Sri Lanka: 13A and its nine lives

Col R Hariharan

Indian Ministry of External Affairs took the unusual step of issuing a strong press statement cautioning Sri Lanka not to dilute the 13^th Amendment (13A) at the end of a Tamil National Alliance (TNA) delegation’s meetings with Indian leadership including the Prime Minister on June 19, 2013. It was in response in to Colombo’s hectic moves to dismantle the constitutional provision of 13A that confers a level of autonomy to Tamil minority.  If 13A is abolished it would not only be negation of the promises President Rajapaksa made to the nation and India but  it would set the clock back on the national reconciliation process that is stalled at the start line since 2009.

The much maligned 13A reached its episodic climax during May-June as the September 2013 Northern Provincial Council (NPC) elections neared. There was a flurry of activities in Colombo as the President was averse to allow the Tamil National Alliance(TNA) – erstwhile political ally of the LTTE- to capture power in the NPC. There was a bit of confusion as the President was making up his mind on how to go about doing this. This resulted in the administration and Gotabaya Rajapaksa, the all powerful Defence Secretary sending confusing signals on future course of action. Lalith Weeratunge, President’s Secretary, added his penny’s worth in twitter justifying the dilution of powers of the “while elephant” provincial councils as they had not served any purpose, a discovery that came 23 years too late.

In this context TNA MP Sumanthiran’s twitter was interesting: “If PCs have not worked so far, then why has this discovery not taken place all these years? Only when the Tamil people were going to vote did they decided that provincial councils are not required... This shows their malfeasance,” he added.

In a political tear jerker that would vie with mid-day television soap, the last two episodes saw the dramatic change in the ruling UPFA coalition’s political strategy. It hopped from bringing an “urgent bill” to replacing 13A with the 19th amendment (a morphed 13A with its non-flyer wings clipped) to refer it to yet another parliamentary select committee (PSC). Obviously, the quick change of mind came after India hinted dark forebodings and some of the coalition partners loudly protested, while Tamil parties watched.

The President has used the PSC as time-tested weapon to bring to heel recalcitrant Tamil political nit-pickers as much as chief justice. The PSC has two advantages –it buys time and rarely it produces acceptable results because key parties usually do not participate in it. In the present instance also, only the ruling UPFA coalition was quick to nominate 19 members while the main opposition UNP and yesterday’s opposition JVP remained non-starters. TNA’s participation is anybody’s guess, as the troika that pulls it ensures it runs in the same place without moving forward.

As the government appears to be reconciled to hold the NPC elections as scheduled in September 2013 without any change in the 13A, the PSC’s purpose is probably to delay a decision on the issue till the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) is seen through in October 2013. As the President has appointed a PSC to “to speed up the process,” Colombo hopes to smoothen India’s ruffled feathers lest it decides not to participate (India never boycotts) in the CHOGM. We can expect the PSC to stretch itself to see through the CHOGM where the President would be anointed lead the CHOGM for two years.

Sri Lanka needs to seriously introspect why the 13A still survives when all politicians, including President Rajapaksa and his brother Gotabaya speak periodically about changing it or getting rid of it.

The 13A fathered by the wily of Sri Lanka neta JR Jayawardane as political expedience to weather a brewing confrontation with India in 1987. It was a deformed child at birth, with low life expectation. It was never allowed to articulate fully and remained a cradle baby after Prabhakaran massacred hapless policemen and other Tamil activists of EPRLF in hundreds in 1990 and killed the hopes of the Northeastern Provincial Council ever functioning. Prabhakaran’s stand against 13A to give substance to his quest for a free Tamil Eelam suited Southern Sinhalas who were in any case averse to “Tamil terrorists” - regardless of their stripes - coming to power.   

However, political parties in the rest of Sri Lanka took to provincial council system with surprising agility because it created one more layer of dispensation of power and favours. It also gave local politicians and their underlings the trappings of non-existent power.   So the 13A continues its ambulatory existence as Sri Lanka polity has not been willing to find a suitable substitute that would provide decentralized powers to the provinces.

As the 13A owes it to the India-Sri Lanka Accord 1987 (ISLA), it has another “useful” political purpose – to make India the whipping boy. India is an essential “evil denominator” in Sri Lanka politics; political and military memoirs written by Sri Lankans are replete with instances to describe this phenomenon. Tamil and Sinhala leaders of all hues ranging from Rajapaksa to Prabhakaran to Weerawansa have emphasized 13A’s as an Indian machination thrust upon an unwilling Sri Lanka.

