Col R Hariharan
[Three questions raised by a
media scribe are answered here]
Is the US working against
Indian interests?
This question cannot be
answered in the binary of yes or no. It has to be answered in the backdrop of
the robust defence partnership that has grown during the last two decades
between India and the US. Both the countries have signed several key agreements
that enhance military cooperation, interoperability and strategic
alignment between them. These include
·
LEMOA (Logistics Exchange Memorandum of
Agreement) allowing both countries to use each other's military facilities for
replenishment, enhancing operational reach and logistics support.
·
COMCASA (Communications Compatibility and
Security Agreement) signed in 2018, facilitates secure communications
between U.S. and Indian military systems, enabling interoperability during
joint operations.
·
BECA (Basic Exchange and Cooperation
Agreement) signed in 2020, allows sharing of geospatial intelligence and
satellite data for improved targeting and navigation.
·
ISA (Industrial Security Agreement) signed
in 2019, enables the transfer of classified technology and information to
Indian private defence firms, boosting co-development and co-production.
·
Last year, India signed SOSA
(Security of Supply Arrangement), which ensures priority access to defence
goods and services during emergencies, strengthening supply chain resilience.
The two countries have signed an MoU on Liaison Officers that enable deployment
of Indian officers to U.S. commands (starting with U.S. Special Operations
Command), improving coordination and information sharing. They have also
signed a 10-Year Defence Framework for long-term roadmap for
defence cooperation, focusing on joint production, technology
transfer, and strategic alignment.
·
The Autonomous Systems Industry Alliance
(ASIA) is a collaborative initiative for Underwater Domain Awareness
(UDA), reflecting growing interest in maritime security. Besides these, India
and US cooperation in space have moved beyond astronaut training and commercial
transactions.
·
A joint Earth-observing satellite using dual
frequency synthetic aperture radar is scheduled for launch from India's Satish
Dhawan Space Center under the NASA-ISRO NISAR agreement.
·
India is also a member of the Quad -
quadrilateral framework - consisting of Australia, India, Japan and the US
which came into existence in the wake of Covid pandemic, to enhance supply
chain cooperation following Chinese domination of chip and rare earths
industries.
These agreements have enabled
India to acquire from the US MH-60R Seahawks, Apache helicopters and P-81
maritime patrol aircraft, enhancing India's airlift, logistics and surveillance
capacities. India's maritime surveillance and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific
has now become reality. GE has become the supplier for engines for LCA Tejas
light combat aircraft. Co-production deals are underway for Javelin anti-tank
missiles and Stryker combat vehicles. In fact, India is the first non-treaty
partner to whom the US has offered the Sea Guardian UAS under the Missile
Technology Control.
This is perhaps the reason why
PM Narendra Modi reacts after a lot of deliberation to POTUS Donald Trump's
provocative comments and moves affecting good relations with India. These
include slapping 50+50 % tariff for energy trade with Russia and increasing
visa fee to $100,000 and cutting down on visas for foreign students.
PM Modi probably understands
Trump's guiding lights better than others. Trump is guided by "Make
America Great Again" (MAGA) - a nationalist framework that
emphasizes American sovereignty, economic self-interest, and a rejection of
globalist "entanglements". His foreign policy, which
is marked by transactionalism, unilateralism and a focus on domestic revival
over international commitments. As a result, promoting domestic
manufacturing and imposing tariffs to protect American industries has been
adopted as his state policy.
He has reduced the US
involvement in multilateral organisations like the UN, WHO and even NATO.
He advocates military deterrence while avoiding foreign wars. Trump also
emphasises traditional values and national pride as fundamental to his policy
pronouncements. As a result, the Trump-Vance Doctrine seeks to avoid open ended
military commitments forcing its foreign allies to spend more on defence.
He treats foreign relations as deals rather than diplomatic initiatives. As
a result short term gains and personal leverage have replaced his moves
even with long-term allies like Japan and NATO members.
Trump has adopted tariff
driven trade policy, imposing sweeping tariffs on imports to rebalance trade
deficits and revive American industry. This has not only affected US relations
with allies but has skewed global supply chains. As a commentator says in
the Centre for International Governance Innovation, Trump's foreign policy
increasingly centers around his own image, shifting from MAGA to MTGA (Make
Trump Great Again) to assert his dominant personality replacing ideology driven
US foreign policy doctrines like Bush's neoconservatism or Obama's
multilateralism. His repeated claims of mediating in the recent Op Sindoor
conflict between India and Pakistan despite India's stout denial, bringing
peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan and Cambodia and Thailand also vouch for
his quest for the Nobel Peace Prize.
"Is Washington seeking to
contain India strategically? What do you make of the developments in the region
and beyond?"
These questions have to be
examined in Trump's ideological backdrop discussed earlier. In my view,
there are three prongs to Trump's US policy approach to India:
a. Use of US trade talks with
India as a bargaining chip to compel India to whittle down its close relations
with Russia and eliminate threat posed to American unilateralism by
multilateral alliances like BICS.
b. Restrict India's ambitions
to South and Central Asia by using Deep State to trigger anti-India sentiments
in its neighbourhood. I see a pattern in the popular uprisings
noticed particularly in Bangladesh and Nepal, though in Sri Lanka it was
different. Reviving US-Pakistan strategic relations is also part of
this strategy apart from US ambitions to gain control over Afghanistan and Iran
(as also the abolishing US' waiver given to India over Chabahar port from US
sanctions slapped on Iran).
How should India perceive
growing U.S.-Pakistan bonhomie and perceived U.S. attempts to increase foothold
in South Asia, including in Afghanistan? Is that something that New Delhi
should be concerned about?
India should be wary of
developments in US-Pakistan bonhomie. Perhaps, time for India to read the red
lines on Pakistan in every foreign policy palaver with the US. I see the US
initiative in Pakistan as more than keeping India engaged. It will help
America tackle Iran (as the possibility of Iran-Russia-China triumvirate
emerging stronger cannot be ruled out). As a part of it,
the US probably hopes to regain control of Bagram airbase as a trade
off for helping Taliban-ruled Afghanistan to regain international recognition.
It will also cut down India's independent quest to repair relations with the
Afghan Taliban. I see the recent strategic cooperation agreement between
Saudi Arabia and Pakistan as part of the US initiative to help the US'
anti-Iran strategy.
India should
adopt a policy not subject to the vagaries of Trump's US policy.
India should not hyphenate its approach to the US to the latter's Pakistan
policy. One can expect the scaling down of US rhetoric on India as concessions
are given to US trade in the talks. Already, $100,000-visa is a little watered
down by the US. It has announced that it is not for renewals. We can expect
conditions for student visas also to be watered down as universities are
clamouring. It is good to remember under POTUS Trump, foreign policy is
irrevocably linked to making "deals".
