The firming up of the Quad alliance after a decade, despite the continued differences in strategic security priorities of its four members, is related to the rise in power of Xi Jinping in China in 2012.
Col R Hariharan | Column | India Legal March 24, 2021
https://www.indialegallive.com/column-news/quad-alliance-modi-japan-quad-initiative/
Addressing the virtual summit meeting
of leaders of QUAD – the Quadrilateral strategic grouping of the US, Japan,
India and Australia – on March 12, Prime Minister Narendra Modi said: “We will
work together closer than ever before for advancing our shared values and
promoting a secure, stable and prosperous Indo-Pacific.” He added: “Today’s
meeting shows that Quad has come of age. It will now remain an important pillar
of stability in the region.”
PM Modi is probably right in
celebrating the summit meeting as the coming of age of Quad, considering its
transformation from a notion aired in the wake of the Boxing Day Tsunami in
2004 by the four nations, to its present avatar as a strategic framework of
cooperation between four stakeholders of the Indo-Pacific. At the time of the
Tsunami, the four countries formed a “core group” to coordinate their response
to the disaster, but it did not progress beyond discussions due to their own
strategic preoccupations.
The concept came
alive briefly thereafter, as the “Strategic Global Partnership of Japan and
India” when Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan addressed the Indian parliament
on August 22, 2007. He called it the “confluence of the two seas”, borrowing a
phrase from the title of a book by Mughal Prince Dara Shikoh. It was part of
Japan’s diplomatic initiative at the time “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity” to be
formed along the outer rim of the Eurasian continent. It had the laudable
objective of ensuring values such as freedom, democracy and respect.
However, differing
strategic priorities in dealing with the booming Chinese economy set to
overtake the Asian frontrunner Japan acted as a dampener to the growth of Quad.
The whole world tried to woo China to do business with it. America, trying to
get out of a looming economic disaster, was busy courting China as an
investment destination. Japanese and Taiwanese investors queued up to make
money out of China’s growing manufacturing industry to boost their exports.
ASEAN countries opened up their markets for trade with China. So generally,
there was a reluctance to firm up the Quad alliance as it could be construed as
“ganging up” against China.
Inward-looking
India, never known for making up its mind, was following the “middle path” in a
bid to rebuild its stilted relations with China. It was still talking of Look
East policy rather than acting upon it. The Quad concept became stillborn after
Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, considered a Sinophile, walked out of the
amorphous “alliance” in 2009.
The firming up of
Quad after a decade, despite the continued differences in strategic security
priorities of its four members, is related to the rise in power of Xi Jinping
in China in 2012.
It was in the same
year that China’s vague territorial claim to the whole of South China Sea (SCS)
turned into aggressive action, as it seized Scarborough Shoals from the
Philippines. The shoals, located 240 km from the Philippine’s main island of
Luzon, and 680 km from Hainan Island of China, is rich in fishing
resources. Four years later, China’s territorial claim, based on the
so-called “nine-dash line”, was rejected by the international maritime
tribunal. China not only rejected the ruling, but firmed up its claims to other
islets in the SCS.
In the meanwhile,
China aggressively went ahead creating artificial islands out of islets and
coral reefs. These developments alarmed ASEAN neighbours as China’s actions
blatantly disregarded the claims of not only the Philippines, but also other
claimants in the SCS-Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei. These developments,
coupled with PLA Navy warships, increased muscle-flexing in the SCS and sent
notice of China’s ambition to stakeholders of the Indo-Pacific region.
It was in 2012 that
President Xi conceptualised his ambitious Belt and Road Initiative, a strategic
multilateral infrastructure and development initiative to link China with the
rest of Asia, Africa and Europe in a bold bid to create a new world order, with
the country at its helm.
Three things
hastened the process of the Quad framework formation. Modi was disillusioned
after his repeated attempts to build a win-win, equitable relationship with
China did not yield results; President Donald Trump’s aggressive “America
First” policy pursuit which increased the level of strategic confrontation with
China and a change in Australian leadership after being disillusioned with
China.
The presence of
Modi, Trump, Abe and Australian PM Malcom Turnbull in the East Asia Summit in
November 2017 provided an opportunity for the top leadership of these countries
to revive the concept of the Quadrilateral framework, in a bid to contain
China. Before the leaders met, officials of the four countries held a meeting
to discuss issues of common interest.