The 13A’s ISLA linkage has been bringing India into the Sri Lanka political scene now and again, though less frequently after India’s unpleasant experience of direct intervention from 1987 to 90. Even the present Indian interest in 13A came about only after President Rajapaksa thawed it out of cold storage when he came to power in 2005 to use it as a political ploy to ward off sermonising Western powers and retain India’s support.

To sustain Indian support during the Eelam War, Rajapaksa went through various committee manoeuvres and promises to “improve” the 13A, which was never fully implemented. Fortunately, for him, New Delhi with its own other internal and external preoccupations had accepted his arguments during the Eelam War. However, after AIADMK dethroned DMK from power in Tamil Nadu using Eelam War issue, New Delhi was pushed into action.

The pay off time for Sri Lanka’s double speak on the subject came at the UNHCR, after the Rajapaksa chose to ignore mounting allegations of war crimes at home and abroad. And New Delhi had little option but (to do the “right thing” as Hardeep S. Puri puts it in his op-ed piece in The Hindu “Why India is right on Sri Lanka”) to vote for the UNHRC resolution calling for Sri Lanka’s accountability for its conduct during the war.

The political scene in India is undergoing change and Sri Lanka will increasingly find its manoeuvring space getting more and more constricted even if the Congress-led alliance comes back to power in 2014.  As Hardeep Puri wrote, “To dismiss popular sentiment in Tamil Nadu as the machinations of politicians is both a misreading of the situation and a recipe for disaster. Why should Sri Lanka not be held to account for not respecting understandings given bilaterally to India, such as those of April-May 2009?”

Unless Rajapaksa finds an answer to this vexing question, any government in India will find it difficult to wish away the issue because Sri Lanka’s “accountability” is as much applicable to its promises on implementing 13A and devolution of powers to Tamil minority, as investigating allegations of war crimes.

The simple truth is devolution and 13A issues have come to haunt President Rajapaksa because he squandered four years of peace in strengthening his political base rather than bringing back Tamils to political mainstream. This has compounded his accountability problem with the international community. Even now many are not convinced that he would go through the NPC election as planned because he has given sufficient indications that he would like to do what he and the Sinhala right want, rather than accept the inevitability of the TNA gaining control of the NPC.  

Surprisingly, the Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa while rightly recognizing the rise of Eelam protagonists abroad as a threat to Sri Lanka’s national security, has failed to recognize the hot house conditions Sri Lanka is providing for them to propagate their cause. Acts of Sri Lanka Buddhist extremism increasing everyday against Hindu, Muslim, and Christian minorities, allowed with studied indifference of the state reinforces the growing belief that the Rajapaksa regime is becoming an inward looking, and intolerant. Political speeches on tolerance and brotherhood sound no more credible.These add to the climate of suspicion.

The present mess has given hope for revival of the Eelam Cause among Tamil Diaspora, though there is little enthusiasm among Sri Lankan Tamils. Thanks to Sri Lanka’s indifference to war crimes allegations and implementation of LLRC recommendations, anti-Sri Lanka sentiment is lodged in Tamil Nadu’s local politics. This poses a serious threat to not only India-Sri Lanka relations but also the interest of Tamil Nadu as has living links with Sri Lanka Tamils.    

Like all half cooked and warmed up food, 13A seems to have finished its shelf life. It has neither met the aspirations of yesterday’s Eelam secessionists nor satisfied Sinhala triumphalists. However, in the absence of a suitable substitute it stands as a sop, if not a symbol of hope, for Tamils. It also apparently satisfies President Rajapaksa’s “liberal sentiments” to leave it for the time being while his coalition members are pandering to Sinhala right wing elements. And it keeps India at bay. Given this curious setting I expect the 13A, truncated or otherwise, to survive its nine lives.

I am one of those who had believed that Sri Lanka at the end of the Eelam War had a wonderful opportunity to open a new chapter in equitable ethnic relations. But what is happening in Sri Lanka mocks at my simplistic belief. I realise Sumanthiran’s words “The Sri Lankan government from the word go was never interested (in devolution of power). The victory in the war meant, take it all….” are probably more than political rhetoric. And that is sad.

(Col R Hariharan, a retired Military Intelligence specialist on South Asia, served with the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka as Head of Intelligence. He is associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies and the South Asia Analysis Group. E-Mail: colhari@yahoo.com   Blog: www.colhariharan.org

Managing India- China convergences and contradictions

By  R. Hariharan          

[This is the full text of a presentation made by the author at the China-South Asia Think Tank Forum meet held on June 6 and 7, 2013 at Kunming]

Introduction

The 21st century is going to be the Asian century, if we go by the continued growth of Asian economy despite global economic downturn. Three Asian power centres – China, Japan, and India – are increasingly influencing global power equation well beyond Asia. As strategic analyst Brahma Challaney puts it “Never before have China, Japan, and India have all been strong at the same time.”

