Crystal gazing India-China relations

 2022 closed with a fresh setback to the fractured relations between India and China after Indian troops threw out 300 strong Chinese troops who had crossed the Line of Actual Control at Yang Tze in Tawang Sector of Arunachal Pradesh on December 9. How will the relations between the two Asian giants be in 2023?

India Legal/ Magazine / Special / January 7, 2023 

https://www.indialegallive.com/magazine/crystal-gazing-india-china-relations-galwan-lac-ladakh/

By Col R Hariharan

After the clashes at Yang Tze, Union Defence Minister Rajnath Singh told the Parliament, the Chinese intruders “attempted to unilaterally change the status quo” along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). In the scuffle that broke out some soldiers on both sides were injured. 

India-China relations started rapidly going south ever since China started massing troops along the LAC in Eastern Ladakh. It culminated in a clash between the Chinese and Indian troops at Galwan along the LAC in Eastern Ladakh in June 2020 in which 20 Indian troops were killed. The Galwan clash was perhaps a moment of truth for Prime Minister Narendra Modi who had invested heavily in building a mutually beneficial relationship with China. As prime minister, he had visited China five times and met with President Xi Jinping 18 times. Even after the ten-week long stand-off between Indian and Chinese troops in Doklam along the border with Bhutan in June 2017, he had met Xi twice in informal summits in Wuhan (April 2018) and Mahabalipuram (October 2019). They had agreed to maintain peace and tranquillity between the two countries, along their disputed border.  

After the Galwan clash, in January 2021, External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar had said three so-called “mutuals”—mutual respect, mutual sensitivity and mutual interests—are the determining factors for the bilateral relationship. “Any expectation that they can be brushed aside and that life can carry on undisturbed despite the situation at the border, that is simply not realistic.”

In the new year, Jaishankar’s latest broadside on China in his first media interaction in Vienna after the Yang Tze intrusion showed that India is in no mood to kiss and make up with China unless it conforms to agreed norms of conduct. He minced no words in reiterating that China was responsible for the tense situation between the two countries on the LAC. “We had agreements with China not to mass forces in our border areas and they have not observed those agreements, which is why we have the current tense situation for flouting the border agreements.” He added, “we had an agreement not to unilaterally change the LAC, which they have tried unilaterally do.”  

Evidently, the Indian MEA’s “calling a spade a spade” remarks can be considered a comment on China’s foreign minister Wang Yi’s Christmas day statement couched in diplomatese. Wang said: “China and India have maintained communication through the diplomatic and military-to-military channels, and both countries are committed to upholding stability in the border areas. We stand ready to work with India in the direction toward steady and sound growth” of the relations.

Evidently, Wang Yi was trying to play down the Yang Tze incident as the military commanders on both sides met after the incident and agreed to adhere to norms of conduct. In Eastern Ladakh, India and China held the 17th round of Corps Commander level talks on December 20 at Chushul/Moldo border. Nothing much was achieved; both sides agreed to maintain dialogue through military and diplomatic channels and work out mutually acceptable resolution of the remaining issues in Eastern Ladakh at the earliest.

Is this how relations between the two Asian giants will be in 2023? At the macro level, 2023 is not going to be like yester-years. As Thomas Friedman, thinker and author of the global best seller The World is Flat says, the world is not flat anymore. “The world is fast, fused, deep and open.” He explains fast as the speed of technological change in the pace of change. “Fused” is not merely the world is interconnected, but it is interdependent. The world is also fused by climate. Friedman explains “Deep” as the most important word of this era because “we have put sensors everywhere.” Lastly, he says the world is getting radically open. With a smartphone, every citizen is now a paparazzi, a filmmaker, a journalist and publisher with no editor or filter.

Friedman’s words are being validated by the way warfare has morphed into hybrid warfare—involving not merely the troops, but trade and commerce, industries, communications and at national and international levels. And China is mastering hybrid warfare. The dislocation of the chip industry in China and its fall out on global supply chains is an example of this. 

As both India and China are big countries, the advantages of coexistence and if possible, cooperation outweighs confrontation. India is an unavoidable Asian neighbour sharing the longest land border with China. Culturally, economically and militarily, India is a dominant power in South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region. More importantly, in spite of India’s self-reliance goals, India-China trade rose 34% to $115.83 billion in the year ending March 2022. 

China also cannot afford to ignore India as it is rated fourth in global military power rankings. Economically, India has the fifth highest GDP. India is also an important member of the Quadrilateral framework with three other-nations—Australia, Japan and the US—aimed to keep global waters free. Though the Quad framework is sketchy, India has assiduously cultivated strategic relations with the member countries.

Internationally, India shares the views of China on global warming and on the need for a more equitable world order where countries share resources equitably. India continues to be a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and the BRICS initiative of five powers who want change. India has maintained its close friendship with Russia in the face of Western sanctions slapped after its war in Ukraine. India has maintained its strategic autonomy by importing Russian oil and evolving monetary instruments for trade with Russia, defying the sanctions regime.

Ideally in 2023, both China and India should take steps to bury their hatchets and take baby steps to build their relations. But the real world is different from the ideal. China is in no hurry to resolve the border dispute as it can be used as a pressure against India. So, we can expect sporadic incidents of manageable proportions in the dozen “trouble spots” along both Ladakh and Arunachal borders.

President Xi is relentlessly pursuing the realisation of the Chinese dream. He has consolidated his control over the CCP; under his leadership China’s policymaking apparatus now rests not with the government, but with the Communist Party. This has strengthened the Party’s role in policy formulation and its strict implementation. General Secretary Xi heads the party’s eight central commissions and the Central Taiwan Small Group, dramatically increasing his decision-making power. With his tenure extended for a third term, Xi’s writ will remain unchallenged for quite some time. In 2023, we can expect President Xi to dominate both the national and international scene. This gives him a huge advantage over other global leaders.  

