Col R Hariharan will be participating as a panelist in a debate being broadcast by Chennai Live 104.8 FM, Chennai’s only English radio station on Monday, September 6, 2010. Other details are given below:
Time: From 8.30 AM to 10.00 AM
Topic of debate: Is Negotiation With Naxals, Terrorists & Hijackers A Sign Of Weakness Or Discretion?
Moderator: Mr Sanjay Pinto of NDTV
Listeners are welcome to send their comments.
Sunday, 5 September 2010
My Army Life 1977-2006
I Love the Indian Army – but I must leave Now!
I stumbled into the Indian Army in the late seventies. The School which admitted us mid-session, when we returned from Singapore, where my father had a brief teaching stint at the Singapore University, was The Army Public School, Dhaula Kuan. With teenage sons of Army officers as friends, it was natural to apply to join the National Defence Academy. A friend filled my form and even paid the application fee. I wasn’t serious at all of pursuing a career in the military – much like Hrithik Roshan in Lakshya. I saw a movie with my friends, after each of the four NDA entrance papers, and argued with my father when he questioned me on my lack of commitment to the exam.
Surprisingly, I qualified on the Service Selection Board standing 19th in the Army all India merit list. I then chose to join the National Defence Academy, as a career was assured at such an early age.
Astonishingly, within a few days of joining the NDA, at pristine Khadakwasala, I began my life long affection and admiration for the Indian Army. The NDA was awesome and I took to it as if the place was always meant for me. It was, and probably still is, a remarkable institution where everything works like clockwork, and boys transform into enthusiastic, self confident young men with fire in their belly and an idealistic vision to contribute meaningfully to the security challenges that India would face in the future.
Three years later at the Indian Military Academy in Dehra Dun, I learnt that toughness and fitness was not just about well developed physical abilities, but also as much about mental strength, and that the IMA motto of ‘Service before Self’ was not some Gandhian mumbo-jumbo, but the very edifice of life in uniform as an officer.
The many years in my Infantry battalion were even more memorable. Not a day was spent as “work”. Every day was enjoyable with a huge family of 800 men; the love, respect and camaraderie was astonishing especially in this day and age. A life of great honesty of purpose; lived simply and with great pride, respect and honour.
I had a tour of duty in Kashmir in every rank I have held. As a Lieutenant in Baramulla before the militancy, as a Captain in the Siachen Glacier at 20,000 feet, as a Major and company commander in Kupwara fighting terrorists, and as Lt Col as second-in-command of my unit in Badgam in a counter insurgency deployment on the outskirts of the Srinagar airport. Finally as a Colonel and Battalion commander, I had three different innings in the Kashmir Valley, first as part of the offensive plans during OP PARAKRAM in 2001, then fighting militants in Anantnag during the 2002 Amarnath Yatra and during the state elections, and finally on the Line of Control in high altitude in the majestic Gurez Valley.
Interspersed between these challenging times was an opportunity to serve with the United Nations in Iraq-Kuwait as a Military Observer where I saw closely officers from 34 different nations from around the globe and learnt from them about their militaries and the relationship between the State and the soldier in other countries.
I also had instructional assignments at the Indian Military Academy, Dehra Dun and at the Infantry School teaching young infantry officers. I then had an enriching year at the Army War College at Mhow during the Higher Command course in 2004-5, learning the art of higher command in the military and traveling to every corner of the country, expanding knowledge, visiting not just our various military headquarters, but also the citadels of economic power of our nation.
After the one year sabbatical at Mhow, I moved, in Apr 2005 to a dream job, to the seat of power of the Army in Delhi – the Army Headquarters with an office in South Block and an appointment in the personnel Branch of the Army dealing with postings and promotions of officers of our Army.
After three years at Delhi, a Brigadiers rank was round the corner in mid 2008. The sixth Pay commission too was promising salaries to meet with the aspirations of soldiers and government officials who had been made to feel like poor cousins to their corporate friends in the galloping India of the 21st century.
In spite of such a bright future, I felt I must I leave the Indian Army.
The three years in the nation’s capital left me with a strange emptiness which refused to go away. All the years, I felt that the many years I spent away from my immediate family, in remote corners of India, were for a cause which was noble and worthwhile. I always felt huge pride for my soldiers and brother officers. I felt there is a grateful nation behind all of us stationed so far away, battling the vagaries of weather and the uncertainty of life.
I remember in SIACHEN, in 1988, just before we started our deployment on the main Glacier, the shy 17 year old soldier, no more than a kid, who met me, then the Adjutant, and requested me to be posted to the transport platoon after this tenure, as he was very fond of motor vehicles. Four days later, he was violently taken ill at KUMAR our Headquarters at 16000 feet. We tended to him the whole night, as the helicopter could come to rescue him away only in the morning. Sadly, the High Altitude Pulmonary Odema which afflicted him was faster. He was dead before the copter arrived at the crack of dawn. It was a sad loss so soon after our induction on to the Glacier, but we took it on our chin as the accepted dangers of a soldier’s life. We shed not a tear, and proceeded to do our duty for the next six months, battling the odds and the enemy, in incredibly difficult conditions.
I recall when a soldier, who had slipped and fallen towards the enemy side was rescued at Bana top, at 20,000 feet by a brave and courageous officer who went across single handedly at grave risk to his life, to get him back. The soldier spent four hours exposed to temperatures of below minus 40 degrees C, (later both his arms were amputated). When I met him in the hospital a month later he said he knew that his company commander would come to rescue him. It taught me a lesson in trust, faith, camaraderie and leadership which I shall never forget for the rest of my life.
I also recall the young soldier who bravely jumped into a building, unrelentingly chasing three dreaded terrorists who had hidden there. We were on the outskirts of Srinagar airfield and fighting a fierce gun battle through the cold winter night in Dec 2000. He killed two of them but in the process was hit by a bullet through the head. He died in my arms. What was even more poignant was the gesture by his father when we honoured him on our battalions Raising day, the following year. In an age where money means everything, the old man broken by his young son’s loss, refused the money we as a unit of 800 had collected as a gesture of our sympathy and concern. He said he had no need for the money and the unit could put it to better use by honouring his brave son in any appropriate way.
What I observed over these three years at Delhi, unfortunately have been a sad revelation of the nature of the relationship between the Indian soldier, the State and the people of India. Like RK Laxmans common man, I have observed silently the ignorance and apathy of the establishment towards all issues military.
As our expectations from our cricket team, we expect the very best from our military in critical moments of our history, like the 71 War or the Kargil conflict.
If we were to build our home, we shall obviously get the best builders and architects we can afford, if our mother was taken ill, we would look for the very best hospital and doctor that we can afford. The critical question is; do we do enough as a nation to ensure that we have the best military India can afford?
Are we as a nation doing enough to ensure that we have the best men and systems in place to guard our sovereignty and security interests? Do we do enough to recruit and retain the brightest men and do we have the structures in place to meet the security challenges within and across our borders in the coming years?
For a start, the inability to put in place an integrated Chief of Defence Staff is the foremost of our weaknesses and is symptomatic of the apathy and ignorance of military matters in modern India. It is often dismissed as a peripheral issue, one that can wait till the services themselves resolve it. The hard truth is that without true integration of the Army, the Air Force and the Navy, a modern military will be grossly inept and incapable of prosecuting a modern day war. To use the cricketing analogy a bit further, the Kargil war was T 20 cricket and can hide a few fatal flaws, but a full scale war will be like a Test match, only synergy; balance, close integration and team spirit will ensure success.