Historically, the three Asian powers have had social and cultural linkages that influenced religious perceptions and life style of Asia as a whole. However, the aftermath of the World War II not only changed Asia’s territorial contours but also introduced political and structural changes. After the end of Cold War and the emergence of a liberalized world economic order, China has developed into a global economic power, overtaking Japan in the process. China now aspires to overtake the U.S., which continues to remain the most powerful nation in the world.

India having grown into a regional economic power has more modest ambitions to expand its linkages with the east and protect its global strategic, economic and political interests. In Japan strong nationalist sentiments are striving to cut loose its umbilical relationship with the U.S in a bid to reassert its global power.

The three nations, despite their divergent aspirations, have a triangular relationship which regularly comes under stresses of their strategic perceptions and world view.  Their relationship with the U.S. and its role in the expanded definition of the Asia-Pacific region is perhaps the most important component of the strategic perceptions of the three Asian powers.

They respect the U.S. military and economic might and its impact in Asia. And they have tried to strike a win-win equation with the U.S. to serve their national interests. China though suspicious of the U.S.’ strategic intentions is trying to build meaningful economic relations with it, while protect its own core interests. This was amply demonstrated during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s recent visit to the U.S.

The strategic environment of South Asia is likely to undergo major changes in the next two to three years.  General elections in India, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, and Maldives and possibly Sri Lanka in this period could result in change of national leadership as it happened in the recent elections in Pakistan.

This could cause changes in their policy perceptions resulting some realignment of equations in their relations. With the thinning out of U.S. troops and coalition forces from Afghanistan in 2014, the Af-Pak region is likely to face a period of uncertainty and instability affecting the region. The resurgence of terrorism in South Asia bordering Af-Pak region is a real possibility.

India, the dominant power in South Asia, is getting ready to respond to the dynamics of change in the region to safeguard its national interests. China with an agenda to build politico-economic partnership with its neighbours has already made large headway in South Asia. Thus China’s South Asia agenda is also likely to face a challenging period. This will be more so, when its competing interests with India come into full play. Given India's domination of the South Asian scene, for building a win-win relationship in South Asia, China has to strengthen its relations India.

Shared interests and contentious issues

India the largest multiparty democracy and China the largest one-party ruled country represent two different growth models. Both have their own advantages and disadvantages; however, China’s centralized leadership has been able to marshal its resources better than India and achieve spectacular results in economic growth and human development.

On the other hand India with heterogeneous population and the pulls and pressures of democracy in action has been able to achieve modest growth.

Despite their political and economic differences the two nations share similar interests.

• The growth rates of both countries have been affected by global economic downturn. As the U.S. and European economies are unlikely to bounce back in the near term, they would like to expand their trade in Asian markets – particularly the under-exploited South Asian markets.
• Their rapid economic growth has increased the disparities between the rich and the poor. While this provided the poor incentive for upward mobility, it has also increased their expectations from the state. If unmet, this could result in social unrest among their populations.  
• Growing social networking among the people, particularly among youth, has increased their ability to rally together on sensitive political, social and environmental issues.
• A rising middle class with growing money power wants to improve the quality of life and standards of governance, eliminating corruption and cronyism.
• Buoyed by economic growth, business class is looking to develop beyond national boundaries and wields strong economic and political clout to impact national policies.
• Strong nationalist sentiments of the population are increasingly influencing government policies while dealing with international issues.

Despite this, two hardy perennials continue to prevent India and China from building a win-win relationship:

• The disputed demarcation of borders and rival territorial claims between the two countries and China’s occupation of Indian territories remains a highly sensitive issue particularly after the 1962 war between India and China. This has left bitter memories that still cloud the dispute. Although 15 rounds of talks have been held between the two countries the problem looks intractable and remains a politically explosive issue in India.
• The Chinese continue to be suspicious of India’s attitude towards the exiled Tibetan leader Dalai Lama and a large number of Tibetan refugees present in India; their activities continue to be China’s core concern. Tibet could face a period of uncertainty as their passive struggle preserve their autonomy, identity, culture, religion and language in the face of increasing domination by the Chinese in Tibet seems to be never ending. This could further be exacerbated if and when the present Dalai Lama is no more on the scene to exercise a moderating influence on younger sections of Tibetan exiles. China would need India’s cooperation and support in managing the situation in such a contingency.

So the relationship between the two countries continues to be hostage to developments in the two issues. However, thanks to far sighted leadership in both countries, India-China relations have steadily grown stronger since 1990. As a result, both countries have evolved protocols and mechanisms to consult, coordinate and manage disputes between them. They have also been cooperating on issues of international concern like global warming and environmental security.

