Guarding India's Seafront

Is it time to pat ourselves on the back? Can India be sure of preventing another terror attack?

By Col R Hariharan

 

Indian security agencies’ successful handling of a series of events involving lucrative terrorist targets in the last quarter of 2010 showed they are succeeding in setting right their woeful performance during the infamous 26/11 Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT) attack in Mumbai two years back. The tasks faced by the security agencies would have daunted security agencies of even big powers.

The blue ribbon event was the high profile visit of U.S. President Barak Obama, World’s Number one terrorist target. This was followed by the XIX Commonwealth Games, in which 83 countries took part. The quarter also included two other potentially explosive anniversaries - the 26/11 attack and the demolition of Babri masjid by Hindu zealots. There were also two other adds-on to the security nightmare – the long awaited judgement in the Babri Masjid ownership case and the visit of French President Sarkozy of the French burqa ban fame. But all the events passed off peacefully. Glitches if any were minor.  

Of course, the security agencies were kept on tenterhooks by reports of Pakistan-based Jihadi groups preparing to strike at some of the prominent targets in India. However, terrorists were kept at bay apparently due to the alertness of security elements in place. A number of arrests of suspected terrorists were also made.

No doubt success in this crucial period is a direct outcome of the efforts of the Union Home Minister P Chidamabaram to tone up the internal security set up. His multi-pronged approach and broad-based strategies to improve the command and control of security response systems on a networked basis is slowly coming into place. So the coherence in action has become visible. However, the task of providing muscle and teeth to state and central police and paramilitary forces is not complete. So the much needed progress has not yet reached the ground floor.

 

There is no dearth of money for the action plan. The Centre’s allocation for internal security is now poised to go up to Rs 40,852 crore this year, if we go by the first budget supplementary. This represents nearly a fifty per cent increase over last year’s allocation of Rs.25, 923 Crore in 2008-09.

The expenditure is mainly due to the two schemes for modernisation of state police and central paramilitary forces (CPMF). Both the schemes have been extended to 2010-11. The force levels of the three CPMF (BSF, CRPF and SSB) are being increased by 109 additional battalions. The hardware and software to connect the security control centres in state capitals with State Special Branches are in place. And connectivity is expected to be completed by end December 2010. 

 

One Central Academy for Police Training (CAPT) at Bhopal, two Central Detective Training Schools (CDTS) at Lucknow and Ahmedabad and 20 Counter Insurgency and Anti-Terrorist (CIAT) Schools are also being set up. After a review, the sanctioned strength of the IPS to the state cadre has been increased by 717 to 4730.

Is it time to pat ourselves on the back? Can India be sure to prevent another terrorist attack on the scale of 26/11?

It is difficult to confidently answer these questions with surety if we consider our inability to execute time-bound projects. In this respect, the Union Home Ministry’s record is slightly better; at the state- level leadership has not shown the urgency required to revamp their set up to handle terrorist threat.

This is not mere lethargy. States had always resisted carrying out police reforms. Despite judicial direction, politicians do not want to lose their control over law enforcement machinery. Even after the 26/11 disaster, this mind set does not appear to have changed.

Nothing illustrates this better than the attitude of states to change existing systems. Local media in Maharashtra says the state home ministry has not shown a keen interest in providing training to the lowest rank post of police constables. The Special Forces raised with a lot fanfare still carry old weapons and do not have enough body armour. There are huge deficiencies in police strength in many states. Efforts to fill up these vacancies are tardy.

However, the biggest chink in national security is in coastal security. No doubt it is a complex issue mired in round-robin power games played by diverse ministries. Apart from state governments, at the Centre also it involves coordinating the functioning of many agencies and ministries including defence, ports and shipping, fisheries, agriculture, off shore drilling, maritime trade, environmental protection and international relations. So it is not surprising the Union Home Ministry took two years to embark upon forming a multi-dimensional command structure. Four Joint Operation Centres have been set up under the respective naval commanders in chief. A Sagar Prahari Bal under the Navy has been set up to patrol shallow waters of the coast. A thousand sailors equipped with 80 fast interceptor boats are being trained in phases. Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for coastal security have been finalized in respect of all coastal states and union territories.

The Centre is optimistic that the first phase of the Coastal Security Scheme will be implemented nationwide by March 2011. Its expectations of states and union territories are that states would establish  73 coastal police stations, provided with  adequate manpower apart from 204 boats and 153 vehicles, and 312 two wheelers. 

In the second phase, the Coastal Security Scheme is even more ambitious with an outlay of Rs.1579.91 crore. It hopes to provide states/UTs more 131 more coastal police stations and boats and infrastructure required to make them operational. The Scheme is also to provide support for equipment, computer systems, vehicles, two-wheelers etc. A uniform system for registration of all boats is being introduced. Action is also being taken for issuing ID cards to all fishermen. There is increased emphasis on technology usage; installation of transponders on vessels to ensure identification and tracking is also being initiated. Radar chains are also being strengthened. 

So where is the problem? It lies in our national inability in executing plans on paper in time. Barring Gujarat, Pondicherry, Tamil Nadu and Maharashtra, other coastal states have made little progress in implementing coastal security projects. Setting up coastal police stations envisaged even in the first phase of the plan is lagging behind. Their infrastructure is not in place. So it is doubtful whether the Coastal Security Scheme would be fully implemented fully even by end 2012.

According to defence analyst Major General Ashok Mehta, “while the Indian navy, the nodal agency for coastal security, has issued elaborate papers on plugging gaps at sea through maritime domain awareness, little has been done in augmenting capabilities of the Coast Guard.”  Only two aircraft or helicopter has been added to the fleet of 48 since 2008 for watching India’s 7,600km coastline.

At the heart of the problem is incompetent political leadership; after all what happened to the Maharashtra Chief Minister Vilas Rao Deshmukh after he messed up the handling of 26/11 terror attack? He was pushed out to a plum post in the Central cabinet as minister for heavy industries. With this law of diminishing return in operation any improvement to national security will come, if and only, when political leadership becomes accountable and demands accountability from the bureaucracy. Otherwise the nation is likely to limp along from year to year explaining why we failed rather than talk of our successes.

Courtesy: GFiles,Vol 4 Issue 11 -  February 2011

URL  http://gfilesindia.com/

Time Armed Forces cleaned up their act

The Rediff News last week carried an article titled "The worrying rot in Indian armed forces" by Ajai Shukla which takes a hard look at the deteriorating standards of armed forces leadership in recent years. All armed forces officers and men, both serving and retired, should take a hard look at the article.

There is an urgent need to make the traditional 'holy cows of army' - the generals at the top - more accountable. I totally agree with the views of attributed to General Afsar Karim in the article. The functioning and accountability of two army welfare organisations the AWWA (Army Wives Welfare Organisation) and the AWHO (Army Welfare Housing Organisation) have come under strong criticism in recent years from serving and retired servicemen. They have refused to share their basic information under the cloak they are not a government body but independent societies.

Armed forces have a culture of not airing their dirty linen in public. So servicemen and veterans generally keep mum despite knowing the truth. I think it is time we moved away from the 18th century mindset. It is essential we start introspecting on the reasons for the rot that is setting in within the armed forces. The increasing cases of corruption, 
insubordination, cronyism, violation of laws, and scams in defence procurement need to be ruthlessly handled regardless of the rank of the culprits. Otherwise the quality of leadership will be irrepairably damaged and armed forces will be reduced to the level of a paramilitary or police. And they would lose the esteem they enjoy among the public forever.

Ajai Shukla's hardhitting article of December 14 is reproduced here, courtesy Rediffnews.

The worrying rot in Indian armed forces

On April 27, 2007, while a dazed United States military was being battered by the resurgent insurgency in Iraq, a mid-ranking US Army officer, Lieutenant Colonel Paul Yingling, published a brutally frank assessment of the failures in American generalship that had led to the bloodying of the world's most powerful military machine.

Writing in the Armed Forces Journal, a private magazine focused on defence, Yingling urged the US Congress to fix accountability for the debacle in Iraq, lamenting that, "As matters stand now, a private who loses a rifle suffers far greater consequences than a general who loses a war."

Yingling's article raced across army chat rooms, combat bases in Iraq and Afghanistan, and military seminar halls. Hard-hitting, incisive, and loaded with statements like, "The intellectual and moral failures common to America's general officer corps in Vietnam and Iraq constitute a crisis in American generalship," the analysis pushed America's senior military leadership towards acknowledging, confronting and acting to fix the problem.
India's armed forces, alas, have neither a Paul Yingling nor a culture of interrogating and addressing serious internal problems.

With revelation after damaging revelation -- including financial misappropriation, sexual misconduct, fake encounters and influence-peddling -- placing troubling question marks over the internal health of India's best-respected institution, not a single serving officer has thrown out a Yingling-style challenge.

Rot at the top?
This silence has endured even through the recent revelations about the improper allocation of multi-crore apartments in Mumbai's tony Colaba area to a bevy of generals and admirals.

The Adarsh Housing Society affair, which has riveted the country's attention, is not just about the apparent abandonment of ethics by three service chiefs and five officers of three-star rank.