Based on President Xi’s speeches at the CCP Congress in 2022, we can identify China’s focus areas for action in 2023. Among these, Global Security Initiative (GSI), the Global Development Initiative (GDI) and Made in China 2025 (MIC 2025) are of special interest as they provide a central global role to China. The US considers the GSI as a challenger to the Quad initiative. GSI aims at staying committed to comprehensive, cooperative, sustainable security, respecting sovereignty, territorial integrity of all countries. India’s neighbours are likely to be invited to join the GSI; already, unconfirmed reports indicate China has approached Nepal to join the initiative. 

GDI is to improve China’s role as a leader in the global development agenda. President Xi proposed the GDI at the UN General Assembly in 2021. It seeks to expedite the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The GDI has received the support of over 100 countries. More than 60 countries have joined the Group of Friends of GDI. Of course, internally China will be busy with overall economic recovery to improve its economic performance in 2023. China is expected to follow proactive fiscal policy and prudent monetary policy to facilitate this. 

In his first comments after the latest round of talks between Indian and Chinese military commanders, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said that China is ready to work with India for the “steady and sound growth” of bilateral ties and the two countries are committed to upholding stability at the border areas. Wang Yi’s palliative words on “growth” of bilateral ties after the latest round of talks on December 20 have failed to make any progress in resolving the remaining issues along the LAC.

We may well end the year 2023 writing about the 30th round of talks; you never know what Emperor Xi can pull out of his hat! 

—The writer is a retired military intelligence specialist on South Asia associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies

SRI LANKA PRESIDENT’S PRIORITY IN 2023

Col R Hariharan

Sri Lanka Perspectives December 2022 | South Asia Security Trends, January 2023  www.security-risk.com

Learnings from 2022

Sri Lanka did not cover itself with glory in the year 2022. But the year is a remarkable one in Sri Lanka' political history.  The spontaneous Aragalaya protestors   demonstrated that they cannot be taken for granted by their elected representatives. It did not matter if they were Rajapaksas - their heroes of yesterday. The protestors’ battle cry “GotaGoGama” saw the unseemly termination of the rule of the Terminator of Tamil separatists - President Gotabaya Rajapaksa. It has shown that getting elected to the high office of President is not enough; it lasts only so long as people accept it.

Events overtook the Machiavellian plans of Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa. He was forced to quit home and office in the face of massive public protests. It showed enjoying parliamentary support is not enough to sustain power, when people are determined to throw you out. The Hindu correspondent in Colombo Meera Srinivasan eloquently puts it:“When you hear ordinary citizens articulate their desire for a better future and country, the message resonates across borders and contexts. At one level, Sri Lankans were resisting leaders who they held responsible for their economic distress. At another, a mass uprising showed that no leader is invincible, and no might is bigger than people’s power.”

The transformation of seven-time Prime Minister and nominated member of parliament Ranil Wickremesinghe, brought in as “night watchman” PM, as President in a crisis, validates another clichéd aphorism: “fortune favours the brave.” But Wickremesinghe, a veteran of many political battles for survival, had the courage to step into the shaky chair. He quickly put together his jerry-built government to stave (save?) the country from plunging into chaos.

The President’s galaxy of ministers are mostly old faces with new labels, with a sprinkle of younger aspirants.  It is still intact there, to usher in the new year, disproving the naysayers. This showed that President Wickremesinghe had a much better understanding of crisis management than the Rajapaksas. Despite the anachronism of his survival as President depends upon pro-Rajapaksa MPs, evidently most people feel his priorities are right. Otherwise, Aragalaya protests would have probably continued. It also showed that people are ready to give the leader time and space to get his act together. President Wickremesinghe’s actions show that he is still wary of muted Aragalaya protestors watching from the wings. Though the threat of Aragalaya has taken a backseat from the political mainstream, hopefully it will force the political class to prioritise people’s needs first.

It is the historical Aragalaya movement that propelled President Wickremesinghe to power. It showed the failure of the traditional tools of state instruments of power including security personnel to quell the protests, Though the movement has seemingly dissipated now, its subterranean presence can be seen now in protests by students and staff in universities, among monks and civil society organisations. So, it is not enough to find berths for youth representatives in advisory bodies of the government. Good governance, rule of law and impartial judiciary will satisfy most of them.

Corruption and cronyism seem to be endemic in every action of the government. For long people have put up with it. The Aragalaya movement has sown the seeds of distrust of the political class in the minds of the people. If Sri Lanka has to survive as a stable democracy, politicians must regain the trust of the people. In this context, Winston Churchill’s words in the House of Commons come to mind. “At the bottom of all the tributes paid to democracy is the little man, walking into the little booth, with a little pencil, making a little cross on a little bit of paper. No amount of rhetoric or voluminous discussion can possibly diminish the overwhelming importance of that point.”

As Sir Martin Gilbert, leading historian, and Churchill’s official biographer, says: “Parliamentary democracy is an easy concept to grasp but a difficult one to sustain. Throughout the Twentieth Century, and into our present Twenty First Century, the institutions and ideals of parliamentary democracy have been under continual threat. The power of totalitarian regimes to dominate their own people is – and remains – attractive to those who wish to control the life of a nation without checks and balances.” These words hold true to Sri Lanka’s present situation as China with its increasing global clout might appear as an attractive alternative. A dissatisfied population may be easily swayed to ignore that it is a one-party “democracy” of 21^st century Communism of the Chinese kind.

