India-China strategic equation along eastern approaches

Col R Hariharan VSM

[This is the text of a presentation made at an international conference on "India, China and the Silk Road Initiatives: Challenges and Opportunities" organised jointly by the Institute for Contemporary Chinese Studies (ICCS) and the School of International Relations and Politics, Mahatma Gandhi University, Kottayam on 11-12 November 2016.]

“Connectivity itself has emerged as a theatre of present day geopolitics. When diplomats get agitated about lines on the map today, they are more likely to be discussing proposed road connections, rail lines, oil pipelines or maritime routes than contesting national boundaries. Who draws these lines; who agrees with them; what are the financial institutions to convert them into reality; what would be the modes of managing and implementing them once built – all these questions carry geopolitical significance. Naturally, every country tends to look at these questions from the view point of its own best interests. Connecting Asia successfully requires the judiciousness and wisdom to reconcile these differing points of view and agree on something that all stakeholders can live with.” - S Jaishankar, Foreign Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs, speaking at the Raisina Dialogue, New Delhi. 2 March 2016

Part I: China's strategic infrastructure initiatives

In order to realise China’s soaring ambition to be a global power in keeping with its worldwide political and strategic influence, President Xi Jinping embarked upon the transcontinental One Belt One Road economic initiative (OBOR) in 2013.[i] In fact, the OBOR is a revival of China’s ancient Silk Route network of trade routes from China to Europe and it forms part of President Xi’s realisation of the ‘Chinese dream’.[ii]

The OBOR includes six initiatives: China–Russia–Mongolia Economic Corridor, New Eurasia Land Bridge Economic Corridor, China–Central Asia–West Asia Economic Corridor, China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar economic Corridor (BCIM) and China–Indo China Peninsula Economic Corridor. In tandem with the land based connectivity, China is also promoting the 21^st Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR) to improve China’s Indian Ocean connectivity through by creating maritime infrastructure and facilities along the littorals of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). Collectively, all the six OBOR strategic initiatives and the MSR are referred to as the ‘Belt and Road’ initiative. The Belt and Road initiative visualises the construction of multimodal infrastructure links and energy and industrial complexes to promote economic interconnectivity between China and Asia, Europe and IOR.[iii]

There are strategic concerns about the OBOR as its vision statement speaks of ‘promoting orderly and free flow of economic factors, highly efficient allocation of resources, deep integration of markets’ and encouraging economic policy coordination among countries ‘to jointly create a balanced regional economic cooperation architecture and to seek new models of international cooperation and global governance.’ [iv] This reinforces the perception of India, shared by the U.S. and its Western and Asian allies, that the OBOR is part of President Xi Jinping’s strategic plan to create a new world order. This has caused concern about China’s strategic intentions as the OBOR’s six economic corridors would become the vehicles for China’s global dominance.[v]

As China’s global footprint expands with the development of the OBOR, the PLA is being modernised to improve its capability to take care of increasing China’s strategic interests. The PLA has recruited better educated soldiers and officers to manage technology systems to suit the modern informatised battlefields.[vi]  The U.S. Department of Defense 2016 Annual Report to the Congress has noted that China’s military modernization program has become ‘more focused on investments and infrastructure to support a range of missions beyond China’s periphery, including power projection, sea lane security, counter-piracy, peacekeeping, and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR).’ [vii] The Report further states that efforts were on to improve PLA’s key capabilities including cruise missiles; short, medium, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles; high performance aircraft; integrated air defense networks; information operations capabilities; and amphibious and airborne assault units.

China is also improving its maritime reach and capability through the MSR initiative.  It has constructed a chain of modern port complexes in Kyaukpyu (in Myanmar), Hambantota (Sri Lanka) and Gwadar (Pakistan) in the Indian Ocean. PLA navy’s warships including nuclear submarines are now familiar with the IOR as they have been regularly patrolling the Indian Ocean waters for some years as part of anti-piracy duties.   

China’s maritime ambition is extending well beyond Asia as evident from plans to establish a naval base in Djibouti in the Horn of Africa, announced in November 2012.[viii] Similarly, China has also been negotiating with Portugal for taking over a US air base in the Azores archipelago in Portugal,  a year after the US decided to vacate it.[ix] As US Republican chairman of the House Permanent Committee on Intelligence Devin Nunes commenting on China spreading its infrastructure investments around the globe said, ‘It is now using the same tactics to establish a foothold in the Azores which, if successful, will be used for a logistics and intelligence hub that could ultimately be expanded for other military purposes, adjacent to critical US military facilities.’ [x] These facilities would be able to sustain the PLA operations far from home shores. Thus OBOR network has the potential to be a game changer in tilting global strategic equations in China’s favour in the coming decade.

Part II: Strategic implications of the OBOR initiatives  in South Asia

South Asia occupies an important place in China’s global power projection for both strategic and economic reasons because five South Asian countries – Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Nepal and Bhutan – border China’s restive Xinjiang and Tibet autonomous regions. South Asia also dominates the Indian Ocean through which China’s maritime traffic passes.  This makes the CPEC, the BCIM and the MSR initiatives, forming part of the OBOR in South Asia, vital to the success of the OBOR as a whole. The South Asian region also provides China’s landlocked western regions direct access to the warm water ports of Indian Ocean. South Asia, with its growing middle class population and under developed infrastructure and manufacturing sectors, offers excellent prospects for Chinese investment and trade. The  World Bank in an April 2016 report has rated South Asia as “the fastest growing region in the world, with economic growth expected to gradually accelerate from 7.1 percent in 2016 to 7.3 percent in 2017” showing resilience in the face of turbulent international markets.[xi]   India with of a population of 1.27 billion (of the total regional population of 1.7 billion) wields enormous strategic, economic, cultural and religious influence in South Asia. More than all this, China probably sees India as a challenger to its ‘vision to write the next era of globalization and help its export and investment engines run for years to come.’[xii] The CPEC, BCIM and the MSR initiatives with their networks in South Asian countries would help China in strategically and commercially handle India’s overwhelming presence in the region. 

Like most of the countries in Central and West Asia, which are starved of investments, South Asian countries also see the OBOR projects as an attractive proposition to facilitate the flow of Chinese investments. They expect Chinese investments to speed up development projects in backward regions and improve employment opportunities, while better international connectivity would increase their international trade prospects. Pakistan as a participant and Afghanistan as a beneficiary have already joined of the CPEC. Nepal has also indicated its willingness to join the OBOR as the Chinese have undertaken projects to improve Nepal’s road connectivity with Tibet.   China wants India to join the OBOR, because as the biggest regional power and a rising global economic power India’s participation would improve China’s credibility in the region. It would also contribute to the economic viability of not only the CPEC and BCIM but the OBOR as a whole.  More than all this, it would help China build multifaceted relations with India and reduce the chances of India “ganging up” with the U.S. and Japan against China. 

 India had been rather lukewarm to the idea of participating in the OBOR initiative. India sees the OBOR as having serious implications for its national security, which had been hostage to China’s territorial claims along India’s northern borders since 1960s. China does not recognise the validity of the Mc Mahon line as the international boundary between India and China (Tibet region). China has continued to illegally occupy of the Indian territory of Aksai Chin in Ladakh region.  China also claims other pockets of Indian territory along the Himalayan border as also the whole of Arunachal Pradesh as Southern Tibet.  In spite of this, from 1996 onwards both the countries have made efforts to rebuild their relations fractured after 1962 war. Although the two countries had held 19 rounds of talks to resolve the border dispute, only limited progress has been made. So far, only agreements on border management to avoid accidental escalation of conflict and maintenance of status quo in respect of areas of existing settlements in the disputed areas have been arrived at.[xiii]

Another factor clouding India’s relations is China’s suspicion about the continued hospitality extended to the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan spiritual leader and about 100,000 Tibetan refugees, living in exile in India for nearly six decades. China has branded the Nobel Laureate for Peace as a ‘dangerous separatist’ because he remains the visible icon of the Tibetan struggle for autonomy to preserve their distinct identity, culture and language. China’s contempt for the Dalai Lama is evident from the intemperate ‘warnings’ it issues to India, whenever the Tibetan leader meets an Indian official or minister or participates even in a religious conclave. Recently, China has issued yet another ‘warning’ to India for clearing the Dalai Lama’s his visit to Arunanchal Pradesh to participate in a religious function at the Tawang monastery. [xiv]

In spite these disputes, India-China relations qualitatively improved after Prime Minister Narendra Modi came to power in 2014. India launched proactive measures to build cordial and mutually beneficial relations with China and other neighbours. Since he came to power, Prime Minister Modi has had four bilateral meetings with President Xi Jinping focusing on building win-win relations between the two countries. President Xi has reciprocated the Indian Prime Minister’s efforts. Prime Minister Modi’s use of the catch phrase “Inch towards Miles” (abbreviation of the sentence ‘India and China towards a millennium of exceptional energy’) expresses his optimism about the emerging India-China relations.[xv]  Both the countries have taken a number of initiatives to foster trade, investment, strategic cooperation on global issues and on building people to people relations between the two countries. China is increasingly investing in and executing a number of projects in India’s industrial, infrastructure and manufacturing sectors.

President Xi and Prime Minister Modi seem to enjoy great personal rapport after their meetings and interactions. Despite this, India-China relations have entered a period of uncertainty. This is mainly due to China’s efforts to deepen its multifaceted strategic cooperation with India’s bête noire Pakistan, even as it talked of building win-win relations with India. The bitter relations between India and Pakistan dates back to1948, when Pakistan invaded and forcibly occupied part of the Muslim-majority state of Jammu and Kashmir, which had opted to join India. Not reconciled to the merger of Pakistan had waged three wars against India in which the Kashmir issue was the centre piece. After losing all the three wars, Pakistan embarked upon using Islamist terror groups based in Pakistan occupied Kashmir (POK) to create public unrest in the state, while Pakistan based terrorists carried out attacks on Indian security forces. India’s parleys to normalise relations with Pakistan have been frustrated by Pakistan’s failure to rein in state-sponsored Jihadi terrorists based in Pakistan operating against India. Despite assurances from Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to take action, they continue to infiltrate into the Jammu and Kashmir state to carry out attacks and trigger unrest.

India has also objected to the CPEC project as its passes through POK violating India’s sovereignty. India is concerned about the $46 billion project as it would not only to help the development of Pakistan, but build also enable China to increase its presence to build very close strategic, economic, political and military relations. This would mutually enhance their political and military capabilities which could be to the detriment of India.  China plans to station 100,000 marine troops to protect its overseas assets in Djibouti base and Gwadar port.[xvi] Thus CPEC would legitimise China’s military presence in Pakistan in areas close to India’s western borders with Pakistan. These moves have raised serious questions in India about China’s strategic intentions, as its close strategic bonds with Pakistan could affect India’s delicately balanced relations with both the countries. This could also make it difficult for India to prevent external considerations influencing the resolution of bilateral problems with both China and Pakistan.  

In bid to safeguard India’s interests in this worsening strategic scene, Prime Minister Modi has strengthened India’s strategic partnerships with the U.S., Japan and Vietnam. The strategic partnership is expected to protect India’s traditional areas of influence in South and Southeast Asia as well as the IOR which have been eroded by China. The Indian navy conducting the 2016 Malabar trilateral joint naval exercises with the U.S and Japan, off Japanese coast in the vicinity of SCS, have added to China’s suspicions. China had not taken kindly to India taking a public stand in support of the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea (SCS) akin to the U.S, in the face of China’s claim to sovereignty over the whole of the SCS.

Opaque process adopted for the OBOR

India has also expressed concerns about the opaque process adopted for the OBOR project. China-centric trade and investment strategies in projects executed in Myanmar and Sri Lanka had been found to lack transparency and promote environmental degradation and corrupt practices. This had caused huge political backlash in both the countries. China’s singular focus on its own interests at the cost of the host nation’s interests had caused public outcry against Chinese aided projects.[xvii]

India’s foreign secretary S. Jaishankar while addressing the Raisina Dialogue, in New Delhi in May 2014, made a pointed reference to these concerns. Though he did not specifically mention the OBOR or its South Asian projects, he said India viewed it differently from the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), also a Chinese initiative. He emphasised that India had detailed consultations with China before it took a decision to join the AIIB. However, the OBOR was presented as a ‘more unilateral decision.’ He said the key issue was ‘whether we will build our connectivity through consultative processes or more unilateral decisions’ and India preferred the former.[xviii] In view of India’s reservations, China is said to be trying to get Russia to calm India and save the CPEC.[xix] 

India and the BCIM

The BCIM project on completion will be connect India and China - the two Asian economic giants – through India’s strategically most vulnerable eastern region bordering four countries -Bangladesh, Bhutan, China and Myanmar. The BCIM initiative aims at harnessing the comparative advantage of each country for the mutual benefit of all members through crucial infrastructure connectivity and economic co-operation. With the intra – BCIM trade galloping from $6 billion in 2001 to $90 billion in 2011 and expected to touch $130 billion, building seamless connectivity between the members would help in rapid economic growth and human development of the backward regions. This would benefit approximately 1.1 billion young people under the age of 25 living in the BCIM region (estimated at Bangladesh 51.1 percent, China 31.8 percent, India 46.6 percent and Myanmar 44.7 percent) and upgrade the quality of life for the people as a whole.[xx]  

The 2800–km long economic corridor starts from Kolkata (West Bengal, India) and connects Kunming (Yunnan province, China). From Kolkata, it runs through the Bangladesh cities of Jessore, Dhaka and Sylhet to cross into India near Silchar (Assam). From there it goes through Imphal and Moreh in Manipur state to join the Tamu - Kalewa friendship road in Myanmar and onward to Mandalay and Lashio. It enters China at Muse to reach Kunming via Riuli and Dali. A stretch of less than 200–km of the road in Myanmar from Kalewa to Monywa is required to be upgraded to all weather road. [xxi] Similarly, another 50 km stretch between Jiribam and Imphal in Manipur state is also in poor condition.

The concept of BCIM interconnectivity is not new. It was thrashed out in detail by scholars, business leaders and economists from the four countries for nearly three decades through track-2 initiative, with little progress. However, it got official recognition when the four nations started looking at connectivity strategies in the late 1990s to take advantage of the global economic liberalisation. Though the BCIM Forum for Regional Cooperation was formed in 1999 and government officials, scholars, business leaders and technical experts from the four countries periodically met and discussed BCIM related issues, progress on the ground was not much.[xxii]

Even before the OBOR was conceived, China had taken up infrastructure construction, industrial and technology development projects in the three landlocked Southwestern provinces including Yunnan province as part of the Western Development Strategy adopted in 1998. Yunnan province which borders Mynanmar, Laos and Vietnam became the focal point of BCIM project when China started promoting the BCIM in 2012.[xxiii]    Chinese visualises the BCIM to provide not only seamless road infrastructure but also provide railway, water, air and digital connectivity for free movement of goods, services and people across the whole region. They expect it to lower barriers to provide for free flow of investments and resources to develop modern cities, create industrial complexes and increase employment opportunities.

Even before the BCIM was conceived, India adopted the Look East Policy in 1992 to improve infrastructure links with Southeast Asian nations, particularly the ASEAN. The Policy aimed at opening up the landlocked Northeast states for development and external trade. India hopes to reduce social unrest in the backward region that had led to decades of separatist and ethnic insurgencies, despite having rich natural resources, tea, fossil fuel and timber. India also hopes that improved communication links with Southeast Asia would fast track the quality of life of the people in this region. As a part of the policy, India had embarked upon two infrastructure projects in partnership with Myanmar to improve the country’s external connectivity through the Northeast. These are the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway (Project) and the Kaladan Multi Modal Transit Transport Project (KMMTTP). The KMMTTP would connect Haldia port on India’s eastern seaboard with Sittwe port in Myanmar where a carrier terminal is being built. From there through the Kaladan River the road reaches Mizoram state (India) reducing the transit time. These projects have progressed well; on completion they are expected to mutually add value to BCIM connectivity.[xxiv]

In addition to these initiatives, the Chinese have also reopened the Stillwell Road of World War II vintage in 2016 from Kunming to Assam. The road was in disuse for long. It runs from Kunming to Assam through Northern Myanmar via Myitkyina to cross the Indian border at Pangsau Pass (Arunachal Pradesh) to reach Ledo in Assam. In a first, two Chinese trucks carrying exhibits for the Assam International Agri Horticultural Show 2016 reached Guwahati in Assam from Baoshan in Yunnan to mark the opening of the Stillwell Road. The Stillwell road enters India through the Pangsau Pass in Arunachal Pradesh. As Aruanchal Pradesh is claimed by the Chinese, the use of the Stillwell road would be susceptible to the vagaries of India–China relations. Moreover, the poor condition of the road is also likely to restrict its use.[xxv] 

Bangladesh officially started taking interest in the BCIM project with the adoption of the Look East Policy in 2001 to improve links with Southeast Asia and China. As the BCIM is in consonant with this policy, Bangladesh hopes the BCIM would help it to gain greater market access to both India and China, the two most powerful Asian economies. It also expects the project to eliminate non-tariff barriers and bring in more investment for infrastructural development.

After Myanmar’s ruling military junta ended its isolationist policy in the 1990s, it started developing better infrastructure links with China and India with their assistance. After democracy was restored, Myanmar readily joined the BCIM project. Myanmar’s state counsellor Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi reiterated Myanmar’s support to Belt and Road initiative and the BCIM when she visited Beijing and met with President Xi Jinping in August 2016.[xxvi]   

Extremist and insurgency threats

Extremism and insurgency is a major problem in Bangladesh, Manipur (India) and Myanmar particularly in the region through which the BCIM corridor runs. The region is a melting pot of diverse ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic identities, which had made it difficult to eliminate the spread of extremism and insurgency.

Manipur state’s accession to India in 1949 is a highly emotive issue for the majority Meiteis, who had been ruling the state before accession. This continues to influence Meiteis social and political perceptions. The Meiteis, who form 53 percent of the state’s 2.86 million population, have a delicately balanced socio-political relationship with the minority indigenous tribal groups who form 20 percent of the population. They have their own distinct ethnic identity, languages and dialects.  This has resulted in complex political and ethnic problems that hamper governance and development activities in the state since it acceded to India on 21 September 1949.

The Meitei insurgency relates to the demand for independence from sections of ultra nationalist Meitei population from 1992 onwards. Most of the insurgent groups are in suspended animation, though some of the splinter groups still carry out criminal activities. Sections of Kukis fearing the domination of Meiteis and Nagas, organised themselves into armed groups to demand the creation of Kukiland, a separate state for Kukis to protect their identity and culture. However, Kuki extremist groups are also observing ceasefire after the government assured it would resolve their grievances.

The Government of India signed in August 2015 the Naga Peace Accord with the most influential Naga insurgent group – the Issac Swu-Muivah faction of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN-IM) to end the insurgency.[xxvii] However, their insistence on the creation of ‘Nagalim,’ a greater Nagaland state made up of Naga inhabited areas of Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur and Nagaland and some parts of Myanmar, has become a stumbling block to permanent peace. The demand for ‘Nagalim’ enjoys widespread support among Naga tribal groups in Manipur, particularly among the Tangkhuls who are an influential Naga group. Unless all sides are prepared to make some compromises to evolve a permanent solution, the Nagalim issue could remain a potential rallying point for the resurgence of Naga extremism.

Another troubling aspect in Manipur is the sporadic raids carried out by the Myanmar based Kaplang faction of the NSCN trans-border raids against Indian security forces in Manipur. [xxviii] Though both India and Myanmar have carried out joint operations a number of times against trans-border insurgents, they still remain a security threat.

Since independence, Bangladesh had been facing both Islamist extremist groups affiliated to the Al Qaeda and Left Wing extremists (LWE). In sustained operations against LWE between 2005 and 2016, security forces had killed as many as 665 extremists.[xxix] This has practically eliminated the LWE threat. A number of Islamic terrorist groups sympathetic to the Al Qaeda came up after the U.S. launched its war on terror in the wake of 9/11 Al Qaeda attacks in the U.S  These include the Harkat-ul Jihad al Islami Bangladesh (HUJI-B), the Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB) and the Jamatul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB). They were very active till 2006, when the military-led caretaker government came to power curbed their freedom of action.