Worse, it is about the alleged subversion of army postings to keep Major General Tej Kishen Kaul in Mumbai so that he could keep the file moving while a succession of key military commanders in Mumbai and Pune were handed out flats, allegedly in exchange for their silence.
"Corruption exists mainly within the senior ranks," avers Major General Afsir Karim, a retired paratrooper with a reputation for probity.

"Bad apples manage to get into the organisation after all, the (military's) selection system has no psychological check for integrity. As the officers rise and start getting opportunities to make money, they surround themselves with a coterie of staff officers and subordinates who are quickly subverted the corrupt pull each other up within the system. And from them the rot spreads to other parts of the military."

Echoing this assessment is a former army commander, well-known for his honesty, who ran afoul of his boss after instituting an inquiry into evidently corrupt purchases of equipment.

He describes the insidious disillusionment of idealistic young officers who gradually realise that the values that were catechised during their training are hardly reflected in day-to-day unit life.

In their training academies, officer cadets are indoctrinated with Field Marshal Chetwode's motto: "The safety, honour and welfare of your country come first, always and every time. The honour, welfare and comfort of the men you command come next. Your own ease, comfort and safety come last, always and every time."
On being commissioned into their units, however, these young lieutenants often encounter a different reality.

An increasing number of units in peace stations focus less on training than on "career-enhancing" activities like officers' mess parties and ladies' club functions, which commanding officers believe would please their bosses or, even better, their bosses' wives.

Meanwhile, youngsters who are posted to the field, or to counter-insurgency operations, come up against a pressure-cooker insistence on success at all costs; after all, the promotions of bosses all the way up the line hinge on operational accomplishment.

With so much at stake, fake encounters and false reports are desperate options for creating an illusory world of success.

'Five-star' culture
Old-school generals say that this new environment of flexible morals and professional dishonesty has inevitably spilled over into the handling of money. Traditionally indifferent, even disdainful, towards money, senior officers are now developing a yen for what the military has always disparaged as the "five-star culture".
"The military had a culture of its own and never felt the need to imitate civilian lifestyles," says General Karim.

"You met civilians, even socialised with them, but you always came back to your mess life. Today, many senior officers want a lifestyle that cannot be supported by military pay and allowances."

Rising alongside the appetite for money, has been the opportunity to gather it illegally.

"The money that an officer handles rises exponentially as he is promoted up the chain," explains a former army commander who prefers to remain unnamed.

"With defence budgets boosted by a growing economy, each of the six field army commanders oversees budgets today that are in the hundreds of crores.
Take the example of the Udhampur-headquartered Northern Command, where the commander, a lieutenant general, controls an annual budget of Rs 2,500-2,700 crore.

Large chunks of this are spent at his sole discretion, including "special financial powers" for Rs 100 crore, and another Rs 15-16 crore for obtaining intelligence about militants.

"I could simply order my staff to give me Rs 20 lakh to pay a political source for important intelligence," says the former army commander. "I wouldn't need to provide proof that I had handed over the money to anyone. I could justify the expenditure simply by stating that I needed a political perspective."

Such opportunities for corruption abound. Northern Command's budget for rations is about Rs 700 crore per year, with another Rs 100 crore allocated for hiring civil transport.

The budget for operational works, constructing bunkers, lighting and temporary housing, is over Rs 250 crore.

And, inexplicably, Northern Command has retained with itself -- despite several attempts to transfer this responsibility to New Delhi -- the job of buying rations for troops deployed on the Siachen Glacier, an annual expenditure of some Rs 40 crore.
Other formations handle smaller budgets. But all these contracts come loaded with the potential to explode into public scandals.

Lieutenant General R K Nanavatty, who headed Northern Command at the start of this decade and was feared and respected for his unwavering rectitude, says that he could see the current crisis coming: "I have always said that the biggest danger for our army was the gradual degradation of moral values. I could see morality eroding and this worried me because trust is the basis of military functioning."

Time for action
A key concern among soldiers, serving and retired, has been the military's lame defence in the face of credible allegations of wrongdoing like those around the Sukhna land scam and the Adarsh scam.

Many believe that frankly acknowledging the problem and taking exemplary action against corruption would protect, perhaps even enhance, the military's public image.
"Why should we wait for the civilian agencies to prove criminal guilt?" asks former army deputy chief, Lieutenant General G D Singh, widely respected for his integrity.

"We have our own code of conduct, which does not rest on court orders or judgements. When an officer is clearly corrupt, we should ostracise him from our community; none of his peers should even speak to him; he should be treated as a pariah."

Considering that officers who were commissioned in the mid-1970s are generals, admirals and air marshals today, it is a paradox that the military often blames the changed background of those who now join as officers for the decline in values and standards.

Far more likely, say the more discerning observers, is the "osmosis of values" that stems from increased interaction -- across all ranks -- with society in general. This takes place in many ways: cantonments, earlier located well outside towns and cities, are now almost indistinguishable from the rapidly expanding civilian colonies that have surrounded them.

The army's growing counter-insurgency commitments bring soldiers into close contact with civilians, and with the institutions of governance.
Meanwhile, the growing reach and intensity of the electronic media beams the civilian world into the remotest military outposts.

Most officers today are keenly aware of the world outside the barracks and are deeply cynical about the declining mores of civilian institutions.

Officers, and even soldiers, ask: With the political class, the bureaucracy, the judiciary, the police and even the media deeply compromised, how can they point a finger at the military, an institution synonymous with honour and sacrifice? But underlying that question is a more troubling one: With corruption everywhere, is it possible for the military to remain unaffected?

The current army chief, General V K Singh, publicly declared while assuming office last April that restoring the army's "internal health" would be his focus. The general has his task cut out for him.

Nuclear capability of India and China: an analysis

By Col. R. Hariharan

A comparison of nuclear capability of India and China cannot be made in isolation. It has to be derived in the backdrop of their strategic vision, global ambitions and political and social ethos that condition their perceptions. Their strategic vision dictates the development of their nuclear capability (including nuclear policy, concepts, weapons capability and delivery systems) appropriate to the geo-strategic environment.

Strategic setting

Ever since the global economic downturn started around 2008, China’s economic clout had been increasing. And the Obama administration soon after it came to power made special efforts to woo China to seek help in stemming its own economic decline. Apparently China’s global ambitions were strengthened by this. So it was not surprising that it showed reluctance to play ball with Obama administration’s efforts to turn it into a partner in international affairs.

However, one of the important reasons for Chinese reluctance is the suspicion about the U.S. intentions in Asia, where the U.S. had been developing strategic convergence in its relations with India. This was made clear in China’s Defence White Paper 2008 that spoke of ‘increasing US military presence in Asia-Pacific.’ China is wary of a US sponsored creation of an anti-Chinese axis extending from India to Japan. Though this was not referred to by General Ma Xiaotian, the Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the PLA, while speaking at the Shangri La Dialogue 2010 he said “we believe that maintaining security in the Asia-Pacific region serves China's interest, and it is also China's responsibility.” Apparently, the Chinese Navy’s increasingly assertive posture in South China Sea is only an affirmation of this policy.

This power assertion has strong strategic connotations to its ASEAN neighbours in particular as China is likely to be embedded in their security architecture inn the coming years as indicated by Professor Zhuang Jian Zhong, Standing Vice Director, Center for National Strategic Studies, Shanghai Jiaotong University, at the Shangri La Dialogue 2010.

After the Indo-US civilian nuclear bill became a reality, US-India economic relations were poised to grow fast. However, this did not happen as Obama administration had its own hangups on India. However, US-India relations have recently been warming up for the first time after President Obama came to power. The reality is that this has come about only after the impasse in the US-China relations. Now US-India economic relations are poised to grow rapidly only because Indian economy, less dependant upon export market than China, is clocking a steady 8 % growth.

Moreover, even if the US pulls out of Afghanistan, it would perhaps like to retain  Pakistan a strategic ally in the region. The Army is likely to continue to decide Pakistan’s strategic posture in the coming years. Perhaps this is the underlying reason for the $ 10 billion U.S. assistance to the Pakistan army. It should not be forgotten that Pakistan, a close ally of China, achieved its nuclear capability aided and abetted by China. These considerations are likely to influence the US form encouraging India to play a major strategic role in Afghanistan and beyond in the west. With such considerations, in the US foreign relations horizon China would continue to occupy a larger space than India in the coming years, regardless the ups and downs of US-China relations. 

India dominates South Asian region physically and economically. Soft power of Indian culture spills over the region as well. During the cold war era, it had built strong relationship with Soviet Union, which still has a large residual content in Russia, particularly as a supplier of defence equipment and weaponry. India’s geographic location enables it to be a dominant power in the Indian Ocean region. So it is not surprising that China had been cultivating India’s smaller neighbours who have latent fear of Indian domination.  China’s close relation with Pakistan is well known. Nepal and Sri Lanka are increasingly coming under Chinese influence. Except for Pakistan, present emphasis of China’s relationship-building with other neighbours of India appears to have more political and economic than military content. 