Agenda for 2023

Sri Lanka is stepping into 2023 with the economy limping on crutches with the tourism industry and export trade taking a beating. The promised IMF recovery package is yet to materialize. Peoples’ woes of continuing price rise, shortage of essential food stuff and energy resources are making life difficult. The scars of Covid pandemic are still there and the flare up of a new variant spreading fast in China, European countries and the US portends ill of a revival of the pandemic in the new year. There is no end in sight to the early end to the Ukraine war. This has queered the strategic stability of Sri Lanka’s environment. Its fall out is being felt in Sri Lanka’s relations with major powers competing for dominating the Indo-Pacific.  

The President's agenda for 2023 will have to be planned in this environment. The year 2023 is going to be a year of long weekends with nine of them falling on Fridays and Mondays. In other words, it will be a year of less than nine months of work. So whatever Sri Lanka plans to achieve will have to factor time as an invaluable resource. In management terms, this would mean investing in short-term projects that yield quick results to stoke the feeling of achievement to raise the morale of the people. Indian experience has shown extensive computerisation of government systems can achieve this. 

The first item on the President’s agenda for 2023 seems to be to resolve “the Tamil issue” by February 4, 2023 before the nation celebrates 75^th anniversary of Sri Lanka’s independence in March. Ethnic reconciliation had been featured as an important item on the agenda of all presidents, except for Gotabaya Rajapaksa. The veteran hero of the separatist war, on becoming president made it clear that Sri Lanka was for the majority - Sinhala Buddhists. Of course, despite all the fanfare with which the ethnic issue has been featured in the agenda of successive presidents no discernible results have been achieved. Of course, the only exception is the 13th amendment that created provincial councils. Even that was sent to the halfway house, when the Rajapaksas prioritised pleasing the Sinhala Buddhist constituency, over reconciliation of minorities.  

President Wickremesinghe is a past master in using ethnic reconciliation as an effective political tool to garner public support. He had spearheaded the UNP protests against the 2000 draft constitution bill moved by President Chandrika Kumaratunga. The UNP MPs set fire to the draft of the bill in the parliament. The draft 2000 constitution contained power sharing proposals that could have ended the ethnic confrontation. It never saw the light of the day and Sri Lanka missed an opportunity to bring the ethnic issue to a closure. It was a costly political expediency that cost the nation dearly, as 100,000 people lost their lives in the Eelam wars that followed.

The Yahapalana government of President Maithripala Sirisena with PM Wickremesinghe went to the extent of preparing a draft constitution fielded by the constituent assembly. But it never saw the light of the day perhaps because both the President and PM had their own political agenda. Considering this background, President Wickremesinghe’s deadline for resolving the Tamil issue by February 4, 2023 seems unrealistic. However, the President appeared to be making the right moves – all party conferences, palaver with the leaders of Tamil, Muslim and like minded leaders of other political parties. He has opened offices in Vavuniya and Mannar to keep his ear to the grind wheel.

But the President must reckon with the elephant in the room – the Sinhala Buddhist rural masses. They need to be convinced that the Tamil issue is the priority when the whole country is locked in the struggle for survival. Can President Wickremesinghe convince them to resolve the four decade long ethnic issue eating into the vitals of Sri Lanka? Only time will tell.

[Col R Hariharan, a retired MI specialist on South Asia and terrorism, served as the head of intelligence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka 1987-90. He is associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies. Email: haridirect@gmail.com  Website: https://col.hariharan.info]    

SRI LANKA: CHARTING A NEW BEGINNING?

Col R Hariharan

Sri Lanka Perspectives November 2022 | South Asia Security Trends, December 2022  www.security-risk.com

 

OVERVIEW

 

President Ranil Wickremesinghe in his capacity as finance minister presented the Budget 2023 in the parliament on November 14. His budget address presenting a roadmap for economic recovery was aptly titled ‘Towards a new beginning’. It showed the government’s ambitious target of increasing government revenue, record economic growth rate of 7-8% and increase FDIs to more than $ 3 billion. The splintered voting by major political parties on the Budget in parliament showed that they are yet to come to terms with the political scene after the Aragalaya protests shook up the nation. We can expect new alliances across political parties to emerge before the provincial council (PC) elections are announced in early 2023.

The President’s invitation to all Tamil MPs for a discussion on issues facing the Tamil people and development plans for the North and East indicates revival of interest in the vexed question of ethnic reconciliation. It has received positive response from the Tamil National Alliance (TNA). However, the moot question is how much can the President who has no political mandate make any real progress on this three-decade long issue?

In a special address on November 24, President Wickremesinghe laid down the redlines for protests and public conduct of protestors including students and clergy. Based on the Aragalaya experience, the government is planning to bring a few measures to tighten its control of such situations in the future.

On the external front, China was in damage control mode to recoup its goodwill damaged in the earlier months due to its lack of sensitivity in handling Sri Lanka. It came with the arrival of a tanker containing the gift of 9000 tonnes of kerosene from China.

CONCEPT OF BUDGET 2023

President Wickremesinghe’s Budget 2023 presented in parliament   aims to raise per capita income by creating means of livelihood for young people matching the lifestyles they aspire. At the same time, it will ensure welfare measures of vulnerable sections of society are implemented effectively. He hopes to achieve goals of the Budget through the ‘social market economy or social security open economy’ (though this construct may appear contradictory).  

The ‘New Economy’ will have three aspects: export oriented competitive economy, an environmentally friendly green and blue economy and a digital economy. To create the New Economy, new sources of revenue and new areas of economy must be found. For this purpose, extensive economic reforms restructuring and reorganisation will be carried out. This will be followed by focus on modernisation of the delivery system in all aspects of governance.

