Wednesday, 4 March 2026

Sri Lanka: Bringing Easter Sunday Attack case to a closure

 Col R Hariharan

Sri Lanka Perspectives February 2026 | South Asia Security Trends, March 2026 |https://www.security-risks.com  

Will the arrest of Sri Lanka’s former intelligence chief Major General Suresh Salley in the last week of the month, in connection with the 2019 Easter Sunday terror attacks that killed nearly 270 people, bring to a closure of cases pending for the  last seven years?  I am not too sure because Gen Salley’s arrest is under the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), with investigators claiming there is “adequate evidence” linking him to the bombings.

When I look at the loose ends left in the Easter Sunday attack cases for the last seven years, I cannot help quoting Winston Churchill who said “Now this is not the end. It is not even the beginning of the end. But it is, perhaps, the end of the beginning.” He was referring to the November 1942 Allied victory at the Second Battle of El Alamein, a turning point in the North African campaign of World War II. The phrase reflected his cautious optimism of when the tide was beginning to turn, but the war was far from over. Hopefully, the long overdue arrest of Gen Salley is the beginning of the process of bringing long overdue cases to a closure.

Comparison with India’s 26/11 attacks

I cannot help comparing the follow-up actions taken after the 26/11 Mumbai attacks by India (2008) and the Easter Sunday attacks by Sri Lanka (2019). There are similarities between both cases. Both were carried out by Jihadi terrorists. Intelligence failure featured as the common cause of both the terrorist attacks.  

In India’s case there was a lack of cohesive assessment mechanism, despite various intelligence agencies providing the police with bits and pieces of information. In Sri Lanka’s case it was much worse; Indian intelligence had provided the details of the impending attack, well in advance as well as on the day of the attack. These included date, time, target and persons involved in the attacks.

After the attacks took place India’s response was institutional and outward-facing, focusing on strengthening counter-terrorism capacity and isolating Pakistan diplomatically. In Sri Lanka’s case the response was internal and accountability-driven, with delayed high-profile arrests of intelligence officials, reflecting political entanglements and contested narratives.

India’s actions

Following the 26/11 Mumbai attacks in 2008, several high-level inquiries and investigations were ordered at both the state and national levels to identify security lapses and prosecute the perpetrators. The Government of Maharashtra appointed a two-member High-Level Enquiry Committee (HLEC), commonly known as the Pradhan Committee, a month after the attack. Its objective was to investigate the response of the Mumbai Police, identify lapses in acting on intelligence, and suggest measures to prevent future attacks. It found leadership failure of the police commissioner as well as systemic lapses like mechanical forwarding of intelligence reports without proper analysis. It also noted that coastal security was neglected.

A year later, India created the National Investigation Agency (NIA) as the country’s first federal agency for investigating and prosecuting terrorism related cases. The Maharashtra government created Force One, an elite specialized counter-terrorism unit modelled after the National Security Guard (NSG).

The Mumbai Police Crime Branch conducted the primary investigation into the attacks, leading to an 11,280-page chargesheet and the successful prosecution and execution of the terrorist Ajmal Kasab, who was caught. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) sent a rapid deployment team to Mumbai on November 29, 2008, to assist Indian authorities and investigate the deaths of six American citizens.

The NIA conducted a week-long interrogation of Pakistani-American David Coleman Headley in Chicago in 2010 after his arrest by the FBI. This investigation provided critical evidence of the involvement of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and individual officers from Pakistan's ISI. 

After the 26/11 attacks, Pakistan came under international pressure and its Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) launched its own probe. It led to the arrest of seven individuals, including LeT operational chief Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi. However, this investigation eventually stalled due to frequent changes in judges and legal delays. 

To put in a nutshell, India created the National Investigation Agency (NIA) in 2009 to improve coordination and assessment of information received from various agencies. India strengthened coastal security and marine policing and streamlined the deployment of NSG hubs in major cities.

The aftermath of the 26/11 attack is still lingering among Indian administrators. After the attacks, Home Minister P Chidambaram wanted to create the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) modelled after the US NCTC. It was to be the apex body under the Intelligence Bureau (IB) with powers to search, seize, and arrest across India. However, the concept was shelved after several chief ministers of states opposed it as they considered it a violation of federal structure.