Nuclear setting

Given India’s comparatively smaller economic and military clout, unlike China, India appears to nurse only regional ambitions. Unlike China, which signed the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a recognised nuclear weapons state, though India did not sign NPT, its nuclear capability got recognition only after it tested nuclear weapons in 1998.  So India has fundamental limitations in augmenting its nuclear weapons capability although it is said to have enriched Uranium stockpile to produce another 30 warheads. India’s nuclear arsenal is estimated between 40 and 80 warheads. This is less than the number of warheads Pakistan has and probably one fifth of China’s holdings. Moreover, with limited nuclear tests carried out, questions about their operational performance have been raised.

But the main limitation of India lies in is weak nuclear delivery capability. India at present has only short and intermediate range ballistic missiles. Its naval missile development is aimed at refining its intermediate range capability only. Its first-ever nuclear submarine INS Arihant, now undergoing sea trials, is likely to become operational in 2012, if it keeps to its schedule. Thus at present it has no operational ballistic missile submarine. Its submarine fleet is aging and due to stilted naval procurement programme its fleet is likely to be reduced to half according to one estimate. So India’s nuclear weapon delivery at present is limited to nuclear-capable aircraft and surface ships of the navy only. At present this restricts the reach of India’s nuclear capability to South Asia and Tibet.

After its nuclear tests in 1998, India adopted a "no first use policy." But according to its nuclear policy even though there will be no first-use of nuclear weapons by India, "nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage." But how far these words can be given form remains to be seen. With India’s limited missile capability, second strike capability will have to be based upon its air force and surface ships. Thus India will continue to be vulnerable nuclear missile strikes beyond the intermediate range. 

Only in 2003, India established the Strategic Nuclear Command. This join services organisation is responsible for holding all of India’s nuclear weapons, missiles and other assets. It has also executive responsibility for enforcing nuclear policy. However, it is the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) under the Prime Minister that will authorise response to any nuclear strike. Quick decision making under pressure had never been the strong point of CCS. Whether it can do so in real time to order a retaliatory nuclear strike is a moot question. 

India’s key weakness is not only in strategic decision making process but tardy implementation of decisions. India has failed to use time as an irreplaceable resource. Thus the state controlled defence research and development programmes regularly fail to keep up their schedules. Defence procurement had become a hotbed of corruption and the bureaucratic procedure appears to be more focused on stemming corruption than on timely procurement of weapon systems.  This has not improved despite the complaints of service chiefs; this has considerably weakened the modernisation of armed forces.

On the other hand, China has developed a clearly articulated long term vision for improving its strategic capability in conformity with its global ambitions. It has developed its large scale weapons research, development and manufacturing capability. It has become a major weapon producer and this gives it a powerful clout to favourably spread its influence.

China adopted No First Use nuclear policy well before India in 1964, with the affirmation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons “at any time or under any circumstances.” Though China has reaffirmed its NFU policy in 2009, China’s credibility to do so is low. For instance, there were reports that China had considered nuclear strikes against the Soviet Union in the event of a conventional Soviet attack. It has capability to deliver nuclear weapons from air craft, surface ships and submarines as well as missiles.

Its military modernisation programme is well on the way with focused development to improve its missile and naval capability while turning the huge PLA into a modern force with better mobility and fire power. 

China is reported to hold the lowest number of nuclear warheads among the five nuclear weapons states. Though exact number of China’s nuclear arsenal is not known, the figure of around 130 nuclear warheads deployed in missiles and aircraft as given by the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists is probably correct. Probably 70 more are in storage. China has a variety of indigenously developed ICBMs including DF -5 ICBM which has a range of about 15000 Km has been in service since 1980. About 80 warheads are deployed in the ballistic missiles of DF-3, DF-4, DF-5 and DF-21. Of these China is estimated to have 25 DF-5 missiles. Under the military modernization programme, China is improving the missile portability, and performance capability. It has the potential to develop multiple warhead carrying capability in some of the missiles as well. 

Though the PLA navy is ranked as the third largest in the world, it had only a defensive capability limited to its coastal region with only brown water capability. However as a result of modernisation efforts, it has now attained green water capability. That would mean it has offensive capability limited to about a thousand miles from its shores. It continues to suffer from weaknesses command C4 systems. 

In keeping with increased strategic priorities Chinese navy is in the process of transforming into a blue water navy, though it is still a long way to go. It has developed Type 094 ballistic submarines armed with JL 2 SLBMs with a range of 8000 Km; this would make the western hemisphere within its range. It has developed a large submarine base in Hainan which has been cause of concern to the U.S. and India.

Since the last decade, Chinese naval presence in international waters has been on the rise. It has carried out joint exercises with over a dozen countries including India and Pakistan. In its first international foray, it is operating a flotilla on anti piracy duties in Gulf of Aden. Probably in during the coming decade we will be seeing large scale power assertion of Chinese navy in Indian Ocean region. 

Chinese has been instrumental in contributing to the development of Pakistan’s nuclear and missile capabilities, flouting international agreements. The two countries have close strategic links. This could result in the further growth of Pakistan’s nuclear capability in the future. The recent Chinese announcement to give two more nuclear power stations to Pakistan ostensibly under a 1991 contract is a case in point. Though the Bush administration had objected to it earlier, the US appears to have chosen to ignore it now due to political expediency dictated by its Pak-Af posture. Thus China enjoys enormous advantage with its proxy presence in Pakistan.

Conclusion

China enjoys definite advantage over India in three key aspects of exercising nuclear capability: decision making process weapons systems, and delivery options. However, Chinese capability is mostly based on its ICBM systems operating from both land and sea. Its green water capability is being augmented with the development of 094 ballistic submarines armed with SLBMs. This could overcome its limitations in blue water operations. Thus China’s nuclear capability is in tandem with its global ambitions.

Comparatively, India’s nuclear capability is circumscribed by the limits of its regional ambitions. This situation is unlikely to change unless India improves its ability to handle strategic security challenges. To give form to it, better nuclear weapons and missile capabilities are essential. In particular, it has to develop a strong anti-missile capability. India has a long way to go in doing so. India’s strength would depend upon building a win-win relationship with China; at the same time India has to develop closer strategic relations with the US without sacrificing its regional interests. Indo-Russian relations, a little stagnant at present, also need to be nurtured. More than all this it has to speed up modernisation of armed forces. In the coming years, Indian Ocean region is likely to become the scene of power assertion. This would imply the need for making Indian navy a powerful entity so that India does not lose its strategic advantage in the region.

Courtesy: South Asia Analysis Group July 12, 2010

Recommended Reading

1. Argumentative Chinese step forward by Sreeram Chaulia, Asian Times, May 18, 2010.
URL: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/LE18Ad01.html

2. From sea to shining sea by Admiral Arun Prakash, Indian Express, May 18, 2010.
URL: http://www.indianexpress.com/story-print/620207/

3. Star war meets reality? Military testing laser weapons by Dan Vergano, USA Today, May 14. 2010.
URL: http://www.usatoday.com/tech/science/2010-05-14-1Adeathray14_CV_N.htm?csp=34

Recent Reading

I heartily recommend the following articles for insights on China's geopolitics and strategy as it grows into a challenger of the U.S. supremacy; many points are relevant to India's strategic security:

1.The Geography of Chinese Power by Robert Kaplan
URL: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66205/robert-d-kaplan/the-geography-of-chinese-power

2.How the Chinese dragon is gobbling up the Sri Lankan lion by Policy Research Group
URL: http://transcurrents.com/tc/2010/05/how_the_chinese_dragon_is_gobb.html

3.Q&A With Robert Kaplan on China, May 7, 2010
URL:http://www.foreignaffairs.com/discussions/interviews/qa-with-robert-kaplan-on-china

Sri Lanka Armed Forces & Dynamics of Change

By Col R Hariharan

[Salient points of this article were included in a presentation the author had made at a national seminar on ‘Ethnic Reconciliation, Economic Reconstruction & Nation Building in Sri Lanka’ organised by the Indian Centre for South Asian Studies and the Centre for Asia Studies at Chennai on April 12-13, 2010.]

INTRODUCTION

Sri Lanka has undergone irreversible changes after President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s successive victories in the Eelam War IV followed by the presidential poll and parliamentary elections. After the three interconnected events, President Rajapaksa has emerged as THE most powerful head of state in the nation’s history. His vast powers as executive president are further augmented by his ten-party United Peoples Freedom Alliance (UPFA) coalition’s majority in the newly elected parliament.

In addition to this he is commander in chief of an over-sized armed forces which has become a power centre after the Eelam War IV. Thus after the final victory over the LTTE, the President has emerged a modern day Dutagemmunu, the legendary Sinhala king who defeated the Tamil ruler Elara of Anuradhapura.


ARMED FORCES AFTER THE WAR

Rajapaksa’s contribution to the military victory

A symbiotic relationship between the armed forces and the President began with President Rajapaksa and the newly appointed army commander Lt General Sarath Fonseka started their terms of office with the same goal - to defeat the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). For Rajapaksa defeat of LTTE was fulfilment of an electoral promise while for the army commander it was a vow to liquidate the LTTE that had heaped ignominy on the army in three earlier episode of Eelam War. In the process of successfully achieving their goals, both the President and General Fonseka became national heroes. But after the downsizing of Fonseka, after his unsuccessful attempt to challenge the President’s bid for re-election, President Rajapaksa has emerged the cock of the walk elected to rule the country for nearly seven more years.