With suitable legislations and legal amendments in place, he expects to achieve high growth of 7 to 8 percent; increase in international trade as a percentage of GDP by more than 100 percent; annual growth of $3 billion from new exports from 2023 to 2032; FDI of $3 billion in the next 10 years. He also hopes to create an internationally competitive workforce with high skills in the next ten years. In his address, the President went on how he proposes to achieve the goals with details of measures and proposals to flesh out the concept.

President Wickremesinghe cannot be faulted for dreaming big or the confidence with which he presented the concept.  As the President emphasised, unless a common social agreement is established between all sections of society and all limbs of government, these ambitious goals cannot be achieved. The million-dollar question is, will the nation as a whole rise up to the occasion to heed the call of a President, who does not enjoy peoples mandate?

WARDING OFF ANOTHER ‘ARAGALAYA’

The Aragalaya protest movement of the masses was against the misrule by the Rajapaksas that peaked in May 2022. It was a spontaneous movement spearheaded by students, professionals, trade unions and ordinary people egged on by political parties, who leveraged the crowds. Aragalaya achieved its aim of packing off the Rajapaksa clan into exile. it lost its momentum when the immediate goal of dethroning the Rajapaksas was achieved. However, there are sections of leftist student leaders, trade unions and Marxist ultras of the Janata Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and its clone the Frontline Socialist Party (FSP), who wanted systemic changes in the government as part of the Aragalaya agenda. They have been demanding the dissolution of the parliament. Since then the JVP and FSP have been talking of restarting the protest movement.

Speaking in parliament, President Wickremesinghe has made it clear that he will not dissolve the parliament amidst an economic crisis. “Today people are fed up with the political parties and politics” he added that without delivering a system change, politicians will not be able to win the confidence of the people.

Addressing the parliament on November 24, he warned that he will never allow violence and anarchy to prevail under the guise of human rights. If any party indulges in such an attempt the security forces will be used to suppress it completely. Dwelling on the role of the army he said, “when it comes to overthrowing governments, the army cannot stand aside…According to Article 9 of the Constitution, the army has the power to stop them. Such acts of violence cannot be tolerated. We should stop them. We should stop creating chaos by employing clerics.”

Pointing out that some members of the clergy were protesting and causing a disturbance, he added “The Sangha has religious activities to attend. They should engage in those activities. Touching upon the issue of human rights, he said “anarchy and violence cannot be allowed to encroach on human rights…Those who cause violence in the name of human rights cannot be protected,” he warned.  

The President said Article 14 of the Constitution outlines our fundamental rights. They can be implemented especially to ensure state security within the limits prescribed by law for public safety, including clauses on the protection of the constitution, as per articles 15/1 and 15/2.

The President has also taken action to amend the university acts to ensure students do not continue beyond the specified period of study. Similarly, he has also approved a bill to register a discourse  to give powers to the Maha Sangha to disrobe errant monks.

As expected, the President’s speech has been vehemently criticised by the JVP and sections of civil society. The Socialist Youth Union, the student arm of the JVP, has decided to “warm up the cold months and start the hot struggle in the streets” in the cities and districts. The SYU has said it believed in parliament, the democratic struggle and people's power. It demanded “an opportunity should be given to a new mandate immediately…we are launching the struggle to end 74 years of rule and establish a peoples rule.”

Tailpiece: Legalising cannabis cultivation. President Wickreme-singhe’s budget has proposed legalising cannabis cultivation, ostensibly “to boost export of farm produce and forex reserves”. Of course, Western tourists accustomed to smoking a toke as a form of recreation would welcome it. But boost exports? Where? To India? No way. To the US where growing cannabis is a huge business in many states? It is sure to boost drug addiction among the island youth, already exposed to smuggled cannabis and heroin. [Written on November 30, 2022]

[Col R Hariharan, a retired MI specialist on South Asia and terrorism, served as the head of intelligence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka 1987-90. He is associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies. Email: haridirect@gmail.com  Website: https://col.hariharan.info]    

Sri Lanka: Strategizing Economic Recovery

Col R Hariharan

Sri Lanka Perspectives October 2022 | South Asia Security Trends, November 2022  www.security-risk.com

Overview

During the month, the government’s preliminary talks with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on structuring its economic recovery continued. However, debt restructuring continues to be delayed with China due to its preoccupation with the 20^th NPC meetings of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Even negotiations with India and Japan are moving at a slow pace. Perhaps, this is due to their lingering doubts about the Wickremesinghe government’s ability to see through the structural reforms. In this context, President Wickremesinghe must be heartened by the show of solidarity for his actions by the US and some of the EU members, despite the use of high-handed methods to suppress public protests.

Internally, the passing of the 22nd Constitutional Amendment (originally introduced as 21A) to improve executive president’s accountability, the use of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) to curb Aragalaya activism and the launching of the Rise Together (Ekwa Nagitimu) campaign at the grass roots to recoup the image of the Rajapaksas were key highlights of happenings in October 2022.

The events leading up to these important internal developments showed existing differences, not only within the ruling Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP) and its cohorts, but also within the opposition parties as well.

Of course, during the month political leaders continued to ride their time-tested political hobby horses – new constitution, electoral reforms, call for general election and the not be missed late entrant “investigation and follow up into the Easter Sunday terrorist attacks.”

The government used the familiar gambit of appointing parliamentary select committees and presidential commissions to tackle the opposition moves. So, everybody continued to be busy doing something.