India’s Ministry of
External Affairs press release after the meeting said: “The discussions focused
on cooperation based on their converging vision and values for promotion of
peace, stability and prosperity in an increasingly interconnected region that
they share with each other and with other partners.” They agreed that a “free,
open, prosperous and inclusive Indo-Pacific region serves the long-term
interests of all countries in the region and of the world at large”.
After the election
of Joe Biden as POTUS, there were doubts about the active involvement of the US
in the Quad initiative. But these vanished after the Biden Administration
acknowledged the significance of the Indo-Pacific region in its Interim
National Security Strategic Guidance document released on March 3, 2021. It
emphasised US commitment to the Quad, carrying forward the agenda of Trump. An
Indo-Pacific coordinator has also been appointed in the US National Security to
coordinate their Indo-Pacific strategy.
Having come of age
with the successful conclusion of the summit meeting on March 12, how will the
Quad framework grouping move forward? Given the diverse strategic priorities
and national interests of the four nations, the Quad concept will be tested
every time the members try to coordinate their moves in the overall interest of
Indo-Pacific.
The Quad leaders’
joint statement issued at the end of the summit indicates a conscious effort to
broad base their areas of cooperation and coordination and take it beyond a
China-centric grouping. The key elements of the joint statement are –
Vision: They are “united in a shared
vision for the free and open Indo-Pacific. We strive for a region that is free,
open, inclusive, healthy, anchored by democratic values and unconstrained by
coercion”.
Strategic perspective: Commitment
to promote “a free, open rules-based order, rooted in international law to
advance security and prosperity and counter threats to both in the Indo-Pacific
and beyond. We support the rule of law, freedom of navigation and overflight,
peaceful resolution of disputes, democratic values and territorial integrity.”
They emphasised the importance of a “rules-based maritime order in the East and
SCS” so as not to lose sight of the current critical situation created by
China’s belligerence.
ASEAN centrality: The
statement refers to upholding peace and prosperity and strengthening democratic
resilience based on universal values. It notes “the urgent need to restore
democracy” in Myanmar and complete denuclearisation of North Korea as
objectives.
Group direction beyond military cooperation: It also addressed a range of challenges including “the economic
and health impacts of Covid-19”, climate change and challenges in a host of
critical issues faced by the world. These include cyberspace, critical
technologies, counter-terrorism, quality infrastructure investment and
humanitarian-assistance and disaster relief as well as maritime domains.
Relevance to current issues: They announced a desire to “collaborate to strengthen equitable
vaccine access for the Indo-Pacific, with close coordination with multilateral
organizations including the WHO and COVAX”.
Action items: Harsh Vardhan
Shringla, Indian foreign secretary, explained that the goal was to pool
financing, manufacturing and distribution capacity to send one billion
coronavirus vaccines across Asia by the end of 2022. They have also committed
to create three working groups on vaccine experts, critical and emerging
technology and on climate.
If the Quad can
live up to the key elements of the joint statement, and transform these into
action, its future can be bright. Otherwise, it can get bogged down in the
bilaterals of member nations with China and among themselves. As of now, the
members have shown a lot of energy in taking forward the understanding arrived
in March. Australia is contributing $77 million for the provision of vaccines
and the last mile delivery support with focus on Southeast Asia. This will be
in addition to its existing commitment of $407 million to regional vaccine and
healthy security coverage to nine Pacific island countries and Timor-Leste.
Japan will be providing grant-in-aid of $41 million and concessional yen loans
for purchase of vaccines and cold chain support in developing countries. The US
is leveraging its existing programmes to boost vaccination capability, with at
least $100 million in regional efforts on immunisation. India is pitching in
with additional manufacture of Covid vaccines with the assistance of the US and
Japan.
Of course, in the
midst of all this, the centrality of China continues to be relevant to Quad.
This was illustrated during US secretary of defence Lloyd James Austin III’s
three-day visit to New Delhi after the summit to discuss defence-related
issues, including Chinese threat on the borders. The navies of India, the
US, Japan and Australia are joining France for its “La Perouse” exercise in the
Bay of Bengal from April 4 to 7. And more are to follow.
—The writer is a military intelligence
specialist on South Asia, associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies
and South Asia Analysis Group.
