Sri Lanka Perspectives - June 2013

Col R Hariharan

Highlights

Devolution muddle: After India cautioned Sri Lanka against tinkering with 13^th Amendment (13A) and some of the partners of the ruling UPFA coalition objected to it, a parliamentary select committee (PSC) has been appointed to consider the issue and make recommendations. The government has clarified that the Northern Provincial Council (NPC) be held in September 2013 under existing 13A.

Continuing Buddhist activism: Continuing Sinhala Buddhist activism directed against Muslims and Christian establishments is causing concern.

Devolution muddle

The ruling UPFA coalition’s reluctance to allow the Tamil  National Alliance (TNA) – former political allies of the LTTE- gain control of the  Northern Provincial Council (NPC) in the elections due in September 2013 was manifest in various moves undertaken to weaken the 13^th Amendment (13A). After a TNA delegation met Indian leaders on June 19 and briefed India on the moves, Indian prime minister cautioned Sri Lanka to desist from diluting the 13A.

While Sri Lanka announced the NPC election would be held as planned in September without any change in 13A, it appointed a parliamentary select committee (PSC) to suggest changes in 13A. The UPFA has nominated 18 members but the three major opposition parties United National Party (UNP), the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and the TNA have refused to take part. The PSC is scheduled to meet on July 9. SLFP leaders have said the PSC would go ahead to make recommendations even if opposition parties do not join in the deliberations.

Since October 2012, Rajapaksa brother’s had been orchestrating political pressure for doing away with 13A using the right wing Jathika Helay Urumaya (JHU), and the Marxist National Freedom Front (NFF) of Weerawansa. However, Indian pressure and strong opposition from some of UPFA’s coalition partners had deferred the issue.

Now, as the NPC elections are nearing, Rajapaksas have launched multiple moves to dilute or do away with 13A and replace it with 19^th Amendment. For instance the SLFP-led Sabaragamuwa Provincial Council has approved the government proposal to amend the 13A. The Province Chief Minister proposed doing away with the provision which enabled two or more provinces to amalgamate as well as rescinding the requirement for consent of all provincial councils for the passage of legislation coming under their purview.

It has been reported that Basil Rajapaksa, President’s brother and Minister for economic development will be visiting New Delhi on July 4, to brief Indian Minister for External Affairs Salman Khurshid and National Security Advisor Shivashankar Menon “on the political situation including matters relating to proposed amendments” to 13A. New Delhi already peeved with Sri Lanka is unlikely to relent from its stand easily as Sri Lanka will need India’s continued support to see through the CHOGM meeting Colombo is hosting in October 2013.

Continuing Buddhist activism

Continuing Buddhist activism led by fringe organizations targeting Muslim traders and Christian religious groups is causing concern in Sri Lanka. The President at a breakfast meeting with editors of newspapers is reported to have requested them not to give publicity to such reports.  

 

On June 16, members of the Ravana Balaya, one of the fringe groups, rounded up a group of Jehovah’s Witnesses, a Christian sect, in Mulleriyawa. According to a media report, Ven. Itthakande Saddhatissa Thero of the group claimed that the Jehovah’s Witnesses visited homes while the men were out and only women were there, distributing leaflets about their cause. This group had visited the Buddhist village of Visthapura and had tried to convert them. The monk was quoted as saying “These are Christian extremists,” and the Ravana Balaya and villagers “arrested and questioned” the Jehovah’s Witnesses, and told them to take Christ’s message to Christians instead of trying to spread it amongst Buddhists.

In another incident, a Muslim beef stall in Tangalle was set ablaze while members of a fringe group Sinhala Ravaya were marching towards Colombo protesting against cattle slaughter. A Muslim photographer was also manhandled by the marchers. Though the group had disclaimed any involvement in the incident, obviously its campaign had provoked the attack.   

Commenting on the Sri Lankan authorities response to such violent incidents the US Department of State’s 2012 International Religious Freedom Report said:“Authorities were reluctant to investigate or prosecute those responsible for attacks on churches, Hindu temples, or mosques. In some cases, the police response was inadequate and local police officials reportedly were reluctant to take legal action against individuals involved in the attacks.”

Miscellaneous

Economy: Sri Lanka's gross domestic product grew 6.0 percent in the first quarter of 2013, slowing from 8.0 percent in the previous year. In the last 12 months ending June 2013 consumer prices rose 6.8 percent. 

Tamil Nadu protest against training Sri Lankan officers: Sri Lanka withdrew two of its defence officers attending the Defence Staff College, Wellington in Tamil Nadu, after the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister objected to their presence as an affront to the sentiments of Tamil people. She wrote to the Prime Minister on the subject and protests by fringe parties in Wellington added to the tension, after which the Union government decided to pull the two Sri Lankan officers.