Strategizing economic recovery

However, President Wickremesinghe appears to be leveraging lack of unity within political parties to adopt transactional strategies to push through actions to achieve targets set in the 2022 interim budget for increase in government revenue and debt reduction. The actions taken so far, include reducing government spending, tackling public corruption, energy reforms to open retail distribution of fuel to private firms, privatise wasteful state-owned enterprises and promote foreign investment avenues.

Normally, these issues are considered politically explosive. Despite paying lip service, political parties in power have seldom considered seriously implementing such measures. Given this dismal record of political parties, Wickremesinghe government’s actions do not seem to have animated the media. The Aragalaya movement has by and large eroded public credibility in political parties

In spite of the lack of credibility in the government, some progress seems to have been made in improving the business climate as indicated by the LMD-NielsenIQ Business Confidence Index (BCI) for October. Reporting on the state of business, Sri Lanka’s online business magazine LMD said the BCI provided “a semblance of relief; it has climbed a heartening 13 basis points to 89” during October from September’s 76. However, it quoted NielsenIQ Director-Consumer Insights Theirca Miyanadeniya’s assertion “concern over the socio-political status of the country is waning as business and people are in a race to survive against a backdrop of extreme hardships.”

With the major economies expecting a period of global recession in the coming months, it is essential that Wickremasinghe government survives to see the country through the period of economic privation in the coming months.

Under such circumstances, the passing of the 22^nd Amendment to the constitution 174 votes in favour and one against, may be considered as an indication of grudging acceptance of President Wickremesinghe’s leadership by over two-thirds members of parliament.  

The amendment was passed despite some pro-Basil Rajapaksa members of the ruling SLPP objecting to the clause on not allowing dual citizens to become members of parliament. This indicated two things: the decline of Basil Rajapaksa’s influence within SLPP and the Rajapaksas continued support to President Wickremesinghe.  

The 22A is a compromise between the Yahapalana government’s 19A to curb the sweeping powers of executive presidency and Gotabaya’s 20A to restore the powers of the executive presidency.

The bill was much debated by parliament members and the public and its present form represents a compromise solution reflecting some of the key elements from both the earlier amendments on the subject. For instance, it has retained the 20A clause on the powers of the president to dissolve parliament after two and half years, as against four and a half years stipulated in the19A. On the other hand, 22A has reintroduced 19A’s clause prohibiting dual citizens from contesting elections which was allowed by the 20A.

The 22A reduces some of the powers of the president enjoyed earlier under 20A, regarding appointments to high officers of the state including the Chief Justice, judges of supreme court and appeals court, chairmen of the election commission, human rights commission and police commission and the IGP. The constitutional council created now has the power to make these appointments. The president and prime minister enjoy some influence in picking members of the constitutional council, which will have three members from civil society.

Conclusion

The writing on the wall is clear: Sri Lanka must achieve targets presented in the 2022 interim budget for increase in government revenue and debt reduction to overcome the worst ever financial crisis it is facing now. Otherwise, Sri Lanka’s debt will be unsustainable; international financial bodies like IMF and World Bank do not assist the economic recovery of such countries.

Obviously, lack of understanding among the political parties in tackling long pending critical issues, has stood in the way of evolving a coherent national political and economic narrative to restore Sri Lanka’s credibility both at home and abroad. It will not be pragmatic to expect the political parties to give up their pettifogging and bury their hatchets to see through the crises. They are accustomed to using the economic crunch and hardship faced by the people to improve their poll prospects.

As a seasoned politician, President Wickremesinghe is using his Machiavellian skills to use factionalism existing within almost all the parties, to push through legislation to restore the economy. So far, political parties by and large are grudgingly accepting his rule for want of a better alternative. How long he survives this perilous journey will determine the future course of events in Sri Lanka. One advantage he only seems to enjoy is the moral, political and even economic support of most of the major Indo-Pacific powers including India and China. But much would depend upon how President Xi Jinping will handle China’s economic downturn, that could have its fall out on Sri Lanka.

Tailpiece: Contact with BJP?

A columnist writing in the Colombo weekly Sunday Times said a group of former LTTE cadres identifying themselves after rehabilitation as the ‘Democratic Cadres Party’ were in New Delhi in India recently. They took part in “an event organised by a group that maintains close ties” with India’s ruling BJP. They are said to have had discussions with various influential political actors and policymakers in New Delhi. Their requests to Indian authorities included lifting of the ban on LTTE proscribed in India since 1991 and full implementation of 13^th Amendment. The article said their allegations that Hindu shrines were being acquired by the Archaeological Dept and WildLife Dept under questionable circumstances seemed to have struck a chord with the audiences, “given the BJP’s aggressive campaigns based on Hindutva ideologies.”

[Written on October 31, 2022]

[Col R Hariharan, a retired MI specialist on South Asia and terrorism, served as the head of intelligence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka 1987-90. He is associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies. Email: haridirect@gmail.com  Website: https://col.hariharan.info]    

Thrust of 20th CCP National Peoples Congress: Questions & Answers

Col R Hariharan

[Here are my answers to some media questions fielded on October 20, 2022, on the recently held Chinese Communist Party’s 20^th Peoples Congress (NPC) and President Xi Jinping.]

Chinese President Xi Jinping presented a report to the Congress, which made a mention of word ‘security’ 52 times. In his speech at the inauguration, Xi also didn’t renounce the use of force to ‘reunify’ Taiwan. Clearly, there is a focus on security aspects rather than the economic ones as far as Xi’s prospective strategy is concerned. Can we expect a greater pushback from China against the U.S’ Indo-Pacific Strategy? 

As President Xi was addressing the CCP’s 20^th NPC, I shall attempt to answer the questions  in the backdrop of his ideological thrust lines, identified by the Party in his speech.