You cannot blame the Defence Secretary or the civilian staff in the Ministry of Defence for the lack of awareness of these issues – very often the Defence Secretary would not have a days experience in the ministry till he joins as the head of the Ministry of Defence. He may have arrived from the commerce, railways or whichever ministry, the senior most bureaucrat is available at that time. The Defence Minister too often has no experience on defence matters till he becomes the Defence Minister. It is like appointing a CEO in a telecom company who had spent all his life in the cement industry!
We cannot quite expect them to understand the vital need for integration of the Services. As a comparison to our system, the United States has a long tradition of appointing secretaries of Defence and Presidents who have spent years soldiering or they choose from retired Generals with vision and an impeccable record of service for these assignments. In fact, even in India it would be inconceivable for the Foreign Secretary to be appointed from amongst the bureaucrats in say the coal ministry, so this assumption that the defence ministry can be managed by amateurs is an insult and an affront to the security needs of India.
To cite another example, we have no clearly enunciated and documented national counter-terrorism policy. In a nation where the threat of terrorism looms larger with every passing day, it is a matter of shame that we haven’t formulated one yet. With the best minds in the Army, with years of experience in counter terrorism retiring every year, it is a pity we have failed to capitalize on their experience and set out a clearly laid out document. The alarming growth of the Maoists in the Red Corridor, will test the ability of the Indian state to respond to this challenge in the coming years. Policing being a State subject and internal threats being the concerns of the Home Ministry, there is an urgent need to look at counter terrorism holistically outside the confines of individual perceptions of States and various ministries. We must radically alter the narrow confines of each ministry when we define the policy for internal threats. There is apparently a visible lack of statesmanship and professionalism on any macro issue concerning national security.
An oblique pointer to India’s concerns on national security and how embedded the military leader is in the psyche of the educated Indian is the representation at various Leadership summits and conclaves. The ‘who is who’ of India and other countries are invariable present. There will be national political figures, corporate leaders, media barons, and of course movie moughals. So while we have the likes of Aiswarya Rai and Sharukh Khan telling us their take on leadership – the practising military leader, whether a senior General or the young Major who is an Ashok Chakra winner – shining examples of leadership in its many hues – are conspicuous by their absence.
From our fiercely independent and vibrant media, one would have expected greater maturity in their coverage of security affairs. It is revealing that a study in the USA suggests that the gradual erosion of coverage of international issues by their media networks was possibly a reason for their flawed international security interventions as the American public was not capable or knowledgeable enough to question their leadership. The Indian media must ask itself – do they exhibit enough concern on the larger dimensions of national security and do they have enough knowledge of military affairs to fulfill their role as the watchdogs of the nation? Will the increasing trivialization and localization of news affect our security?
There are many such concerns that we must address as a military, as a society and as a nation. There are individual and collective responsibilities that we must fulfill. Will India and Indians meet the challenge of the future? Time, and the collective will of the nation, will tell.
Posted on August 29, 2010 by gopalkarunakaran
[Reproduced from another blog]
I stumbled into the Indian Army in the late seventies. The School which admitted us mid-session, when we returned from Singapore, where my father had a brief teaching stint at the Singapore University, was The Army Public School, Dhaula Kuan. With teenage sons of Army officers as friends, it was natural to apply to join the National Defence Academy. A friend filled my form and even paid the application fee. I wasn’t serious at all of pursuing a career in the military – much like Hrithik Roshan in Lakshya. I saw a movie with my friends, after each of the four NDA entrance papers, and argued with my father when he questioned me on my lack of commitment to the exam.
Surprisingly, I qualified on the Service Selection Board standing 19th in the Army all India merit list. I then chose to join the National Defence Academy, as a career was assured at such an early age.
Astonishingly, within a few days of joining the NDA, at pristine Khadakwasala, I began my life long affection and admiration for the Indian Army. The NDA was awesome and I took to it as if the place was always meant for me. It was, and probably still is, a remarkable institution where everything works like clockwork, and boys transform into enthusiastic, self confident young men with fire in their belly and an idealistic vision to contribute meaningfully to the security challenges that India would face in the future.
Three years later at the Indian Military Academy in Dehra Dun, I learnt that toughness and fitness was not just about well developed physical abilities, but also as much about mental strength, and that the IMA motto of ‘Service before Self’ was not some Gandhian mumbo-jumbo, but the very edifice of life in uniform as an officer.
The many years in my Infantry battalion were even more memorable. Not a day was spent as “work”. Every day was enjoyable with a huge family of 800 men; the love, respect and camaraderie was astonishing especially in this day and age. A life of great honesty of purpose; lived simply and with great pride, respect and honour.
I had a tour of duty in Kashmir in every rank I have held. As a Lieutenant in Baramulla before the militancy, as a Captain in the Siachen Glacier at 20,000 feet, as a Major and company commander in Kupwara fighting terrorists, and as Lt Col as second-in-command of my unit in Badgam in a counter insurgency deployment on the outskirts of the Srinagar airport. Finally as a Colonel and Battalion commander, I had three different innings in the Kashmir Valley, first as part of the offensive plans during OP PARAKRAM in 2001, then fighting militants in Anantnag during the 2002 Amarnath Yatra and during the state elections, and finally on the Line of Control in high altitude in the majestic Gurez Valley.
Interspersed between these challenging times was an opportunity to serve with the United Nations in Iraq-Kuwait as a Military Observer where I saw closely officers from 34 different nations from around the globe and learnt from them about their militaries and the relationship between the State and the soldier in other countries.
I also had instructional assignments at the Indian Military Academy, Dehra Dun and at the Infantry School teaching young infantry officers. I then had an enriching year at the Army War College at Mhow during the Higher Command course in 2004-5, learning the art of higher command in the military and traveling to every corner of the country, expanding knowledge, visiting not just our various military headquarters, but also the citadels of economic power of our nation.
After the one year sabbatical at Mhow, I moved, in Apr 2005 to a dream job, to the seat of power of the Army in Delhi – the Army Headquarters with an office in South Block and an appointment in the personnel Branch of the Army dealing with postings and promotions of officers of our Army.
After three years at Delhi, a Brigadiers rank was round the corner in mid 2008. The sixth Pay commission too was promising salaries to meet with the aspirations of soldiers and government officials who had been made to feel like poor cousins to their corporate friends in the galloping India of the 21st century.
In spite of such a bright future, I felt I must I leave the Indian Army.
The three years in the nation’s capital left me with a strange emptiness which refused to go away. All the years, I felt that the many years I spent away from my immediate family, in remote corners of India, were for a cause which was noble and worthwhile. I always felt huge pride for my soldiers and brother officers. I felt there is a grateful nation behind all of us stationed so far away, battling the vagaries of weather and the uncertainty of life.
I remember in SIACHEN, in 1988, just before we started our deployment on the main Glacier, the shy 17 year old soldier, no more than a kid, who met me, then the Adjutant, and requested me to be posted to the transport platoon after this tenure, as he was very fond of motor vehicles. Four days later, he was violently taken ill at KUMAR our Headquarters at 16000 feet. We tended to him the whole night, as the helicopter could come to rescue him away only in the morning. Sadly, the High Altitude Pulmonary Odema which afflicted him was faster. He was dead before the copter arrived at the crack of dawn. It was a sad loss so soon after our induction on to the Glacier, but we took it on our chin as the accepted dangers of a soldier’s life. We shed not a tear, and proceeded to do our duty for the next six months, battling the odds and the enemy, in incredibly difficult conditions.