Pak army chief’s visit: General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, Chief of Army Staff, Pakistan arrived in Sri Lanka on June 27, 2013 on a three-day visit. This was his second visit to Sri Lanka after his January 2011. As chief guest he reviewed the Passing out Parade at Sri Lanka Military Academy, Diyatalawa. The visiting Pakistan's Chief of Army called upon the Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa. The Defence Secretary discussed the sequence of security concerns that were emerging in the region. Chief of Defence Staff, Navy and Air Force Commanders were in attendance during the meeting with Secretary Defence.  

General Kayani also met with his Sri Lankan counterpart General Jagath Jayasuriya. According to Sri Lanka army website their meeting “explored avenues of receiving more training opportunities for Sri Lankan officers in Pakistan, in addition to ongoing training programmes. Participation in Sri Lanka Army’s Defence Seminar, higher education programmes in both countries and Sri Lanka’s military exercise ‘cormorant’, etc were among other matters that were taken up.” 

Written on June 30, 2013 
Courtesy: South Asia Security Trends, Volume 7, No. 6 July 2013, New Delhi

www.security-risks.com 

Sri Lanka: 13A, CHOGM, China and India

Col R Hariharan

[This is an extract of an E-mail interview given to Confluence, a London based magazine.]

Q1. India has blown hot and cold over the Sri Lankan national question over the past several decades.  Now there is 13A and the elections for a Northern Provincial government looming. Do you see the Manmohan government acting positive and decisively in this context?

There are two narratives on India’s stand on the Sri Lankan national question. One is India as a regional power which would like to maintain a strategically useful and friendly relationship with Sri Lanka and the other, a national narrative based upon the traditional linkages between Tamil Nadu and Sri Lanka Tamils. The “hot and cold” relationship as you call it is due to the priorities of which narrative overtakes policy making at a specific time of criticality.

India had been trying to strike a balance between the two narratives. The Indo-Sri Lanka Accord 1987 was a product of this recipe. And it had all the makings of satisfying neither the regional strategic needs nor the local Tamil aspirations. It was in a way built into fail because it had so many loopholes for politicians on both sides to wriggle out of their commitment. The 13A as a product of this Accord is there with a lot of short comings. But it is at least recognition of the need for equitable justice to minorities. (I am not a great votary of the 13A; it needs to be reworked in the present climate when LTTE guns have been silenced. See my latest SAAG update on 13A uploaded yesterday.)

When Rajapaksa came to power and promised devolution and then waged Eelam war and sought Indian acquiescence, it was the regional narrative that dictated the policy. But when he failed to save the face of New Delhi by going back on his promises, New Delhi’s inability to meet the political demands in Tamil Nadu on the issue brought on the national narrative to the fore. With the elections looming for Indian parliament end 2013-14, the ruling Congress coalition facing multiple hazards to win the next election, national narrative is likely to get shriller unless Rajapaksa (in the most unlikely event ) of doing a sleight of hand and gets Tamils back in political mainstream.    

In international relations acting positively and decisively as you term it comes perhaps on the last stage before slapping sanctions or going to war. Indian foreign policy moves like the proverbial Indian elephant – at its own phase – and its large political body takes a long time to get decisive action going. Keeping this as well as the existing antagonistic relationship between the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister and New Delhi in view, I do not expect a dramatic breakthrough in the near future. Ms Jayalalithaa’s partisan approach to Sri Lanka national question limits her capability to rally India to act positively and equitably to bring about a useful solution.

After all, the days of Operation Poomalai that sent IAF aircraft to drop food supplies to beleaguered Jaffna are over. No country – not even the so called super power the U.S. - can get away with it unless it has a level of acceptance internationally. Indian usually does not make such multilateral moves in its neighbourhood unless it is under the UN aegis.

Q2. How do you see CHOGM playing a role in the present predicament at its September meeting in Sri Lanka?  Canada has dropped out while David Cameron has said he will attend and yet give a terse message. South Africa is also likely to follow in the same vein. Others including Australia may toe a different line. How do you see a man accused as a war criminal functioning as the Head of the Commonwealth in the next two years?

The CHOGM undoubtedly puts India in a dilemma of Shakespearean proportions. Here also we see the national and regional narratives making their play to pull Indian decision making in opposite directions.

Tamil Nadu political parties, including the Congress, have asked for boycotting the CHOGM in protest against Sri Lanka’s conduct and lack of accountability. India does not take such drastic decisions. I don’t think present leadership in New Delhi would take such a step which could damage the strained India-Sri Lanka relationship irreparably (already soured by Indian vote at UNHCR) as Mahinda Rajapaksa who would be ascending to CHOGM chair could take it as a personal affront.