Armed forces, particularly the army, before their transformation into a strong and powerful force, were considered a rather weak and professionally not so competent. This is not wholly correct; in the earlier Eelam War the army drove out the LTTE from Jaffna peninsula in Operation Riviresa in October 1995, and never allowed the insurgents to stage a comeback there. However, unfortunately public remembered it only for failures: large scale desertions, corruption, and some notorious debacles at the hands of the LTTE due to its stodgy leadership that failed to enlarge its victories. But the May 2009 victory has changed this; armed forces have at last gained recognition as the vanguards of Sri Lanka security.

President Rajapaksa’s contribution in transforming the armed forces into fighting machines should not be ignored. To achieve his goal he created a politico-administrative structure to help armed forces successfully reach their military objectives, unmindful of its enormous cost in terms of finance, manpower, governance and international relations.

He also provided the much needed political support for the armed forces. When he took over as President, things on the political front were abysmal. Schism between the outgoing President Chandrika Kumaratunga and the erstwhile Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe had stalled the government from taking any strategic initiative to revive the negotiation at the peace process. And the LTTE which had the military initiative at the time of ceasefire now held the political initiative also.

To change this, Rajapaksa strengthened his coalition in parliament by attracting defectors from the opposition benches. Once he was politically strong he had no hesitation in discarding the Peace Process 2002 which got bogged down after 2003. While doing so, he successfully weathered adverse international reaction, particularly from the Four Co-Chairs of the Peace Process – the European Union, Japan, Norway and the U.S. At the same time, he took care to allow face saving leeway for international efforts to bring about resumption of the peace process. However, when the LTTE failed to respond to international efforts there was no stopping the President from seizing the military option.

The President’s approach to fighting the LTTE was also different from that of the earlier presidents. Unlike his predecessors, he went to war with his eyes wide open and listened to the armed forces commanders to choose a place and time to start the war. Once it started he provided all the help required to make the armed forces quantitatively and qualitatively strong. To keep a close interface between the government and armed forces he called in his two brothers – Basil and Gotabaya - from overseas and appointed them as presidential advisor and defence secretary respectively.

Though his detractors accuse him of running the government as a ‘family affair’, it helped formation of close knit executive troika co of his two brothers and Lt General Fonseka, the Army Commander to plan and conduct the war. While Basil Rajapakse provided the political interface for the war, Gotabaya Rajapakse provided the government interface for military operations. Thus the military operations had seamless political and government support. As the defence ministry also controls law and order and public security, actions of paramilitary forces, civil defence forces and the police were coordinated with army’s operational requirements.

This arrangement continued even after Basil Rajapakse became a parliament member later on. Initially, Sri Lanka’s a broad plan was probably to take on the LTTE in its own turf and seize military initiative back from the insurgents and regain control of territory under insurgent control. But the victory in Mavil Aru came in rather easily than expected in July 2006. Then onwards any pause in operation came only when the army commander wanted, mostly to induct more troops in the offensive.

Sri Lanka always felt that India had played spoil sport in its conflict with Tamil insurgents. So throughout the conflict President Rajapaksa handled India with kid gloves. He made a conscious effort to prevent any Tamil Nadu swing in favour of Tamil insurgents from interfering with his military operations. This is a significant aspect because in earlier wars. Fortunately for the President, this job was a little easy thanks to Prabhakaran’s mindlessly assassination of former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1992 made it politically impossible for India to directly intervene in Sri Lanka’s conflict. To add to President’s comfort, the LTTE made no conscious effort to mend its relations with India, and strengthen its weakened political constituency in Tamil Nadu.

The President in a strategic ploy identified his campaign against the LTTE as part of the global war against terrorism. India and the U.S. started providing regular intelligence inputs and technical support on the movement of LTTE’s shipping logistics. The LTTE was banned in 32 countries particularly after the assassination of Sri Lankan foreign minister Lakshman Kadirgamar. With that foreign assistance to Sri Lanka in its war against the LTTE gained legitimacy.

Thus President made a substantive contribution to directly and indirectly help the armed forces not only to become powerful but achieve total victory against the LTTE after 26 years of war. Probably the armed forces feel beholden to the President for restoring its pride. And President Rajapaksa is likely to continue to command personal loyalty of commanders, who have been carefully chosen by him presumably after assessing them on this count.

On the other hand the negative aspects of Rajapaksa’s style of achieving his goals discussed in the paper titled ‘Sri Lanka: President Rajapaksa’s victory and the "power problem" – Update No 195’at: http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cnotes6%5Cnote575.html have tarnished the image of the armed forces also. This has given rise to allegations of lack of accountability, corruption, human rights violations and war crimes against the armed forces, particularly the army, during the war. Administrative actions taken so far have neither been adequate nor convincing.

General Fonseka and expansion of army

When Fonseka took over as army commander, army was in bad shape. Between 2003 and 2005 repeated LTTE bomb strikes and pistol group attacks had taken their toll of military intelligence operatives. The navy fared no better. Repeated LTTE Sea Tiger suicide boat attacks confined the navy to its own shores. As the armed forces of a legitimate government, they could not carry out retaliatory strikes without government approval as it would violate the ceasefire agreement. (And till President Rajapaksa came to power such an approval was not given.) This sapped the morale of armed forces. This made the ambitious General angry at the way army had been made to pay the price for ineptness of politicians and the government, under the peace process 2002.

General Fonseka’s leadership significantly contributed to the following aspects in turning around the around the army to become a sizeable force with proven battlefield record. Specifically he paid attention to improve the following aspects, despite certain abrasive aspects of his leadership style.

• Force level: He expanded and refurbished the army from an under-equipped and weak force into a 190,000-strong force by 2009. In order to provide adequate force levels the army went into a recruiting spree. When the war started in 2006 he had deployed 12 divisions and by the time the war ended in 2009, he had raised and inducted four more divisions. (Out of this about 150,000 troops were deployed against the LTTE which had a combatant strength of around 20,000 apart from other auxiliary forces.)
• Exploiting the potential: The army had added 40,000 troops in 2008 to raise 47 infantry battalions, 13 brigades, 4 task force contingents, and two divisions. By any yardstick this was a colossal task and the army managed to carry it out successfully. This showed the potential strategic strength and capability of Sri Lanka to raise large sized forces in times of war.
• Training: He improved their training to address weaknesses in command and control. Understanding the need for numbers, he reduced the training duration of soldiers and put them on frontline as a military expediency. As the LTTE lacked rifle strength, overwhelming numbers proved a crucial factor. Similarly Special Forces units were well trained for optimising their use in operations.
• Conduct war: The army’s biggest weaknesses in the past were in higher direction of war, maintenance of momentum, coordination of operations on multiple axes, and use of air force and navy to support land operations. Operational planning was pedestrian and lacked innovation in execution. The LTTE exploited these weaknesses to capture Mullaitivu and Kilinochchi towns after driving out the army from vast areas in Vanni. However, when they went into Eelam War IV the armed forces, particularly the army, appear to have learnt from past mistakes and their performance was better in all these aspects.
• Higher direction of war: During the war, General Fonseka dusted up his operational planning and used multiple offensive axes to split and weaken the LTTE force levels, already depleted due to the defection of its Batticaloa commander Karuna along with his followers. Fonseka captured the Mannar coastline early in the operation to cut off the supply chain of basic essentials from Tamil Nadu coast. With advances along converging axes, the army offensive gathered more strength and fire power as the LTTE ranks were weakened with the progress of operations. Special Forces were used innovatively and deep penetration squads of commandos successfully eliminated some the key LTTE leaders.
• Holding the nerve: General Fonseka had initial failure in carrying out attacks on the Elephant Pass salient from the Jaffna peninsula side. However, he converted that an opportunity to soften up LTTE bunkers well before the final offensive to subdue the LTTE positions in the narrow strip between Muhamalai and Elephant Pass. In early stages the army was caught unaware by ‘bombing’ sorties by of the fledgling Air Tiger force. However, Fonseka refused to be overawed by it. The air defence system was tightened and the “air threat” of the LTTE could cause no worthwhile damage.
• Morale: The General’s biggest contribution was in rebuilding the morale of army. When he retired as army chief he left a force with high morale. This was mainly achieved through deliberate planning of operations with adequate force levels and fire power which resulted in successful conclusion of operations.

On the negative side, his abrasive style of leadership particularly in handling officers has created bitterness in section of army just as it also created a group of personal loyalists. This had its fall out when the General had a face off with the President and probably divided the army.

Air Force in war

The Eelam War IV saw the extensive use of air support for land and sea operations. The Air Force strengthened with acquisition of new MIG-29 fighters, supported ground operations effectively. Its bombing missions allowed no respite for the LTTE leadership. Relentless air strikes demoralised the Tamil Tigers and prevented their free movement. At sea, the air force helped the navy in operations against Sea Tiger boats. Thus air support was one of the key elements of Sri Lankan success. This is evident from the huge number of sorties the air force flew in the Eelam War IV. In the period from June 2006 onwards till January 2009, the air force carried out a total of 1345 missions flying 2582 sorties of jets and helicopters. Three jet squadrons namely Kfirs (No 10), MIGs (No 12) and F7s (No 5) undertook 1,116 missions while helicopter gun ships took part in 229 operations. However, ground defence of air bases continued to be its weakness.