I recall when a soldier, who had slipped and fallen towards the enemy side was rescued at Bana top, at 20,000 feet by a brave and courageous officer who went across single handedly at grave risk to his life, to get him back. The soldier spent four hours exposed to temperatures of below minus 40 degrees C, (later both his arms were amputated). When I met him in the hospital a month later he said he knew that his company commander would come to rescue him. It taught me a lesson in trust, faith, camaraderie and leadership which I shall never forget for the rest of my life.
I also recall the young soldier who bravely jumped into a building, unrelentingly chasing three dreaded terrorists who had hidden there. We were on the outskirts of Srinagar airfield and fighting a fierce gun battle through the cold winter night in Dec 2000. He killed two of them but in the process was hit by a bullet through the head. He died in my arms. What was even more poignant was the gesture by his father when we honoured him on our battalions Raising day, the following year. In an age where money means everything, the old man broken by his young son’s loss, refused the money we as a unit of 800 had collected as a gesture of our sympathy and concern. He said he had no need for the money and the unit could put it to better use by honouring his brave son in any appropriate way.
What I observed over these three years at Delhi, unfortunately have been a sad revelation of the nature of the relationship between the Indian soldier, the State and the people of India. Like RK Laxmans common man, I have observed silently the ignorance and apathy of the establishment towards all issues military.
As our expectations from our cricket team, we expect the very best from our military in critical moments of our history, like the 71 War or the Kargil conflict.
If we were to build our home, we shall obviously get the best builders and architects we can afford, if our mother was taken ill, we would look for the very best hospital and doctor that we can afford. The critical question is; do we do enough as a nation to ensure that we have the best military India can afford?
Are we as a nation doing enough to ensure that we have the best men and systems in place to guard our sovereignty and security interests? Do we do enough to recruit and retain the brightest men and do we have the structures in place to meet the security challenges within and across our borders in the coming years?
For a start, the inability to put in place an integrated Chief of Defence Staff is the foremost of our weaknesses and is symptomatic of the apathy and ignorance of military matters in modern India. It is often dismissed as a peripheral issue, one that can wait till the services themselves resolve it. The hard truth is that without true integration of the Army, the Air Force and the Navy, a modern military will be grossly inept and incapable of prosecuting a modern day war. To use the cricketing analogy a bit further, the Kargil war was T 20 cricket and can hide a few fatal flaws, but a full scale war will be like a Test match, only synergy; balance, close integration and team spirit will ensure success.
You cannot blame the Defence Secretary or the civilian staff in the Ministry of Defence for the lack of awareness of these issues – very often the Defence Secretary would not have a days experience in the ministry till he joins as the head of the Ministry of Defence. He may have arrived from the commerce, railways or whichever ministry, the senior most bureaucrat is available at that time. The Defence Minister too often has no experience on defence matters till he becomes the Defence Minister. It is like appointing a CEO in a telecom company who had spent all his life in the cement industry!
We cannot quite expect them to understand the vital need for integration of the Services. As a comparison to our system, the United States has a long tradition of appointing secretaries of Defence and Presidents who have spent years soldiering or they choose from retired Generals with vision and an impeccable record of service for these assignments. In fact, even in India it would be inconceivable for the Foreign Secretary to be appointed from amongst the bureaucrats in say the coal ministry, so this assumption that the defence ministry can be managed by amateurs is an insult and an affront to the security needs of India.
To cite another example, we have no clearly enunciated and documented national counter-terrorism policy. In a nation where the threat of terrorism looms larger with every passing day, it is a matter of shame that we haven’t formulated one yet. With the best minds in the Army, with years of experience in counter terrorism retiring every year, it is a pity we have failed to capitalize on their experience and set out a clearly laid out document. The alarming growth of the Maoists in the Red Corridor, will test the ability of the Indian state to respond to this challenge in the coming years. Policing being a State subject and internal threats being the concerns of the Home Ministry, there is an urgent need to look at counter terrorism holistically outside the confines of individual perceptions of States and various ministries. We must radically alter the narrow confines of each ministry when we define the policy for internal threats. There is apparently a visible lack of statesmanship and professionalism on any macro issue concerning national security.
An oblique pointer to India’s concerns on national security and how embedded the military leader is in the psyche of the educated Indian is the representation at various Leadership summits and conclaves. The ‘who is who’ of India and other countries are invariable present. There will be national political figures, corporate leaders, media barons, and of course movie moughals. So while we have the likes of Aiswarya Rai and Sharukh Khan telling us their take on leadership – the practising military leader, whether a senior General or the young Major who is an Ashok Chakra winner – shining examples of leadership in its many hues – are conspicuous by their absence.
From our fiercely independent and vibrant media, one would have expected greater maturity in their coverage of security affairs. It is revealing that a study in the USA suggests that the gradual erosion of coverage of international issues by their media networks was possibly a reason for their flawed international security interventions as the American public was not capable or knowledgeable enough to question their leadership. The Indian media must ask itself – do they exhibit enough concern on the larger dimensions of national security and do they have enough knowledge of military affairs to fulfill their role as the watchdogs of the nation? Will the increasing trivialization and localization of news affect our security?
There are many such concerns that we must address as a military, as a society and as a nation. There are individual and collective responsibilities that we must fulfill. Will India and Indians meet the challenge of the future? Time, and the collective will of the nation, will tell.
Posted on August 29, 2010 by gopalkarunakaran
[Reproduced from another blog]
Learning from Wikileaks
By Col R Hariharan
To those weary of reading all about the Wikileaks -the publication of 92,000 secret military intelligence documents relating to the U.S. war against the Al Qaeda in Afghanistan on the net – I can assure this article is not to ‘advise’ Americans how to conduct the war. This is about what we in India can learn from the leaks relating two key areas – governance and intelligence operations.
Wikileaks has brought about the stark reality of modern environment of war and peace which coexist in nations fighting terrorism and insurgency. Compromise of military operational secrets also questions government policy decisions and applications as President Barack Obama is finding out now. In democracies it is elected members who critically analyse government actions in parliament. But Wikileaks has enlarged arena of debate to public domain where everyman will be questioning the government based on the information from Wikileaks. Such public debates are healthy no doubt; but they could also make governments overcautious to in taking timely decisions. At times it could drive them to the point of inaction.
Wikileaks’ insights on the relationship between governance and conduct of war are revealing. Governance relates to a whole gamut of issues extending from policy prescriptions, to logistics and inept decision making as much as poor generalship and conduct of operations of armed forces.
Wikileaks is not the first large scale leakage of classified papers. The ‘Pentagon Papers’ during the Vietnam War compromised by Daniel Ellsberg who worked for Rand Corporation was another classic case of similar proportions. But the scale and scope of Wikileaks is unprecedented. In fact Wikileaks will be releasing 12,000 more documents relating to Afghan war. Nor Wikileaks will be the last. The reason is simple: the era of right to information and whistle blowers is here to stay. As this is the era of copy cats, we can soon expect our own Indian edition of Wikileaks. So is the government gearing up for such possibility? I have my reservations as our lumbering style of governance has its own method of stymieing any new ideas. And if there is a ‘Delhileak’ of massive proportions there would not be enough fig leaves for the government to hide behind.
And suppressing such leaks is not going to be easy. It may also be politically not prudent to take action under the Official Secrets Act against a whistleblower. Whistleblowers have become modern day Davids fighting the Goliath of mindless governments. Ideally the only way make them inactive is for the rulers to clean up their acts. And that is not going to be easy as ultimately such dirty jobs fall on the laps of bureaucracy. So bureaucracy is likely to end up with this unviable job without supportive policy decisions. This could mean cosy days of bureaucracy taking a snooze and leave the decision making to committees (or in our case groups of ministers) are (hopefully) coming to a close.