Recently, both nations managed to resolve a military stand-off between the two countries when Chinese troops intruded across the Line of Actual Control in Ladakh region in India. This cited as an example of successful use of the dispute resolution mechanism. However, it is good to remember the situation was defused only after strong public pressure forced the governments of India and China to act with seriousness. This underlines the fragile nature of the relationship building between the two countries; it is still largely a work in progress. Under the circumstances both countries will have to handle contentious issues with greater sensitivity and transparency.

The two governments also have a responsibility to their people to ensure the border dispute is resolved in a reasonable time frame without rancour or political gamesmanship. As regards the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan refugees, India has recognized Tibet as a part of China and it is unlikely to change its stance. If China wants to gain India’s trust, it should take a relook at its ambivalent stand on the status of Jammu and Kashmir.

The building of a constructive partnership between India and China has to be in this backdrop. It is needed for the peaceful development of South Asia as it would benefit nearly a third of humanity. However, it requires a higher level of understanding, cooperation and trust than existing at present between the two countries in three strategic areas. 

Strategic relations

India’s traditional economic, political and strategic domination of South Asia is being challenged by China. China already has multifaceted relations with Pakistan – India’s bête noir. This is more so since China made strategic shift in its policy regarding the status of Indian state Jammu and Kashmir - a part of which Pakistan has occupied illegally. In fact, Chinese construction troops are building roads in Indian territory in Kashmir occupied by Pakistan.

Apparently, this reflects China’s response to changes in South Asian security environment which could impact China both internally and externally. Internally, China is investing heavily in Xinjiang’s development. To achieve this it is imperative that internal security of the region, troubled by Uighur revolt, is strengthened. The potential for Uighur revolt increases when the strategic environment of the Taliban dominated areas along Pakistan-Afghan border changes for the worse when American military power is scaled down in the Af-Pak region. 

A second aspect, related to earlier issue, is the likelihood of Taliban increasing its clout in the Af-Pak region. In this context, it would be in China’s interest to further consolidate its strategic relations with Pakistan over the long term to ensure harmony prevails along its border. It would also serve China’s global interests: improve China’s backward Western regions’ land access to Chinese managed Gwadar port on Arabian Sea coast, upgrade energy security and improve China’s military options. Of course, an added incentive is a militarily more reliable Pakistan would add to China’s strategic options along India’s western flank increasing its leverage in handling India.

It is inevitable that India’s strategic equation with the rest of South Asia would respond to this emerging scene on the West.  Possibly, this is one the reasons for India trying to strengthen its strategic relations with the U.S. and - in East Asia – with Japan, South Korea and Vietnam.

The U.S. has been striving to build a meaningful strategic relationship with India even as it tries to manage its schizophrenic relationship with Pakistan.  The U.S. is also rapidly enlarging its relationship with Myanmar where it will be challenging the free run China had enjoyed all these years.

Though the U.S. has made clear its posture is not directed against China, it is evident that it is in response to China’s growing economic and military assertion in Asia and beyond.

While the U.S. posture is a matter of concern for China, global economic downturn has given a strong reason for symbiotic, non-confrontational relationship building between the U.S. and China.

Both China and the U.S. appear to be conscious of this and are striving to build better understanding, avoiding confrontation.

China’s increasing effort to build its relationship in South Asia will be taking place in this emerging complex strategic scene. Both India and China will have to be conscious of this complex setting, while protecting their national self interest. To achieve this they have to keep their communication lines open at the highest levels.

Jihadi terrorism

With the changes in the strategic environment of Af-Pak region discussed earlier, the Taliban forces are likely to militarily challenge the elected government of Afghanistan. As Jihadi terrorism has established itself as an extra constitutional factor in Pakistan, particularly in the sensitive tribal regions astride Pak-Afghan border, the pacification of Af-Pak region is likely to become an important international issue for preserving peace not only in Afghanistan but in South and Central Asian countries as well.

India’s close relationship with Afghanistan is centuries old. This has continued even after India was partitioned to create Pakistan and subsequently to the time President Karzai-led government came to power in Afghanistan. India had been the largest provider of non-military assistance to Afghanistan to rebuild its infrastructure and services.  India would like to ensure the relationship between the countries remain stable; in order to achieve this India's strategic relationship with Afghanistan had been growing.

Resurgence of Taliban terrorism could challenge Afghanistan-India relationship as it had been the source of inspiration and support to Pak based Jihadi terrorists like Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). Both the terror groups have been carrying out terrorist attacks in India.

Pakistan has continued to provide succour and sanctuary to these terrorists on its soil.  This has enabled them to act with impunity not only against India but to grow into a major threat to the survival of democracy in Pakistan as well. Their continued existence is a major road block in rebuilding India’s troubled relationship with Pakistan. This in turn has prevented the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) to come into full bloom and optimize its potential.

As Pakistan government’s ability to control Islamist terrorists operating inside the country and along Afghan border has become suspect, the rise of Taliban could pose problems to China also as discussed earlier affecting the development of Xinjiang as well as interfering with its plans to make Afghanistan an important source of raw material.

China, as a strategic partner of Pakistan, has multifaceted relations in defence, nuclear, energy and infrastructure sectors. This relationship could come in handy in strengthening China’s ability to influence Af-Pak situation.

Thus ensuring peace and stability in Af-Pak region is in the interest of both India and China. As the biggest powers of the continent, they need to bring in their strengths to ensure the survival of Afghanistan as a peaceful democracy and contain the impact of jihadi terrorism in South Asia. There is no other option.

Trade and commerce

South Asia remains one of the under exploited market economies with ever growing middle class with increasing consumer appetite. During the last decade, China has made large inroads into South Asian countries, including India, in a number of ways. It has emerged as the largest trading partner of India. This is equally true in the case of many other South Asian countries also.

With the RMB remaining strong, many smaller South Asian countries, like some of their European counterparts, have started looking to China for economic assistance and investment to write their own survival and growth story. This is likely to increase as no dramatic breakthrough is expected in global economic downturn.

The increased dependency upon China among South Asian countries has started eroding India’s economic influence in South Asia. This has started impacting India’s special relationship with some of its close neighbours like Maldives, Nepal and Sri Lanka.

India’s efforts to build stronger bonds with Bangladesh and Myanmar are also likely to be made a little more complex by the looming presence of China. Despite this India-China trade estimated around $ 66 billion is poised to grow much more as there is sufficient scope for it. However, it is weighted heavily in favour of China; and it is in China’s own interest to give sustenance to it by increasing Indian imports and invest more in India.

China’s foray into building its trade and commerce in South Asia needs to be viewed in this complex setting. Smaller nations like Sri Lanka are already taking advantage of the increasing domination of China over India. This is understandable as long as it is done with a degree of even handedness and China and India continue to increase the levels of mutual trust, which suffers from periodic hiccups.

Conclusion

To conclude, South Asia is likely to figure increasingly in the strategic calculus of India and China as China enlarges its foot print in the sub-continent. Considering their responsibility to the people of the region, India and China have no choice but to build a meaningful relationship with each other, avoiding military confrontation.

However, both countries cannot wish away historical legacies of their uneasy relationship by acts of provocation, distrust and contrarian claims over territory. To build a long term relationship they need strengthen convergences, and even out contradictions without jeopardizing each other’s national interest. To carry out this difficult task, national leadership in both countries will have to rally their strengths and work on achieving time bound objectives.

As this will be an ongoing process, three things are essential to keep a balance in their relationship – keeping in perspective each other’s sensitivities, long term national interests and regional peace, maintaining regular and cordial communication links open, and avoiding selective policy prescriptions adversely affecting the other nation.

(Col R Hariharan, a retired MI officer, is associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies and the South Asia Analysis Group. E-Mail: colhari@yahoo.com   Blog: www.colhariharan.org)  

Courtesy: Chennai Centre for China Studies Paper No 1164 dated 21 June 2013        http://www.c3sindia.org/india/3631

South Asia analysis Group Paper No 5514 dated 21 June 2013                     http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/node/1297

Ending the romance with Maoists

Col R Hariharan

[This article includes points made by the author in a discussion on a TV news channel on Maoist violence beamed on June 14, 2013.]

The Maoist attack on Dhanbad-Patna Intercity Express at Jamui - one of Bihar's seven Maoists-hit districts on May 13 killing three persons, is a rude reminder that the state is yet to win its war against Maoist extremism, despite winning many battles on other fronts.

The attack comes even as the nation is recovering from the gruesome killing of Chattisgarh Congress President Nand Kumar Patel and his son, as well as the well-known Adivasi leader Mahendra Karma, and 20 others by Maoists near Suguma in Southern Bastar District earlier.

The two incidents underline the need to shed the romantic notions many of us nurture about Maoist extremism. Ironically the Congress leaders were on a “Parivartan yatra” as a part of their electioneering campaign; but when will the country make a parivartan (change) in the way it combats Maoists?             