The Global Times, the CCP tabloid, has published “major takeaways” from President Xi’s “report” to the Party’s 20^th NPC meeting. GT’s takeaways focus’ appear to be on Xi’s efforts to kindle nationalism among the people to support his CCP agenda under his guidance.

The very first takeaway is in support of the Party’s dedication “to achieving lasting greatness for the Chinese nation and committed itself to the noble cause of peace and development for humanity” through Xi’s brand of Socialism with Chinese characteristics. It reinforces Nationalism will continue to be the core element.

The second point is on self-reform to ensure the Party does not change its conviction or character. It goes on to focus on the need for flexibility and the need to fight corruption.

On reunification of Taiwan, Xi is emphatic: While China will continue its efforts to strive for peaceful reunification, “we will never promise to renounce the use of force, and we reserve the option of taking all measures necessary.”

Presumably, this is an assurance to the people that China will not waver from the goal of reunification; it is equally a warning to the US, Taiwan and their allies that China will not hesitate to use force if needed till it is achieved.

China already considers the Hongkong issue as closed. Xi considers reunification of Taiwan will lead to rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and “must be completed.”

However, China’s option to use the military to force reunification has become complicated by the emergence of the QUAD (quadrilateral) framework with the US, India, Japan and Australia as members. Its core aim is to ensure freedom of navigation in the Indo-Pacific. Moreover, the signing of the AUKUS (Australia-United Kingdom-US) trilateral security pact in September last year, has further complicated China’s maritime power play in the region. The recent visit of US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan, in spite of vehement opposition from China, has sent a clear signal to China that the US has a sustained interest in Taiwan, regardless of its acceptance of the one-China policy

Under these circumstances, Xi may have second thoughts about using the military option to subdue Taiwan’s aspirations to be independent. It may not be cost effective for China to do so in the unsettled global strategic realignment in the wake of the Ukraine war. The war has adversely impact on global trade and economy. China is also facing these effects.

A better option for China will be to resolve the issue politically. Taiwan will be going for presidential election in 2024. The incumbent President Tsai Ing-wen of the Democratic Progressive Party is not eligible to contest as she has already served two terms. So, it will be smarter for China to politically ensure the election of Pro-China KMT Party candidate as President. Last September, China welcomed the election of potential presidential candidate Eric Chu, as leader of the KMT. Though the KMT Party has denied it is pro-unification, China can expect under KMT rule Taiwan to be more amenable to its overtures for peaceful reunification.

Q: What does China’s greater focus on security mean for India and the South Asian neighbourhood?

Under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) China has invested in all neighbouring countries of India except Bhutan. This has whittled down India’s influence in South Asia over the years. China’s biggest investments are in Pakistan and Sri Lanka, which are vital cogs in China’s strategic foray in South Asia and Indian Ocean region. It has built strong strategic relations with Pakistan and its focus on developing infrastructural connectivity through China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) increases threat potential on India’s Western borders. China is also building Pakistan’s naval capability which will enhance PLA navy’s capability in Western Indian Ocean in tandem with bases in Djibouti and Gwadar.

India considers secure and stable Indian Ocean as central to its security environment. Geographically, India also enjoys a great strategic location dominating the Sea Lanes of Indian Ocean. Shedding India’s years of strategic neglect, PM Narendra Modi since coming to power in 2014 had been following “neighbourhood first” policy giving priority to building close relations with India’s neighbours, notably island nations of the Indian Ocean. 

As early as 2009, Robert Gates the then US Secretary of Defense suggested that India be a “net security provider” and this is becoming a reality with India becoming a member of the QUAD framework. Besides, India and France signed a military logistics agreement in 2018, which gives reciprocal access to each other’s military facilities. Now India can enjoy the use of French bases in Reunion and Mayotte in Western Indian Ocean.  India has signed similar logistic agreements also with the US, Australia, South Korea, Singapore and Japan. This has expanded India’s geographical reach.

India has also strengthened the India-Sri Lanka-Maldives trilateral maritime cooperation with the periodic meeting of National Security Advisor (NSA) level participation from the three countries. This has facilitated the collaboration of the three countries to improve their maritime capability by conducting trilateral exercises biennially.  Mauritius and Seychelles have attended the meeting as guest countries.

Though China has established firm foothold in Sri Lanka, so far its efforts to build a counter-narrative to India’s efforts to remain as a dominant maritime power in the region. With the formation of the Quad initiative, China’s desire to establish its strategic maritime writ in the IOR will become a little more difficult to realise in the coming days.

Q: A PLA soldier who fought in the Galwan Valley clashes with Indian Army was present at the Congress. A movie released by Global Times today also documented the Galwan Valley clashes to emphasise the valour of the PLA.  

What do you make of it, as far as the India-China boundary question is concerned? What does it mean for India-China relations?

India shares nearly 4000 km long land border with China (Xinjiang and Tibet). China continues to occupy Aksai Chin on the northwest and has not accepted the Mc Mahon Line as India-China border in the Northeast India. So far 22 rounds of talks between the two countries have failed to resolve the border issue. However, both the countries have agreed to stick to existing border management protocols to avoid confrontation between the troops guarding the borders along the line of actual control (LAC) in the West and the McMahon Line in the northeast.

The clash between Chinese border troops and Indian forces at Galwan on the LAC happened on June 15/16, 2020 because India objected to China’s troop concentrations along the border and interfering with Indian border patrolling. These were in violation of existing border management protocols. Though 14 corps commander level meetings have taken place so far, still China has not vacated its troops in two contentious areas.