After  Mrs Sheikh Hasina-led Awami League came to power in 2009 with a mandate to eliminate Islamic extremism and cut its links with ultra right wing Islamist political parties, large number of militants have been arrested and arms cache have been recovered.  In spite of this, small groups of Islamist extremists continue to target liberal elements, which raise their voice against Jihadi terrorism.  On 1 July 2016, a group of five armed terrorists raided a well known cafe in Dhaka and held a dozen customers including foreigners as hostages.  In the police action that followed, in all 29 people including 20 hostages (including 18 foreigners), five terrorists and two police officers were killed.

Though, Bangladesh police have discounted the claim of the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL), the international jihadi terrorist group for carrying out the attack, the possibility is very much there, as local terrorist elements probably inspired by the ISIL propaganda are believed to have carried out the attacks.[xxx] Security forces have killed 74 JMB extremists so far in 2017, in operations carried out against them. To escape the security crackdown, many JMB cadres are said to have infiltrated into West Bengal, Assam and Tripura states. The Bangladesh government has warned the government of India about their infiltration in the three states.  Thus Islamic extremism in Bangladesh continues to be a potential threat to destabilise the smooth operation of the BCIM.

Myanmar has been facing ethnic insurgency since 1948. Ethnic minorities make up about 30 percent of the population. They are mainly concentrated in the Shan, Kayah, Karen, Mon, Chin, Kachin and Rakhine states. They took to insurgency demanding independence after they found promises made to treat them equitably at the time of independence were not kept by successive governments in Myanmar.  The threat of ethnic insurgency had been one of the reasons for the army to rule the country either directly or indirectly since 1961. Though the army had managed to work out a ceasefire agreement with about 14 of the 16 insurgent groups, it floundered when major ethnic groups of Kachins, Kokang, and Shans refused to merge their armed cadres with the army till a durable settlement for a federal union was worked out. However, from 2013 the Myanmar government had held nine rounds of peace talks and reached a national ceasefire agreement. Eight insurgent groups had signed the agreement by November 2016.

Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, senior counsellor of the National League for Democracy government, convened the 21^st Century Panglong Conference on 31 August 2016, kindling hopes of achieving complete peace in the country by 2019-20. The nine ethnic armed groups which form the United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC) attended the conference to push their demand for a federal union.[xxxi]

However, armed conflicts which broke out in northern part of the country in November 2016 have stalled the peace making process. The Kachin Independence Army (KIA), Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA - formed of tribes of Chinese ethnicity) and the Arakan Army (AA) launched coordinated attacks on military outposts, police stations and a trade centre in Muse and Kutkai township in northern Shan State. It is through this region the BCIM corridor enters China. The 105-mile trade zone southeast of Muse in Kutkai township area has come under a standstill due to the clashes. The situation along the Yunnan border has worsened with as many as 20,000 Kokang tribals, who are of Chinese ethnicity living on the Myanmar side of the border, seeking refuge with their kinsmen living on the Chinese side of the border. China has repeatedly expressed its concern about the situation in the Kokang region to Myanmar.

Myanmar’s fledgling democracy has been facing a major challenge after anti-Muslim violence broke out in Central Myanmar town of Meiktila in March 2013. Egged on by fringe elements among Buddhist clergy, it is now focused mainly on Rohingiya Muslim minority living in Rakhine sate as Myanmar has not granted them citizenship though they had been living in the country for generations. Rohinigiyas had to been trying to flee the country after army crackdown which destroyed their villages. It has snowballed into a major international human rights issue after the army was accused of wanton destruction of property, rape and murder of Rohingiyas.

Myanmar government has set up an advisory commission on Rakhine state headed by former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan to find lasting solutions to the conflict in the state.[xxxii] The Commission is scheduled to submit its report this year. In the meanwhile, Myanmar army had been involved in operations against suspected Rohingiya militants, said to be affiliated to the ISIL, who attacked an army camp in the region. The whole situation is nebulous and uncertain along the Bangladesh border with potential to adversely affect Myanmar’s relations with Bangladesh which is already hosting thousands of Rohingiya refugees.  The enormity of the problems facing the BCIM corridor through this troubled region has the potential to frequently dislocate its smooth and uninterrupted operations unless security forces are earmarked for ensuring secure movement.

CONCLUSION

Despite serious reservations over China’s strategic intentions in promoting the Belt and Road initiative (OBOR), as it is linked to the giant CPEC infrastructure initiative in Pakistan, India has agreed to join the BCIM corridor initiative which also forms part of the OBOR. The BCIM traversing from Kolkata through Bangladesh and Manipur state in India and Myanmar will end in Kunming in Yunnan, China. It is expected to open up the backward region by initiating development activities to improve employment and trading opportunities.

The BCIM region is a complex one composed of people of diverse ethnicity who belong to different religions. They speak many languages and tribal dialects. Their interaction is conditioned by their historical experiences including conflicts.  The difficult terrain and poor communication in the region has discouraged close interaction. Lack of development and desire to preserve the distinct identity of various ethnic groups had given rise to a number of separatist and ideological insurgencies, notably in India and Myanmar with their fall out in Bangladesh bordering both India and Myanmar.  Though both the countries have initiated a dialogue process to end separatist insurgencies, normal life has not been fully restored yet. Bangladesh, which had been troubled by Islamic radicalism in politics, had been trying to eradicate Islamic extremists who had become active in the country since 1992. Though the security forces have succeeded the threat is far from over. International jihadi terrorist organisations like the ISIL have been interested in using local extremist elements to their advantage to carry out terrorist strikes. So the potential threat from resurgent Islamic extremism is very much there.  

In addition to the threat of insurgency and Islamic extremism, the region had been facing other unconventional threats from trans-border movement of extremists, unrest due to illegal immigrants, trafficking in drugs, arms and people and operation of criminal gangs across the borders.

These have the potential to hinder the smooth operation of the BCIM. The mismatch in political perceptions and bilateral problems among the four countries serviced by the BCIM could also delay resolution of problems arising in the day to day operation of the BCIM. In order to address these issues, a regulatory framework to handle issues of governance i.e., transparency, accountability, sovereignty, security and monitoring environmental impact will be required.  

This is going to be a major challenge for all the member countries, particularly in Myanmar. Dr. Rej Jia, President of the Yunnan Academy of Social Sciences, had suggested institutionalising a four-nation security partnership as part of the recommendations of the JSG. She said the BCIM countries could draw lessons from the six-nation Greater Mekong Sub-region Economic Cooperation Programme to enforce security along the route for transportation, trade and trade. While addressing the problems relating to physical connectivity might be easier, establishing an appropriate legal and regulatory framework could prove harder, she added.[xxxiii] Dr Ria’s suggestion is worthy of consideration for evolving a fool proof mechanism to ensure greater transparency, security and accountability is in place for the BCIM project.  

NOTES AND REFERENCES

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[i] ‘Full Text: Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Belt and Road.’ 2015. Xinhua CRI English News. March 29.  http://english.cri.cn/12394/2015/03/29/2941s872030.htm (accessed 12 January 2017).

[ii]  President Xi fully explained the ‘Chinese dream’ for the first time in 2012 as ‘every person has ideals they pursue, their own dreams. Right now, everyone is discussing the Chinese dream. I think that the realisation of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese people is the modern era the great dream of the Chinese people.’ See Bandurski, David. 2016. ‘Meeting Mr. “Hot Phrase.”China Media Project. February 6. http://cmp.hku.hk/2015/02/06/thus-spoke-uncle-xi/ (accessed 4 October 2016.)

[iii] ‘Full Text: Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Belt and Road.’ 2015. Xinhua CRI English News.March 29.  http://english.cri.cn/12394/2015/03/29/2941s872030.htm (accessed 12 January 2017.)

[iv] Full text. Ibid

[v] Stutter, Robert. 2014. ‘China’s Grand Strategy in Asia’. Testimony delivered to the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Washington DC. March 14.  http://unsc.gov/sites/default/files/SUTTER_Testimony.pdf  (accessed 5 October 2016.)

[vi] ‘China well on track to building modern and strong army.’ 2016. Peoples’ Daily Online.

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-03/02/c_135148008.htm  (accessed 7 October 2016.)

[vii] ‘The Department of Defense USA Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoples Republic of China 2016’. http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2016%20China%20Military%20Power%20Report.pdf  (accessed 12 January 2017.)

[viii] ‘How China’s Base in Djibouti Reveals an ‘expanding sphere of influence’. 2016. Sputnik News. August 24. https://sputniknews.com/africa/201608241044589413-china-base-djibouti-influence/  (accessed 12 January 2017.)

[ix] ‘China poised to takeover US air base, invest in Portugal’s Azores base.’ 2016. Sputnik News, October 14. https://sputniknews.com/europe/201610141046328782-china-azores-base/  (accessed 5 December.)

[x] ‘Portugal open to China investment in Azores, as US power wanes’. 2016. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-10-12/portugal-open-to-china-investment-in-azores-as-u-s-sway-wanes  (accessed 12 January 2017.)

[xi] ‘South Asia Remains World’s Fatest Growing Region, but Should Be Vigilant to Fading Tailwinds’. 2016.  http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2016/04/09/south-asia-fastest-growing-region-world-vigilant-fading-tailwinds (accessed 12 January 2017.)

[xii] Mourdoukoutas, Panosmourdos. 2017. ‘China wants Russia to calm India and save CPEC’. January 8. https://www.forbes.com/sites/panosmourdoukoutas/2017/01/08/china-wants-russia-to-calm-india-and-save-cpec/#2cf0d8335e08  (accessed 15 January 2017.)

[xiii] ‘India and China hold new round of talks to resolve border dispute.’ 2016. PTI. April 20. http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/india-china-hold-new-round-of-talks-to-resolve-border-dispute/ (accessed 5 January 2017.)

[xiv] Chakraborty, Abhishek. 2016. ‘Letting Dalai Lama visit Arunachal will damage relations, China warns’ October 18. www.ndtv.com (accessed 4 January 2017.) 

[xv] Godbole, Avinash. 2014. ‘Chinese President Xi Jinping’s Visit to India’. CLAWS Journal, Winter 2014 issue.  http://www.claws.in/images/journals_doc/1358290672_AvinashGodbole.pdf  (accessed 8 August 2015.)

[xvi] PTI. 2017. ‘China to deploy 1 lakh marines at ports in Gwadar and Djibouti’  Economic Times. 15 March. http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/china-to-deploy-1-lakh-marines-at-ports-in-gwadar-and-djibouti/articleshow/57644955.cms (accessed 16 March 2017.)

[xvii] Smith, M. Jeff. 2016. ‘China and Sri Lanka between a dream and a nightmare’. http://thediplomat.com/2016/11/china-and-sri-lanka-between-a-dream-and-a-nightmare/  (accessed 5 December 2016.)

[xviii] Bhoothalingam, Ravi. 2016. ‘One belt one road to join or not join?’ May 14. https://thewire.in/42582/one-belt-one-road-to-join-or-not-to-join/  (accessed  6 June 2016.)

[xix] Mourdoukoutas, Panosmourdos. 2017. ‘China wants Russia to calm India and save CPEC’. January 8. https://www.forbes.com/sites/panosmourdoukoutas/2017/01/08/china-wants-russia-to-calm-india-and-save-cpec/#2cf0d8335e08  (accessed 15 January 2017.)

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[xxi] ‘China, India fast track BCIM economic corridor project.’ 2015. The Hindu. June 26.

http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/china-india-fasttrack-bcim-economic-corridor-project/article7355496.ece

[xxii] Bhattacharjee, Rupak. 2016. ‘The emerging Bangladesh China India Myanmar Economic Corridor and its opportunities.’ February 11. http://www.eastern-today.com/entries/editorial/the-emerging-bangladesh-china-india-myanmar-economic-corridor-and-its-opportunities  (accessed 12 September 2016.)

[xxiii] Singh, Naina. 2016. ‘Yunnan: China’s Bridge to South and Southeast Asia’. August 26. http://thediplomat.com/2016/08/yunnan-chinas-bridge-to-south-and-southeast-asia/  (accessed 12 December 2016.)

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[xxv] Arpi, Claude. 2016. ‘Reopening of Stilwell Road is historic for India China ties’. January 11. http://www.dailyo.in/politics/northeast-stilwell-road-ledo-xi-jinping-bcim-kiren-rijiju-tibet-himalayas-kailash-mansarovar/story/1/8386.html

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[xxxii]  ‘Kofi Annan to probe reports of Rohingiya Muslims abuse in Myanmar’ http://www.news18.com/news/world/kofi-annan-to-probe-reports-of-rohingya-muslims-abuse-in-mynamar-1317370.html  (accessed 16 December 2016.

[xxxiii] Aneja, Atul. 2015. ‘Non-traditional threats stalk Kolkata Kunming corridor.’ June 28. http://thehindu.com/news/national/experts-to-address-the-non-traditional-security-threats-to-the-BCIM-project/article7364290.ece

Onward, women soldiers!

[Recently Army Chief General Bipin Rawat has made a statement that women would be recruited as soldiers and allowed to serve in front line arms like infantry. Women are playing a bigger role in armed forces now than before. However, I am reproducing here an article on the subject I wrote in December 2009 for its topical interest.]

The armed forces have a golden opportunity to set an example for the rest of the nation in having empowered women join them to serve the country

BY COL R HARIHARAN

Courtesy: GFiles December 2009

http://gfilesindia.com/title.aspx?title_id=52

DURING the past three decades, the traditional male orientation of the armed forces all over the world is undergoing a sex change. As more and more women don the uniform, there are visible cracks in the macho citadels of armed forces. Now they are trying to come to grips with the issue arising from this.

Historically, women have proved they are as good as men in combat. During World War II, 800,000 women served in the Soviet armed forces; nearly 70 per cent of them fought in the frontlines. But armed forces are a little reluctant to recognize this. They have been propagating “masculine values” for centuries, cultivating aggressive male persona as the essence of soldiering. So MCP attitudes are ingrained in many of their traditions. The semantic signature of the male superior attitude is visible in common military parlance. Epithets like “walking like pregnant ducks” and “bunch of school girls” continue to echo in the corridors of their hallowed chambers.

The Indian armed forces are also in the throes of this phenomenon. Recently, the Vice-Chief of the Indian Air Force, Air Marshal PK Barbora, touched off a minor controversy when he said there were financial, operational and cultural constraints in having women fighter pilots. On the other hand, for the first time in India’s naval history, two women officers are being inducted in combatant jobs in the Naval Maritime Squadron. They will be working as observers (air borne tacticians) to manage weapons, sensors, radars and navigation on board maritime patrol aircraft.

Air Marshal Barbora was only restating the armed forces’ reservations on employing women in frontline combat roles. However, the way he put it was provocative: “if a woman gets pregnant, it will not be fruitful for either the force or her…” as training a fighter pilot costs the government Rs 11.66 crore. After spending so much, “not being able to utilize women operationally would not be a prudent thing,” he added.

Women have been serving in the Indian armed forces since World War II. But their intake as officers was only in medical, dental and nursing corps. It was in 1992 that the Indian Army opened the doors of other services for women officers and the Navy and Air Force followed suit. Since then, hairline cracks in the male bastion have widened as more and more women join the forces.

Starting with an initial intake of 50 women officers in 1992, the Army now has 1100 (3.1 per cent) of them in a total strength of 35,377 officers. This is the least among all the three services because the officer-soldier ratio in the Army is less than in the naval and air forces. The Navy has the largest presence with 750 (nearly 7 per cent) women out of a total of 10,760 officers. In the Air Force, out of a total of 7,394 officers, 300 (4.1 per cent) are women. 

At present, the Army has the capacity to train 350 women cadets annually in the non-technical stream. Of course their intake in the technical stream is based upon the requirements. Women cadets undergo the same 49 weeks of training as men. 

However, gender parity is a little slow in coming. Women are still not treated as equals in terms of engagement, service, and employment. Unlike men, only unmarried women can apply for commission in the Army. Women are eligible for the Short Service Commission (SSC) while their male counterparts can apply for permanent commission after five years of service. This limits the women officers’ career to 14 years of service. They have to retire at the peak of their competency, after serving as Lt Col for just one year. 

Similarly, while all arms and services are open to men, at present women are commissioned only in services and in selected arms like air defence, signals, engineering and intelligence. Even then they are not allowed in close combat duties. But this has more to do with the nation’s cultural conditioning and harsh operational conditions in which the Army operates.

The problems regarding employment of women in the armed forces go well beyond the “military mindset”. They have their roots in the social and cultural environment of the country and systemic constraints of operations designed for male combatants. Assertion of gender parity is the order of the day the world over. The pill has made pregnancy optional for women. Growing consumerism is expanding the traditional role of women in the family and more women are compelled to work alongside men. The institution of marriage is no more the end-all for women and single mothers are more readily accepted in society than ever before. 

The Western world has come to terms with these changes more and women’s empowerment is accepted in society. And the increased presence of women in the armed forces is only a part of it. But the process is neither smooth nor complete as women are facing major problems in integrating themselves in the armed forces.

However, these changes are yet to take place fully in our country. Despite cosmetic changes in urban India, the social and cultural environment is still loaded against women. The Indian soldier comes from rural and semi-urban areas where women are treated as second-class citizens. In many parts of the country, female foeticide and bride-burning are endemic even among educated sections of society. In this environment, male chauvinism continues to retard any process which tries to bring about gender equity.

Political parties are still shy of taking up women’s issues as the centerpiece of their election campaigns. Without strong political support, women are yet to assert their rights vigorously due to lack of awareness, and caste and religious restrictions in the name of tradition. Women coming from the same social milieu opting for military service represent the small number of pioneers trying to break these barriers. So it is not surprising the armed forces are extremely cautious in handling this politically sensitive issue.

On a recent TV talk show, spirited young women, middle-aged socialites and a few men put up a strong case for allowing women soldiers to fight shoulder to shoulder with men in mixed combat units. I doubt very much whether they understood what they were saying. I am sure they would not like their daughters to be cooped up in underground shelters with a dozen or so combat soldiers at altitudes of over 14,000 ft along the borders for months at a time. There is a total lack of privacy for anyone, let alone women.

Very few countries employ a fully integrated military. Even in the US and Israel, where such integration has taken place, rape is a major menace dogging women soldiers. And it is at the hands of their male colleagues. According to Professor Helen Benedict, who has researched the subject, a survey of female veterans of the US from the Vietnam War to the first Gulf War revealed that 30 per cent were raped in the military. Another study of veterans in 2004 from Vietnam to all the subsequent wars found that 71 per cent of the women said they were sexually assaulted or raped while in the military. The results of a 1992-93 study of female veterans of the Gulf War and earlier wars were even more appalling – 90 per cent said they were sexually harassed in the military.

Can our society cope with such issues when they come up in the armed forces as more women enter their portals, when even in the national capital women are not safe from sexual harassment and rape? Society’s problems are reflected in the armed forces, although military training instils discipline. So integration of women in the armed forces is going to be a long process. Society has to be more enlightened in the way it treats women if it wants the armed forces to increase the role of women on equal terms with men. And that will not happen merely by sloganeering; it has to become the political agenda of the nation.

That does not mean the armed forces should defer introduction of structural mechanisms to employ women gainfully in a safe environment both during war and peace. The armed forces, renowned for their operational management skills, have a golden opportunity to set an example for the rest of the nation in having empowered women join them to serve the country.

Sri Lanka Perspectives -May 2017

Colonel R Hariharan   | 31-05-2017 |  

Sri Lanka floods and mudslides

Sri Lanka suffered the worst floods in nearly two decades during the last week of the month, killing at least 196 people, who were buried in mudslides. Another 93 people were still unaccounted for. Torrential rains which triggered the floods, affected over half a million people living in 15 districts, particularly in coastal areas of Colombo, Galle, Hambantota, Mullaitivu and Trincomalee, among others. Sri Lanka has appealed for international help in providing assistance to the affected people.

 India was the first nation to rush disaster relief assistance through three naval ships, the first of which reached within hours of the disaster. Reief  from China and Pakistan came a little later. After tsunami struck Sri Lanka in 2004, India had demonstrated for the first time, its real time capability to rush to the assistance of its close neighbour, while the US took three days. India's response to the calamity is also a subtle reminder of the indivisibility of the common security interests of the two countries tied by geographic contiguity.

Indian PM’s Vesak Day visit

Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Sri Lanka to participate in the 14^th International Vesak Day celebrations on May 12, 2017 at Colombo and Kandy. The choice of the Vesak day for the Indian prime minister’s visit to Sri Lanka was a politically smart move by both sides, as it reinforced the cultural and religious ties that bind the two countries. For PM Modi, it was an opportunity to show solidarity with Sri Lanka’s national unity government.  Both India and Sri Lanka had announced in advance that the Indian PM’s visit was only to take part in the religious event and not hold talks or sign agreements. This probably defused the opposition efforts to hold black flag demonstrations against India’s involvement in the development of Trincomalee port complex, as well as the leasing of tank farms there.

However, the opposition protest ended in a whimper when former President Mahinda Rajapaksa, who had been spearheading the opposition protest against the ruling coalition, at his own request met PM Modi. He was accompanied by former defence secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa and former foreign minister Prof GL Peiris. Though the meeting was claimed to be a friendly one without a political agenda, the presence of foreign policy and defence advisers would indicate otherwise. In fact, Rajapaksa’s response to PM Modi's visit typifies the dilemma of Sri Lanka politicians in handling India’s overwhelming shadow, clouding the country's political discourse.

PM Modi’s visit to Sri Lanka, the second in three years sets a record for Indian PM's visit to its southern neighbour. Similarly, he has become the first Indian PM ever to visit the war-ravaged Northern Province in 2015 as well as the Upcountry Tamils, descendants of indentured Indian labour working in tea plantations when he addressed them in Dickoya during the visit.

  

It was in keeping with his style of touching base with  Indian disaspora everywhere. It also showed his abiding interest in further reinforcing the close relations that exist between the two countries in keeping with his foreign policy priority to strengthen relations with India’s neighhours.  This is the reason, India is showing no hurry in pushing through the Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement (ETCA), which was initiated at Sri Lanka’s initiative and generated a lot of controversy among Indophobic segments in Sri Lanka.

PM Modi was at his oratorical best in his speeches at the inauguration of the Vesak Day celebration as also at Dikoya, where he addressed Upcountry Tamils. His Vesak inauguration speech largely focused on Buddha’s teachings and the common values that they had enjoined on both India and Sri Lanka. His stress that conflict between the nation states were from “mindsets, thought streams, entities and instruments rooted in the idea of hate and violence” and its “proponents of ideologies of  hate, in our region” were not open to dialogue was a subtle reminder to Sri Lanka of the dangers in building close relations with Pakistan.

The reality of PM Modi’s statement “whether it is on land or in the waters of the Indian Ocean the security of our societies is indivisible” was borne out when China sought permission to berth a submarine in Colombo even before PM Modi completed his visit. Of course, Colombo promptly refused permission. This was perhaps China’s way of muscle flexing to remind Sri Lanka of its determination to protect its interests in Indian Ocean Region, whether India or Sri Lanka liked it or not.  

Perhaps, this was one reason why PM Wickremesinghe, addressing the Belt and Road Forum (BRF) summit in Beijing, said that the success of the BRF and Sri Lankan plans would depend upon the maintenance of long term stability of the Indian Ocean, by promoting peaceful and non-military cooperation, to ensure unimpeded commerce based on the multi-lateral trading system.

PM Modi’s reference on the “indivisible security of our societies” in his speech was perhaps an uncomfortable reminder to many Sri Lankans, who are wary of the Indian ‘big brother’ meddling in local politics to their detriment. Despite all the goodwill for India that exists in Sri Lanka, Indian leadership actions relating to Sri Lanka have the potential to hurt Sri Lankan pride, after India’s heavy-handed intervention during Ms Indira Gandhi’s rule, which had disastrous consequences.  Indian policy makers will have to bear this in mind.

During the month, small pro-LTTE fringe groups in Tamil Nadu tried to organize meetings to commemorate the memory of LTTE cadres and people, who lost their lives during the Eelam War that ended in May 2009.  Such activities are a reminder to both India and Sri Lanka of the need to be wary of divisive elements, pandering to mutual suspicions that exist among sections of the people on both sides of the Palk Strait.

EU restores GSP+ concessions

The European Union (EU) has announced that Sri Lanka will receive Generalised Scheme Preference Plus (GSP+) tariff concessions for exports to EU countries from May 19, 2017.  According the EU sources, this would mean 66 percent of tariff lines would enjoy duty free export to EU member countries. This will be a shot in the arm for ready made garment industry and fisheries in particular, which were languishing after the EU withdrew the GSP+ duty free tariff concessions in 2010.

This had affected Sri Lanka’s $1.56 billion worth annual exports to the EU. The EU action was in response to the failure of the Mahinda Rajapaksa government, then in power, to satisfactorily respond to EU’s concerns over gross human rights aberrations in the country.

The EU has restored the GSP+ concessions, although two conditions it had laid down for it have not been met by Sri Lanka. These relate to drafting an internationally acceptable counter terrorism act (CTA) and an amendment to the code of criminal procedure act (CCPA). The drafts prepared so far have attracted widespread criticism.  However, despite this, the EU’s positive response is an indication of its confidence in the Sirisena-Wickremesinghe government fulfilling all its commitments to the international community. Politically, the EU’s action comes at a time when the coalition is facing internal stress as opposition is marshalling its resources to bring down the coalition

However, as the European Commissioner for Trade Ms Cecilia Malmström had pointed out, granting access to the GSP+ scheme does not mean that the situation in Sri Lanka with respect to the 27 international conventions was fully satisfactory. She added: “….the removal of customs duties for Sri Lanka would be accompanied with rigorous monitoring of the country's progress in the area of sustainable development, human rights and good governance."

This statement really sums up the situation; though the EU had granted GSP+ status to Sri Lanka, its efforts restoring human rights and good governance are still work in progress.

Col R Hariharan, a retired MI officer, served as the head of Intelligence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka from 1987 to 90. He is associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies and the International Law and Strategic Analysis Institute, Chennai. E-mail: haridirect@gmail.com  Blog: http://col.hariharan.info

Courtesy: South Asia Security Trends, June 2017 Issue. www.security-risks.com

List of Modi's strengths and weaknesses

Gone are the somnolent days of Dr Manmohan Singh

POLITICS | 7-minute read | 03-06-2017

COLONEL R HARIHARAN @colhari2

Despite all the 'for and against' rhetoric that clouds any assessment of Prime Minister Narendra Modi's performance during the last three years, none can deny his singular achievement is in making all of us relook at the way we run the country. 

Gone are the somnolent days of Dr Manmohan Singh, when everyday had a predictable monotony of the days gone by. 

Not with Modi. He makes news, when he does, or does not do or say anything or nothing. 

After Mrs Indira Gandhi, perhaps only Modi can lay claim as a leader with nationwide appeal. 

The charismatic leader is trying to rework the "accepted way of doing things" in government, in the nation that had accepted corruption, family rule and cronyism as necessary evils.

The crests and troughs of his leadership personality seen during the last three years of Modi’s rule, provide some insights into the strengths and weaknesses of his leadership style. 

Communication skill 

Strength: Even Rahul Gandhi, not known for his perceptive comments, could spot Modi's communication skill as his biggest asset. Modi is simple, clear, direct and structured; probably, his talks are also well rehearsed, if the occasion demands it. 

The acronyms and catchy slogans he uses are a copy writers’ delight. They make his messages easy to remember, suited for social media format. No wonder, he clocks over 3 million followers on Twitter. The unique feature of Modi’s communication is his ability to convey complex issues in simple terms. 

Weakness: The media is yet to forgive Modi for bypassing them and directly communicating with their audience. Probably this is Modi’s way to express his disgust with the media that had been hounding him for years. 

Media focus on Modi is more on the negatives than positives, though there is some grudging acceptance of Modi, thanks to TRP rating and ABC data compulsions  

The media, which stoically accepted Manmohan Singh’s “loud” silence even on shocking corruption issues of his cabinet members, expects Modi to comment on every news headline. And Modi refuses to oblige. 

Media analysts, particularly from the Lutyens English media, traditionally cultivated and pampered by New Delhi, are invariably slanted against Modi, because he does not think like them. 

Though the impact of English media might be overrated within India, it provides real time feed for international media.  As a result, Modi’s image makers continue to contend with negative reporting in international media. 

Vision building

Strength: Modi has shown a remarkable ability to articulate a national vision. It is in sharp contrast to the clutch of cliches that were used as guiding light by earlier rulers. 

The Modi slogan “sab ka saath, sab ka vikas” focuses on the common man's belief “Sarva dharma sama bhav” to articulate the national vision.

This makes it easy for most people to identify themselves with the vision, than a vague concept like secularism. 

The vision leverages harnessing youth power and India's strength in information technology to improve quality of life. Its focus on issues affecting day to day life, which are easily understood by the common man.

Weakness: Realising his lofty vision 'Sab ka Saath, Sab ka Vikas' is handicapped at delivery end. Fat cats that thrived on corrupt bureaucrat-businessmen-politician nexus continue to thrive affecting the overall efficiency. 

As the process of weeding out bad eggs is a time consuming process, Modi has become over dependent upon a few efficient ministers and bureaucrats, who are overloaded with work. 

Extraordinary energy 

Strength: Modi's greatest asset is perhaps is his extraordinary stamina to put in long hours of work. This enables him to think and act ahead of his detractors. This has inspired many others working with him to emulate him and strive to deliver timely results.

Weakness: As the PM's support staff are also putting in long hours work, the chances of systemic breakdown is high due to increased stress. It also increases the chances of hasty decision making with adverse after effects.  It has also heightened public expectations about the PM's ability to resolve all issues here and now, which increases his workload.

Leadership skills 

Strengths: The three skills listed above make Modi a naturally assertive leader, clear about what he wants to achieve. 

He has an eye for picking his team with people who can be trusted to turn his ideas into action. This has enabled him to turn the BJP from being a copycat of the Congress party, into a dynamic engine of change of his own design.

Weakness: Modi's confidence in his own skills as a leader and troubleshooter has probably prevented him from taking small but timely taking actions to assuage discontent. 

The handling of the 'One Rank One Pension' agitation by military pensioners is a very good example of this weakness. Had he met the representatives of pensioners in early stages as they desired, their agitation would not have become a national embarrassment. 

The casual attitude to lynching of suspected cattle traffickers by BJP’s “fellow travelling” vigilante groups is yet another example of his overconfidence in “managing” crises, rather than taking preventive action  to avert them. 

Commitment to ideology

Strength: His unflinching commitment to Hindutva ideology has given courage to rally many Hindus to think of national interest beyond narrow confines of castes and sects, imparting new energy, particularly among youth. 

His assurance of fair play for Muslim minority and proactive initiatives like the abolition of triple talaq have bought him time and space among minorities to prove himself as a leader for all Indians.

Weakness: Taking advantage of Modi's ideological commitment, a number of Hindu fringe groups have started acting brazenly to settle scores to enforce their obscurantist ideas. 

Apart from law and order issues related to such activism, it has become the soft underbelly of the Modi government, which has not been able to curb such activism effectively.   

As a result, Jihadi extremism has been given a lease of life in trying to find fertile ground among the Muslim population. This is the flipside of ideological commitment of the PM, translated into action at the street level by some of his ideological cohorts.

Grey areas 

For a leader, who had shown great ability to understand even complex foreign relations issues, the PM has shown a surprising lack of understanding the effect of ignoring some key issues. 

National security continues to be a grey area, with an overworked finance minister doubling as part time manager of defence affairs for most part of three years. 

This could snowball into a major problem for the PM in the coming months as the national security environment is heating up rapidly.  

Instances like the crisis in appointments to higher judiciary, the ill-considered notification banning cattle trading, trampling upon  Centre-State relations  (despite Modi being had been a staunch supporter of states' powers) and continued sidelining of armed forces chiefs in national security policy making are some more examples of the PM’s grey areas.

Narendra Modi is perhaps the most critically analysed leader the country had ever produced. 

Despite this, the man still considered an outsider, if not a usurper, by New Delhi chatterati, has continued to top national popularity charts. This speaks for the strength of his personality and leadership skills.

Considering that there is no worthwhile challenger in the horizon, it looks as though Modi is poised to lead the nation for some time to come. 

However, he needs to attend to the grey areas clouding his performance, lest the opposition baying for his blood gains elbow strength to pull the rug from under his feet. 

#Sabka Saath Sabka Vikas, #Narendra Modi

The Writer is a retired Military Intelligence specialist on South Asia, has rich experience in terrorism and insurgency operations.

Courtesy: India Today opinion portal www.dailyo.in

http://www.dailyo.in/politics/modi-ideology-sabka-saath-sabka-vikas/story/1/17593.html