Even before Wikileaks hit the headlines, New Delhi has been in a tizzy as our TV channels have frequently displayed documents ‘leaked to them’ on a number of inconvenient issues. Undoubtedly whistleblowers have been doing a splendid job to keep the public informed of the misdeeds of power brokers. The underground ‘political’ response to whistleblowers has resulted in the growing number of unnatural deaths among them. So far the long arm of law had been showing studied reluctance to act even in cases where the identity of the whistleblower was compromised at the highest level. There had been increasing public outrage at this.
Deferring to public opinion, the Union Cabinet has recently given the go ahead for the Public Interest Disclosure and Protection to Persons Making Disclosure Bill 2010 to be introduced in parliament. The Bill provides the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) the powers of a civil court to enable it to penalise people revealing the identity of whistleblowers. The onus will be on the CVC to protect the identity of citizens who provide information about the misuse of governmental authority and funds. But can the CVC act boldly under the new enactment in the inner sanctums of South or North Block?
As an old MI hand, with the advent of electronic age I find age-old problems of intelligence have morphed into gigantic proportions. With the click of a mouse, Wikileaks has compromised a colossal number of secret documents. Traditionally the enemy eavesdrops on secrets of state by infiltrating an agent to access the secrets. The revolution in electronics and communication has made this job much easier. The agent or source need not be near the operational area any more to unravel the secrets. He could do the same job from another country where he can access the server or elsewhere if the work is farmed out offshore.
Ideally to overcome this problem, the vetting process of those employed on sensitive jobs will have to be constantly upgraded to keep pace with advances in technology. But these are unlikely to stop whistleblowers acting according to their conscience. The FBI has already arrested Bradley Manning, 22-year old IT professional who was horrified at the atrocities committed on Afghan war, for suspected involvement in the leaks. Regardless of merits of the issue, what can security administrator in war or peace do about such whistleblowers? Very little, as our democracy is more condescending to the perpetrator as long as he does not wear a uniform. With individual freedom gaining more space than national interest, and the media vying for exclusive news breaks plugging such leaks will not be easy. This is evident from the follow up on Wikileaks.
Wikileaks has also done a great disservice to intelligence community by giving out the particulars of agents and sources who had been working for law enforcing agencies, government, and armed forces. What will happen to them now as their cover is blown? Who will save them from terror threats to their lives and property? These are open ended questions that must be bothering the American intelligence agencies on the ground in Afghanistan. But it is time we also found answers to these questions as our security enforcement systems are loose and criminal nexus with extremism is rampant. The job of intelligence gatherers is going to be much more difficult. Probably a healthy mix of technology tools and human intelligence would emerge as the answer to problems of intelligence gathering.
At times intelligence agencies carry out double cross operations converting the agent caught in the act to work for them. At the height of Cold War, the British SIS and CIA successfully mounted - Berlin Tunnel - a major operation to tap the underground cable lines between East Berlin to Moscow by digging a tunnel. However, when the KGP came to know of it, it decided to turn it into its favour by deception. Soviets sent a lot of dummy traffic that kept the SIS-CIA sleuths in a wasteful exercise of translating thousands of transcripts, while KGB honchos were tickled to death. Such deception operations to reduce the compromise of sources and information through leaks of the Wikileaks could be the answer. But that is totally a different ball game.
To those weary of reading all about the Wikileaks -the publication of 92,000 secret military intelligence documents relating to the U.S. war against the Al Qaeda in Afghanistan on the net – I can assure this article is not to ‘advise’ Americans how to conduct the war. This is about what we in India can learn from the leaks relating two key areas – governance and intelligence operations.
Wikileaks has brought about the stark reality of modern environment of war and peace which coexist in nations fighting terrorism and insurgency. Compromise of military operational secrets also questions government policy decisions and applications as President Barack Obama is finding out now. In democracies it is elected members who critically analyse government actions in parliament. But Wikileaks has enlarged arena of debate to public domain where everyman will be questioning the government based on the information from Wikileaks. Such public debates are healthy no doubt; but they could also make governments overcautious to in taking timely decisions. At times it could drive them to the point of inaction.
Wikileaks’ insights on the relationship between governance and conduct of war are revealing. Governance relates to a whole gamut of issues extending from policy prescriptions, to logistics and inept decision making as much as poor generalship and conduct of operations of armed forces.
Wikileaks is not the first large scale leakage of classified papers. The ‘Pentagon Papers’ during the Vietnam War compromised by Daniel Ellsberg who worked for Rand Corporation was another classic case of similar proportions. But the scale and scope of Wikileaks is unprecedented. In fact Wikileaks will be releasing 12,000 more documents relating to Afghan war. Nor Wikileaks will be the last. The reason is simple: the era of right to information and whistle blowers is here to stay. As this is the era of copy cats, we can soon expect our own Indian edition of Wikileaks. So is the government gearing up for such possibility? I have my reservations as our lumbering style of governance has its own method of stymieing any new ideas. And if there is a ‘Delhileak’ of massive proportions there would not be enough fig leaves for the government to hide behind.
And suppressing such leaks is not going to be easy. It may also be politically not prudent to take action under the Official Secrets Act against a whistleblower. Whistleblowers have become modern day Davids fighting the Goliath of mindless governments. Ideally the only way make them inactive is for the rulers to clean up their acts. And that is not going to be easy as ultimately such dirty jobs fall on the laps of bureaucracy. So bureaucracy is likely to end up with this unviable job without supportive policy decisions. This could mean cosy days of bureaucracy taking a snooze and leave the decision making to committees (or in our case groups of ministers) are (hopefully) coming to a close.
Even before Wikileaks hit the headlines, New Delhi has been in a tizzy as our TV channels have frequently displayed documents ‘leaked to them’ on a number of inconvenient issues. Undoubtedly whistleblowers have been doing a splendid job to keep the public informed of the misdeeds of power brokers. The underground ‘political’ response to whistleblowers has resulted in the growing number of unnatural deaths among them. So far the long arm of law had been showing studied reluctance to act even in cases where the identity of the whistleblower was compromised at the highest level. There had been increasing public outrage at this.
Deferring to public opinion, the Union Cabinet has recently given the go ahead for the Public Interest Disclosure and Protection to Persons Making Disclosure Bill 2010 to be introduced in parliament. The Bill provides the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) the powers of a civil court to enable it to penalise people revealing the identity of whistleblowers. The onus will be on the CVC to protect the identity of citizens who provide information about the misuse of governmental authority and funds. But can the CVC act boldly under the new enactment in the inner sanctums of South or North Block?
As an old MI hand, with the advent of electronic age I find age-old problems of intelligence have morphed into gigantic proportions. With the click of a mouse, Wikileaks has compromised a colossal number of secret documents. Traditionally the enemy eavesdrops on secrets of state by infiltrating an agent to access the secrets. The revolution in electronics and communication has made this job much easier. The agent or source need not be near the operational area any more to unravel the secrets. He could do the same job from another country where he can access the server or elsewhere if the work is farmed out offshore.
Ideally to overcome this problem, the vetting process of those employed on sensitive jobs will have to be constantly upgraded to keep pace with advances in technology. But these are unlikely to stop whistleblowers acting according to their conscience. The FBI has already arrested Bradley Manning, 22-year old IT professional who was horrified at the atrocities committed on Afghan war, for suspected involvement in the leaks. Regardless of merits of the issue, what can security administrator in war or peace do about such whistleblowers? Very little, as our democracy is more condescending to the perpetrator as long as he does not wear a uniform. With individual freedom gaining more space than national interest, and the media vying for exclusive news breaks plugging such leaks will not be easy. This is evident from the follow up on Wikileaks.
Wikileaks has also done a great disservice to intelligence community by giving out the particulars of agents and sources who had been working for law enforcing agencies, government, and armed forces. What will happen to them now as their cover is blown? Who will save them from terror threats to their lives and property? These are open ended questions that must be bothering the American intelligence agencies on the ground in Afghanistan. But it is time we also found answers to these questions as our security enforcement systems are loose and criminal nexus with extremism is rampant. The job of intelligence gatherers is going to be much more difficult. Probably a healthy mix of technology tools and human intelligence would emerge as the answer to problems of intelligence gathering.
At times intelligence agencies carry out double cross operations converting the agent caught in the act to work for them. At the height of Cold War, the British SIS and CIA successfully mounted - Berlin Tunnel - a major operation to tap the underground cable lines between East Berlin to Moscow by digging a tunnel. However, when the KGP came to know of it, it decided to turn it into its favour by deception. Soviets sent a lot of dummy traffic that kept the SIS-CIA sleuths in a wasteful exercise of translating thousands of transcripts, while KGB honchos were tickled to death. Such deception operations to reduce the compromise of sources and information through leaks of the Wikileaks could be the answer. But that is totally a different ball game.
Friday, 3 September 2010
Sri Lanka Perspectives - August 2010
By Col R Hariharan
Constitutional amendments
The Rajapaksa government is set to carry out the much awaited amendments to the 1978 Constitution. The Supreme Court is to give its comments on the proposed amendments and the parliament is scheduled to discuss them on September 8.
The need for constitutional amendments, particularly with a view to exercise some form of parliamentary oversight on the executive presidency, had figured as a major issue in almost all elections. President Rajapaksa had been sounding leaders of most of the political parties including the opposition United National Party (UNP) on this issue ever since he was elected for a second term. However, till now he had not been able to push through the amendments as the ruling United Peoples Freedom Alliance (UPFA), with 144 seats, fell short of two thirds majority support in the 225-member house.
However, towards the end of August, the president managed to win over the support of the opposition Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) which has 8-members in parliament. The surprise U-turn of the SLMC, which had been opposing President Rajapaksa all along, shows the declining fortunes of political opposition. The proposed amendments are likely to be passed in parliament with the committed support of 154 members in the first week of September.
The proportional representation system of voting makes it difficult for any political party or alliance to gain two thirds majority in the house Thus the amendment of the constitution will be a politically significant achievement for President Rajapaksa. One of the proposed amendments allows the election of the president for third term in office; this will enable President Rajapaksa a chance to be elected a third term. Thus consolidation of the president’s political power now appears to be almost complete.
Under the 1978 constitution, the President enjoys enormous powers including the unilateral dissolution of parliament and declaration of emergency. He also has powers to appoint judges, heads of armed forces and police, election commissioners and secretaries to the government etc. In a state of emergency, the President can even promulgate emergency regulations to override laws enacted by the parliament. Sri Lanka has a long history of emergency since 1970 mainly triggered by war against Tamil separatists. Even though the war ended in May 2009, the emergency continues to be in force. This has caused concern to civil society organisations both at home and abroad.
In a bid to ensure some form of control over President’s powers to make appointments to high office, the parliament adopted the 17th Amendment to the Constitution in 2001. This makes it mandatory for the president to act on the recommendations of a 10-member Constitutional Council (CC) while making appointments. However, so far there had been no attempt to enforce the 17th Amendment in letter and spirit. One of the amendments proposed now, aims at replacing the CC with a five-member Constitutional Advisory Committee (CAC). The name of the proposed amendment would suggest the advisory rather than mandatory nature of its role. This could defeat the fundamental purpose of the 17th Amendment.
Sri Lanka’s credibility has suffered over allegations of humanitarian and human rights excesses both during the war, particularly in its last lap. Given this background its reputation as a democracy now depends entirely upon how President Rajapaksa handles enormous powers vested in him in the next decade and a half, assuming he is elected for a third term.
Court martial of General Sarath Fonseka
The process of downsizing of the political image of former Army Commander General Sarath Fonseka made significant progress when an army court martial found him guilty of engaging in politics while in service. With President’s approval, the General has been cashiered and stripped of his medals and honours.
Those who gave evidence against the General included the Cooperatives and Internal Trade Minister Johnston Fernando, UNP MP Lakshman Seneviratne, and Major General Krishantha Silva, former Military Secretary.
Fonseka is facing one more Court Martial for his alleged involvement in shady procurement deals, which also involved his son-in-law Dhanuna Tillekeratne. In addition to this, he has also been indicted for defamation over his alleged statement in The Sunday Leader accusing the Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa of ordering the army not to take prisoners during the war in Vanni.
Fonseka is the leader of the opposition Democratic National Alliance (DNA) in parliament. The main opposition parties including the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) alliance partner of the DNA, and the UNP have condemned the conviction of Fonseka, as politics of persecution. Fonseka had opposed Rajapaksa’s bid for the second term as president. Whether it is true or not, the prosecution of the national hero marks the low ebb of politics in the country.
India raises its sights on Sri Lanka
As Tamil Nadu is gearing up for legislative elections, both the ruling Dravida Munnetra Kazagham (DMK) and its national ally the Congress Party have focused on Indian aid to Sri Lanka for the Tamils affected in the war torn Northern Province. The issue had figured in interaction between leaders of both parties at the highest level. And Tamil Nadu chief minister Karunanidhi expressing concern at the proper utilisation of the Indian aid had requested the prime minister for despatching a representative to make a first hand assessment.
Towards the end of the month, the Indian government despatched Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao on a visit to Vavuniya, Kilinochchi, and Jaffna areas for a first hand assessment of Indian assistance to the affected population. She met a number of displaced persons awaiting resettlement as well as those already resettled. She also visited sites of de-mining operations carried out by Indian agencies.
The visit has brought sharp focus on the implementation aspects of resettlement for which Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh had announced Rs 500-crore humanitarian assistance last May. Ms Rao also focused on India’s promise to construct 50,000 houses for the displaced population made during the visit of President Rajapaksa to India in June 2010. She said the houses would be constructed with local participation to give a fillip for their employment.
Both New Delhi and Colombo took another significant step to boost bilateral relations when they signed an agreement to establish Indian consulates general in Jaffna and Hambantota. This was agreed upon during Rajapaksa’s New Delhi visit. Sri Lanka is also likely to establish yet another consulate in India, in addition to the ones now in Chennai and Mumbai.
These Indian moves are significant in the face of sustained high profile interest of China in Sri Lanka for sometime now. On August 15, the President participated int the ceremonial filling of sea water in the harbour basin of the Chinese aided Hambantota Port under construction. This marked the completion of first phase for which the Chinese had given a loan of $ 425 million. Sri Lanka is negotiating for a further $ 800 million loan for the second phase of the $ 1.5 billion dollar project. When completed Hambantota will have bunkering facility and a tank farm project with a capacity of 80,000 metric tonnes. The port will begin handling ships from November. It is one of the four ports being built or upgraded as part of Rajapaksa's plan to boost the economy. They will significantly change the strategic profile of Sri Lanka in Indian Ocean security, apart from impacting trade and commerce.
Tamil refugees in Canada
The travails of Tamil refugees seeking safety overseas were highlighted when Canada intercepted MV Sun Sea carrying over 490 Tamils heading towards Port Alberni in British Colombia. They have been detained in camps apparently for screening before deciding their future. Sri Lanka has alleged that among them were LTTE cadres escaping capture from Sri Lanka and their supporters. In a similar incident last October Canada took in 72 Tamils asylum seekers after their ship Ocean Viking was stranded without a port to berth off Indonesia. It is going to be more and more difficult for Sri Lankan Tamil refugees to find refuge as Sri Lanka is no more considered as war torn country.
August 31, 2010
Courtesy: South Asia Security Trends, September 2010 Vol 4 No 8
www.security-risks.com
Constitutional amendments
The Rajapaksa government is set to carry out the much awaited amendments to the 1978 Constitution. The Supreme Court is to give its comments on the proposed amendments and the parliament is scheduled to discuss them on September 8.
The need for constitutional amendments, particularly with a view to exercise some form of parliamentary oversight on the executive presidency, had figured as a major issue in almost all elections. President Rajapaksa had been sounding leaders of most of the political parties including the opposition United National Party (UNP) on this issue ever since he was elected for a second term. However, till now he had not been able to push through the amendments as the ruling United Peoples Freedom Alliance (UPFA), with 144 seats, fell short of two thirds majority support in the 225-member house.
However, towards the end of August, the president managed to win over the support of the opposition Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) which has 8-members in parliament. The surprise U-turn of the SLMC, which had been opposing President Rajapaksa all along, shows the declining fortunes of political opposition. The proposed amendments are likely to be passed in parliament with the committed support of 154 members in the first week of September.
The proportional representation system of voting makes it difficult for any political party or alliance to gain two thirds majority in the house Thus the amendment of the constitution will be a politically significant achievement for President Rajapaksa. One of the proposed amendments allows the election of the president for third term in office; this will enable President Rajapaksa a chance to be elected a third term. Thus consolidation of the president’s political power now appears to be almost complete.
Under the 1978 constitution, the President enjoys enormous powers including the unilateral dissolution of parliament and declaration of emergency. He also has powers to appoint judges, heads of armed forces and police, election commissioners and secretaries to the government etc. In a state of emergency, the President can even promulgate emergency regulations to override laws enacted by the parliament. Sri Lanka has a long history of emergency since 1970 mainly triggered by war against Tamil separatists. Even though the war ended in May 2009, the emergency continues to be in force. This has caused concern to civil society organisations both at home and abroad.
In a bid to ensure some form of control over President’s powers to make appointments to high office, the parliament adopted the 17th Amendment to the Constitution in 2001. This makes it mandatory for the president to act on the recommendations of a 10-member Constitutional Council (CC) while making appointments. However, so far there had been no attempt to enforce the 17th Amendment in letter and spirit. One of the amendments proposed now, aims at replacing the CC with a five-member Constitutional Advisory Committee (CAC). The name of the proposed amendment would suggest the advisory rather than mandatory nature of its role. This could defeat the fundamental purpose of the 17th Amendment.
Sri Lanka’s credibility has suffered over allegations of humanitarian and human rights excesses both during the war, particularly in its last lap. Given this background its reputation as a democracy now depends entirely upon how President Rajapaksa handles enormous powers vested in him in the next decade and a half, assuming he is elected for a third term.
Court martial of General Sarath Fonseka
The process of downsizing of the political image of former Army Commander General Sarath Fonseka made significant progress when an army court martial found him guilty of engaging in politics while in service. With President’s approval, the General has been cashiered and stripped of his medals and honours.
Those who gave evidence against the General included the Cooperatives and Internal Trade Minister Johnston Fernando, UNP MP Lakshman Seneviratne, and Major General Krishantha Silva, former Military Secretary.
Fonseka is facing one more Court Martial for his alleged involvement in shady procurement deals, which also involved his son-in-law Dhanuna Tillekeratne. In addition to this, he has also been indicted for defamation over his alleged statement in The Sunday Leader accusing the Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa of ordering the army not to take prisoners during the war in Vanni.
Fonseka is the leader of the opposition Democratic National Alliance (DNA) in parliament. The main opposition parties including the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) alliance partner of the DNA, and the UNP have condemned the conviction of Fonseka, as politics of persecution. Fonseka had opposed Rajapaksa’s bid for the second term as president. Whether it is true or not, the prosecution of the national hero marks the low ebb of politics in the country.
India raises its sights on Sri Lanka
As Tamil Nadu is gearing up for legislative elections, both the ruling Dravida Munnetra Kazagham (DMK) and its national ally the Congress Party have focused on Indian aid to Sri Lanka for the Tamils affected in the war torn Northern Province. The issue had figured in interaction between leaders of both parties at the highest level. And Tamil Nadu chief minister Karunanidhi expressing concern at the proper utilisation of the Indian aid had requested the prime minister for despatching a representative to make a first hand assessment.
Towards the end of the month, the Indian government despatched Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao on a visit to Vavuniya, Kilinochchi, and Jaffna areas for a first hand assessment of Indian assistance to the affected population. She met a number of displaced persons awaiting resettlement as well as those already resettled. She also visited sites of de-mining operations carried out by Indian agencies.
The visit has brought sharp focus on the implementation aspects of resettlement for which Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh had announced Rs 500-crore humanitarian assistance last May. Ms Rao also focused on India’s promise to construct 50,000 houses for the displaced population made during the visit of President Rajapaksa to India in June 2010. She said the houses would be constructed with local participation to give a fillip for their employment.
Both New Delhi and Colombo took another significant step to boost bilateral relations when they signed an agreement to establish Indian consulates general in Jaffna and Hambantota. This was agreed upon during Rajapaksa’s New Delhi visit. Sri Lanka is also likely to establish yet another consulate in India, in addition to the ones now in Chennai and Mumbai.
These Indian moves are significant in the face of sustained high profile interest of China in Sri Lanka for sometime now. On August 15, the President participated int the ceremonial filling of sea water in the harbour basin of the Chinese aided Hambantota Port under construction. This marked the completion of first phase for which the Chinese had given a loan of $ 425 million. Sri Lanka is negotiating for a further $ 800 million loan for the second phase of the $ 1.5 billion dollar project. When completed Hambantota will have bunkering facility and a tank farm project with a capacity of 80,000 metric tonnes. The port will begin handling ships from November. It is one of the four ports being built or upgraded as part of Rajapaksa's plan to boost the economy. They will significantly change the strategic profile of Sri Lanka in Indian Ocean security, apart from impacting trade and commerce.
Tamil refugees in Canada
The travails of Tamil refugees seeking safety overseas were highlighted when Canada intercepted MV Sun Sea carrying over 490 Tamils heading towards Port Alberni in British Colombia. They have been detained in camps apparently for screening before deciding their future. Sri Lanka has alleged that among them were LTTE cadres escaping capture from Sri Lanka and their supporters. In a similar incident last October Canada took in 72 Tamils asylum seekers after their ship Ocean Viking was stranded without a port to berth off Indonesia. It is going to be more and more difficult for Sri Lankan Tamil refugees to find refuge as Sri Lanka is no more considered as war torn country.
August 31, 2010
Courtesy: South Asia Security Trends, September 2010 Vol 4 No 8
www.security-risks.com
Sunday, 29 August 2010
Building a meaningful strategic relationship with China
By Col R Hariharan
The recent India-China stand-off over the issue of a Chinese visa for Lt General BS Jaswal, a serving commander of Northern Command, has highlighted the tenuous nature of existing ties between the two countries. This incident has shown the limitations in building a military relationship with China, in the absence of greater and closer strategic relationship between the two countries. At present the military relationship in a nascent stage limited to goodwill visit of senior officers and naval ships. There had been a few low level exercises with the participation of sub units of armies of both the countries.
It also raises the fundamental question whether India can build a meaningful military relationship at all with China? Both the countries have no choice to build a strategic relationship in which military relationship would be an important segment. So far India-China relationship building had been a halting process, despite appreciable growth in mutual trade largely to the advantage of China. So building a military relationship is going to be a long haul filled with minefields of petty misunderstandings and minor confrontations.
Building a military relationship is inextricably intertwined with a number of strategic issues in which the two countries have conflicting interests – China’s territorial claims in India’s border areas, presence of sizeable Tibetan refugees who refuse to accept Chinese rule in Tibet, China’s growing relations with India’s close neighbours, growth of integrated strategic defence ties between China and Pakistan, and China’s increasing presence in the Indian Ocean region. These issues have gained new dimensions after the US economic downturn and Washington’s efforts to scale down its strategic moves to contain China. China’s rapid progress in military modernisation – particularly naval and missile capability – have strengthened and made its ambitions to become a global super power a little more realistic.
India had been bending over backwards to accommodate China’s periodic aberrations in its fragile relations. It had always played down even reports of Chinese border intrusions and protests over Indian prime minister’s visits to Arunachal Pradesh. However, New Delhi has reacted strongly in the case of Lt General Jamwal’s visa to China. Apart from issuing a demarche to Beijing, India has reciprocated by refusing visas to Chinese PLA officers including one to attend a course at the National Defence College in India. It has also suspended other military interactions with China, at least for the time being.
If we go by India’s defence minister AK Antony’s reaction the following day, New Delhi appears to have had second thoughts on the issue and tried to play down the whole thing, even as the media went gewgaw over the incident. Answering a media question on the incident, he said "We have close ties with China. There may be some short term problems (emphasis added) but they will not come in the country’s overall approach towards our neighbour." Does this mean the defence minister, who gives form to India’s national defence, has failed to read the strategic signal Beijing has sent with this incident? After all India has gulped down similar rebuffs from Canada to its serving and retired army officers in denying visa for private visits on even more specious grounds. Then why raise the ante in the first place, when China poses a problem over visas?
As B Raman has pointed out in his recent article " Dealing with China’s machinations in J and K" (available at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers41%5Cpaper4004.html) there appears to be a distinct shift in Chinese policy regarding the status of J and K. This is probably in keeping with China’s revised strategic security perceptions. The first relates to Xinjiang – the region troubled by Uighur revolt - on its south-western flank. The potential for Uighur revolt increases when the strategic environment of the Taliban dominated areas along Pakistan-Afghan border changes for the worse as and when American military power is scaled down over the next year.
A second aspect, related to earlier issue, is the likelihood of Pakistan increasing its clout in this region when the muscle power of Taliban increases after American exit. So it would be in China’s interest to further consolidate its strategic relations with Pakistan over the long term. It would also serve China’s global interests: improve China’s access to the Arabian Sea and its energy security. Of course, an added incentive is a militarily more reliable and stronger Pakistan would keep India busy on its western flank. China would then be able to leverage it to its advantage both in negotiations and confrontations with India.
India has always had a problem in rationalising its policy making to meet the needs of national interests in a changing strategic environment. Even on other issues that require real time action, there is a lot of foot dragging and uncertainty to the detriment of national interest both in internal and external policy making. As a direct consequence even manageable issues like Kashmir unrest, Naga insurgency, and Maoist upsurge have become hardy perennials. While these issues have a large internal content, it has also affected foreign policy making with a lack of clarity and definition. India will have to be proactive in building relations with other nations, with clear and visible demarcation of its own interests where it would not make compromises. This is essential in dealing with countries like China who see their own interest in clearly defined terms in every move they make and action they take. The Chinese have made good use of India’s weakness in this respect to needle India as and when it suits them.
Any improvement in this regard requires a change in national mindset. It is doubtful whether the present Indian national leadership, including the political community as a whole, is ready to take charge, instead of deferring decisions and debating the frivolous. Unless this is done, it is going to be increasingly difficult to deal with China. India has to foster a win-win relationship with China. It is essential for handling contentious issues that are often in conflict with national security interests of both the countries. Otherwise as national security interests gather more form and content, India would be the loser. And we cannot afford to do that
Courtesy: South Asia Analysis Group, August 29, 2010
The recent India-China stand-off over the issue of a Chinese visa for Lt General BS Jaswal, a serving commander of Northern Command, has highlighted the tenuous nature of existing ties between the two countries. This incident has shown the limitations in building a military relationship with China, in the absence of greater and closer strategic relationship between the two countries. At present the military relationship in a nascent stage limited to goodwill visit of senior officers and naval ships. There had been a few low level exercises with the participation of sub units of armies of both the countries.
It also raises the fundamental question whether India can build a meaningful military relationship at all with China? Both the countries have no choice to build a strategic relationship in which military relationship would be an important segment. So far India-China relationship building had been a halting process, despite appreciable growth in mutual trade largely to the advantage of China. So building a military relationship is going to be a long haul filled with minefields of petty misunderstandings and minor confrontations.
Building a military relationship is inextricably intertwined with a number of strategic issues in which the two countries have conflicting interests – China’s territorial claims in India’s border areas, presence of sizeable Tibetan refugees who refuse to accept Chinese rule in Tibet, China’s growing relations with India’s close neighbours, growth of integrated strategic defence ties between China and Pakistan, and China’s increasing presence in the Indian Ocean region. These issues have gained new dimensions after the US economic downturn and Washington’s efforts to scale down its strategic moves to contain China. China’s rapid progress in military modernisation – particularly naval and missile capability – have strengthened and made its ambitions to become a global super power a little more realistic.
India had been bending over backwards to accommodate China’s periodic aberrations in its fragile relations. It had always played down even reports of Chinese border intrusions and protests over Indian prime minister’s visits to Arunachal Pradesh. However, New Delhi has reacted strongly in the case of Lt General Jamwal’s visa to China. Apart from issuing a demarche to Beijing, India has reciprocated by refusing visas to Chinese PLA officers including one to attend a course at the National Defence College in India. It has also suspended other military interactions with China, at least for the time being.
If we go by India’s defence minister AK Antony’s reaction the following day, New Delhi appears to have had second thoughts on the issue and tried to play down the whole thing, even as the media went gewgaw over the incident. Answering a media question on the incident, he said "We have close ties with China. There may be some short term problems (emphasis added) but they will not come in the country’s overall approach towards our neighbour." Does this mean the defence minister, who gives form to India’s national defence, has failed to read the strategic signal Beijing has sent with this incident? After all India has gulped down similar rebuffs from Canada to its serving and retired army officers in denying visa for private visits on even more specious grounds. Then why raise the ante in the first place, when China poses a problem over visas?
As B Raman has pointed out in his recent article " Dealing with China’s machinations in J and K" (available at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers41%5Cpaper4004.html) there appears to be a distinct shift in Chinese policy regarding the status of J and K. This is probably in keeping with China’s revised strategic security perceptions. The first relates to Xinjiang – the region troubled by Uighur revolt - on its south-western flank. The potential for Uighur revolt increases when the strategic environment of the Taliban dominated areas along Pakistan-Afghan border changes for the worse as and when American military power is scaled down over the next year.
A second aspect, related to earlier issue, is the likelihood of Pakistan increasing its clout in this region when the muscle power of Taliban increases after American exit. So it would be in China’s interest to further consolidate its strategic relations with Pakistan over the long term. It would also serve China’s global interests: improve China’s access to the Arabian Sea and its energy security. Of course, an added incentive is a militarily more reliable and stronger Pakistan would keep India busy on its western flank. China would then be able to leverage it to its advantage both in negotiations and confrontations with India.