China using PLA’s ‘Galwan Hero’ at the Winter Olympics staged in China in February 2022 and now at the 20^th CCP Congress shows its readiness to use the incident to whip up nationalist sentiments among the population. It also shows that in China’s reckoning, repairing the adverse effect of the Galwan clash on India-China relations does not enjoy the same priority as boosting Xi’s national image.

India’s minister for external affairs S Jaishankar has maintained in recent months that relationship with China cannot be normalised till there is peace and tranquillity on the LAC. Speaking at a conference at New Delhi on October 20, he said that must prepare to “compete more effectively, especially in our immediate periphery.” On the international stage, building deeper relationships and promoting better understanding of India’s interests strengthens the country. This indicates that India will considering the relationship with China in the broader context of India’s concerns in Indo-Pacific region as a whole. He again reiterated “peace and tranquillity in the border areas clearly remain the basis for normal relations. From time to time, this has been mischievously conflated (italics added) with the sorting out of the boundary question.” This shows the border issue is far from resolved; probably China will continue to use as a pressure point against India, when required.

Q: The Zero covid strategy has been hailed as a success, in spite of the punitive costs imposed on the economy. China has also delayed the release of its official report on GDP which was expected to reveal the revised growth forecast. Given China’s economic position, how do you view the future of BRI?

China will be celebrating ten years of BRI in 2023. So we can expect China take stock of it, particularly with the economy taking a big hit thanks to its Covid pandemic strategy.  BRI can be seen as a strategic initiative for China’s global domination in keeping with its role as a political and economic superpower supported by PLA. It can also be seen as China response to its industrial overcapacity, slowing down of local demand and a vehicle to boost export growth, which is lagging now.  

China has claimed that so far 147 countries have joined the BRI. By March 2022, 140 of them have signed MOUs to become part of the BRI. BRI investments have stabilized by 2021 at $59.5 compared to $60.55 bn in 2020. BRI investment trends underperformed global trends of FDI into emerging markets.

BRI beneficiaries in Africa and South Asia have been hit hard by the global economic downturn in the wake of Covid pandemic and the Ukraine war. Infrastructure and energy projects have been laggards in Pakistan and the projects are being reviewed. Sri Lanka saddled with huge debts to service went bankrupt; it  is now undergoing an economic reset under the watch of IMF. Maldives has fared no better. BRI projects have not taken off in Nepal and China is trying to speed them up. In Bangladesh there are 27 BRI projects with Chinese support. However, out of the promised $20 bn financing, so far only $3.8 bn has been disbursed to keep them going.

Considering this gloomy picture, we can expect China to review and scrutinise the projects and take corrective measures. Its future investment can be expected to be for smaller projects in areas which will showcase China’s global concerns i.e. renewable energy. Considering China’s problems with economic recovery and global economic uncertainties due to the Ukraine war, it is doubtful whether China will be able to enhance its 2021 BRI performance. During the year, Chinese enterprises invested $20.3 bn in non-financial direct investments “along the Belt and Road” as Chinese call it.  

The economic crunch is likely to affect the outlay for new BRI projects.  So BRI projects are likely to be small; those that can achieve Xi’s  political objectives and enhance his global image are likely to be preferred. Green technology and renewable energy projects using science and technology as key enablers coming under this category are likely to be the choice. 

India’s Realpolitik

India’s long held position is that country specific resolutions are never helpful and dialogue is the way forward. Does its surprising abstention from voting on human rights in China serve its national interest?

By Col R Hariharan | Columns| India Legal Magazine | October 15, 2022

https://www.indialegallive.com/magazine/india-china-uygur-xinjiang-unhrc-abstention/

 

India’s abstention from voting on a draft resolution at the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) to debate on the human rights situation in China’s Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (XUAR) on October 6, has surprised many at home and abroad. The draft resolution, moved by a core group of eight nations—Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, the UK and the US—could find support from only 17 members in the 47-strong Council. Nineteen others, led by China and most of the Islamic countries, including Pakistan, voted against it, confirming our neighbour’s clout in the UN body.

Since 2017, international civil society organisations and media have been highlighting China’s increasing rights violations to systematically brainwash and subjugate the Uygur people. Former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet had recently submitted a scathing report on China’s coercive conduct against Uygur in XUAR. Had the resolution been voted, China would have been hauled up for the first time in the history of UNHRC to account for its terrible human rights record in XUAR. 

It was reasonable to expect that India would vote for the draft resolution, particularly as China’s conduct at the UN had been hurting its interests on several issues relating to Pakistan’s support to jihadi terrorist operations. This has been going on for quite some time to suit China’s emerging strategic interests in the Af-Pak region.

Two years ago on January 20, at the behest of Pakistan, China tried to revive the Kashmir issue for “closed-door consultation” under “AOB” (Any Other Business) at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Its attempt miserably failed after all the other 14 members of this Council rejected it. That is a small consolation for India as China has also been repeatedly blocking the UN listing of jihadi terrorists based in Pakistan as global terrorists under the UNSC 1267 Al Qaeda Sanctions Committee. China had been placing them on “technical hold” without giving specific reasons for its action.

Last month, China had blocked for the third time in four months, a proposal by India and the US at the UN to blacklist Sajid Mir, a mastermind of Lashkar-e-Taiba in the 26/11 Mumbai attacks in 2008. The UN listing of Mir as a global terrorist would have led to the freezing of all his assets and subjected him to travel ban and arms embargo. Mir was the most wanted 26/11 terrorist in India. He also figures in the FBI’s list of most wanted terrorists and carries a bounty of $5 million for his capture and arrest. As early as August 2012, the US Treasury Department had designated Mir as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist, freezing all his property in the US.