Navy in war

The navy which was hemmed in the early stages along bases in Jaffna peninsula, Trincomalee Bay and Southern Sri Lanka coasts, managed to improve its performance as the operations progressed. It adopted an offensive posture; up-gunned its patrol boats, coordinated its patrolling and surveillance with Indian navy and coast guard, and improved its electronic and other surveillance with inputs from the Indian and US intelligence agencies.

It managed to suppress the Sea Tiger movements. The navy’s biggest success came when it destroyed most of the LTTE’s captive logistic shipping network sinking eight to ten ships in well planned and executed operations in international waters in 2006-08. The destruction of ships were loaded with millions of rupees worth of military supplies including light aircraft parts, artillery weapons, rockets, small arms and ammunition destined for the LTTE, reduced its sustaining power in war.

Defence coordination

The defence ministry was also responsible for internal security. This enabled the armed forces to achieve a great deal of coordination in employing police and paramilitary forces to prevent the LTTE’s notorious sabotage and suicide strikes from causing significant damage in the rear areas and cities. On the negative side, the concentration of forces law enforcement and national security under a single ministry can give rise to the emergence of yet another power centre in times of political uncertainty.

STRATEGIC STATUS OF ARMED FORCES

Sri Lanka armed forces appear to have graduated from a land bound army-dominated force to a strong multifaceted force capable of planning and executing complex operations utilising large sized forces on multiple axes. If the armed forces continue to hone their military skills in the coming years they are likely to become a first rate force supported by competent air and naval forces. Army’s higher command and leadership at various levels have shown they are capable of bouncing back with right leadership. Army has also shown its ability to integrate the air force, navy and paramilitary forces to further overall objectives of operations.

The present strength of the armed forces is about 230,000; individual strength of the three services as gleaned from open sources is as follows:

Army

The army has 12 divisions and four newly raised divisions that are probably under trained and also under strength. Bulk of these forces is deployed in north and east after carrying out the Eelam War IV. Approximately 1000 troops (a battalion+) are with the UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti.

The army has seven regiments of armour (including one volunteer regiment), nine regiments of artillery (including two volunteer regiments), seven engineer regiments (including one volunteer regiment), ten regiments of signals (including one volunteer regiment), 97 infantry battalions, one mechanized infantry battalion, four commando regiments and three special forces regiments.

The divisions are slightly smaller than Indian infantry divisions. Both support arm strength and logistics would indicate the Sri Lanka army at present probably can put into operation a force of 10 to 11 fairly self contained divisions, with the rest of the troops being reserves and those under training.

Army as a potential power centre

Armed forces are conscious that their success in the war would not have been possible without Rajapaksa’s leadership and the unprecedented support extended by the government machinery. Thus at the end of the war, a symbiotic relationship between the President and armed forces that came about during the war has now been strengthened. The significance of this relationship is evident when the President’s handpicked officer Lt General Jagat Jayasuriya took over as army commander over looking the recommendation of the out going army chief General Fonseka.

Subsequently officers considered close to Fonseka were retired. The indebtedness of army to President Rajapaksa came to play in the run up to the presidential poll when the army commander and senior officers came out in his support both directly on TV and indirectly through seemingly routine actions.

Sri Lanka armed forces are a sizeable force with considerable military muscle. With subtle politicisation it is emerging as an extra political power centre in the country. Under ambitious commanders such a power centre outside the democratic sphere has the potential to dabble in politics and meddle with government actions, particularly in times of political instability. And the army could become the deciding factor in such uncertain times.

President Rajapaksa and the main political parties are probably conscious of such a possibility. The arrest and prosecution of a man of General Fonseka’s popularity and national stature is probably a testimony to President Rajapaksa’s determination to discourage such possibilities. The General’s well orchestrated campaign brought major opposition parties under a single umbrella, opening up a number of options for anti-Rajapaksa forces. Fonseka had established a network of trusted retired army officers in every district. Evidently this had triggered the President’s suspicion of Fonseka cooking up a military coup about which investigations are underway.

On the other hand, the General and many other officers considered close to him have been slandered and treated in an undignified and shabby way regardless of their loyal service and contribution to win the war. Serious allegations have been made against the retired General and he is being court-martialled. The Sinha Regiment, the parent regiment of the General had been singled out for loyalty checks. And soldiers on security duty were disarmed by police when Fonseka’s office was raided.

Such acts hurting professional pride of soldiers usually have far reaching consequences, though the situation appears normal at present. Probably the army is divided in the cavalier way General Fonseka and his colleagues were handled even though they might not consider the ambitious General free of guilt.

A sizeable section of the population sees the government action against Fonseka as vindictive one. The Fonseka affair frittered away the strategic gains made by the President and distracts the nation from the task of rebuilding. So the impact of dynamics of changes in armed forces would very much depend upon how the President handles and employs them in his second term. The more they are involved to buttress his regime the greater would be the politicisation of the army.

But Rajapaksa is an experienced politician with an uncanny ability to time his actions; so one can expect him to act with a lot of deliberation when it comes to the army.

Air Force

The air force has limited capability to keep Sri Lanka air space sanitized. It is probably capable of providing close air support both with fighters and gun ships to a divisional front. Its air lift capability is probably an infantry battalion minus. However, maintenance of the air force fleet is likely to pose a problem as it is an expensive proposition.

Navy

The navy is capable of detecting and engaging intruders along the coast line of Sri Lanka. A coast guard force is being raised. This would further enhance costal security of the country. In tandem with friendly forces its limited off shore capability can be enhanced.


STRATEGIC TAKEAWAYS

Three issues are of immediate interest in an overall study of dynamics of change in the Sri Lanka armed forces. These are national leadership, strategic role for armed forces and India related issues.

National leadership

President Rajapaksa has demonstrated the importance of dynamic national leadership to prosecute successful war more importantly in achieving military victory against insurgents. He provided national leadership to fine tune government policies including external relations to ensure success of military operations. The President has shown his ability to leverage international environment to further his military objectives. Rajapaksa has shown clarity in preventing political interference in the conduct of military operations, allowing sufficient flexibility to the army commander in his execution.

With a massive popular mandate in parliament and second presidential term he has emerged as an unchallenged leader. His strength is augmented by a powerful army now. Such powerful leadership can enable smooth passage of the country through a difficult journey to normalcy in the post-war period. On the other hand his flaws in leadership style and governance can create divisions within the country and lead to political unrest.

He has failed to take strategic political action towards achieving ethnic amity. Despite repeated public affirmation, President Rajapaksa has not put a political package to resolve the question of devolution of powers to Tamils. Without a parallel political dispensation, military success against the Tamil Tigers in could be frittered away without consolidating the gains of war. Thus the President has left the country vulnerable to revival of such efforts in the future.

Rajapaksa government’s conduct and accountability on issues like fundamental freedom of people, media freedom, human rights, transparency governance, and war crimes has failed to satisfy civil society both at home and abroad. The abrasive style of his ministers and officials particularly in handling international opinion has eroded the nation’s image. Already this is having its effect in actions like the European Union’s withdrawal of the GSP+ duty concessions extended after 2005 tsunami strike. International support is likely to dwindle further, unless he takes concrete measures to satisfy basic norms of international conduct. Absence of international support could also affect taking timely actions to discourage revival of Tamil insurgency with the support of Sri Lankan expatriates once again.

Historically in many countries, the making of national leaders of immense popularity goes through some of the negative aspects Sri Lanka has been facing. Usually in such set ups personalised politics becomes the leader’s operational tool and they tend to use the armed forces at their command to enforce their will. In Sri Lanka there is potential for such a deadly combination. Political power combined with military power can erase the thin line bet between democrats and demagogues both of who may enjoy popularity. Normally, they end up creating life time presidents. But Rajapaksa may prove to be the exception as he has exhibited an uncanny sense of timing his moves to arrive at success during his first term. So his second term in office is going to be crucial for him as much as for the country. We can hope the country under his leadership will spend less time on rhetoric and paranoia and spend more on positive action to achieve political and economic stability sorely needed by the country.

Strategic role for armed forces:

The armed forces have the strength and potential to take a share of responsibility in regional security arrangements to prevent Sri Lanka from becoming the hunting ground for external powers. The introduction of Sri Lanka as a new military factor in the regional security spectrum has to be reckoned in future operational planning of all powers including India. It will be in the interest of both India and Sri Lanka to evolve greater strategic convergence between both countries to ensure better coordination of their security strategies to their mutual advantage. This would enable both nations to keep the Indian Ocean region sanitized from external forces.

The army has expanded too fast and the new recruits’ training had been short. As the new army commander Lt General Jagath Jayasuriya has emphasised the army needs to be trained with greater discipline and professionalism to make it fit a first rate fighting force for conventional operations. This is usually an ongoing process in the army and that should take priority.

The President and the armed forces have developed a symbiotic relationship. And this has introduced a subtle element of politicisation within the armed forces. And the Fonseka affair has introduced seeds of division within the army. This coupled with politicisation of armed forces could be used by unscrupulous commanders to act as a pressure group on the functioning of democratic governments. It would also affect the growth of the army as a disciplined conventional force to effectively take part in a regional security set up.

India

Although India had adopted a cautious policy of support to the President, he has not fulfilled his promises to India on taking action to devolve powers by implementing the 13th amendment. This has downgraded his credibility among the ruling coalition in India. Apparently for reasons of political expediency he has overlooked India’s support as an essential element in Sri Lanka’s strategic capabilities.

From Indian point of view, there are a few disturbing trends in Rajapaksa’s foreign policy dispensations. One is the slow drift towards China and possibly Iran for reasons of economic support and assistance. While a slow increase in Chinese influence in Sri Lanka is inevitable, its potential to destabilise the power equation in Indian Ocean region and India’s immediate neighbourhood (area of strategic influence in military parlance) cannot be denied. This is likely to come under close scrutiny of both India and the U.S.

A second aspect is Rajapaksa’s continued casual attitude to public sentiments in India, particularly Tamil Nadu, on devolution of powers to Tamils. Though this is no more a major political issue in India, it could be leveraged by extreme Tamil elements to keep the flame of Tamil insurgency flickering in the minds of Sri Lanka Tamils. It can also be taken advantage of by pro-LTTE politicians of Tamil Nadu when the local political climate suits such a development. With coalition politics ruling the roost in New Delhi, India-Sri Lanka relations have the potential to sour.
In view of this New Delhi will have to take a re-look at its Sri Lanka policy and approach it afresh to achieve a win-win situation for both countries.

The threat to internal stability in Sri Lanka is mainly from unresolved ethnic confrontation. For historical and geographic reasons it is closely related to the strategic relationship between India and Sri Lanka. This will involve helping Sri Lanka maintain its unity while resolving the ethnic issue to the satisfaction of all communities. As Sri Lanka now has a strong armed force, it is essential that India and Sri Lanka closely coordinate the long term strategies for security of the two countries and Indian Ocean Region. Thus it is essential India builds a meaningful relationship with President Rajapaksa’s government which is likely to rule for another seven years. This cannot come about unless the ethnic issue is resolved to create a win-win situation within a reasonable time frame.

The time for implementation of 13th amendment even with additional palliatives is well past and it is unlikely to satisfy all parties. It is essential for India to take two initiatives to bring ethnic amity and normalcy. It can use its good offices with Sri Lanka Tamil Diaspora to open a positive dialogue with Sri Lanka government while prevailing upon President Rajapaksa to come up with a political agenda for implementation without any more delay. Secondly, extend large scale aid and credit for the reconstruction and development of war ravaged north and east to enable speedy return to normal life in these provinces. This would create a positive stake for Tamils in political participation to ease ethnic tensions to carry out development of northern and eastern provinces.

Although this analysis has not considered the trade and economic aspects, these are key issues that could affect future strategic relations of the country. The Sri Lankan proposal for a road bridge between Sri Lanka and India made by the late Lakshman Kadirgamar is worthy of consideration. This could help the development of backward areas of Tamil Nadu as well as Sri Lanka north.

Igniting the ‘COLD START’ doctrine

Despite strategies on paper, our capability to face battle on two fronts is far from being achieved.

ARE we ready for a 21st-century war? The Army chief, General Deepak Kapoor’s reported comment on the revision of India’s “cold start” military doctrine to achieve the capability to take on China and Pakistan on two fronts at the same time might tempt us to answer in the affirmative to the above question.

But, as a nation of dreamers, our record in translating ideas into action has not been a happy one. Our well-crafted plans often remain just fine print on paper. Even in matters of national security, we have been lagging in giving life to our strategic concepts.

The Cold Start Doctrine was drawn up in 2004 when the bitter experience of Kargil was fresh in military planners’ minds. The war had laid bare our weaknesses in fighting wars in which terrorism and conventional operations are seamlessly interwoven. It also drove home the real possibility of a confrontation with Pakistan turning into a nuclear one.

The Doctrine focused on multiple offensive strikes against Pakistan, using battle groups of mechanized forces. The Doctrine was designed to cut down mobilization time after the hiccups during Op Parakrama in the wake of the terrorist attack on Parliament.

For any offensive doctrine to succeed, close air support, greater density of mechanized forces, heavier artillery firepower and high mobility are key elements. Most important, a forward-thinking political leadership with the mental strength to give a green signal is the fundamental requirement for pro-active offensive strategy.
Since 2004, the Army and Air Force have carried out a number of joint exercises with troops to test the doctrine. Similar joint exercises with the Navy have also been held. So the three services were on the ball in implementing the Cold Start strategy.

Sadly, the political leadership appeared to be cold to the Cold Start. Either it is not conscious of the key role it has to play in making a success of the doctrine or it is indifferent to the strategic requirements. It is difficult to understand Defence Minister AK Antony’s readiness to apologetically proclaim India’s peaceful intentions instead of chastizing the Pakistani Army for belligerently commenting on the two-front strategy. It was left to Pakistani columnist Ayaz Amir to do that. He said, “If an Indian Army chief were not to envisage the possibility of a two-front war, and mull over the means of waging it, he would deserve to be sacked.”

The Minister’s response brings home the truth that the leadership’s political priorities would always outweigh national security considerations. If the government had been serious about its role as per the 2004 doctrine, the three services would not be having huge backlogs today in their basic tools of trade. They are in bad shape for no fault of their making. In the words of veteran journalist Shekhar Gupta, “The larger state of our armed forces has begun to resemble 1962.”

The complacency seems to be all-pervasive. It is typical of the national attitude to security that it was left to the Comptroller and Auditor General to critically comment about the battle-worthiness of the armed forces!

Though as many as 12 well known defence manufacturers have been blacklisted for corrupt practices, not more than a handful at home have been indicted. Therein hangs a sordid tale of defence procurement. This is taking a toll of our combat readiness more than any strategic plans of adversaries.

The Army is still in the quest for tanks. Its missiles are not even of late 20th-Century vintage. Since 1987, new guns for the artillery have not been procured. Both the projects to manufacture 155 mm ammunition as well as buying 155 mm guns are in limbo. As a result, by 2008 the Army had to make do with just 400 plus Bofors guns as against its long-term plan for 3,600 artillery guns by 2025.We seem to be endlessly short listing weapons for procurement and not going beyond that. Then there is the manpower shortage with nearly 25 per cent deficiency in officers.

In spite of all the hype about the increasing Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean, the Navy is not in happy shape. More than half of India’s submarines are not battle-ready. The CAG says 63 per cent of the submarine fleet would be ready for phase-out by 2012. The radars are too old and too few to provide any credible defence against an air attack. Submarine procurement and production are facing perpetual hiccups. And overall naval strength is at an alarming low of 135 ships!

The Air Force fares no better; from a 45-squadron force it is down to 32 squadrons. It is deficient of 136 fighters. The IAF’s radar acquisition plans have not been cleared due to repeated delays in the tendering process and objections by the CVC on the purchase of Israeli radars has led to a lowering of air defence capabilities. The Air Force’s story of woes seems endless.

The last straw was the report by a group of 13 scientists about the failure of the fusion test (H-bomb) during the Pokhran-II nuclear tests of 1998, contrary to official claims. This has cast grave doubts about our nuclear bomb capabilities. Even the service chiefs have expressed their concern on this.

Defence research and public sector responsible for manufacture of weapons and ammunition have been holy cows of successive governments. It is high time these cows are tethered and milked for accountability and productivity.

The two-front strategy is to handle an emerging strategic scene in which China is increasing its strategic reach in our neighbourhood in Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Myanmar. And the Pakistani Army is being modernized with American cash with obscurantism having come to stay.

The two-front doctrine is the strategic expression of India’s aspirations as a regional power graduating to a global power status. It envisages short and swift operations. As analyst Subhash Kapila says, “With a nuclear overhang with both Pakistan and China, the Indian military operations to neutralize the Chinese and Pakistani threats has to be fast-paced, facilitated by a high degree of synergy” between the Army, Navy and Air Force. That is why the Army chief has emphasized technology-oriented inputs of C4I2 (this is military acronym for command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, and information technology) for activating the new doctrine.

Twenty-first Century military technology has compressed to minuscule proportions our reaction time in readiness for war. In a nuclear setting, even to survive, nations have much more to do in much less time. We have already wasted too much time; as a result, our two-front strategy is starting with its feet hobbled by outdated mindsets and methodologies, and indifferent political leadership.

But the silver lining is the increasing public awareness on these issues thanks to the media reach and hype. Our battles are here and now with ourselves to give the wherewithal to the armed forces to deliver what they promise.

German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer said, “All truth passes through three stages. First, it is ridiculed. Second, it is violently opposed. Third, it is accepted as self-evident.” It is time we accepted the truth and got ready.
Couresy: GFiles magazine, February 2010, Vol 3, Issue 11

Media Bytes:: Navy's Acquisition of Recce Aircraft

This is an excerpt of an interview given to NDTV-Hindu in the first week of January 2009. The questions raised by NDTV-Hindu reporter are shown in bold letters.

The Indian Navy has signed a $ 2.1 billion deal with Boeing for supply of eight highly sophisticated P8-I Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA). This is said to be the biggest Indian arms deal so far with the United States. Will this tighten our coastal protection to prevent infiltration of terrorists, particularly from Sri Lanka as the war is over there?

Actually, the Boeing deal is part of Indian Navy’s modernization programme. So its purpose is to extend the strategic long range maritime reconnaissance capability of the navy to become truly blue water navy. Their capability is well beyond the limited tactical role of detecting infiltration of terrorists through the sea. In any case the LTTE is no more a powerful entity it was. It is unlikely to be a threat in the near future to Sri Lanka, let alone India.

The new Boeing acquisitions will replace the ageing Tu-142 and IL-38 aircraft now used for long range maritime reconnaissance.

The first Boeing P-8I aircraft is to be delivered by 2012; and the last aircraft by 2015. The P-8I aircraft, based on the Boeing 737 commercial airliner, has been customised to meet Indian Navy’s needs. It is a modified version of the P-8A Poseidon Multi-Mission Maritime Aircraft currently being developed for US Navy.

The P-8I aircraft, with a range of over 600 nautical miles, are expected to plug the large gaps in Navy's maritime reconnaissance capabilities. The P-8I’s weapon systems including torpedoes, depth bombs and anti-ship missiles make it a formidable platform for anti submarine warfare (ASW).

But do we need such huge investments in the navy?

Actually it is not only the navy, but army and air force are also modernising to catch up with the demands of an increasingly technology oriented battlefields of 21st century. The modernisation we had planned for even 20th century warfare has not been completed due to our poor weapon acquisition, research and development systems.

Unless we make investments now, we will never be able to get our armed forces ready to face the challenges that come with our growth as a regional power. New acquisitions are time consuming and expensive. In particular naval ships take time to build and many of the weapons, radars, and electronic warfare systems are procured from different suppliers and fitted.

It is not like buying small arms off the shelf. Countries design weapon systems based upon the requirements for the type of operations they visualise. So when we buy or develop a weapon system it has to be specially modified or designed to suit our specific requirements and theatres of war.

As early as August 2008, the then Navy chief Admiral Sureesh Mehta had described Indian Navy’s vision to become a 160-ship force (at present we probably have 135 ships). He said "By 2022, we plan to have 160-plus ship navy, including three aircraft carriers, 60 major combatants, including submarines and close to 400 aircraft of different types. This will be a formidable three dimensional force with satellite surveillance and networking to provide force multiplication."

The Air Force is also modernising. It is in the process of phasing out MiG 21 fleet and acquiring modern fighters. It has been trying to persuade the Ministry of Defence to procure a new fleet of A330 multi-role tanker transport (MRTT) for mid-air refuelling of fighter aircraft, instead of the Russian Illushin-78 tankers, which are already in use. Mid air refuelling system increases the sphere of operation of the air force.

Similarly Army is also trying to modernise. It has started the process of acquiring network-centric warfare capabilities. As a part of this effort it is “all set to induct a computerised command and control system to integrate its artillery weapon operations. Project Sakthi, the Artillery Combat Command and Control System (ACCCS) will be a major division of the Tactical Command Control Communication and Intelligence (Tac C3I) system. Rocket and missile systems are being modernised increasing their range and fire power.

So the armed forces should be ready for 21st century warfare by end of the next decade?

Far from it; there are formidable obstacles to it. We are trying to use 19th century methodology to modern day defence procurement. Then there are holy cows: defence research and development, and public sector fixation for defence supplies. They are beyond the pale of accountability. The quality of our nuclear weapon systems has become suspect in the eyes of many defence scientists.

The fashion in our defence procurement appears to be to sign a contract and then cancel it,wasting years of work. For instance MoD has cancelled three contracts – two with the EADS for supply of refueling aircraft and Eurocopter deal and one with BAE fo supply of 155 mm artillery guns to the army.

Thus our problem is not for want of ideas but evolving a corruption free system of procurement. Despite paying lip service to private sector, we have mental blocks in bringing in private capital for defence manufacture. Despite a patchwork quilt of measures in all this, I do not expect any great change in mindset of our administrators. So I presume we will plod through the coming decade adopting a Pakistan-centric reactive policy.

Indian Navy gains international recogntion for fighting piracy

The London-based UN agency, International Maritime Organisation (IMO), has awarded a special 'Certificate of Commendation' to the Indian navy in appreciation of its role in fighting pirates in the Gulf of Aden, forces.

Indian Navy had deployed 12 ships off the coast of Somalia till July 2009. Indian Naval ships have escorted about 700 merchant ships, including 600 foreign-flagged vessels from over 45 countries, during anti-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden since October 2008.

Commodore P K Banerjee, Naval Adviser in London and also the commanding officer of INS TABAR one of the warships that took part in international anti-piracy patrols received the award from E E Mitropoulos, IMO Secretary General at a ceremony held in London.

Nalin Surie, the High Commissioner of India to UK, Georg Boomgaarden, Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany and President of IMO Assembly, were among dignitaries present on the occasion.

The award ceremony coincided with the inauguration of the 26th Regular Session of the IMO Assembly in London.

What is China up to in Hambantota?

What is China up to in Hambantota? This is the question many of the readers had been asking me from time to time. Definietly, the increasing Chinese influence in India's neighbourhood is matter of concern for India. Apart from the strong Pakistan-China strategic ties, recent developments in the US-China relations, political developments in Nepal,and the growth of China-Myanmar relations show a definite uptrend in Chinese influence in South Asia. And China had fully used the war situation in Sri Lanka to its advantage. The Hambantota project in Sri Lanka, though a non-military commercial port development project, definitely increases China's strategic options in the region.

But we need to contextualize Hambantota in the overall relationship between India and Sri Lanka on the one hand and India-China relations on the other. It is not that Sri Lanka is completely going under Chinese influence as many LTTE acolytes had started saying as the Tamil Tigers started losing the Eelam War IV. At the same time growing Chinese influence in Sri Lanka should not be ignored.

I found Mr B Raman's article "Hambantota & Gwadar - An Update" published on June 12, 2009 in www.southasiaanalysis.org, the website of South Asia Analysis Group, useful in understanding the Hambantota project. He has made it more interesting by comparing it with the Gwadar port project in Pakistan. I am reproducing Mr Raman's article here, courtesy South Asia Analysis Group.


Hambantota & Gwadar -- An Update

By B. Raman

The foundation for the construction of a modern port with Chinese assistance at Hambantota in southern Sri Lanka was formally laid in October, 2007. The construction actually started in January, 2008.

2. It is a 15-year project to be completed in stages. The entire project is estimated to cost US $ one billion. The present Chinese commitment is for the construction of the first stage only, which is estimated to cost US $ 360 million. China has agreed to give 85 per cent of this amount at concessional interest. The balance is being contributed by the Government of Sri Lanka.

3. The first stage of the 15-year (2008-2023) project is expected to be completed by the end of 2010. This stage envisages the construction of a 1000-metre jetty, which will enable the harbour to function as an industrial port for the import and export of industrial chemicals, fuel and heavy machinery. By 2023, Hambantota is projected to have a liquefied natural gas refinery, aviation fuel storage facilities, three separate docks giving the port a trans shipment capacity and dry docks for ship repair and construction. The project also envisages that when completed the port will serve as a base for bunkering and refueling.

4. The draught (depth) of the new harbour will be 16 metres against 15 metres in Colombo. A 230 metre passage-entrance channel will be created at the breakwater which is 988 metres long on the west end and 311 metres long on the east end.
5. The Government hopes that as a refueling location Hambantota will have many advantages over the Colombo port or ports in South India. The construction has been undertaken by a consortium of Chinese companies headed by the China Harbour Engineering Company and the Sino Hydro Corporation.

6. The project doesn’t have a separate consultant. The Sri Lanka Port Authority (SLPA) is functioning as the client-cum-consultant while the China Harbour Engineering Co Ltd is the contractor. In September, 2008, there were 328 Sri Lankans and 235 Chinese working at the site-----engineers, administrative personnel and others. The present number is not known.

7. The first stage due to be ready by end 2010 will allow three ships to berth. The final stage, for which there is no offer of funding yet from China, is planned to accommodate more than 30 ships, which is the present capacity at Colombo.

8. Reliable reports say that while the Sri Lankan authorities want Hambantota to emerge as a modern port with better facilities and efficiency than any of the ports in South India, they do not want the present importance of the Colombo port to be reduced. Colombo presently has the reputation of being the most modern and most efficient port in South Asia. They want this reputation to be maintained. There is no proposal at present to set up container yards and cater to container ships at Hambantota.

9. The present Chinese interest is in the use of the docking and refueling facilities that would come up in Hambantota for their commercial and naval ships. There is no proposal at present for a Chinese naval base at Hambantota.
10. The Chinese have helped Pakistan in the construction of a similar port at Gwadar on the Mekran coast in Balochistan. The first phase of the construction has already been completed and the port was commissioned when Pervez Musharraf was the President. The contract for the running of the port has been given to a Singapore company.

