategic Studies Institute 

 

 

 

 

Coming to terms with China: Modi’s foreign policy initiatives in our neighbourhood

Colonel R Hariharan 

Courtesy: South Asia Analysis Group Paper No 6371 | 26 April 2018 | http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/node/2291

Prime Minister Narendra Modi is meeting President Xi Jinping in what is described as informal summit on April 27 and 28, 2018. They are expected to try and reboot their relations which had come under strain after the Doklam confrontation. China’s increasing in roads among smaller neighbours in India’s own backyard has become a matter of concern for India. The decision of all the neighbours’ of India, except Bhutan, to join the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), much to India’s discomfort, speaks for itself. Does the Indian establishment continues to see the smaller neighbours through eyes of a big brother? Can India deal with ever increasing in Chinese influence in South Asia? 

These questions will have to be answered collectively because there is a seamless connectivity between Modi’s the external and internal policy initiatives to ensure India gains its rightful place in the international community, taking advantage of its size, growing economic power and geostrategic location.

His foreign policy initiatives are linked to benefit national development, trigger entrepreneurship and increase employment opportunities.  In this respect, his foreign policy differs qualitatively from earlier initiatives, which lacked an overall vision. PM Modi’s relationship building initiatives with other countries are applied at three geo-strategic levels - neighbourhood, regional and global. They are not mutually exclusive and need to be considered holistically.

At the strategic level, he is de-hyphenating India's relations with other countries in keeping with the dynamics of strategic power play to come to terms with China’s efforts to create a new world order. This will explain Modi’s efforts to strengthen India-US relations, while maintaining existing close links with Russia. He has also de-hyphenated India’s growing relations with Israel from India’s stand on Palestine, while strengthening traditional links with other Islamic states like Iran, Saudi Arabia and the GCC. This has enabled India to strengthen national security as well as ensure energy security. With these initiatives, India hopes to expand trade and commerce and increase foreign investment in manufacturing and infrastructure.

India's national security responsibilities have also increased, in keeping with its increasing international foot print, resulting at times in competing interests with China. However, it would be incorrect to equate PM Modi's initiatives as a response to China's own enlarging international presence. This is more so in our neighbourhood - Afghanistan, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka and for that matter Maldives, Mauritius and Seychelles in IOR. India's relations with these countries are multi-faceted and special (in some cases unique) due to umbilical links of geographical connectivity and shared history.

India by sheer size of its land mass, population, economy and military power at times makes its neighbours uneasy. On some occasions, India’s own complacency in handling its power has resulted in browbeating some of the smaller neighbours to agree to its dispensation, reinforcing the notion of the big brother. Though this is inevitable in the world of realpolitick, India's inability to fine tune its architecture in handling the smaller neighbours’s concerns over the years has given rise to anti-Indian sentiment within the body politics of neighbouring countries. Conscious of this, India seems to be improving its approach in treating them as equal partners, in its own national interest.

PM Modi's initiatives have addressed some of these glitches affecting the neighbours with mixed results. To a large extent, during the last three years India has managed to improve its relations with neighbours (barring Pakistan) to retain its status as their key partner. However, India is still slow on delivering upon its promises, thanks to its internal “democratic” political decision-making process and limitations of bureaucracy to think out of the box. Of course, the same weaknesses apply to India’s neighbours in making good of India’s readiness to help.

China's has come as a huge attraction for the impoverished  smaller countries in South Asia. It promises to bring in Chinese investment to develop their capacities and open up global markets through better infrastructure. However, China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project in Pakistan, the 21st Maritime Silk Road project in Sri Lanka and BRI linkages in Nepal and Bangladesh are much more than development initiatives. . India has to watch these developments carefully and turn them to its advantage. This is more easily said than done. This can be achieved not by arm twisting, but by creating conditions for smaller neighbours to benefit from India's own development agenda. This has to be ingrained in our policy implementation.

Whether China’s projects in our neighbourhood are economically viable or not, they boost China's power assertion in South Asia. China’s strategic assets created in South Asia and Indian Ocean region is already leading to stationing of Chinese troops to protect its interests. The BRI also improves China's global competitiveness; so it is not surprising that large chunks of Chinese investments are being made in BRI in South Asia with an eye on the huge underserviced markets.

The reality is India cannot match China's political and economic power and capabilities or its unbridled global ambitions. PM Modi is heading a vibrant democracy with its checks and balances operating on a different political plane, unlike President Xi Jinping who enjoys total political support as the leader of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) ruling the country.

However, the two countries differ in their aspirations. India’s efforts in this region aim to protect its interest, rather than neutralize China’s entry. So India would like to maintain cordial, than confrontational, relations with its northern neighbour. Unlike India, China’s ambitions are global, in keeping with its massive economic clout supported by growing military power. So it would be logical for China to ensure normal relations with India are maintained, lest its global ambitions are queered by getting bogged down in confrontation with India, a regional power with its own strengths of size and growing economic and military power.

Moreover, China would like to continue to profit from India’s rapidly growing economy. Already China has emerged as the number one player in India’s huge mobile phone market. This does not mean China would give up its territorial claims on India or to settle the border problem. They serve as useful levers to periodically assert China’s strategic power. So, it would be incorrect to award brownie points to India's foreign policy based only on China’s (or any other power’s) performance in India’s neighbourhood. 

India will continue to loom larger than China in competitive politics of neighbouring countries for reasons of geography and soft power influence. Sections of political class in these countries find it profitable to leverage latent anti-India feelings to their advantage. China has increased its influence with these sections. Combined with its economic clout and selective use of anti-Indian sentiments, China is poised to enlarge its political influence in these countries. India will be keeping this in mind in building both bilateral relations as well as in evolving multi-lateral strategies with other likeminded nations. India's quadrilateral initiative with the US, Japan and Australia is one such move; however it has to grow beyond its military content.

India is trying to build qualitatively different initiatives with countries where China’s economic and military power loom larger than India i.e., Vietnam, Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia. PM Modi's invitation to ASEAN heads of state to attend the Republic Day celebrations in New Delhi is an example of such an initiative in action. India and Japan are closely cooperating in many projects in the region including in Sri Lanka, where they are jointly involved in building an LPG terminal. Japan is also investing in Chahbahar project in Iran, which is an India-Iran project. The Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC) is also in the offing.

But India is perhaps under performing in progressing its initiatives in South Asia as it is bogged down by its preoccupation with Pakistan. China’s strategic alliance with Pakistan has qualitatively changed India’ strategic threat perceptions. This has probably encouraged Pakistan army to renew its effort to pursue its tactics of ‘bleeding India’ using Jihadi terrorist groups to tie-down Indian security forces in Jammu and Kashmir. PM Modi has been fairly successful in his efforts to internationally highlight Pakistan’s state- sponsored terrorism, which has embarrassed Pakistan. This may not be enough for Pakistan army to loosen its stranglehold on national policy making in respect of national security and India. It is in this complex environment PM Modi will be meeting with President Xi.

The Indian PM’s success in implementing his vision is directly related to his political fortunes as India's democracy validates national leadership every five years. President Xi does not enjoy such limitations as he is poised to lead the monolithic country perhaps for "life time." So it is advantage China and President Xi as of now. We have to wait and watch, how the cookie crumbles. In this context, probably Lord Palmerston of Great Britain’s cliché that in international relations there are no permanent friends or permanent enemies, only permanent interests is true more than ever before. But our permanent interests will always rest in the neighbourhood and that has to include China.

Col R Hariharan is a military intelligence specialist on South Asia, associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies, South Asia Analysis Group and the International Law and Strategic Analysis Institute. E-mail: haridirect@gmail.com  Web: http://col.hariharan.info

Also:  Chennai Centre for China Studies Article No 023/2018

https://www.c3sindia.org/geopolitics-strategy/coming-to-terms-with-china-modis-foreign-policy-initiatives-in-our-neighbourhood-by-col-r-hariharan-vsm-retd/

India-China strategic equation along eastern approaches

Col R Hariharan VSM

[This is the text of a presentation made at an international conference on "India, China and the Silk Road Initiatives: Challenges and Opportunities" organised jointly by the Institute for Contemporary Chinese Studies (ICCS) and the School of International Relations and Politics, Mahatma Gandhi University, Kottayam on 11-12 November 2016.]

“Connectivity itself has emerged as a theatre of present day geopolitics. When diplomats get agitated about lines on the map today, they are more likely to be discussing proposed road connections, rail lines, oil pipelines or maritime routes than contesting national boundaries. Who draws these lines; who agrees with them; what are the financial institutions to convert them into reality; what would be the modes of managing and implementing them once built – all these questions carry geopolitical significance. Naturally, every country tends to look at these questions from the view point of its own best interests. Connecting Asia successfully requires the judiciousness and wisdom to reconcile these differing points of view and agree on something that all stakeholders can live with.” - S Jaishankar, Foreign Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs, speaking at the Raisina Dialogue, New Delhi. 2 March 2016

Part I: China's strategic infrastructure initiatives

In order to realise China’s soaring ambition to be a global power in keeping with its worldwide political and strategic influence, President Xi Jinping embarked upon the transcontinental One Belt One Road economic initiative (OBOR) in 2013.[i] In fact, the OBOR is a revival of China’s ancient Silk Route network of trade routes from China to Europe and it forms part of President Xi’s realisation of the ‘Chinese dream’.[ii]

The OBOR includes six initiatives: China–Russia–Mongolia Economic Corridor, New Eurasia Land Bridge Economic Corridor, China–Central Asia–West Asia Economic Corridor, China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar economic Corridor (BCIM) and China–Indo China Peninsula Economic Corridor. In tandem with the land based connectivity, China is also promoting the 21^st Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR) to improve China’s Indian Ocean connectivity through by creating maritime infrastructure and facilities along the littorals of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). Collectively, all the six OBOR strategic initiatives and the MSR are referred to as the ‘Belt and Road’ initiative. The Belt and Road initiative visualises the construction of multimodal infrastructure links and energy and industrial complexes to promote economic interconnectivity between China and Asia, Europe and IOR.[iii]

There are strategic concerns about the OBOR as its vision statement speaks of ‘promoting orderly and free flow of economic factors, highly efficient allocation of resources, deep integration of markets’ and encouraging economic policy coordination among countries ‘to jointly create a balanced regional economic cooperation architecture and to seek new models of international cooperation and global governance.’ [iv] This reinforces the perception of India, shared by the U.S. and its Western and Asian allies, that the OBOR is part of President Xi Jinping’s strategic plan to create a new world order. This has caused concern about China’s strategic intentions as the OBOR’s six economic corridors would become the vehicles for China’s global dominance.[v]

As China’s global footprint expands with the development of the OBOR, the PLA is being modernised to improve its capability to take care of increasing China’s strategic interests. The PLA has recruited better educated soldiers and officers to manage technology systems to suit the modern informatised battlefields.[vi]  The U.S. Department of Defense 2016 Annual Report to the Congress has noted that China’s military modernization program has become ‘more focused on investments and infrastructure to support a range of missions beyond China’s periphery, including power projection, sea lane security, counter-piracy, peacekeeping, and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR).’ [vii] The Report further states that efforts were on to improve PLA’s key capabilities including cruise missiles; short, medium, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles; high performance aircraft; integrated air defense networks; information operations capabilities; and amphibious and airborne assault units.

China is also improving its maritime reach and capability through the MSR initiative.  It has constructed a chain of modern port complexes in Kyaukpyu (in Myanmar), Hambantota (Sri Lanka) and Gwadar (Pakistan) in the Indian Ocean. PLA navy’s warships including nuclear submarines are now familiar with the IOR as they have been regularly patrolling the Indian Ocean waters for some years as part of anti-piracy duties.   

China’s maritime ambition is extending well beyond Asia as evident from plans to establish a naval base in Djibouti in the Horn of Africa, announced in November 2012.[viii] Similarly, China has also been negotiating with Portugal for taking over a US air base in the Azores archipelago in Portugal,  a year after the US decided to vacate it.[ix] As US Republican chairman of the House Permanent Committee on Intelligence Devin Nunes commenting on China spreading its infrastructure investments around the globe said, ‘It is now using the same tactics to establish a foothold in the Azores which, if successful, will be used for a logistics and intelligence hub that could ultimately be expanded for other military purposes, adjacent to critical US military facilities.’ [x] These facilities would be able to sustain the PLA operations far from home shores. Thus OBOR network has the potential to be a game changer in tilting global strategic equations in China’s favour in the coming decade.

Part II: Strategic implications of the OBOR initiatives  in South Asia

South Asia occupies an important place in China’s global power projection for both strategic and economic reasons because five South Asian countries – Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Nepal and Bhutan – border China’s restive Xinjiang and Tibet autonomous regions. South Asia also dominates the Indian Ocean through which China’s maritime traffic passes.  This makes the CPEC, the BCIM and the MSR initiatives, forming part of the OBOR in South Asia, vital to the success of the OBOR as a whole. The South Asian region also provides China’s landlocked western regions direct access to the warm water ports of Indian Ocean. South Asia, with its growing middle class population and under developed infrastructure and manufacturing sectors, offers excellent prospects for Chinese investment and trade. The  World Bank in an April 2016 report has rated South Asia as “the fastest growing region in the world, with economic growth expected to gradually accelerate from 7.1 percent in 2016 to 7.3 percent in 2017” showing resilience in the face of turbulent international markets.[xi]   India with of a population of 1.27 billion (of the total regional population of 1.7 billion) wields enormous strategic, economic, cultural and religious influence in South Asia. More than all this, China probably sees India as a challenger to its ‘vision to write the next era of globalization and help its export and investment engines run for years to come.’[xii] The CPEC, BCIM and the MSR initiatives with their networks in South Asian countries would help China in strategically and commercially handle India’s overwhelming presence in the region. 

Like most of the countries in Central and West Asia, which are starved of investments, South Asian countries also see the OBOR projects as an attractive proposition to facilitate the flow of Chinese investments. They expect Chinese investments to speed up development projects in backward regions and improve employment opportunities, while better international connectivity would increase their international trade prospects. Pakistan as a participant and Afghanistan as a beneficiary have already joined of the CPEC. Nepal has also indicated its willingness to join the OBOR as the Chinese have undertaken projects to improve Nepal’s road connectivity with Tibet.   China wants India to join the OBOR, because as the biggest regional power and a rising global economic power India’s participation would improve China’s credibility in the region. It would also contribute to the economic viability of not only the CPEC and BCIM but the OBOR as a whole.  More than all this, it would help China build multifaceted relations with India and reduce the chances of India “ganging up” with the U.S. and Japan against China. 

 India had been rather lukewarm to the idea of participating in the OBOR initiative. India sees the OBOR as having serious implications for its national security, which had been hostage to China’s territorial claims along India’s northern borders since 1960s. China does not recognise the validity of the Mc Mahon line as the international boundary between India and China (Tibet region). China has continued to illegally occupy of the Indian territory of Aksai Chin in Ladakh region.  China also claims other pockets of Indian territory along the Himalayan border as also the whole of Arunachal Pradesh as Southern Tibet.  In spite of this, from 1996 onwards both the countries have made efforts to rebuild their relations fractured after 1962 war. Although the two countries had held 19 rounds of talks to resolve the border dispute, only limited progress has been made. So far, only agreements on border management to avoid accidental escalation of conflict and maintenance of status quo in respect of areas of existing settlements in the disputed areas have been arrived at.[xiii]

Another factor clouding India’s relations is China’s suspicion about the continued hospitality extended to the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan spiritual leader and about 100,000 Tibetan refugees, living in exile in India for nearly six decades. China has branded the Nobel Laureate for Peace as a ‘dangerous separatist’ because he remains the visible icon of the Tibetan struggle for autonomy to preserve their distinct identity, culture and language. China’s contempt for the Dalai Lama is evident from the intemperate ‘warnings’ it issues to India, whenever the Tibetan leader meets an Indian official or minister or participates even in a religious conclave. Recently, China has issued yet another ‘warning’ to India for clearing the Dalai Lama’s his visit to Arunanchal Pradesh to participate in a religious function at the Tawang monastery. [xiv]

In spite these disputes, India-China relations qualitatively improved after Prime Minister Narendra Modi came to power in 2014. India launched proactive measures to build cordial and mutually beneficial relations with China and other neighbours. Since he came to power, Prime Minister Modi has had four bilateral meetings with President Xi Jinping focusing on building win-win relations between the two countries. President Xi has reciprocated the Indian Prime Minister’s efforts. Prime Minister Modi’s use of the catch phrase “Inch towards Miles” (abbreviation of the sentence ‘India and China towards a millennium of exceptional energy’) expresses his optimism about the emerging India-China relations.[xv]  Both the countries have taken a number of initiatives to foster trade, investment, strategic cooperation on global issues and on building people to people relations between the two countries. China is increasingly investing in and executing a number of projects in India’s industrial, infrastructure and manufacturing sectors.

President Xi and Prime Minister Modi seem to enjoy great personal rapport after their meetings and interactions. Despite this, India-China relations have entered a period of uncertainty. This is mainly due to China’s efforts to deepen its multifaceted strategic cooperation with India’s bête noire Pakistan, even as it talked of building win-win relations with India. The bitter relations between India and Pakistan dates back to1948, when Pakistan invaded and forcibly occupied part of the Muslim-majority state of Jammu and Kashmir, which had opted to join India. Not reconciled to the merger of Pakistan had waged three wars against India in which the Kashmir issue was the centre piece. After losing all the three wars, Pakistan embarked upon using Islamist terror groups based in Pakistan occupied Kashmir (POK) to create public unrest in the state, while Pakistan based terrorists carried out attacks on Indian security forces. India’s parleys to normalise relations with Pakistan have been frustrated by Pakistan’s failure to rein in state-sponsored Jihadi terrorists based in Pakistan operating against India. Despite assurances from Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to take action, they continue to infiltrate into the Jammu and Kashmir state to carry out attacks and trigger unrest.

India has also objected to the CPEC project as its passes through POK violating India’s sovereignty. India is concerned about the $46 billion project as it would not only to help the development of Pakistan, but build also enable China to increase its presence to build very close strategic, economic, political and military relations. This would mutually enhance their political and military capabilities which could be to the detriment of India.  China plans to station 100,000 marine troops to protect its overseas assets in Djibouti base and Gwadar port.[xvi] Thus CPEC would legitimise China’s military presence in Pakistan in areas close to India’s western borders with Pakistan. These moves have raised serious questions in India about China’s strategic intentions, as its close strategic bonds with Pakistan could affect India’s delicately balanced relations with both the countries. This could also make it difficult for India to prevent external considerations influencing the resolution of bilateral problems with both China and Pakistan.  

In bid to safeguard India’s interests in this worsening strategic scene, Prime Minister Modi has strengthened India’s strategic partnerships with the U.S., Japan and Vietnam. The strategic partnership is expected to protect India’s traditional areas of influence in South and Southeast Asia as well as the IOR which have been eroded by China. The Indian navy conducting the 2016 Malabar trilateral joint naval exercises with the U.S and Japan, off Japanese coast in the vicinity of SCS, have added to China’s suspicions. China had not taken kindly to India taking a public stand in support of the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea (SCS) akin to the U.S, in the face of China’s claim to sovereignty over the whole of the SCS.

Opaque process adopted for the OBOR

India has also expressed concerns about the opaque process adopted for the OBOR project. China-centric trade and investment strategies in projects executed in Myanmar and Sri Lanka had been found to lack transparency and promote environmental degradation and corrupt practices. This had caused huge political backlash in both the countries. China’s singular focus on its own interests at the cost of the host nation’s interests had caused public outcry against Chinese aided projects.[xvii]

India’s foreign secretary S. Jaishankar while addressing the Raisina Dialogue, in New Delhi in May 2014, made a pointed reference to these concerns. Though he did not specifically mention the OBOR or its South Asian projects, he said India viewed it differently from the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), also a Chinese initiative. He emphasised that India had detailed consultations with China before it took a decision to join the AIIB. However, the OBOR was presented as a ‘more unilateral decision.’ He said the key issue was ‘whether we will build our connectivity through consultative processes or more unilateral decisions’ and India preferred the former.[xviii] In view of India’s reservations, China is said to be trying to get Russia to calm India and save the CPEC.[xix] 

India and the BCIM

The BCIM project on completion will be connect India and China - the two Asian economic giants – through India’s strategically most vulnerable eastern region bordering four countries -Bangladesh, Bhutan, China and Myanmar. The BCIM initiative aims at harnessing the comparative advantage of each country for the mutual benefit of all members through crucial infrastructure connectivity and economic co-operation. With the intra – BCIM trade galloping from $6 billion in 2001 to $90 billion in 2011 and expected to touch $130 billion, building seamless connectivity between the members would help in rapid economic growth and human development of the backward regions. This would benefit approximately 1.1 billion young people under the age of 25 living in the BCIM region (estimated at Bangladesh 51.1 percent, China 31.8 percent, India 46.6 percent and Myanmar 44.7 percent) and upgrade the quality of life for the people as a whole.[xx]  

The 2800–km long economic corridor starts from Kolkata (West Bengal, India) and connects Kunming (Yunnan province, China). From Kolkata, it runs through the Bangladesh cities of Jessore, Dhaka and Sylhet to cross into India near Silchar (Assam). From there it goes through Imphal and Moreh in Manipur state to join the Tamu - Kalewa friendship road in Myanmar and onward to Mandalay and Lashio. It enters China at Muse to reach Kunming via Riuli and Dali. A stretch of less than 200–km of the road in Myanmar from Kalewa to Monywa is required to be upgraded to all weather road. [xxi] Similarly, another 50 km stretch between Jiribam and Imphal in Manipur state is also in poor condition.

The concept of BCIM interconnectivity is not new. It was thrashed out in detail by scholars, business leaders and economists from the four countries for nearly three decades through track-2 initiative, with little progress. However, it got official recognition when the four nations started looking at connectivity strategies in the late 1990s to take advantage of the global economic liberalisation. Though the BCIM Forum for Regional Cooperation was formed in 1999 and government officials, scholars, business leaders and technical experts from the four countries periodically met and discussed BCIM related issues, progress on the ground was not much.[xxii]

Even before the OBOR was conceived, China had taken up infrastructure construction, industrial and technology development projects in the three landlocked Southwestern provinces including Yunnan province as part of the Western Development Strategy adopted in 1998. Yunnan province which borders Mynanmar, Laos and Vietnam became the focal point of BCIM project when China started promoting the BCIM in 2012.[xxiii]    Chinese visualises the BCIM to provide not only seamless road infrastructure but also provide railway, water, air and digital connectivity for free movement of goods, services and people across the whole region. They expect it to lower barriers to provide for free flow of investments and resources to develop modern cities, create industrial complexes and increase employment opportunities.

Even before the BCIM was conceived, India adopted the Look East Policy in 1992 to improve infrastructure links with Southeast Asian nations, particularly the ASEAN. The Policy aimed at opening up the landlocked Northeast states for development and external trade. India hopes to reduce social unrest in the backward region that had led to decades of separatist and ethnic insurgencies, despite having rich natural resources, tea, fossil fuel and timber. India also hopes that improved communication links with Southeast Asia would fast track the quality of life of the people in this region. As a part of the policy, India had embarked upon two infrastructure projects in partnership with Myanmar to improve the country’s external connectivity through the Northeast. These are the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway (Project) and the Kaladan Multi Modal Transit Transport Project (KMMTTP). The KMMTTP would connect Haldia port on India’s eastern seaboard with Sittwe port in Myanmar where a carrier terminal is being built. From there through the Kaladan River the road reaches Mizoram state (India) reducing the transit time. These projects have progressed well; on completion they are expected to mutually add value to BCIM connectivity.[xxiv]

In addition to these initiatives, the Chinese have also reopened the Stillwell Road of World War II vintage in 2016 from Kunming to Assam. The road was in disuse for long. It runs from Kunming to Assam through Northern Myanmar via Myitkyina to cross the Indian border at Pangsau Pass (Arunachal Pradesh) to reach Ledo in Assam. In a first, two Chinese trucks carrying exhibits for the Assam International Agri Horticultural Show 2016 reached Guwahati in Assam from Baoshan in Yunnan to mark the opening of the Stillwell Road. The Stillwell road enters India through the Pangsau Pass in Arunachal Pradesh. As Aruanchal Pradesh is claimed by the Chinese, the use of the Stillwell road would be susceptible to the vagaries of India–China relations. Moreover, the poor condition of the road is also likely to restrict its use.[xxv] 

Bangladesh officially started taking interest in the BCIM project with the adoption of the Look East Policy in 2001 to improve links with Southeast Asia and China. As the BCIM is in consonant with this policy, Bangladesh hopes the BCIM would help it to gain greater market access to both India and China, the two most powerful Asian economies. It also expects the project to eliminate non-tariff barriers and bring in more investment for infrastructural development.

After Myanmar’s ruling military junta ended its isolationist policy in the 1990s, it started developing better infrastructure links with China and India with their assistance. After democracy was restored, Myanmar readily joined the BCIM project. Myanmar’s state counsellor Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi reiterated Myanmar’s support to Belt and Road initiative and the BCIM when she visited Beijing and met with President Xi Jinping in August 2016.[xxvi]   

Extremist and insurgency threats

Extremism and insurgency is a major problem in Bangladesh, Manipur (India) and Myanmar particularly in the region through which the BCIM corridor runs. The region is a melting pot of diverse ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic identities, which had made it difficult to eliminate the spread of extremism and insurgency.

Manipur state’s accession to India in 1949 is a highly emotive issue for the majority Meiteis, who had been ruling the state before accession. This continues to influence Meiteis social and political perceptions. The Meiteis, who form 53 percent of the state’s 2.86 million population, have a delicately balanced socio-political relationship with the minority indigenous tribal groups who form 20 percent of the population. They have their own distinct ethnic identity, languages and dialects.  This has resulted in complex political and ethnic problems that hamper governance and development activities in the state since it acceded to India on 21 September 1949.

The Meitei insurgency relates to the demand for independence from sections of ultra nationalist Meitei population from 1992 onwards. Most of the insurgent groups are in suspended animation, though some of the splinter groups still carry out criminal activities. Sections of Kukis fearing the domination of Meiteis and Nagas, organised themselves into armed groups to demand the creation of Kukiland, a separate state for Kukis to protect their identity and culture. However, Kuki extremist groups are also observing ceasefire after the government assured it would resolve their grievances.

The Government of India signed in August 2015 the Naga Peace Accord with the most influential Naga insurgent group – the Issac Swu-Muivah faction of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN-IM) to end the insurgency.[xxvii] However, their insistence on the creation of ‘Nagalim,’ a greater Nagaland state made up of Naga inhabited areas of Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur and Nagaland and some parts of Myanmar, has become a stumbling block to permanent peace. The demand for ‘Nagalim’ enjoys widespread support among Naga tribal groups in Manipur, particularly among the Tangkhuls who are an influential Naga group. Unless all sides are prepared to make some compromises to evolve a permanent solution, the Nagalim issue could remain a potential rallying point for the resurgence of Naga extremism.

Another troubling aspect in Manipur is the sporadic raids carried out by the Myanmar based Kaplang faction of the NSCN trans-border raids against Indian security forces in Manipur. [xxviii] Though both India and Myanmar have carried out joint operations a number of times against trans-border insurgents, they still remain a security threat.

Since independence, Bangladesh had been facing both Islamist extremist groups affiliated to the Al Qaeda and Left Wing extremists (LWE). In sustained operations against LWE between 2005 and 2016, security forces had killed as many as 665 extremists.[xxix] This has practically eliminated the LWE threat. A number of Islamic terrorist groups sympathetic to the Al Qaeda came up after the U.S. launched its war on terror in the wake of 9/11 Al Qaeda attacks in the U.S  These include the Harkat-ul Jihad al Islami Bangladesh (HUJI-B), the Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB) and the Jamatul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB). They were very active till 2006, when the military-led caretaker government came to power curbed their freedom of action.

After  Mrs Sheikh Hasina-led Awami League came to power in 2009 with a mandate to eliminate Islamic extremism and cut its links with ultra right wing Islamist political parties, large number of militants have been arrested and arms cache have been recovered.  In spite of this, small groups of Islamist extremists continue to target liberal elements, which raise their voice against Jihadi terrorism.  On 1 July 2016, a group of five armed terrorists raided a well known cafe in Dhaka and held a dozen customers including foreigners as hostages.  In the police action that followed, in all 29 people including 20 hostages (including 18 foreigners), five terrorists and two police officers were killed.

Though, Bangladesh police have discounted the claim of the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL), the international jihadi terrorist group for carrying out the attack, the possibility is very much there, as local terrorist elements probably inspired by the ISIL propaganda are believed to have carried out the attacks.[xxx] Security forces have killed 74 JMB extremists so far in 2017, in operations carried out against them. To escape the security crackdown, many JMB cadres are said to have infiltrated into West Bengal, Assam and Tripura states. The Bangladesh government has warned the government of India about their infiltration in the three states.  Thus Islamic extremism in Bangladesh continues to be a potential threat to destabilise the smooth operation of the BCIM.

Myanmar has been facing ethnic insurgency since 1948. Ethnic minorities make up about 30 percent of the population. They are mainly concentrated in the Shan, Kayah, Karen, Mon, Chin, Kachin and Rakhine states. They took to insurgency demanding independence after they found promises made to treat them equitably at the time of independence were not kept by successive governments in Myanmar.  The threat of ethnic insurgency had been one of the reasons for the army to rule the country either directly or indirectly since 1961. Though the army had managed to work out a ceasefire agreement with about 14 of the 16 insurgent groups, it floundered when major ethnic groups of Kachins, Kokang, and Shans refused to merge their armed cadres with the army till a durable settlement for a federal union was worked out. However, from 2013 the Myanmar government had held nine rounds of peace talks and reached a national ceasefire agreement. Eight insurgent groups had signed the agreement by November 2016.

Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, senior counsellor of the National League for Democracy government, convened the 21^st Century Panglong Conference on 31 August 2016, kindling hopes of achieving complete peace in the country by 2019-20. The nine ethnic armed groups which form the United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC) attended the conference to push their demand for a federal union.[xxxi]

However, armed conflicts which broke out in northern part of the country in November 2016 have stalled the peace making process. The Kachin Independence Army (KIA), Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA - formed of tribes of Chinese ethnicity) and the Arakan Army (AA) launched coordinated attacks on military outposts, police stations and a trade centre in Muse and Kutkai township in northern Shan State. It is through this region the BCIM corridor enters China. The 105-mile trade zone southeast of Muse in Kutkai township area has come under a standstill due to the clashes. The situation along the Yunnan border has worsened with as many as 20,000 Kokang tribals, who are of Chinese ethnicity living on the Myanmar side of the border, seeking refuge with their kinsmen living on the Chinese side of the border. China has repeatedly expressed its concern about the situation in the Kokang region to Myanmar.

Myanmar’s fledgling democracy has been facing a major challenge after anti-Muslim violence broke out in Central Myanmar town of Meiktila in March 2013. Egged on by fringe elements among Buddhist clergy, it is now focused mainly on Rohingiya Muslim minority living in Rakhine sate as Myanmar has not granted them citizenship though they had been living in the country for generations. Rohinigiyas had to been trying to flee the country after army crackdown which destroyed their villages. It has snowballed into a major international human rights issue after the army was accused of wanton destruction of property, rape and murder of Rohingiyas.

Myanmar government has set up an advisory commission on Rakhine state headed by former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan to find lasting solutions to the conflict in the state.[xxxii] The Commission is scheduled to submit its report this year. In the meanwhile, Myanmar army had been involved in operations against suspected Rohingiya militants, said to be affiliated to the ISIL, who attacked an army camp in the region. The whole situation is nebulous and uncertain along the Bangladesh border with potential to adversely affect Myanmar’s relations with Bangladesh which is already hosting thousands of Rohingiya refugees.  The enormity of the problems facing the BCIM corridor through this troubled region has the potential to frequently dislocate its smooth and uninterrupted operations unless security forces are earmarked for ensuring secure movement.

CONCLUSION

Despite serious reservations over China’s strategic intentions in promoting the Belt and Road initiative (OBOR), as it is linked to the giant CPEC infrastructure initiative in Pakistan, India has agreed to join the BCIM corridor initiative which also forms part of the OBOR. The BCIM traversing from Kolkata through Bangladesh and Manipur state in India and Myanmar will end in Kunming in Yunnan, China. It is expected to open up the backward region by initiating development activities to improve employment and trading opportunities.

The BCIM region is a complex one composed of people of diverse ethnicity who belong to different religions. They speak many languages and tribal dialects. Their interaction is conditioned by their historical experiences including conflicts.  The difficult terrain and poor communication in the region has discouraged close interaction. Lack of development and desire to preserve the distinct identity of various ethnic groups had given rise to a number of separatist and ideological insurgencies, notably in India and Myanmar with their fall out in Bangladesh bordering both India and Myanmar.  Though both the countries have initiated a dialogue process to end separatist insurgencies, normal life has not been fully restored yet. Bangladesh, which had been troubled by Islamic radicalism in politics, had been trying to eradicate Islamic extremists who had become active in the country since 1992. Though the security forces have succeeded the threat is far from over. International jihadi terrorist organisations like the ISIL have been interested in using local extremist elements to their advantage to carry out terrorist strikes. So the potential threat from resurgent Islamic extremism is very much there.  

In addition to the threat of insurgency and Islamic extremism, the region had been facing other unconventional threats from trans-border movement of extremists, unrest due to illegal immigrants, trafficking in drugs, arms and people and operation of criminal gangs across the borders.

These have the potential to hinder the smooth operation of the BCIM. The mismatch in political perceptions and bilateral problems among the four countries serviced by the BCIM could also delay resolution of problems arising in the day to day operation of the BCIM. In order to address these issues, a regulatory framework to handle issues of governance i.e., transparency, accountability, sovereignty, security and monitoring environmental impact will be required.  

This is going to be a major challenge for all the member countries, particularly in Myanmar. Dr. Rej Jia, President of the Yunnan Academy of Social Sciences, had suggested institutionalising a four-nation security partnership as part of the recommendations of the JSG. She said the BCIM countries could draw lessons from the six-nation Greater Mekong Sub-region Economic Cooperation Programme to enforce security along the route for transportation, trade and trade. While addressing the problems relating to physical connectivity might be easier, establishing an appropriate legal and regulatory framework could prove harder, she added.[xxxiii] Dr Ria’s suggestion is worthy of consideration for evolving a fool proof mechanism to ensure greater transparency, security and accountability is in place for the BCIM project.  

NOTES AND REFERENCES

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[i] ‘Full Text: Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Belt and Road.’ 2015. Xinhua CRI English News. March 29.  http://english.cri.cn/12394/2015/03/29/2941s872030.htm (accessed 12 January 2017).

[ii]  President Xi fully explained the ‘Chinese dream’ for the first time in 2012 as ‘every person has ideals they pursue, their own dreams. Right now, everyone is discussing the Chinese dream. I think that the realisation of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese people is the modern era the great dream of the Chinese people.’ See Bandurski, David. 2016. ‘Meeting Mr. “Hot Phrase.”China Media Project. February 6. http://cmp.hku.hk/2015/02/06/thus-spoke-uncle-xi/ (accessed 4 October 2016.)

[iii] ‘Full Text: Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Belt and Road.’ 2015. Xinhua CRI English News.March 29.  http://english.cri.cn/12394/2015/03/29/2941s872030.htm (accessed 12 January 2017.)

[iv] Full text. Ibid

[v] Stutter, Robert. 2014. ‘China’s Grand Strategy in Asia’. Testimony delivered to the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Washington DC. March 14.  http://unsc.gov/sites/default/files/SUTTER_Testimony.pdf  (accessed 5 October 2016.)

[vi] ‘China well on track to building modern and strong army.’ 2016. Peoples’ Daily Online.

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-03/02/c_135148008.htm  (accessed 7 October 2016.)

[vii] ‘The Department of Defense USA Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoples Republic of China 2016’. http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2016%20China%20Military%20Power%20Report.pdf  (accessed 12 January 2017.)

[viii] ‘How China’s Base in Djibouti Reveals an ‘expanding sphere of influence’. 2016. Sputnik News. August 24. https://sputniknews.com/africa/201608241044589413-china-base-djibouti-influence/  (accessed 12 January 2017.)

[ix] ‘China poised to takeover US air base, invest in Portugal’s Azores base.’ 2016. Sputnik News, October 14. https://sputniknews.com/europe/201610141046328782-china-azores-base/  (accessed 5 December.)

[x] ‘Portugal open to China investment in Azores, as US power wanes’. 2016. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-10-12/portugal-open-to-china-investment-in-azores-as-u-s-sway-wanes  (accessed 12 January 2017.)

[xi] ‘South Asia Remains World’s Fatest Growing Region, but Should Be Vigilant to Fading Tailwinds’. 2016.  http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2016/04/09/south-asia-fastest-growing-region-world-vigilant-fading-tailwinds (accessed 12 January 2017.)

[xii] Mourdoukoutas, Panosmourdos. 2017. ‘China wants Russia to calm India and save CPEC’. January 8. https://www.forbes.com/sites/panosmourdoukoutas/2017/01/08/china-wants-russia-to-calm-india-and-save-cpec/#2cf0d8335e08  (accessed 15 January 2017.)

[xiii] ‘India and China hold new round of talks to resolve border dispute.’ 2016. PTI. April 20. http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/india-china-hold-new-round-of-talks-to-resolve-border-dispute/ (accessed 5 January 2017.)

[xiv] Chakraborty, Abhishek. 2016. ‘Letting Dalai Lama visit Arunachal will damage relations, China warns’ October 18. www.ndtv.com (accessed 4 January 2017.) 

[xv] Godbole, Avinash. 2014. ‘Chinese President Xi Jinping’s Visit to India’. CLAWS Journal, Winter 2014 issue.  http://www.claws.in/images/journals_doc/1358290672_AvinashGodbole.pdf  (accessed 8 August 2015.)

[xvi] PTI. 2017. ‘China to deploy 1 lakh marines at ports in Gwadar and Djibouti’  Economic Times. 15 March. http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/china-to-deploy-1-lakh-marines-at-ports-in-gwadar-and-djibouti/articleshow/57644955.cms (accessed 16 March 2017.)

[xvii] Smith, M. Jeff. 2016. ‘China and Sri Lanka between a dream and a nightmare’. http://thediplomat.com/2016/11/china-and-sri-lanka-between-a-dream-and-a-nightmare/  (accessed 5 December 2016.)

[xviii] Bhoothalingam, Ravi. 2016. ‘One belt one road to join or not join?’ May 14. https://thewire.in/42582/one-belt-one-road-to-join-or-not-to-join/  (accessed  6 June 2016.)

[xix] Mourdoukoutas, Panosmourdos. 2017. ‘China wants Russia to calm India and save CPEC’. January 8. https://www.forbes.com/sites/panosmourdoukoutas/2017/01/08/china-wants-russia-to-calm-india-and-save-cpec/#2cf0d8335e08  (accessed 15 January 2017.)

[xx] Khasru, Munir Syed. 2015. ‘BCIM – Economic opportunities for Bangladesh’. Daily Star. March 11. https://mygoldenbengal.wordpress.com/2015/06/27/bcim-economic-opportunities-for-bangladesh/

[xxi] ‘China, India fast track BCIM economic corridor project.’ 2015. The Hindu. June 26.

http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/china-india-fasttrack-bcim-economic-corridor-project/article7355496.ece

[xxii] Bhattacharjee, Rupak. 2016. ‘The emerging Bangladesh China India Myanmar Economic Corridor and its opportunities.’ February 11. http://www.eastern-today.com/entries/editorial/the-emerging-bangladesh-china-india-myanmar-economic-corridor-and-its-opportunities  (accessed 12 September 2016.)

[xxiii] Singh, Naina. 2016. ‘Yunnan: China’s Bridge to South and Southeast Asia’. August 26. http://thediplomat.com/2016/08/yunnan-chinas-bridge-to-south-and-southeast-asia/  (accessed 12 December 2016.)

[xxiv] Answer to ‘Question No. 3222 Infrastructure Projects in Myanmar’. 20016. Rajya Sabha Secretariat. December 15.  https://www.mea.gov.in/rajya-sabha.htm?dtl/27849/question+no3222+infrastructure+projects+in+myanmar

[xxv] Arpi, Claude. 2016. ‘Reopening of Stilwell Road is historic for India China ties’. January 11. http://www.dailyo.in/politics/northeast-stilwell-road-ledo-xi-jinping-bcim-kiren-rijiju-tibet-himalayas-kailash-mansarovar/story/1/8386.html

[xxvi] Aneja, Atul. ‘Myanmar to support Silk Road, BCIM’. 2016. The Hindu. August 20. http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/Myanmar-to-support-Silk-Road-BCIM/article14580511.ece

[xxvii]  ‘Peace at last, peace at last. Thank God Almighty, peace at last’ 2015. www.Rediff.com      (accessed 10 October 2016,)

[xxviii] ‘Rebels behind Manipur strike survived Indian army’s Myanmar raid?’ 2015. Hindustan Times. June 26.  http://www.hindustantimes.com/india/rebels-behind-manipur-strike-survived-indian-army-s-myanmar-raid/story-Mryfo0RVAJV71AbV5YM6bJ.html  (accessed  26 August 2915.)

[xxix] South Asia Terrorism Portal. 2017. http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/bangladesh/database/Fatalities-%20Left-wing%20Extremism%202010.htm  (accessed 5 February 2017.)

[xxx] Zee Media Bureau. 2016. ‘Dhaka cafe slaughter is trailer of what is to come, warns Islamic State in new video’  July 6. http://zeenews.india.com/news/south-asia/islamic-state-releases-new-video-hailing-dhaka-attack-calls-for-jihad-against-crusaders_1904087.html  (accessed 8 August 2016.)

[xxxi]  ‘Burma insurgency’  2016. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/burma.htm (accessed 16 December 2016.)

[xxxii]  ‘Kofi Annan to probe reports of Rohingiya Muslims abuse in Myanmar’ http://www.news18.com/news/world/kofi-annan-to-probe-reports-of-rohingya-muslims-abuse-in-mynamar-1317370.html  (accessed 16 December 2016.

[xxxiii] Aneja, Atul. 2015. ‘Non-traditional threats stalk Kolkata Kunming corridor.’ June 28. http://thehindu.com/news/national/experts-to-address-the-non-traditional-security-threats-to-the-BCIM-project/article7364290.ece