In August, China blocked yet another proposal by the US and India at the UNSC to blacklist Abdul Rauf Azhar, the brother of Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) chief Masood Azhar and a senior leader in the terrorist organisation. He had carried out the attack in Pulwama on February 14, 2019, killing 40 CRPF personnel. For long, China had blocked the listing of Masood Azhar as a global terrorist by the UNSC, though he was the chief of JeM, which is listed by the UN as a global terrorist organisation. After blocking similar moves in 2016, 2017 and 2019, China relented only in May 2019 for the UN to declare Azhar as a global terrorist.

Some reports claimed the reason for China’s change of mind was “new factual evidence” of Masood Azhar’s activities provided by some countries. However, its action was probably prompted to help Pakistan’s case for removal from the “grey list” of the Paris-based international terror-financing watch dog—the Financial Action Task Force. This was evident from the alacrity with which Pakistani authorities issued orders to freeze assets of Azhar and slapped a travel ban immediately after the UNSC ruling.

After Pakistan became a key member of President Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China’s strategic interests in the region have become multifaceted. First and foremost is to protect China’s growing investments in BRI projects in Pakistan. The other is to ensure the safety of an increasing number of Chinese ex­patriates working in Pakistan. According to a Geo-TV report on September 22, 2021, over five million Chinese are expected to be working in Pakistan by 2025 under various development, industrial and other projects, according to a senior public health expert. Their security has become a major concern for China, particularly after targeted attacks against them in Balochistan.

China would also like to strengthen its strategic links with the Taliban after it came to power in Afghanistan. It has been maintaining contact with the Taliban all along to prevent any support to the Uygurs’ anti-China agitation in Xinjiang. In fact, China’s ambassador to Pakistan Lu Shulin was the first senior diplomat of any non-Islamic country to meet Taliban leader Mullah Omar in 2000. Omar is said to have assured him that the Taliban will not allow Uygurs in its ranks to launch attacks inside Xinjiang. It is significant that there have been no major attacks by Uygurs against the Chinese in Xinjiang in recent times.

Taliban’s rival Salafist outfit, the Islamic State-Khorasan (ISIS-K), has become active once again after the Taliban subdued it in and around Kabul and Nangarhar province in 2021. On August 19, ISIS-K claimed responsibility for a bomb blast in a mosque in Kabul which killed 21 worshippers, including Rahimullah Haqqani, an influential Taliban-linked cleric. The ISIS-K is said to enjoy financial and political backing from the parent organisation. This must be worrying for China because the members of the outfit have the ability to operate across the borders in Xinjiang.

China’s crackdown against the Uygurs, Kazakhs, and other predominantly Muslim ethnic minorities in Xinjiang, carried out in the name of fighting terrorism since 2017, is well documented. Given this background, why did India abstain when the UNHRC debated China’s human rights violations against Uygurs in Xinjiang?

Answering the question at a press briefing, Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) spokesperson Arindam Bagchi said: “India remains committed to upholding all human rights. India’s vote is in line with its long held position that country specific resolutions are never helpful. India favours a dialogue to deal with such issues.” 

“We have taken note of the OHCHR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights) Assessment of human rights concerns in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, People’s Republic of China. The human rights of the people of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region should be respected and guaranteed. We hope that the relevant party will address the situation objectively and properly,” he added.

The MEA explanation may sound Machiavellian. But India has traditionally voted against or abstained on such country specific resolutions at the UNHRC. Generally, India’s stand at the UN is nuanced to serve its national interest while maintaining its focus on core issues. In other words, it is an expression of realpolitik. 

A recent example was India’s abstention on the resolution on “Promoting reconciliation, accountability and human rights in Sri Lanka”, adopted by the UNHRC at the 51st Session in Geneva. Twenty of the 47 members voted for the resolution, seven against, including China and Pakistan and 20 abstentions including India, Japan, Nepal and Qatar.

In a statement during the adoption of the resolution, India’s representative Indra Mani Pandey said that while India has taken note of the commitments by Sri Lanka on implementation of the measures in the spirit of the 13th Constitutional Amendment and the early conduct of provincial elections, “we believe that the progress towards the same remains inadequate.” In other words, while India stood for the promotion of reconciliation, accountability and human rights in Sri Lanka, it would like the island nation to fulfil its commitments to India as per the 13th Constitutional Amendment and conduct the much-delayed provincial elections.

This is amply borne out by India’s stand on a spate of resolutions at the UNSC, UN General Assembly and UNHRC relating to Russia’s war in Ukraine that started in February. It took India six months before it voted against its trusted friend Russia for the first time during a “procedural vote” at the UNSC. It was in favour of inviting Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to address a meeting of the UNSC through a video-conference; Russia cast the lone vote against it.

A few days ago, for the third time in the past few months, India voted against Russia when it wanted a secret ballot on a draft resolution to condemn its “annexation” of four regions of Ukraine at the UN General Assembly. The resolution will be coming up for voting during the week. External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar was asked at an interaction in Lowy Institute in Canberra about how India would vote on the resolution? He replied: “Nobody puts their decision to vote out in front. You take the call when you have to…A large part of the world today is hurting because of this conflict…because their lives are impacted in a very damaging manner.”

Jaishankar in his book “The India Way: Strategies for an Uncertain World”, written after his retirement from the MEA and before he became a minister, explains the essence of foreign policy making by the present government. It calls for realism in terms of a policy which is not idealistic. A policy that does not believe achieving peace is easy and cheap. And a policy which perceives national security as a key component of foreign policy. This forms the backdrop of India’s stand on various issues in international relations. 

—The writer is a retired military intelligence specialist on South Asia associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies