Interview: Col.Ramani Hariharan: Intelligence Head of Indian Peacekeepin...

Ranil faces Hobsons Choice

Col R Hariharan | Sri Lanka Perspectives February 2023 | South Asia Security Trends March 2023 | www.security-risks.com

February ended as a month of discontent for the public after the government raised power tariffs for a second time on February 15. It was said to be the last of 15 conditions to be met for the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Extended Fund Facility (EFF) of $2.9 billion. But the uncertainties over the EFF are not over as the IMF is yet to receive assurance from China as India and the Paris Club have done. China has offered only a two-year moratorium on its debts.

Opposition SJB MP and economist Dr Harsha De Silva, while strongly condemning the raising of power tariffs for a second time, said Sri Lanka could technically still receive IMF support. He said it can be done through Lending into Official Arrears Policy (LOAP) with support from the US, if 50% of debtors have agreed to restructure their facilities. He suggested that if loans from the China Development Bank can be moved under commercial loans instead of bilateral loans, this could be achieved.

President Ranil Wickremesinghe speaking at various forums has focused on economic recovery. While addressing a Rotary gathering on February 18, he emphasised the importance of economic recovery and improving citizens quality of life. He said democracy depends on the maintenance of public order which requires law and order. Following the country’s economic recovery, next year it would be able to decide on the future it wants, with the use of the ballot (italics added), clearly indicating he was against the LG election.

Addressing Tax Forum 2023 on February 21, he strongly defended the current tax policy, as a rescue operation and not a normal tax policy. If the policy is disrupted, Sri Lanka will not be able to join the IMF programme and lose the opportunity to do business with foreign countries.

The President is applying his masterly skills at obfuscation to handle questions on the long overdue LG elections. The election scheduled for March 9 stands postponed as the Election Commission had been facing a number of structural and financial issues to conduct the elections. The air has been thick for the last two months with questions on LG elections from all sides, ranging from semi literate politicians, sensationalising paparazzi, sanctimonious but erudite civil society leaders and sermonising do-gooders who shun responsibility.

The President’s speech on the LG election issue in parliament on February 23 is an eloquent example of obfuscation. He said “There is no election to be postponed. I have so far not got into this debate on elections as I kept out of it on the grounds that I will not get involved in politics. However, today, we hear the Election Commission will inform Courts that the election cannot be held since an affidavit has been submitted. I will speak on it, as otherwise it will be unfair on the part of the Treasury Secretary. The Commission has been informed by the Treasury Secretary that they are unable to provide necessary funds to conduct the elections. That is not true. It was I who first informed the Election Commission in December that due to the economic situation, it was not possible to hold the elections.

President Wickremesinghe appears to be a votary of 50s British humourist Stephen Potter who authored Lifemanship series of books. In that era of self-help manuals of the Dale Carnegie variety, Potter focused on books with less exalted goals of survival issues like: “winning without actually cheating (Gamesmanship), “creative intimidation (One-Upmanship)”, and “making the other man feel that something has gone wrong however slightly” (“Lifemanship”). The President seems to be using all the ploys of Potter to confuse the nation reeling under unmanageable price rise of daily necessities.  

Obfuscation is the erudite man’s quibbling in action. Oxford Languages explains it as “the action of making something obscure, unclear or unintelligible, when confronted with sharp questions they resort to obfuscation.”

Successful politicians develop their skills at the art of obfuscation to difficult questions from the paparazzi, awkward questions from the informed audience and perhaps, to handle embarrassing moments with their girlfriends. If there is an award for obfuscation in politics, President Wickremesinghe will win a platinum award. Perhaps, he can’t be faulted for it because probably that came, when he earned the President’s chair without a popular mandate after a severe drubbing in the general elections.

But time may be running out for such gamesmanship, if we go by the mood of the people in the thousands who had gathered in protest in Colombo on February 26. The National People's Power (NPP) led by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna(JVP) held a massive protest against the postponement of the LG elections by the government in Colombo. NPP and JVP leaders including MP Anura Kumar Dissanayake and NPP MP Vijitha Herath had joined the protest. Prior to the protest, magistrate courts concerned had issued orders preventing the protests. Orders were also issued against 26 persons including Dissanayake from marching towards Galle Face Green and the Presidential Secretariat. When the protestors gathered in strength and wanted to march towards Colombo Fort area they were stopped by the police. Meanwhile, reinforcements of police in riot gear and army personnel  joined the police. Police used tear gas and water cannons to disperse the restive crowd which were shouting anti-Wickremesinghe slogans. In the melee that followed more than 20 persons were hospitalised. One of the NPP candidates for LG election who was hospitalised succumbed to his injuries. Police action in crushing the public protest has been condemned by civil society and even political parties not supporting the NPP-JVP combine.

Meanwhile 15 unions of the Ceylon Electricity Board employees are already protesting against the structural changes and tariff revisions. Trade unions of several sectors are scheduled to go on strike on March 1 against the recently introduced tax policy. Meanwhile, President Wickremesinghe has signed a gazette notification declaring several services related to ports, airports and passenger transport services as essential services.

Clearly the President faces Hobson’s choice.

Tailpiece: Resurrection of Prabhakaran : On February 13, 2023, Tamil nationalist movement leader Pazha Nedumaran resurrected the ghost of Velupillai Prabhakaran, the LTTE leader who was slain on May 19, 2009 towards the end of the Eelam War. The aging former Congress leader from Tamil Nādu claimed Prabhakaran was still alive and would appear in public shortly. He said the LTTE leader was “hale and robust” and urged the Tamil people to rally behind him. The news failed to animate anyone. [written on February 28, 2023]

[Col R Hariharan, a retired MI specialist on South Asia and terrorism, served as the head of intelligence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka 1987-90. He is associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies. Email: haridirect@gmail.com  Website: https://col.hariharan.info]    

Sri Lanka: LTTE’s moment of truth at Sampur (Reprint)

[ This is a reprint of the author's Sri Lanka Updte No 101 published by the South Asia Analysis Group Note No 331 dated 08.09. 2006 as part of the archives.] 

By Col R Hariharan (retd.)

In the wake of the fall of Sampur to the Sri Lanka Security Forces (SLSF) on September 4, 2006, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have said the 2002 Cease Fire Agreement (CFA) has “ended.” S.P. Tamilselvan, LTTE’s political head, met with the visiting Norwegian Ambassador Brattskar, and the new Deputy Ambassador Laegreid, at Kilinochchi on September 6, 2006. After the meeting Tamilselvan explained to the press that the Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL)’s occupation of Sampur violated the basic requirement of CFA, which was respecting the existing borders of control. “By this occupation (of Sampur) GOSL has brought an end to the CFA” he added.

Does this mean LTTE has formally renounced the CFA? It is not clear.

However, the fall of Sampur means a major shift in the power equation between the two sides in the east in the on going series of military confrontations since mid July 2006. LTTE artillery based in the Sampur area had posed a strategic threat to the movement of Sri Lanka naval ships from Trincomalee harbour across the Koddiyar Bay. And that meant the GOSL and SLSF supply chains to Jaffna from Trincomalee were under LTTE’s threat and surveillance.

The LTTE had termed the loss of Sampur as a tactical withdrawal rather than a defeat. In spite of this, Sampur represents a big loss of face for LTTE as it comes in the wake its successive failures against the SLSF in operations that started with Mavil Aru (See SAAG Paper No 1908 dated Aug 12, 2006 “Mavil Aru operation and after-an analysis” for details) and continued with the LTTE’s offensive in the north (See SAAG Note 325 dated Aug 15, 2006 “LTTE strikes back Up date 98” and SAAG Note 327 dated Aug 25, 2006 “LTTE under duress Up date 99” for details).

Media reports indicate that LTTE had managed to pull out the bulk of its artillery to safer areas further southeast around Eechchalmpattu. Thus, LTTE still retains to a certain extent the capability to use its long-range artillery from positions in depth to interfere with shipping in and out of Trincomalee. So the SLSF can be expected to continue their operation to its logical conclusion of clearing the whole of the Muttur East ? Sampur bulge, in case the LTTE artillery opens up once again. But LTTE is unlikely to do so in this sector as its manoeuvring space has been restricted.

There is some dispute whether LTTE was in possession of Sampur at the time of ceasefire. However LTTE insists it was so. LTTE would probably choose a time and place where it is assured of success, to avenge its losses with a spectacular action. Considered in this background, Tamilselvan’s warning that the majority Sinhalese would have to “face the consequences soon” sounds ominous.

LTTE’s strategic errors

LTTE appear to have committed a number of strategic errors in the on going series of operations.

1. The first error was in triggering the SLSF operations in Trincomalee sector, where LTTE’s tactically weak. The region has Tamil villages interspersed between Sinhala and Muslim villages. Traditionally the Sinhala response in this sector to Tamil confrontation had been violent. Army, navy and air force units based in Trincomalee are readily available in close proximity. So any confrontation in this area was bound to gain quick retaliation.
2. The attack on the Army Commander provided the motivation and excuse for the SLSF to pound LTTE positions in Sampur area intermittently from air and ground since April 2006. This would have prevented the LTTE cadres from aggressively patrolling and dominating the ground.
3. The blocking of Mavil Aru waters gave a legitimate reason for President Rajapaksa to launch a military offensive for a “humanitarian” cause. This was despite the offer of the Tamil population to hold talks to consider the opening of the sluice gates and resume the supply of water. And this should have been a strong indication for his intention to use force rather than talk in any confrontation with LTTE.
4. LTTE’s military escalation was done at the worst possible time. LTTE had already stretched the patience of the four Co-chairs and had not heeded their pleas for restraining its conduct. On the other hand it defied them and continued its attacks on Army officers and naval ships. When the operations started, the attitude of the international community appeared to silently allow LTTE “to stew in its own juices” for sometime.
5. LTTE had rendered the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) ineffective with its insistence on the withdrawal of its monitors belonging to EU countries. This put Norway on the defensive and kept it busy in sorting out the SLMM staffing problems.
6. Most importantly, LTTE failed to gauge the mood of President Rajapaksa to go for a full-scale military option against LTTE. The air strikes carried out on his orders on April 26, 2006 on Sampur defences was a clear indication that the President had decided on the hard option and would strike at an opportune moment.

Analysis of operational performance

In the absence of complete information, probably it is too early to make an assessment on operational performance; after all one swallow does not make a summer, as the cliché goes. Still it is difficult to ignore some tell tale signs that show up in the performance of both sides.

1. Overall LTTE’s operational performance had shown its weakness in handling conventional operations. However, in the north LTTE showed its ability to launch operations on multiple axes, a luxury considering its limited availability of troops. This dissipated its thrust on the main A9 axis.
2. On the other hand SLSF with its successes has gained increasing confidence. Despite a few flaws, it has come out better. The SLSF’s training and modernisation efforts appear to have paid off. The Army had excellent close support from the air force and navy during the operations. In a way the air force fighters and the multi-barrel artillery paved the way for SLSF successes.
3. LTTE appear to have underestimated the staying power of the SLSF defenders. They not only held on but also broke up LTTE’s repeated assaults and counter attacks, which indicated high morale of troops. LTTE’s problem was probably in believing one’s own propaganda. A careful study of the rigorous training that SLSF had undertaken during the last four years should have opened the eyes of LTTE. Under Lt General Fonseka, the Army has shown better level of junior leadership, which showed  it could take as well as inflict casualties and continue with the operations.
4. The Mavil Aru operations exposed LTTE’s tactical limitations in conventional operation in the face of overwhelming firepower. In spite of this experience, it is surprising that LTTE went in for a conventional offensive in Muhamalai-Nagarkovil area, where the SLSF was fully entrenched. The SLSF had been preparing the defences in these areas for sometime. LTTE’s sporadic sniping and Claymore attacks in this region in the earlier months had kept them alert and on their toes.
5. LTTE showed it could bring up accurate long-range artillery fire. Its artillery strike on Jaffna air base put it out of action. However, it could not sustain the fire, which showed limited availability of artillery ammunition. The SLSF enjoyed the freedom of the air to carry out air operations in support of ground attacks. It knocked off the LTTE guns interfering with Jaffna airport operation, which was resumed after a break for a few days. This clearly showed LTTE’s Achilles heel ? air defence. LTTE had no worthwhile anti-aircraft or surface to air missile (SAM) capability. (LTTE was said to possess a few SAMs. However they were not seen in action. This could be due to the aging of missiles in stock. Or they were too few and kept as critical reserves). SLSF is likely to exploit LTTE’s vulnerability to air attacks in future operations. (The paucity of SAMs would explain LTTE’s desperate efforts to procure them in the U.S. Even as the operations were in progress, the FBI busted a U.S.-Canadian LTTE ring and arrested over a dozen Tamils who were trying to procure missiles and electronic devices for LTTE. )
6. LTTE could not reinforce Sampur from north or east. Presumably Karuna and his cadres in Batticaloa bottled up LTTE in the east, while SLSF aircraft made large scale LTTE movement elsewhere untenable. Considering this, the military wisdom of going for an offensive in the northern front even as the guns had not cooled in Mavil Aru is questionable.
7. During the course of the operation, Sea Tiger attempts to strike at Sri Lanka naval ships at Trincomalee and off the coast of Point Pedro in Jaffna peninsula failed dismally. The SLSF claimed to have sunk 15 LTTE boats during the Point Pedro operation. Alertness and faster response to situation of the Sri Lanka navy to the LTTE threat probably was responsible for these successes.

Did Karuna affect the operations?It is clear LTTE’s strength has been severely affected due to Karuna’s break away. The eastern region was a major recruitment area for LTTE. Karuna also probably has a hand in strengthening Sri Lankan intelligence network as more and more LTTE operations, particularly in the sea and in the vicinity of Colombo are being compromised. Even as the guns are going silent in Sampur, Karuna’s Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP) in a press release have claimed to have driven away LTTE cadres from as many as six bases in Amparai district in an overnight operation and killing15 LTTE cadres, while losing one of their own cadres. The TMVP captured 15 T-56 assault rifles, one RPG and two LMGs, apart from grenades and ammunition in these operations.  If this claim is correct, it is clear that Karuna is taking advantage of the destabilisation of LTTE in Trincomalee to wrest control of areas under LTTE control.

Humanitarian issues

While the war hogged the headlines, sufferings of the common man in the war zone have been pushed to the back burner. Both sides have shown little concern for the suffering of civilian population or casualties. Scores of houses have been destroyed in Mutur town and in nearly a dozen villages in Sampur bulge. Jaffna has been choked as A9- the highway link for supplies has been cut off. Over 230,000 people from the war affected regions of north and east have been displaced and are living in make shift camps. The UN has estimated that their maintenance cost for three months would work out to $ 37 million.

There had been a number of extra judicial killings. The hand of Sri Lankan security personnel is suspected in the killing of 17 aid workers of Tamil origin belonging to a French NGO. The ill-planned SLSF bombing of Chencholai camp in the heartland of LTTE killed 61 school kids, in the belief they were Black Tigers. (Sri Lanka government has disputed both of these allegations.)  LTTE manipulated the operations to drive away over 30,000 Muslims from their homes in Mutur. It also shot and killed 35 Muslims picked up from the fleeing crowds. Of course, a bigger tragedy was the wanton gunning down of Ketheswaran Loganathan, a widely respected Tamil intellectual, who had been striving for peace in Sri Lanka at his Colombo home.

LTTE’s moment of truth

Though it has lost a few battles, LTTE war machine is intact. It holds sizeable territory fully in its control. It also holds the destiny of Tamils living in those areas in its hands. It is possible that LTTE’s recent offensive in the north was only a dress rehearsal of the main offensive yet to come to capture Jaffna. In spite of all this, the fall of Sampur as a culmination of recent military confrontations offers a moment of truth for LTTE to re-examine its undiluted faith in the military option.

Unlike the earlier generation of LTTE fighters, for LTTE’s present rank and file anti Tamil pogroms of `1983 are only oral history. Can they be motivated to launch a mother of all operations to recapture Jaffna? Even if they succeed in doing so after another few rounds of bloody battle, can they regain east? Even a month long war has shown that Tamils were suffering “absolute misery,” in the words of Tamilselvan. He has accused the international community of not taking action to help them and adopting a soft approach to the violence against Tamils. Will these things improve with more military operations? The sections of Tamil Diaspora that feed the LTTE war machine are going to find it more and more difficult in the coming months, as the West is tightening up its anti terrorism operations. In such an environment is an all out war a viable option? These are some of the questions that the LTTE leadership need to introspect. The writing on the wall is clear – GOSL and LTTE will have to put aside their guns, sit down and discuss. There is no other way out of the tunnel.

(Col R Hariharan, a Military Intelligence specialist on South Asia, was the Head of Intelligence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka, 1987-90. E-mail: colhari@yahoo.com )

SRI LANKA: MAVIL ARU OPERATION & AFTER – An Analysis (Reprint)

 

This is a reprint of South Asia Analysis Group Paper No 1908 dated 12.08.06 as part of archives of the author's work. Paper no.1908

SRI LANKA: MAVIL ARU OPERATION & AFTER – An Analysis By Col R Hariharan (retd.) 1.   Operation Watershed, the Sri Lanka Security Forces (SLSF)’s bloody confrontation with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) for achieving what both sides called ‘humanitarian objectives’ over the water supply from the Mavil Aru reservoir in eastern Sri Lanka has been going on since July 26, 2006. People heaved a sigh of relief on August 8, 2006 when LTTE announced it was restoring the water supply, which was the basic reason for the confrontation. Everyone expected the SLSF to call off the offensive when LTTE lifted the blockade. But it was not to be and the Operation Watershed continued as the Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) announced that operations would end only when it gained control of the sluice gates controlling the water flow. On August 10, 2006 the GOSL announced that they had gained full control of the sluice gates of the reservoir and they only had opened them. But the fighting has continued on August 11, 2006 as the GOSL said it wanted to make the area fully secure. The SLSF is said to have inflicted heavy casualties on the Tigers. 2.   As though to underline his newfound determination to ‘bash on regardless’, President Rajapakse said that the supply of water was a non-negotiable fundamental human right. “If any one tries to obstruct it by laying down conditions, the Government will do everything within its means to overcome such obstructions and cater to the people’s needs,” he cautioned. 3.   With the Tigers faring not so well in Mavil Aru, as they were comparatively weak in the east, it was expected they would strike in a big way in the North. As though to justify this expectation on the morning of August 12, 2006, the LTTE claimed to have destroyed Muhamalai post which is the entry point for Jaffna. Reuters quoted a LTTE official as saying: “We have completely destroyed the army checkpoints at the Muhamalai (border) crossing, and we are advancing on Jaffna”. 4.   According to him the LTTE the Sea Tigers had also attacked just south of Jaffna town and assaulted a navy base at the island’s northern tip before dawn. At the time of writing it is not clear at which point this attack has taken place. Analysis of Mavil Aru operation 5.   This paper presents an analysis of the Mavil Aru confrontation up to the SLSF recapture of the reservoir on August 8, 2006 and its consolidation of the area up to August 10, 2006. As it appears to be an ongoing operation the analysis has its own limitations due to paucity of objective information in media reports. 6.   The Mavil Aru confrontation  had started when Tamils of Mutur East-Ichchilampattai area closed the sluice gates to block the supply of water to about 30,000 acres of ripe paddy affecting about 60,000 Sinhalas depending upon it for their livelihood. Of course as these Tamils were living in areas under LTTE control, there was no question of taking such a drastic action without LTTE’s support. In the earlier years of ceasefire, such an issue would have been resolved through negotiations. But this time it was not to be. The GOSL decided to use the SLSF to lift the blockade, and resume the water supply. 7.   After the ceasefire came in force in 2002, this is the biggest military confrontation between the SLSF and LTTE. The SLSF operation was a full-fledged war using army, navy and the air force for the offensive. SLSF did not confine its offensive only to this region; its air force engaged Tigers locations in Batticaloa, and Vavuniya also. Significantly the SLSF probed well within territory under LTTE control, in defiance of the ceasefire agreement (CFA). The GOSL in a major departure of policy appears to have decided not to bother about the niceties of CFA violation any more. This probably portends the resumption of full-scale war between the two rivals in all sectors, even though it may not be termed as Eelam War IV as the ceasefire is still on in paper. 8.   During the operation LTTE showed its strength and limitations in not only in the use of conventional forces including artillery, but also in continuing its guerrilla operations to carry out killings, intimidation and propaganda even during the operation. Why Mavil Aru operations? 9.   The Mavil Aru operations are in a sense precipitation of the war clouds that had been darkening the skies of ceasefire in Sri Lanka, ever since LTTE made an abortive suicide attack on Sri Lanka Army Commander Lt Gen Sarath Fonseka on April 25, 2006. The SLSF had been smarting under a large number of LTTE attacks affecting its morale and efficiency during the first three years of ceasefire. But the attack on the Army Commander was an affront neither President Rajapakse nor SLSF could ignore. Since then both SLSF and LTTE had been flexing their muscles for a full-fledged confrontation. Though SLSF stepped up its retaliation, LTTE had continued hitting at selected targets, the latest one being an suicide bomber’s attack on former Tamil M.P. and Eelam People’s Democratic Party (EPDP) leader Sivathasan on August 8, 2006. 10.   Both sides appear to have chosen Mavil Aru as the scene for a show down for their own reasons. These may be grouped under the heads of geo-strategy, ethnic, political and international environments. Geo-strategic reasons 11.   Geographically, Mavil Aru is located in an ethnically sensitive area where Sinhala, Muslim and Tamil villages are located almost nudging each other. Operations in this area impact all the three communities. Strategically, it is south of Mutur bulge, which dominates the entry into Koddiyar Bay, the inlet for Trincomalee port and naval base. LTTE presence in the area has always posed a threat SLSF domination of the seas and free naval movement in and out of the base. LTTE has always ensured its presence in this region particularly along Mutur East ? Ichchilampattai ? Verugal Ferry. In the past it has been the scene of all conflicts with LTTE. The dense forests of Somawathie sanctuary on the Southwest restrict free movement of troops and facilitate easy dispersal of insurgents. The highway A-15, linking Trincomalee and Batticaloa areas, runs along this coast. A-15 has gained added tactical significance in LTTE’s struggle to re-establish its writ in the east ever since the eastern leader Karuna broke away. Thus this area has gained greater significance now. Ethnic environment 12.   A spark of conflict anywhere in Sri Lanka usually has an incendiary response in this region. This is linked to the long simmering issue of ‘colonisation’ of Tamil areas. The region has seen the progressive rise of Sinhala population and consolidation of Muslim population. Three decades ago the GOSL created the Mavil Aru project to benefit the state sponsored Sinhala settlements in the region. To the Tamils it is a visible example of Sinhala colonisation in areas traditionally considered as Tamil land. In the past Eelam wars, Mavil Aru reservoir had changed hands twice. In 1991 conflict LTTE failed to capture the reservoir but blew up the sluice gates. The SLSF captured it and lost it in Eelam War III in 1997. After the ceasefire in 2002, Mavil Aru came within the LTTE controlled area. However, it continues to water the fields in government-controlled area. According to government spokesman GOSL’s engineers of the Irrigation Department had been visiting the area. And that is where the catch is. The reservoir waters are vital for farmers in government-controlled area. The present crisis started when GOSL announced an Asian Development Bank Project to supply drinking water from Mavil Aru to villages in government-controlled areas. This drew a lot of protest from people in areas under LTTE control from Mutur east and Ichchilampattai division. The ADB then agreed to extend the project to both the areas. 13.   In normal course, this issue would have been resolved through negotiations. But the area had been far from normal after April 25, 2006 when SLSF stepped up operations against LTTE. Since then LTTE strongholds in this area had come under frequent SLSF air and artillery attacks, putting the local population under great stress. Their movement to other areas have been restricted due to operations of SLSF and as well as LTTE. Thousands have fled their homes and are living in camps as refugees with inadequate food supplies. So when the GOSL went ahead with the drinking water project in areas under its control, the people in LTTE-controlled area cut off water supply to press home their demand for security to life and property and supply of essential rations for refugees, in addition to the extension of the water supply scheme to their area. Political environment 14.   Ever since he was elected, President Mahinda Rajapakse had been facing pressure on two fronts ? LTTE, and anti-Eelam lobby including the Janatha Vimukthi Permana (JVP) and the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) and the Sinhala right. LTTE had been putting had escalated its violent attacks targeting the army and naval movements in land and sea, causing huge casualties since November 2005. The President had been hard pressed to show tangible results to overcome LTTE militarily to re-establish the credibility of SLSF. Politically Rajapakse had chosen to take a strong stand against LTTE and a federal solution to the Tamil problem. This gained him the support of anti-Eelam lobby as well as the Sinhala south during his election. When he started retaliating LTTE with force, they were applauding his action. He had also been building up his party strength in the parliament. He has successfully persuaded a number of opposition M.P.s to join him. When LTTE precipitated a crisis over Mavil Aru affecting the livelihood of 60,000 Sinhala peasants, launching a military operation rather than negotiating probably appeared to the President as a more attractive political option. Use of armed forces to resume water supply to peasants starved of Mavil Aru water would not only provide ‘humanitarian relief’ to them but also satisfy the anti-Eelam lobby clamouring for action from the President. 15.   For some time now LTTE had been losing its grip over the east, as Karuna and his followers slowly extended their sway. As a result, free movement of LTTE’s local leaders in the region had been curtailed. East has ceased to be a lucrative source of recruits for LTTE. Pro-LTTE elements were being attacked and killed. At the same time the SLSF was now attacking its locations in Mutur-Sampoor areas with impunity unlike earlier years when they observed the niceties of ceasefire. These activities had been making life harder for LTTE cadres in this region. Thus LTTE has been under pressure to re-establish its credibility as a viable force in the east. If LTTE can prove itself as a fighting force that could withstand a face-to-face confrontation with SLSF in the east it would help boost its image. In Mutur East-Ichchampattai area LTTE has been strong and strategically located where it had better chances of achieving such success. LTTE success in the area also had the advantage of impacting all the three major ethnic communities. And it would show them that LTTE controlled the destinies of not only Tamils but also others in the east. Mavil Aru issue offered a good opportunity to rally the Tamils of the area on a humanitarian question that touched their lives while preparing the ground for confrontation with the GOSL. It also offered LTTE an option to show the GOSL as a weak and ineffective body that would be struck in prolonged negotiations. International environment 16.   The timing of the confrontation is also significant. The Israeli operations against Hizbollah in Lebanon have been hogging global news headlines. The U.S. and the EU, two key sponsors of the Sri Lanka peace process, have been busy trying to ward off the fall out of the Israeli foray into Lebanon. The monitoring process in Sri Lanka has almost ground to a halt after a confrontation between the navy and Sea Tigers in April 2006, when the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) categorically refused to recognize LTTE’s claim to operate in the Sri Lanka waters as a de facto power. The banning of LTTE first in Canada and later in the EU in May 2006 were severe blows to LTTE’s grandiose image. It had been peeved with its worsening international credibility and freedom of action. After the EU ban was announced the Tamil insurgents had asked to the SLMM representatives from Denmark, Finland and Sweden who are members of EU, to quit the body. Already Finland and Denmark have announced they were withdrawing their monitors from September 1. The SLMM had been limping ever since. Norway had been vainly trying to sort out the monitoring issue and appears to have put the mediation process in the cold storage for the time being. The opportunity for a confrontation that had minimal international complications could not have escaped the notice of both GOSL and LTTE. Human cost 17.   Nearly 800 civilians are estimated to have died in 2006 in Sri Lanka as a result of the SLSF-LTTE conflict. And Operation Watershed appears to have caused at least 100 to 200 more civilian casualties. It has displaced nearly 50,000 people, who have fled the town of Mutur and a number of villages around. International agencies have not been able to gain access to the war zone to provide succour to the refugees. Large numbers of Muslims were caught in the LTTE attack on Mutur and later in the SLSF counterattack. They have accused LTTE of intimidation and killing. Their properties have been destroyed. Seventeen aid workers of a French NGO Action Contre la Faim engaged in tsunami relief work were found murdered in Mutur. This has caused consternation among NGOs and raised UN concern. Barring one, all of them were Tamils; this has caused the suspicion to fall on the Army. On the other hand LTTE’s record as far as such killings are concerned is equally dismal. 18.   Both sides have shown a remarkable lack of concern, except for making sympathetic noises, to the human cost of the operation. There is a discernable downtrend in human rights consideration also, with more and more reports of summary killings allegedly perpetrated by both sides indicating increasing brutalisation of those involved in the conflict. The brutalisation goes hand in hand with the hardening of top decision makers’ attitudes and becomes counterproductive to government forces in low intensity warfare. While LTTE, as an insurgent body outside the pale of law, can afford to carry out acts of human rights violation, the government has to show greater accountability. The GOSL appears to be aware of this aspect, as it had quickly sought Australian forensic assistance to investigate the murder of 17 aid workers. However, its past record shows lack of transparency in such investigations. One can only hope that it would overcome this aberration and tighten up discipline among the ranks. As far as the 50,000 displaced persons are concerned a major human tragedy is in the making. Having achieved his aim of freeing the water source, President Rajapakse should now focus on ensuring that the people displaced due to the operation are cared for. This would improve his credibility among the affected people. Military performance 19.   It is perhaps too early to carry out an after action analysis of the operation in the Mavil Aru area during the last two weeks as full details are not available. However, SLSF was able to put together a plan and execute it, though ponderously, to achieve its objective. On the other hand, LTTE after initially holding up the progress of SLSF broke contact and was satisfied with opting to voluntarily open the sluice gates that closing of which had been the bone of contention. This indicated that LTTE was not keen or ready for a determined engagement with SLSF. This only underlines the weakness of LTTE in east. Though both sides had claimed inflicting considerable casualties, LTTE with its limited number of cadres in the east and limited recruiting base, was at a disadvantage in taking casualties. Overall, LTTE appears to have suffered about 100-150 casualties including the auxiliaries while the SLSF probably had a toll of around 50.Of course these figures do not include civilians killed during the operations. From the available details certain strengths and weaknesses of both sides during the operation have come to light. 20.  LTTE: 20.1     GOSL’s decision to use force to resolve the Mavil Aru issue appears to have caught the LTTE by surprise. Though LTTE initially appeared to have warded off the multi-pronged attack, it could not sustain. Similarly after infiltrating into Mutur, LTTE did not appear to have productively used the initiative. It could not hold on to the gains and inflict casualties when SLSF responded in strength. [Choice of Mutur, which is a Muslim majority town as objective, itself is a questionable decision.] This showed inadequate operational planning and excessive reliance on irregular warfare techniques of mining. In my SAAG Note “Sri Lanka: How strong are the Tigers? Up date 84” dated February 28, 2006, I had pointed out two weaknesses of LTTE in handling conventional operations: (1) inability to build upon its success and (2) inadequate use or employment of support weapons. Evidently, this operation has shown that these problems have not been overcome. 20.2     Another aspect is LTTE’s inability to carry out anti-aircraft operations; this gave a major advantage to SLSF, which effectively used Kfirs before, during and after the operations. This vulnerability is likely to be fully exploited by SLSF in future operations. (Of course, this could be due to paucity of antiaircraft weapons and systems or trained personnel with LTTE in the east.) These weaknesses could also be due to the changes effected in the LTTE command set up in the region, as the new set up perhaps could not react in time. Though LTTE had shown it could handle 122 mm artillery, its limited impact on the SLSF would indicate shortage of artillery weapons and or ammunition. 20.3     People are insurgent forces’ strength. LTTE has continued to falter in handling Muslim population, who dominate this region. This was exhibited in the callous way it handled Muslim population. This is its major weakness in gaining control of east and will be fully exploited by its opponents. 20.4     On the positive side, LTTE had shown the ability to stand up and delay the advance of SLSF, imposing caution on them. It had also shown that it could employ civilian auxiliary force in tandem with its main forces. There had been no reports of surrender or capture of prisoners, which would indicate that its morale is intact. 21.  The SLSF: 21.1 Broadly the SLSF appears to have been able to carry out a coordinated Operation. This shows the better morale and impact of training on troops. It as sent a clear message that LTTE should not under estimate its capability. The SLSF appears to have been able to coordinate its air operations with ground operations for maximum effect. It has claimed precision bombing of targets; however, it is not clear whether air strike was carried out to silence LTTE artillery or put them out of action. 21.2 From the beginning SLSF appear to have had a clear objective: to capture Mavil Aru sluice gates rather than succumb to the temptation of holding on to the gains. Though this might appear contrary to the political stand that it was a ‘Humanitarian operation’, in military terms, the steadfast maintenance of aim is to be commended. 21.3  Overall planning to keep LTTE engaged in other sectors through air and ground operations showed considerable thought given to the planning of the operation. In the past in Vanni operations SLSF failure to maintain momentum after the initial success reflected a static mindset at the strategic level. Similarly its defensive operations had lacked innovation and mobility. Considered in this background, the SLSF appears to have considerably improved, overcoming the mental limitations imposed by the CFA. However, its progress was extremely cautious giving adequate time for LTTE to slip out and mine the Mavil Aru area. 21.4  It is also to the credit of SLSF that it could prevent any major LTTEinterference in Trincomalee naval base or at Mutur naval base during the entire period. 21.5  However, the accusations of human rights violations that have emanated during the course of operations indicate SLSF needs to work on this to improve its credibility. This is a major problem faced by any uniformed service involved in counterinsurgency operations especially with an uncanny organisation like LTTE, which uses propaganda as a weapon. But SLSF has no option but to improve this situation. Conclusion 22.   LTTE appears to have made a tactical mistake in selecting Mavil Aru as a point of confrontation with the GOSL. While it probably rallied the Tamil population who had legitimate grievances on sharing of waters of the reservoir, LTTE does not appear to have been prepared for the President’s essentially military approach to solve the issue and establish the authority of GOSL on the water resources of the reservoir. LTTE has tried to play down the military operations and its performance after the first few days of operation. It has focused on the humanitarian aspect of what was actually a military situation, though Muslims of the region have been further alienated. All that the LTTE political wing leader S.P. Tamilselvan could tell Reuters as fighting continued last Sunday was: “We consider this a declaration of war and strongly condemn the attitude of the government”. Overall the Mavil Aru operation has shown LTTE’s serious limitations in progressing operations in east. LTTE is unlikely to take it lying and launch major operation in North where it is strong on ground. The attack on Muhamalai post on August 12, 2006 may well be precursor of a bigger LTTE operation. 23.   LTTE is also likely to carry out major stealth attack in depth areas under government control on lucrative economic targets. Colombo and Trincomalee could be under its sights for such attacks. If carried out successfully it could hope to restore some of the shine it had lost in Mavil Aru operation. 23.   Despite the slow progress initially, SLSF has shown that it could be successfully achieve its objective in the face of LTTE opposition. This should come as a boost to its morale. SLSF has also shown it can employ and coordinate SLAF with its ground operations with telling effect. However, whether it can sustain such performance for prolonged periods in more adverse circumstances over a wider front is still an open question. But it is clear that its re-equipment and training are paying dividends. 21.   It is clear the objective of the GOSL from the beginning was not merely humanitarian but to re-establish its credibility in its ongoing cold war with LTTE. It had totally sidelined the SLMM efforts to negotiate a solution with the LTTE and resolve the Mavil Aru issue. This is a clear shift in the strategy of GOSL – to adopt a tough approach towards LTTE as the SLMM has been weakened by the impending departure of nearly half its strength. Thus a dangerous situation is developing towards full-fledged war in Sri Lanka and Operation Watershed appears to be an overture for that. One can only hope President Rajapakse encouraged by his political and military success in this episode does not go for the military option. An episode does not make a whole story and such a foray may prove too costly, ending in yet another stalemate. (Col R Hariharan, a retired Military Intelligence specialist on South Asia, served with the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka as Head of Intelligence E-Mail: colhari@yahoo.com)

இலங்கை இனப்பிரச்சினையின் பரிணாமம். தமிழீழ போராளிகளுக்கு இந்தியாவில் ராணுவப் பயிற்சி!! - பாகம் 1

India and Sri Lanka’s internal conflict Q & A: Part 7 Role of Sri Lanka Presidents

Col R Hariharan |28 May 2018

[This is part 7 of the 9-part series of notes used in a telephone interview  with a civil society social group, which aims to “promote pathways for solving the ethnic issue under a federal solution” in Sri Lanka and to address human rights violations committed during the ethnic conflict by both the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government. The interview was conducted in January 2017; its contents remain still valid.]

Q12: Both JR Jayawardene and Premadasa, had negative sentiments of India’s direct involvement in Sri Lanka, but they reacted to the IPKF in two different ways. JR Jayawardene used the IPKF to fight the LTTE in the north and east, freeing up his own forces to take on the JVP insurgency in the south. Whereas, Premadasa wanted to get rid of the foreign military presence in Sri Lanka and when he was President he began secretly providing weapons to Prabhakaran to fight the IPKF.  How did the Indian government respond when it received intelligence that Premadasa was covertly providing weapons to the LTTE to attack the IPKF?

I think there are limitations in judging the actions of the two presidents in the present environment. We should understand the two presidents were lonely men looked upon by most of the people to take wise decisions, when the nation was under tremendous political pressure. They had to manage popular emotions, while acting upon logical course of action considered best at that moment. So I would be a little cautious in judging their actions now.

In answers to earlier questions I have already explained my perception on why JR decided to get the IPKF to Sri Lanka. Many Sri Lankans seem to believe that JR’s action was a devious plan to let Indian troops engage the LTTE to free the Sri Lanka army to take on JVP insurgents in the South. I don’t think that was the sole intention; while his primary motive in signing the Accord was probably to be on the right side of India to ensure Indians do not arm Tamil militants. However, the Indian troops might have been invited to let them handle the nettlesome LTTE.

This would also help him to be free to manage the backlash generated after the Accord. It also had the advantage of freeing Sri Lanka Army to take on the JVP insurgents in the South. In fact, during the first JVP insurrection also an Indian battalion was flown in to assist Sri Lanka fight the JVP. In any case in 1988-89, Sri Lanka showed it was quite capable of suppressing JVP ruthlessly with its own forces. In fact, it left the JVP in shambles, to come back only as a political party sanitized of its revolutionary fervour, retaining “Vimukthi” only in the name.

As far Premadasa was concerned, I think he genuinely felt inviting foreign forces to operate on Sri Lankan soil was shameful. I can understand this feeling as any nationalist would feel the same. As far as Premadasa’s help to the LTTE was concerned, I have myself provided copies of conversations relating to arms supply from his office to the LTTE contact person in Sri Lanka army. We had photographed the transfer of weapons also. Actually, we played these tapes during a meeting with the Sri Lanka defence minister, much to his discomfort.  

I personally feel the LTTE outsmarted Premadasa, who was gullible to its overtures. He probably believed he could cover himself with glory, if he could succeed in bringing the war to a close. And he was not the first politician to be conned by the LTTE. To me Premadasa’s unforgivable action was allowing the LTTE to disarm and massacre hundreds of innocent policemen in eastern province after the Indian forces left. It was a shameful act that only emboldened the LTTE.

In India, the opposition had captured power and it was already campaigning for withdrawal of Indian forces from Sri Lanka. So Premadasa’s collusion was the last straw for it to push the decision to withdraw the IPKF. (To be continued)

India and Sri Lanka’s internal conflict Q & A: Part 5 On IPKF and its performance in Sri Lanka

Col R Hariharan |28 May 2018

[This is part 5 of the 9-part series of notes used in a telephone interview  with a civil society social group, which aims to “promote pathways for solving the ethnic issue under a federal solution” in Sri Lanka and to address human rights violations committed during the ethnic conflict by both the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government. The interview was conducted in January 2017, its contents remain still valid.]

Q8: It was a common belief of the Sri Lankan army security forces that the IPKF did not take an interest in protecting the Sinhala villages bordering Tamil areas. For example, when the LTTE was planning to strike the Morawewa village on March 3^rd 1988, Sri Lankan intelligence had intercepted the LTTE communications and passed this information to the IPKF. But no action had been taken by the IPKF, and the LTTE killed 15 civilians and injured 10.  Why was the IPKF largely reluctant to protect Sinhala villages—wouldn’t you agree that a failure to do so allowed Prabhakaran to ethnically cleanse LTTE territory from Muslims and Sinhalese?

I have always admired Sri Lankans ability to blame Indians for all the things that happens in Sri Lanka (to this day this persists).The IPKF was fighting the LTTE to disarm them as per our mandate; we were not deployed to protect all Sri Lankans at all times. This was Sri Lanka government’s responsibility as they were ruling the country.

I fear I have no knowledge of the specific instance of LTTE attack on Morawewa village. The village was among a few others located just outside the Northern Province boundary which had faced the ire of LTTE because local Tamils associate them with the Sinhala migration carried out by the Sri Lanka government. Even during the 2002 Peace Process, the LTTE had attacked the village. In any case it was for Sri Lanka government to provide protection to the village as it was outside our jurisdiction.

Q 9: Did you have any relationship with Jyotindra Nath Dixit? It is stated that Dixit was hated by both the IPKF and RAW operatives alike.  Why? Dixit was also hated by most people in Sri Lanka as many Sri Lankans believed it was Dixit’s manipulating which forced Jayewardene to sign the Accord as well as induct a foreign army in Sri Lanka.

Of course, I have met Ambassador Dixit a number of times; on occasions I have briefed him on my perspectives of Tamil militancy. There was no question of IPKF or RAW operatives hating him; we operated under different channels of command and leadership. It was for the respective leaderships to put across their differences in opinion with the Ambassador either directly or through the ministry at appropriate level. 

To this day, Indian high commissioners always have been having good relations with the Sri Lankan president, the prime minister and many of the political leaders of all hues. This is mainly due to the close affinity between the two nations and the umbilical links they have. Ambassador Dixit enjoyed very close rapport with JR. I thought they got along well because both of them were astute and canny persons in their own right. You are underestimating JR, if you think Dixit’s “manipulation” was behind the Sri Lankan President signing of the Accord. 

Sri Lankan politics is strewn with evidence of JR’s superior manipulative skills.  JR probably made up his mind to come to terms with India after Americans failed to intervene in favour of Sri Lanka after Operation Poomalai. When Rajiv Gandhi was amenable to the idea, he signed the Accord.

I would go along with many Sri Lankans who say JR saw the advantage of having Indian forces on Sri Lanka soil to do the dirty job of disarming LTTE as per the Accord. JR also had internal compulsions. He probably wanted to be ready to save himself from a possible coup attempt by army as some sections were unhappy when their Jaffna operation was halted when they were poised to round up Prabhakaran. So at his request Indian warships were kept in readiness to ensure his protection off Colombo coast. In any case, Sri Lanka forces and police proved they were quite capable and absolutely ruthless in suppressing the JVP militants. (To be continued)

India and Sri Lanka’s internal conflict Q & A: Part 2 Indo-Sri Lanka Accord and its implications

Col R Hariharan

[This is part 2 of the 9-part series of notes used in a telephone interview  with a civil society social group, which aims to “promote pathways for solving the ethnic issue under a federal solution” in Sri Lanka and to address human rights violations committed during the ethnic conflict by both the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government. The interview was conducted in January 2017, its contents remain still valid.]

Q2 (a) On July 29^th 1987, the Indo-Lanka Accord was signed with an understanding that the Sri Lankan government would devolve powers on the Indian model to a new merged Northern and Eastern province, to be called the North-East Province, granting official status to the Tamil language through the 13^th Amendment to Sri Lanka’s constitution. In your opinion, what do you believe are mistakes Rajiv Gandhi made in his execution of the Indo-Lanka accord?  

We have the advantage of hindsight in analyzing the Indo-Sri Lanka affairs of 90s. At that time many believed that Rajiv Gandhi had an understanding with JR Jayawardane to devolve powers to the provinces based upon the Indian model. The Varadaraja Perumal government of the merged northeastern province had repeatedly projected this request to New Delhi without positive response. He is the right person to answer this question. The TULF, which was politically savvy but wasted time nitpicking on the sidelines at that time, also might be able to answer this question. 

The Accord was flawed in many ways. It showed Rajvi Gandhi’s good intentions alone were not enough in evolving solutions. Perhaps, he was in a hurry to produce results than think through problems. Of course, he lacked political experience to deal with a wily and astute leader like JR Jayawardane, who was past master in the art of political survival. Basically, India’s approach to signing an accord with Sri Lanka to underwrite a solution on Sri Lanka’s internal issue, outside its control was flawed.  This was pointed out to Rajiv Gandhi by the late Narasimha Rao (who was then the HRD minister) when he was shown the draft Agreement.  

Before the Accord was signed, India did make efforts to help work out a political solution of their own. It brought Sri Lanka government and Tamil separatists to the table at Thimpu to hammer out an agreement. All such efforts failed because none of the Sri Lankan stakeholders were willing to go the extra mile to resolve the issue. JR Jayawardane refused to see the big picture because it did not suit him. The TULF played political dicks and drakes with India because Prabhakaran had rendered it impotent. As always Prabhakaran wanted to be the cock of the heap, accountable only to himself.  

Thus Sri Lanka missed an opportunity to work out a solution without bloodshed. (I had said so to the late TULF leader Amirthalingam at one of the many meetings I had with him. He was not amused.) This was not the only occasion when the Tamil and Sri Lanka political grandstanding came in the way of evolving a peaceful solution. Their collective failure to approve President Chandrika Kumaratunga’s 2000 Constitutional draft is another case in point. 

In my view, India’s attempt to use the Tamil issue and the Accord as tools to achieve its strategic goal to keep Americans from gaining a foothold in Sri Lanka (probably to help out Soviet Union) clouded its genuine desire to help Tamils get their just rights within a united Sri Lanka. It confused India’s priorities and distracted its attention from Sri Lanka after the IPKF was inducted. In addition to this, India had to oblige JR’s request to send troops to save him from a possible coup, which further added to the strategic confusion.

Q2 (b): Prabhakaran, for example, stated that whether or not the LTTE accepted the Indo-Lanka Accord, the Indian government was determined to put it into effect. Was Rajiv Gandhi’s biggest blunder not giving the LTTE, the Tamil community, and the Sinhalese (the parties who would be affected by the Accord) direct input when drafting the Indo-Lanka accord?

I do not understand the rationale of this question. India and Sri Lanka are sovereign nations in their own right to sign and enforce any agreement they want. Where does Prabhakaran come in this? He was neither a party to the agreement nor one who promoted it. He was as we say in Hindi “Kebab me haddi” (bone in the kebab). His standing at that time was only as the leader of the LTTE, one of the four powerful Tamil militant groups among the 33 that sprang up in the wake of 1983 pogrom. It was for Tamil leaders and Sri Lanka’s elected government to explain the Accord to the Sri Lankan people. Rajiv Gandhi had no business to do this as he was accountable only to his own people on this count; so there was no question of providing “direct input when drafting” the Accord.

The Accord was a product of Indian and Sri Lankan diplomatic initiative at work; it was not a matter to be trolled on Twitter for the benefit of the public. However, I agree the whole process was rushed through, cloaked in needless secrecy, which gave rise to avoidable suspicions and created political backlash in both countries. (To be continued)

India and Sri Lanka’s internal conflict Q & A: Part 1 Was the use of army justified in Eelam conflict?

Col R Hariharan

[These notes were used in a telephone interview  with a civil society social group, which aims to “promote pathways for solving the ethnic issue under a federal solution” in Sri Lanka and to address human rights violations committed during the ethnic conflict by both the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government. The interview was conducted in January 2017, its contents remain still valid. This is part 1 of the 9-part series.]

Q1: Former Indian National Security Adviser Shivshankar Menon in his recent book, Choices: Inside the Making of India's Foreign Policy, in the book’s chapter on Sri Lanka, Menon said the following: “The way the Sri Lankans fought the war, though criticized for its brutality in the final stages, might have taken a higher toll if delay and stalemate were brought about….Indeed, one must logically ask the question, would an earlier adoption of the more brutal methods of the last thirty months of the war have brought it to an earlier end and actually saved lives and minimized the war’s deleterious effects?  This is a recurrent problem in state craft. It is also the strongest justification for the use of atomic weapons to end World War II.” 

Col. Hariharan, do you believe that an earlier adoption of brutal methods may have brought an end to the war much sooner and saved more lives? The IPKF were largely restrained from going on an all-out offensive against the LTTE in order to avoid civilian casualties due to pressure from Tamil Nadu.  In retrospect, should the IPKF have gone on all-out military offensive (regardless of the opinions   of civilians in Tamil Nadu) to destabilize the LTTE and then work on achieving a political solution?

I have not read Shivshankar Menon’s book, except for some excerpts. So I would not comment on what you are quoting without understanding the context in which it was written. But as one spent most of his service career in operations against nearly two dozen insurgencies in three countries (including Sri Lanka), I shall try to answer your question.

Despite all the romantic notions about the glories of war, there should be no illusion about brutality in war. War is all about eliminating the enemy. So there is no such thing as war without brutality. Most of the time victory comes to the side which kills or maims more soldiers.  Bringing an early end to the war is always used to justify the use of highly lethal weapons that cause mass killings. Americans gave the same excuse to justify their use of atom bombs on densely populated cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki that killed thousands of people which led to the surrender of Japan in World War II. That is an example of unparalleled act of brutality in war. Perhaps, humanity will continue to debate forever the justification for use of brute force in war as conflict and peace are the two sides of our existence.  

Many countries use regular army in operations to suppress or eliminate insurgencies. So insurgency conflicts are no different from war as far as the troops carrying out the operations are concerned, though they may adopt tactics appropriate to the operation.

As regards the IPKF, we received no instructions to minimise casualties because of political pressure from Tamil Nadu. Indian army operates upon directions from New Delhi not on political pressures of states. So the Ministry of Defence would probably be able to answer this part of the question better. 

To win wars against insurgents or regular forces, armies have to use superior force. This is ingrained in every soldier. In spite of this, India army generally uses minimum force against insurgents because of the country’s peculiar national security decision making process. That is why insurgencies in India seem to be never ending; they have even continued for two generations (i.e., Naga and Left Wing extremism). 

The Indian political system shows immense patience to work out politically acceptable compromises with insurgent groups so that they would join mainstream politics. It treats most of their minor aberrations like extortion and kidnapping merely as a crime. This is how insurgencies in the Northeast have been managed. 

But the system is not without its merit; it reduces collateral damage to ordinary people as well as insurgents. Even though it may not succeed in eradicating the insurgent group, over period of time the group loses its credibility and its popular support slowly withers away. This method does not make military sense, as it prolongs of the agony of the people who bear the brunt of insurgent activity and state’s counter-measures curtailing or restricting public activity. But it suits the Indian style of laid back and opaque process of decisions making, as well as the national security environment in which political leadership trusts civilian bureaucracy more than the armed forces in its national security decision making process.  

Using maximum force is the accepted practice of the armies the world over.  When the Indian soldier is asked to do contrary to this basic military concept, it confuses him, which can have a detrimental effect on his psyche. But politicians in India care two hoots about such niceties of soldiering; so we soldiers plod along because we are Indian and Asian, who always “manage” to get along with any system.

Generally, Indian army does not use heavy weapons including artillery and tanks in insurgency operations. Even in Jammu and Kashmir, artillery has been used on Pakistan troops supporting infiltration of Jihadi terrorists. But if the operational situation warrants, the army will use all available forces including tanks and artillery to achieve its aim.  Even the IPKF had used tanks and gunships in Jaffna operations for shock effect or in critical situations i.e., to extricate its troops when encircled by the LTTE.  

When insurgents fight as conventional forces supported by artillery as the LTTE did in the Eelam War, use of maximum force by the army is inevitable. There is no point in comparing the methods of India and Sri Lanka in fighting the LTTE because they had different strategic objectives and operational mandates.

The IPKF had a limited task to disarm Tamil militant groups as per the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord. The LTTE refused to comply with this and used its weapons against civilians and other Tamil militant groups which had surrendered their weapons. So the IPKF’s military action was limited to disarm the LTTE, so that its ability to interfere with the normal life of citizens is curtailed. That was how IPKF managed to restore normal life in North and East. 

It was Indian army that facilitated restoration of electric supply, telecom facilities, normal functioning of banks and opening of railway link to Colombo. After IPKF successfully broke the LTTE’s back, Prbhakaran and his cadres took refuge in the Alampil jungles in Wanni. A desperate Prabhakaran even decided to collaborate with the sworn enemy of Tamil militancy President Premadasa to get Indian troops off his back.

Sri Lanka forces were fighting against the LTTE because it had challenged the sovereignty and unity of Sri Lanka. The LTTE effectively neutralized any chances of Tamil and Sinhala polity peacefully resolving their differences. The LTTE’s armed separatist struggle was indirectly aided by Sri Lanka’s confused leadership, which for long had looked for only for band aid solutions. However, President Rajapaksa changed the narrative forever to defeat the LTTE.

Much as one may malign Rajapaksa’s methods in the Eelam War, it was his single minded focus on eliminating the LTTE that freed the nation from the coercive threat of the LTTE - an extra-constitutional force that had drained the nation’s energies for two and a half decades. (To be continued)