However, the concept has been revived by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) with the adoption of PRAHAAR – Policy for Response Against Hostile Activities and Radicalism – as India’s first comprehensive national counter terrorism policy unveiled on February 23, 2026.

Sri Lanka’s actions after the attacks

Sri Lanka took three actions in the wake of Easter Sunday attacks. It increased the military presence, arrested suspects linked to National Thowheeth Jama’ath (NTJ) and banned extremist groups. Zahran Hashim radical preacher who led the suicide squad died in the explosion at the Shangri-La Hotel during the 2019 attacks.

Scotland Yard and the FBI were involved in the follow-up investigations of the Easter Sunday terror attacks. Their contributions yielded several worthwhile results, especially in forensic analysis, network mapping and uncovering ideological links.

The FBI’s 72-page affidavit filed in the U.S. District Court in Dec 2020 offered a detailed forensic account of the attacks, including bomb composition and digital communications. The FBI traced ideological and operational links between the attackers and transnational ISIS extremist networks. It helped recover deleted communications and encrypted data from the devices used by bombers and their handlers. The FBI affidavit became a key document in international legal cooperation and intelligence sharing.

Scotland Yard helped Sri Lanka police structure the investigation and advised on securing digital evidence. They also assisted in identifying the chemical composition of the bombs (urea nitrate-based), linking them to known jihadist methods. Scotland Yard also provided strategic guidance on profiling extremist cells and understanding radicalization pathways in South Asia.

The prosecution process has been marked by several distinct phases and delays. Criminal prosecution of the main trial against 25 men, including alleged mastermind Mohamed Naufar with ISIS links, started in November 2021. Prosecutors filed more than 23,000 charges against these suspects, involving over 1,200 witnesses. Although indictments were served in October 2021, the trial faced several postponements due to the massive number of charges. There were also “practical issues” like lack of Tamil-speaking lawyers and translated documents. So the case that began in 2021 is still going on. 

Former National Police Chief Pujith Jayasundara and former Defence Secretary Hemasiri Fernando were tried in separate ‘trial at bar’ proceedings. Both officials were acquitted on February 18, 2022, after the court found insufficient evidence to convict them.

In January 2023, Sri Lanka's Supreme Court found former President Maithripala Sirisena and four other top officials negligent handling of information led to the attacks. The court ordered them to pay approximately Rs 310 million (roughly $1 million) in compensation to the victims' families in civil action.

Developments after 2024

President Anura Kumara Dissanayake in late 2024 ordered the launch of a fresh investigation to identify "masterminds" and potential political links to the master minds. While there have been no high-profile convictions of "masterminds" for the Easter Sunday attacks, there have been significant new prosecutions and arrests targeting high-level state and paramilitary figures previously accused of being "architects" of the bombings. 

That includes not only Gen Salley but also Sivanesathurai Chandrakanthan (alias "Pillayan") arrested on April 8, 2025. Though initially detained on other charges, the government informed Parliament that new evidence links Pillayan's paramilitary network directly to the 2019 attacks, specifically in recruiting and supporting the bombers. Similarly, Lt Gen Hendavitharana, former Head of Military Intelligence, is being investigated for alleged strategic oversight and suspicious communications around the time of the attacks.

Salley is alleged to have aided and conspired in the Easter Sunday attacks. Do the investigators have any evidence against him beyond the claim of a whistleblower of Salley's involvement with a local Islamist group in a 2023 Channel 4 documentary?

The allegations against Salley centre around his close relation with Gotabaya Rajapaksa. It is alleged Salley wanted to stoke Islamists to cause insecurity and create conditions favourable for Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s presidential campaign.

India brought visible judicial closure with the execution of terrorist Kasab, and took constructive action to improve the system. Sri Lanka’s politically oriented process has interfered with the investigative process. This has skewed its systemic process affecting the handling of terror attacks. Will the arrest of Salley lead to final closure? One can only hope President Dissanayake is able to bring the Easter Sunday attack cases to a closure and punish the actual criminals.

[Col R Hariharan VSM, a retired MI specialist on South Asia and terrorism, served as the head of intelligence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka 1987-90. He is associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies. Website: https://.col.hariharan@net  Email: haridirect@gmail.com,]