11. From the beginning, Gwadar was planned as a naval-cum- commercial port. Both Pakistan and China were interested in its naval potential. Pakistan wanted the naval facilities in Gwadar to give a strategic depth to its navy and reduce its dependence on the Karachi port, which is vulnerable to attack by the Indian Navy in times of war. The Chinese were interested in the use of the refueling and docking facilities of Gwadar for their naval ships visiting the Gulf area.

12. The Pakistanis had and continue to have ambitious plans for the development of Gwadar as a port to cater to the external trade of the Central Asian Republics (CARs) and the Xinjiang and the Sichuan provinces and the Tibetan region of China. They also offered to the Chinese the use of Gwadar as a transshipment point for oil and gas, which could be brought to Gwadar and from there moved by pipelines to Xinjiang. They also proposed the construction of a rail and road network between Gwadar and Xinjiang. They are also interested in the construction of a huge oil refining capability in Gwadar. Beyond agreeing to feasibility studies in respect of these proposals emanating from Pakistan, the Chinese have not made any firm commitments regarding their participation in any other project in addition to the port construction.

13. Even though it is about two years since the Gwadar port was commissioned, it has not been attracting many ocean-going ships. Most shipping companies prefer the continued use of the Karachi port despite its inefficiency. This is mainly due to the poor security situation in the Makran coast and the failure of the Pakistani authorities to develop the road and other infrastructure, which could sustain an increased level of activity at Gwadar. Even the Chinese preferred using the facilities at Karachi for the ships of their anti-piracy patrols than the facilities at Gwadar. Unless and until there is peace and stability in Afghanistan, the prospects of Gwadar emerging as the gateway for the external trade of the CARs will remain weak.

14. In contrast to Pakistan, Sri Lanka's interest in developing Hambantota has remained purely commercial. It has very limited external trade. The Colombo port is able to meet satisfactorily its external trade needs. It does not need another port for this purpose. Its interest in Hambantota is as a source of additional foreign exchange earned by offering world class facilities and efficiency to international shipping companies. It is hoping that the present Colombo port and the new port coming up at Hambantota will give it an advantage over India, whose ports are not known for their modern facilities and efficiency.

15. The Sri Lankan Navy has a long history of cordial relations and co-operation with the Indian Navy. It fears no threat from the Indian Navy. As a result, the interest of the Sri Lankan Navy in Hambantota is minimal. But the Chinese interest is more strategic than purely commercial. It is very unlikely that Sri Lanka would allow the Chinese Navy to use Hambantota against India. But a Chinese naval presence in Hambantota would add to the concerns of the Indian Navy by increasing the vulnerability of the South to pressures from the Chinese Navy.

16. Reliable reports say that the Chinese have not so far raised the question of developing Hambantota as a naval base which they can also use to ensure the security of their oil and gas supplies. But they do not rule out the possibility of the Chinese raising it if and when negotiations are held for additional Chinese financial commitments for the subsequent stages of the project.

http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers33%5Cpaper3248.html

Forgotten Signalmen of Jabalpur

Recently Raghu, one my readers, had drawn my attention to an article (“Radioactive Rebels” in Outlook magazine, April 20, 2009) of an unrecognized revolt by some Signalmen in the Signals Training Centre, Jabalpur February 26, 1946, against the British Raj.

According to the article 120 men of the 'J' company of the Signals Training Centre (STC), Jabalpur, defied their British superiors a broke free from their barracks. Part of a radio signalling unit, they were angry at the abuse heaped on them by their British counterparts. They were also upset at the incarceration of two Indian National Army (INA) officers at Red Fort in Delhi. The ranks of the mutineers swelled to 1,700 men, armed with nothing more than Congress and Muslim League flags. The protest was peaceful till they were bayonet charged by the Somerset Light Infantry to break up the revolt. Eighty men were court-martialled and dismissed without pay and pension and 41 others were sent to prison.

According to the article, the British hushed up the whole incident and destroyed most of the records. However, Forty-one others were sent to prison. But the incident was quickly hushed up. The British officers stationed in Jabalpur were replaced by Indian officers and most of the records destroyed. This part of unwritten role of armed forces in Indian freedom would have remained so till Maj Gen VK Singh (retd.) chanced upon the information while collating material for the third volume of the official history of the Corps of Signals.

He has included the details of the Jabalpur mutiny his recent book “The Contribution of the Indian Armed Forces to the Freedom Movement.”

He chanced upon the few remaining records of the Jabalpur mutiny while working on the official history of the Corps of Signals. He has already published the second volume of the corps's history and is busy collating material for the third and final volume. According to Maj Gen VK Singh, the Jabalpur mutiny so soon after the Naval mutiny became a matter of grave concern to the British colonial rulers. .
Of course, the men who took part in the revolt for the cause of Indian freedom were forgotten after independence.

This was not the only mutiny during the last days of the Raj. Writing in the Mainstream, (Vol XLVI No 41 October 1, 2008), the author Ajeet Jawed says “between March 1942 and the beginning of 1946 there were 19 uprisings in the Royal Indian Navy alone.” The most important and tragic was the Royal Indian Naval revolt that started with a strike in Bombay by naval ratings of HMIS Talwar February 18, 1946, just a week earlier than the army mutiny at Jabalpur. Like the naval army men the naval ratings were also protesting against the racist behaviour of Royal Navy personnel towards Indian sailors and against the prosecution of two INA officers in Delhi. The mutiny evoked widespread public support and Bombay observed a general strike in sympathy on February 19. It was suppressed with British troops with casualties on both sides.

According to Ajeet Jawed, the naval ratings strike spread within 48 hours to “almost all the ships at anchor and on the sea and establishments ashore in India and abroad. Even the units at far-flung Aden and Bahrain did not remain unaffected. In all 74 ships, four flotillas and 20 shore establishments (including three major naval bases) joined the strike. The ratings pulled down the Union Jack and raised the tricolour (Congress), crescent (Muslim League) and hammer-sickle (Communist Party) flags on the mastheads of the rebel ships.”

The revolt in Bombay also triggered sympathetic vibrations in distant Karachi, Morvi and Manora as well. He says, about 1200 airmen of the Royal Indian Air Force also went on a procession in support of their strike on Februray 20. Indian officers of the RIAF refused to fly out troops, and the transport units refused to carry British troops to fight the naval ratings and the Indian officers refused to pilot planes to bomb the ships.

The mutiny was called off following after senior Congress leader Vallabh Bhai Patel met the strike committee leaders and requested them to end it. The Muslim League chief Mohammed Ali Jinnah also made similar call. Of course, politicians did not help the mutineers from being court-martialled and dismissed from service. And after independence in India and Pakistan they were never reinstated. They were either incarcerated or rendered jobless.

Their struggle was not recognized for a long time after independence. The Congress government of the time probably wanted to ignore this important chapter in India’s freedom struggle because there were many Communist sympathisers among the naval mutineers. However, they were later accorded the status of freedom fighters.

But all the army men who revolted in Jabalpur have not been accorded this recognition so far. According to the Outlook article Lance Naik Neelakantan Nair, one of the survivors of the mutiny appealed to the Kerala High Court seeking redress. Though the court directed the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Kerala government to look into the matter nothing came of it. The MHA in a letter dated February 14, 2003 (No 8/2/2003-FF-P), stated that the issue of granting freedom fighter status to the mutineers had been "considered and it has been decided at the level of the home minister that they cannot be treated as freedom fighters."

What is more important in the current political context when BJP has come out in strong support of the armed forces demands its election manifesto, is the then Home minister and BJP’s present prime ministerial aspirant L.K. Advani did not find “the mutiny and its impact adequate enough to club it with the freedom struggle.” However, thanks to the efforts of the Corps of Signals the signals corps 41, out of over 1,700 mutineers, were granted the freedom fighters meagre pension. The others were ignored since official records showed that they had been "discharged on administrative grounds," although the discharge certificates showed they were discharged for taking part in the "Jubalpore STC mutiny".

This simple incident of forgotten history of a few hundred soldiers point to two home truths: veterans must be cautious in putting too much faith in BJP politicians’ electoral promises becoming a reality. Firstly, politicians suffer from a peculiar ailment: post-election amnesia. Secondly, even if they want to do something, the roadblocks of Babudom have to be overcome.

I have first hand experience of the mysterious ways of “Babudom blocks.” this. After independence, my father was recognized as a freedom fighter because he was imprisoned for a year during the individual satyagraha. For nearly 30 years he enjoyed the nation’s recognition as a freedom fighter more than the small pension that went with the official stamp of approval. When he passed away, my mother as the spouse of the freedom fighter was eligible for a smaller pension. However, her application was rejected as the officials of MHA wanted a copy of my father’s original prison discharge certificate after 80 years - half a century of imprisonment and 30 years of receiving the pension! My efforts when I was posted in Army Headquarters on this count were in vain. I gave up the struggle in disgust as the watchdogs of government would not relent. My mother died without ever getting the pension that was her due.

The moral of the story: it is Babus who rule India. During the British rule it was British Babudom that held the sway. The only change after independence is the change in the colour of its skin. So veterans should be prepared for a long haul for OROP to come through even if the political heads nod in agreement, unless the mandarins of Babudom will it.