But New Delhi is definitely not happy with his broken promises and prevarication which have politically embarrassed Indian national leadership. And it will be paying a price for it in coalition politics. New Delhi will be factoring these aspects while considering Tamil Nadu’s political pressures.   

If political compulsions and pressures from Chennai are insurmountable then New Delhi might downgrade the level of participation to Minister of External Affairs.

On the other hand, India at the strategic level would like to leverage its attendance to get what it wants from Sri Lanka. In the present context it might be limited only to ensure the Northern Province elections go through without amending 13A. Already Sri Lanka has indicated that it would be the game plan. It would be logical to deduce this did not come from a change of heart in Sri Lanka but as a sop to India. While it might satisfy North Block in New Delhi it is unlikely to be accepted in Tamil Nadu. So presumably India could apply more pressure on Mahinda – form and content of this remains in the realms of speculation – in the coming weeks.

Personally, I feel India should participate in CHOGM – at whatever level it wants – so that Rajapaksa’s double speak is laid bared to all the leaders on the sidelines of the conference or interspersed amidst generalities that pass for CHOGM declaration. Perhaps David Cameron is already working on such a thing and India can ginger it up a bit to send a strong medicine to Rajapaksa.

Boycott is a one shot affair suited to Canadian vote banks but not India as it has umbilical relations with Sri Lanka. India has to take the narrative further, not chop it.

Q3. Rajapakse has cultivated China assiduously and there is even a defence agreement for the supply of arms and training.   How do you view China's role in this context?

Yes Chinese are in a big way, digging their heels in Sri Lanka in many sectors. This is what they are doing in Nepal, where they are funding Chinese language teaching. And Bangladesh is in line for it. Pakistan is a strong strategic ally just as Myanmar is. The entire Indian neighbourhood is coming under high profile Chinese presence in infrastructure, telecom, tourism, power generation, and consumer goods sectors.

But it should not be forgotten that in India also Chinese influence in the same business sectors, barring Chinese tourism, is going up. Already Indian companies are availing RMB loans. India-China trade is poised to hit $ 100 billion in 2015. Would Chinese want to endanger this by stepping on India’s corns with a confrontational profile in Sri Lanka? I don’t think so. They will be more nuanced and subtle.

This does not minimise the strategic risk India will be facing with incremental Chinese influence. It does not matter whether it is defence training or arms supply. India surpasses all countries put together in training Sri Lankan troops. India does not supply arms to Sri Lanka in any case. China cannot match India except in select areas. And there is a military culture that has to have compatibility which India and Sri Lanka enjoy much more than China could aspire. But they could use Sri Lanka as a springboard for snooping on Indian communication, manage intelligence network, embed agents and practise all the arts and crafts of intelligence because India and Sri Lanka are so close.  India has no option but to counter them using their own assets in Sri Lanka.

But the real danger is in China influencing Sri Lankan policy decisions that could adversely affect India in trade, transit, furthering India-Sri Lanka economic links. Already there are some indications that some attempts are being made. With Sri Lanka so close by land and sea in times of war which I do not visualise, China’s ever-growing profile would be a real threat. The merchant marine assets could be used for R and R and supply; telecom satellites could eavesdrop on India. India should factor it in its big picture of regional strategy and in shaping its China policy and Sri Lanka policy because this is what Big Game is all about. 

This will be more so when Chinese naval profile increases its potential as a threat in Indian Ocean in next ten years. I am sure someone is already doing it or planning to do it [in their reckoning] in North and South Blocks, political leaders willing. 

(Col R Hariharan, a retired Military Intelligence specialist on South Asia, served with the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka as Head of Intelligence. He is associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies and the South Asia Analysis Group. E-Mail: colhari@yahoo.com   Blog: www.colhariharan.org)  

Courtesy: South Asia Analysis Group Note No 687 dated 28 June 2013

http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/node/1304

Selling Yunnan to South Asia

A report on the China-South Asian Countries Think Tank Forum meet held in Kunming – June 6 and 7, 2013

Col R Hariharan

China’s keen desire to broaden its relationship with South Asian countries, with special focus on building linkages with Yunnan Province, was manifest at the first-ever China-South Asian Countries Think Tank Forum (CSA Forum) hosted jointly by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and the Yunnan Provincial Government at Kunming, capital of Yunnan Province on June 6 and 7, 2013.

Institute for Chinese Studies, New Delhi and Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad were South Asian co-hosts of the conference.

Three premier Chinese think tanks - the National Institute of Asia Pacific and Global Strategy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Yunnan Academy of Social Sciences - and the Yunnan Provincial Foreign Culture Exchange Association provided support in conducting the Forum meet.

About 40 resource representatives from South Asian countries (including Afghanistan) and Myanmar and about 80 representatives of Chinese think tanks from various provinces and academic institutions participated in the two-day deliberations. 

On the evening of June 5, participants of the Forum were invited to attend a huge open air cultural event showcasing a mix of Chinese opera, ethnic and pop dances and music, organised on the eve of the first ever China-South Asia Expo starting on June 6. Significantly, a Bollywood dance with song crooned by a Chinese pop star was uproariously received by the audience.

The next morning, the Forum delegates were  invited to attend the inaugural function of the  China-South Asia Expo (a morphed form of South Asian Countries Trade Fair held in earlier years). At the inaugural function, among the representatives from South Asia, India was a conspicuous absentee.

One of our hosts proudly pointed out the Expo venue was completed in record five months; he added two metro net works under construction in Kunming would be completed by 2015 linking the existing metro.

CSA Forum was inaugurated in the afternoon of June 6 at the International Conference Hall in picturesque lakeside resort of Dianchi Garden Hotel and Spa. Veteran diplomats Mr Eric Gonsalves and Mr Kishan Rana, Major General Dipankar Banerjee (retd), and Mrs Alka Acharya were some of the prominent Indian representatives.

Pakistan was represented by Mr Fazal-ur-Rahman, Director, Strategic Studies Institute Ltd Islamabad (not to be confused with the more reputed Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad) and Mr Khalid Rahman, Director General, Institute of Policy Studies, Islamabad. Major General Sajjadul Haque, Director General, Bangladesh Institute of International & Strategic Studies, Mr Nihal Rodrigo, former foreign secretary of Sri Lanka, and Dr Kelegama, Executive Director, Institute of Policy Studies of Sri Lanka, were some of the other prominent South Asian participants. Nepal had representatives from the international relations cell of United Communist Party (Maoist) and the Nepal Congress.    

After a brief inaugural function addressed by Chinese government and academic dignitaries, the Forum deliberations were carried out in three simultaneous meetings to discuss Regional Economic Cooperation, Regional Connectivity and People to People Contact.

In the evening Shanti Niketan and Vishwa Bharati University made a audio-visual presentation for the delegates on Ravindranath Tagore's universal message of love and peace, interspersed with melodious Ravindra Sangeet. Professor Tan Chung gave a moving introduction to the programme on Tagore and his contribution  for amity and peace.

At the session on Regional Connectivity, senior representatives from India spoke. Mr Gonsalves stressed the need to work on common interests as relationship building was a work in progress. Major General Dipankar Banerjee touched upon problems of visa issue which was affecting connectivity.  Col Hariharan (Retd) made a presentation on strengthening China-India convergences which was well received.  Commodore RS Vasan (Retd) from Center for Asia Studies, speaking at the same session highlighted the power play in the Indian Ocean and identified areas in which India and China can actively cooperate. 

The Chinese representatives made multifaceted and well researched presentations. They focused on positive aspects on which relationship could be built. They stressed the need for China-South Asia networking to minimise the impact of the global economic downturn as well as for sharing technological advancements in China and India.  

There was an open house to draw up a China-South Asia Forum Charter. After a lot of debate, a declaration rather than a memorandum was drawn up to take the Forum forward.  The Chinese hosts wanted the Forum to meet next year to add form and content to the ideas discussed at the forum. Delegates agreed to the suggestion.

Overall, the Forum meet was very well organised with excellent time management and logistics. The credit goes to Professor Ren Jia, chairman of the Yunnan Academy of Social Sciences who was ably assisted by Professor Guo Suiyan. A surfeit of enthusiastic student volunteers from the university, who tried out their English skills with the delegates, went out of their way to help the delegates.The delegates will remember the warm hospitality and courtesy of all the staff looking after them.

The Forum meet coincided the China-South Asia Expo (a morphed form of South Asian Countries Trade Fair held in earlier years) at Kunming from June 6 to 10, 2013. Simultaneously, the 21st China Kunming Import and Export Fair was also held. According to a Xinhua report, business volume transacted at the two five-day fairs “proposed to strengthen cooperation and maintain economic growth amid the lack lustre economic rebound” totalled $17.47 billion, “up 116.5 percent over last year.”

With the Yunnan - Burma road to the Indian Ocean coast and pipeline links poised to be completed this year, clearly the objective of the whole exercise was not only to show case Kunming which has become a modern city but also to market Yunnan as the gateway for business with China for South Asians. It is a timely move that can also take advantage of the BCIM infrastructure link which is taking shape.

Obviously, the Chinese objective in organizing the CSA Forum was to understand the perceptions of South Asian countries to provide for smoother interaction with them and strengthen the growing links with China. 

Courtesy: Chennai Centre for China Studies, C3S Paper No 1167 dated 27 June 2013
http://www.c3sindia.org/india/3635