The Maoists’ –whatever be the latest alphabetical acronyms of their faction – fundamental credo is to destroy the democratic state and its machinery through armed violence. Maoists have shown repeatedly that all those who are in the way of achieving this objective – be it the Adivasi they claim to protect, politicians, petty government officials or even the hapless cop on traffic duty – will be ruthlessly eliminated.  So, successful cohabitation of democratic governance and Maoists is an oxymoron proposition. 

Though national leaders periodically repeat the cliché of Maoist extremism being a national threat, they generally soft pedal the anti-democratic nature of Maoist conflict and adopt reactive strategies. As a result for long the nation had adopted a soft approach in dealing with Left Wing extremism in contrast to its attitude to separatist insurgencies in Kashmir and northeast.

There are a few reasons for this. Maoist strongholds are generally in backward tribal areas which have low population density, and send fewer elected representatives. As long as Maoist conflicts do not affect urban constituencies where political idiom is commanded by money power and caste equations, politicians choose to ignore them because poor Adivasis are outside the Hindu caste pantheon.

Tribals have long faced social and political exploitation, and economic deprivation. Over a period of time, society has chosen to ignore their plight. Their traditional areas of habitation have been exploited by feudal elements that left the Adivasi population eking out a marginal living. However, economic liberalisation has drawn powerful national and foreign business entities with rapacious appetite for raw material, particularly mineral deposits and green resources into traditional areas of tribals. While mega business corporations in collusion with political-bureaucracy nexus prospered with this development, the Adivasis have been left out of the growth story. Moreover, corrupt political and administrative system well entrenched in society has marginalised Adivasis from gaining access to social security outreach of available to the rural poor.  

Claiming to be defenders of the oppressed people, particularly the tribals, Maoists have been able to sell their struggle to gain broad based support among human rights and environmental activists and left wing sympathisers. Usually they are more articulate and committed to their beliefs than politicians whose words fail to carry conviction. 

Political parties have also been treating Maoist extremism to score brownie points against the ruling party. Of course, the ineptness of execution of operations and knee jerk response of political leadership to Maoist extremism provide opportunities galore for the opposition.

Elected governments at the state and Centre are aware of this situation. However, due to lack of accountability in governance, the state has unwittingly become unofficial patrons of exploiters. As a result their repeated promises to make the system vibrant are suspect. As structural changes continue to be elusive, Maoists have thrived.

During the last decade or so, Maoists have also become part of this network of exploitation by extorting mining entities and their contractors. So Maoists are no more gooey eyed idealists the intellectual class would like to believe.

When P Chidambaram donned the mantle of Union Home Minister in the wake of 26/11 Lashkar terrorist attack in Mumbai, he adopted a systematic approach to strengthen the police and paramilitary forces. The fight against Maoist extremism also benefitted from this approach. According to the Home Ministry reports total number of districts affected by Maoist extremism fell from 208 in 2009 to 173 in 2012. Some major counter extremists operations were launched in 2009-10 and as many 5,705 extremists were killed, surrendered or arrested.

Does this mean government has succeeded in eradicating Maoist extremism? The figures of casualties and "liberated areas" are deceptive, as in low intensity warfare body count may weaken the extremist but does not end their activity. After suffering heavy losses in 2009-10, Maoists have changed their tactics to avoid contact with paramilitary forces. Maoists, despite their depleted strength, retain the ability to carry out sensational strikes. Exploiting the operational incompetency and leadership weaknesses of state apparatus, they now carry out attacks like the ones on the Intercity express in Jamui and Congress leaders and functionaries in Chattisgarh. 

There is an underlying national consensus among political parties, and even among most of the civil society organs, that Maoist extremism vitiates the gains of democratic governance. However, deep differences exist on how to go about eliminating them or render them ineffective. There appears to be an element of desperation in the government’s approach. In September 2011 Union Home Minister P Chidambaram expressed Centre’s readiness for holding unconditional talks with Maoists even if they do not surrender arms or renounce their extremist ideology. It is not clear what will the state and the extremists talk about, if the extremists continue to retain the arms and adhere to their ideological commitment to destroy the state through armed struggle!

In short our national approach to combating Maoist extremism appears confused and vacillating.  The country’s war against Left Wing extremism appears to be heading for a long haul, unless it can overcome some fundamental weaknesses that have become part of our system:

·    

• The overall objective should be to remove the Maoists as interlocutors for the oppressed people and sensitise the state administrative machinery to meet the needs of the people. The state has to own up its responsibility to protect the constitution and provide a secure environment for the people to live in. This involves the removal of Maoists as an extra constitutional entity interfering with governance. To achieve this, the state requires goal clarity, which does not seem to exist now.

• The state should be able to sustain its presence in the “liberated” area and defend it against recurrence of Maoist extremism. This can come about only when the people see the state as a better option than Maoists and extend their support. Attempts to carry out such programmes have not made much headway due to lack of political will and commitment. Political rivalry, cronyism and corruption coupled with aberrations in the administrative and police machinery usually vitiate the gains.

•  A well integrated approach between the state and the Centre in combating Maoists continues to remain elusive although their paramilitary and police forces have been working together for nearly a decade now. Law and order is largely the state’s responsibility and states are wary of Centre poaching on their pasture under cover of counter extremist operations. This has been aggravated by schism between states ruled by the opposition and the Centre. At functional level this affects real time information sharing and coordination of operations.    

•  Police forces continue to be colonial stereotypes lacking a people-friendly approach. This has affected modernisation of police forces affecting their counter extremist operations. As most of the states have chosen to ignore implementation of police reforms, recommended by successive police commissions, organs of law enforcement continue to wallow in corruption and pandering to political influence. Palliative measures like employing retired army brigadiers for planning of operations against extremists are unlikely to yield lasting results professional standards of police and paramilitary forces are upgraded without delay.

In short, success in operations against extremists cannot be gauged merely by body counts or size of sanitized areas, though they do indicate success of operations at the field level. The more difficult part of operations is weaning away the people from Maoists’ pernicious ideology that undermines the very existence of the state. To create a congenial environment for this, it becomes imperative to render Maoists ineffective so that they cease to be an instrument of terror. But such security operations should be a means to an end for good governance. To achieve this counter-terror operations have to be planned and executed with greater sensitivity to human rights and environmental protection lest the organs of state merely replace Maoists as the exploiter of peoples’ grievances. 

Col Hariharan is a retired Military Intelligence officer associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies and the South Asia Analysis Group. E-mail: colhari@yahoo.com Blog: www.colhariharan.org)

Courtesy: South Asia Analysis Paper No 5511 dated June 17, 2013  http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/node/1294

India's Mr Intelligence is no more

 It is a sad day for all of us who have known Bahukutumbi Raman for some years now. He passed away yesterday after valiantly fighting Cancer. A bachelor, his only passion was intelligence. To me he was Mr Intelligence - the very best in intelligence community. He had phenomenal memory and prodigious energy. His blogs and twitter avidly read the world over by analysts provided unusual insights. I reproduce here a moving write up on who Raman was in The Hindu (courtesy: The Hindu)

 A Kao-boy till the end

Special Correspondent

The Hindu

B. Raman, one of India’s first external intelligence agents, died here on Sunday after a battle with cancer. He was 77. Raman served for 26 years in the Research and Analysis wing, right from the day it was carved out of the Intelligence Bureau in September 1968 on Indira Gandhi’s orders, until his retirement in 1994.

An IPS officer of the 1961 Madhya Pradesh cadre, Raman was on deputation to the Intelligence Bureau when he was handpicked by Rameshwar Nath Kao to join R&AW, set up in the aftermath of the wars with China and Pakistan.

He retired as Additional Secretary in the Cabinet Secretariat. In the last six years of his career, he headed R&AW’s counter-terrorism unit. Throughout his career, he was, in his own words, known “as a man with a poker face. As someone who showed no emotion or passion on his face.”

The first assignment that Kao, who headed R&AW, gave him was to be in charge of the agency’s Burma branch. He was there for five years handling analysis as well as clandestine operations, an early phase in his career that earned him the sobriquet ‘Burma Raman’.

In his book, The Kao-boys of R&AW – Down Memory Lane (2007), Raman gave a detailed account of the external intelligence agency’s work that contributed to the liberation of Bangladesh. Kao had given the agency’s operatives two priority tasks — “to strengthen its capability for the collection of intelligence about Pakistan and China and for covert action in East Pakistan.”

In a rare foray by a “spook” into writing about field operations, Raman disclosed that providing intelligence to policy makers and the armed forces, to train Bengali freedom fighters in clandestine camps, to network with Bengali public servants from East Pakistan posted in West Pakistan and in Pakistan’s diplomatic missions abroad to persuade them to cooperate with the freedom fighters and mount a special operation in the Chittagong Hill Tracts where Naga and Mizo hostiles had sanctuaries and training camps.

He recorded the secret negotiations Rajiv Gandhi had on behalf of Indira Gandhi with Sikh leaders before Operation Bluestar in 1984. Indira Gandhi was keen that these be recorded so that posterity would know how she tried in vain for a negotiated solution before she sent the Army into the Golden Temple. Raman was entrusted with this task. He says he had the negotiations secretly recorded and spent endless hours transcribing them. These records were handed over to the organisation’s archives, but nobody knows where these are now.

Raman strongly believed that covert capability was an indispensable tool for any state that had external adversaries. He served as the head of RAW’s counter-terrorism division from 1988 to 1994. He declined an offer by the Narasimha Rao government to be the intelligence coordinator for the north-east after his retirement, preferring to return Chennai.

He was a member of the special task force appointed by the government in 2000 to revamp the intelligence apparatus and a member of the National Security Advisory Board. He was also a member of the committee set up to examine the intelligence failure that led to the Kargil incursion.

In his retirement, especially in the last 10 years, he was active in writing about strategic affairs, touching on a range of internal and external issues. He spoke with precision and clarity. He was quick to respond to sudden and developing events such as terror attacks, posting his perspective and preliminary views on anti-terrorism portals and social media sites. He believed that all strategic thinking and discussion should have the national interests in mind, even though his analysis always took into account the political and social underpinnings of conflicts and crises.

He was active on Twitter as @sorbonne75, and despite his illness, continued to post messages on his timeline on issues of current national interest. In the last week of May, he tweeted that “Ind-Japan shd make China’s seeming strengths into strategic vulnerabilities.”

He also talked about his illness on Twitter, saying he wanted to create awareness of cancer and its treatment. In his very last tweet, on May 31, he spoke optimistically about returning from hospital soon.

Raman was associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies and was a regular contributor to the South Asia Analysis Group. He was also Director, Institute for Topical Studies, Chennai.
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/a-kaoboy-till-the-end/article4820697.ece?homepage=true

CHINA'S MILITARY MODERNIZATION PROGRAMME

 By D.S.Rajan

“Building strong national defense and powerful armed forces that are commensurate with China’s international standing and meet the needs of its security and development interests is a strategic task of China’s modernization drive.

“We should attach great importance to maritime, space and cyberspace security. We should make active planning for the use of military forces in peacetime, expand and intensify military preparedness, and enhance the capability to accomplish a wide range of military tasks ,the most important of which is to win local war in an information age”.(1)
– Work Report to the 18th Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Congress, November 2012

“China unswervingly pursues an independent foreign policy of peace and a national defence policy that is defensive in nature…. China will never seek hegemony or behave in a hegemonic manner, nor will it engage in military expansion… China’s armed forces provide a security guarantee and strategic support for national development, and make due contributions to the maintenance of world peace and regional stability(2)
- China’s Defence White Paper, April 2013.

The two quotes mentioned above clearly bring out the essence of the military modernization policy of People’s Republic of China (PRC). Notwithstanding such official positions, strong opinions exist outside China that there is incompatibility between the PRC’s declared path of ‘peaceful development’ and its drive to project military power well beyond its borders, perceived as challenging the security interests of concerned countries. In such a situation, two questions become worth considering – whether China’s stated intentions behind its military modernization drive are genuine and whether the ‘China threat’ perceptions prevailing abroad to a considerable degree are justified? Recognizing that without the help of a sound data base, it may not be possible to find clear answers to these questions, and make assessments from a wider perspective, an attempt has been made to compile all the facts relating to China’s military modernization; they are placed below as Appendix.

Aftershocks of Chinese incursion in Ladakh

R Hariharan

Most people in India would welcome that a potential military conflict with China had been averted after China pulled back its troops who had intruded 19 km across the of Line of Actual Control (LAC), into Indian territory in Ladakh. The intrusion in the strategically sensitive area near Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO) tested Indian nerves for 20 days. The aftershocks of what many Indians perceive as an ill-timed and seemingly uncalled for Chinese provocation is sure to linger for a long time affecting  Indian perceptions in the long term.  

Sri Lanka Perspectives - April 2013

Col R Hariharan

Highlights

• Northern Province issues: With the proposed Northern Provincial Council elections scheduled for September 2013 getting closer, the political situation in the province is getting ugly. A recent public outcry against the military acquiring prime land of displaced persons in Valikamam North has snow balled into a political issue.  

• Energy tariff and rising costs: Revision of electricity tariffs during the month has triggered widespread protests in all sections of society. And the President is expected to announce some concessions on May Day.

• CHOGM Summit: It seems certain that Sri Lanka will be hosting the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) summit in November 2013. At the recently meeting of the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group (CMAG) has clarified that the heads of Commonwealth governments had already chosen Sri Lanka as the venue. This should come as a relief to Sri Lanka.

• Sri Lanka refugee outflow: Australia’s strong action repatriating Sri Lanka refugees who had illegally entered the country from Sri Lanka is likely to stem the outflow towards Australia.  South India had become the transit point for this outflow and the police had been cracking down on such illegal activities.