India has always had a problem in rationalising its policy making to meet the needs of national interests in a changing strategic environment. Even on other issues that require real time action, there is a lot of foot dragging and uncertainty to the detriment of national interest both in internal and external policy making. As a direct consequence even manageable issues like Kashmir unrest, Naga insurgency, and Maoist upsurge have become hardy perennials. While these issues have a large internal content, it has also affected foreign policy making with a lack of clarity and definition. India will have to be proactive in building relations with other nations, with clear and visible demarcation of its own interests where it would not make compromises. This is essential in dealing with countries like China who see their own interest in clearly defined terms in every move they make and action they take. The Chinese have made good use of India’s weakness in this respect to needle India as and when it suits them.
Any improvement in this regard requires a change in national mindset. It is doubtful whether the present Indian national leadership, including the political community as a whole, is ready to take charge, instead of deferring decisions and debating the frivolous. Unless this is done, it is going to be increasingly difficult to deal with China. India has to foster a win-win relationship with China. It is essential for handling contentious issues that are often in conflict with national security interests of both the countries. Otherwise as national security interests gather more form and content, India would be the loser. And we cannot afford to do that
Courtesy: South Asia Analysis Group, August 29, 2010
Sri Lanka: Fonseka’s Perils of Playing Politics and its Implications
By Col R Hariharan
For General Sarath Fonseka who revamped a demoralised Sri Lanka army and led it to final victory in the nearly three-decade long campaign against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in May 2009, its aftermath had not been peaceful. His woes appear to be mounting after an army court martial found him guilty of dabbling in politics while in uniform and recommended his cashiering. And President Mahinda Rajapaksa promptly confirmed the harsh sentence, stripping his rank and hard earned military honours and medals. The hapless General is facing a few more court martial that would haunt him in the coming years.
It will be difficult for non-military minds to understand the ignominy of cashiering. It is much more than stripping of rank and medals of General Fonseka (I do not have the heart to drop his rank and call him Mister Fonseka, although this is what has been reduced to now). It is the negation of the contribution of a person who served the army for 38 years to become the first-ever chief of defence staff. And in the history of Sri Lanka his victory against the Tamil insurgents will always be hyphenated with his cashiering. Only four years back he was lucky enough to escape (with serious injuries) a LTTE suicide bomber assassination attempt him in 2006. It seems the perils of politics have proved more deadly to the General than the Tamil Tiger assassin.
As I am not privy to Fonseka’s court martial proceedings or judgement I am unable to comment on its legality. Even if his political contacts were substantive as decided by the court, Fonseka was neither the first Sri Lankan army officer to do so nor will he be the last. The history of Sri Lanka’s three decades of war against the LTTE is strewn with examples of army officers either favoured or discarded by political masters, not necessarily for reasons of military competency. So it will be reasonable to conclude the Fonseka episode has its seeds in politics of power; after all the government has not shown the same alacrity shown in prosecuting the General to put on the dock even a single hardened LTTE leader held in custody for over a year.
This is evident if we see the sequence of events after the war ended and General Fonseka was hailed as a national hero, sharing the victory banners alongside the President. Politicians were a little unnerved at the soaring popularity of the General after the war and a subdued campaign sideline his contribution in the Eelam War was launched.
The campaign within the government against the General gained more decibels when he spoke of his plans to expand the army, making the politicians even more nervous. Though his plan was not accepted, the government’s mind on his future became clear when it decided not to extend his tenure as Chief of Staff after December 2009 when it ended. The process of cutting down the war hero to size was truly in place when the government offered him the job of secretary in the ministry of sports after his retirement!
The point of no return was probably reached when he developed political ambitions and decided to throw his gauntlet against President Mahinda Rajapaksa seeking his second term as president. The situation was further aggravated when the deeply divided opposition rallied together to put him up as their common candidate against Rajapaksa. In the run up to the presidential poll, Fonseka’s campaign threw a scare, though ultimately he polled fewer votes than Ranil Wickremesinghe did in the presidential election 2005.
The presidential election campaign saw the transformation of the General, generally considered a Sinhala hawk, into a champion of Tamil problem. And it was anachronistic to see that elements of Tamil Diaspora that had supported the LTTE, which tried to kill him, were his election bedfellows! Even as the pre-election campaign gathered momentum, political screws against the General were tightened. Conspiracy theories of military coup and take over abounded, Gajaba regiment troops deployed for his security were withdrawn for suspected personal loyalty to the General and serving officers considered loyal to Fonseka were given the walking papers. Even the retired servicemen who supported him were not spared. And in a clear break from the past even some elements of army joined the tar brush brigade to paint Fonseka as a villain during the election campaign. The smear campaign had three parts; prosecution of the General on the legal cases relating to three aspects.
The army and civil intelligence sleuths have "discovered" a whole range of offences committed by the General during his tenure as army commander. Presumably there was a prima facie case at least in some of them. But their inaction in showing the same diligence they later displayed when he became political loose cannon is rather intriguing.
Thus in an oblique way it was the General’s rapid rise in national popularity charts that did him in. It led him to the bogs of party politics and he quickly got entangled in its culture of intrigues and character assassination. Otherwise he would have probably ended up enjoying his well earned retirement, expanding on his concept of counter terrorism warfare in haloed portals of military learning everywhere.
But his prosecution has shown the weakness of Sri Lankan system in action where checks and balances of government action appear to have been sacrificed to serve political interest. While this is inevitable in party-politics it is detrimental to the long term interest of healthy growth of democracy. At present Sri Lanka is involved in a serious exercise of revising its constitution. A key dilemma is the changeover of the present presidential system to a Westminster type parliamentary democracy, limiting the powers of executive president. A compromise is likely to be struck - to have the cake and eat it in typical South Asian style - by retaining the presidential system while clipping his powers. But constitution largely remains a document in parchment unless political parties and the people are able to exercise full powers guaranteed to them in the constitution. Will they be allowed to do this or become victims of maelstrom of power? This question has to be confronted not only by politicians and the civil society but the intelligentsia as well. Otherwise mere changes in constitutional structure will be a cosmetic surgery that does not cure the underlying maladies.
Courtesy: South Asia Analysis Group, August 29, 2010
For General Sarath Fonseka who revamped a demoralised Sri Lanka army and led it to final victory in the nearly three-decade long campaign against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in May 2009, its aftermath had not been peaceful. His woes appear to be mounting after an army court martial found him guilty of dabbling in politics while in uniform and recommended his cashiering. And President Mahinda Rajapaksa promptly confirmed the harsh sentence, stripping his rank and hard earned military honours and medals. The hapless General is facing a few more court martial that would haunt him in the coming years.
It will be difficult for non-military minds to understand the ignominy of cashiering. It is much more than stripping of rank and medals of General Fonseka (I do not have the heart to drop his rank and call him Mister Fonseka, although this is what has been reduced to now). It is the negation of the contribution of a person who served the army for 38 years to become the first-ever chief of defence staff. And in the history of Sri Lanka his victory against the Tamil insurgents will always be hyphenated with his cashiering. Only four years back he was lucky enough to escape (with serious injuries) a LTTE suicide bomber assassination attempt him in 2006. It seems the perils of politics have proved more deadly to the General than the Tamil Tiger assassin.
As I am not privy to Fonseka’s court martial proceedings or judgement I am unable to comment on its legality. Even if his political contacts were substantive as decided by the court, Fonseka was neither the first Sri Lankan army officer to do so nor will he be the last. The history of Sri Lanka’s three decades of war against the LTTE is strewn with examples of army officers either favoured or discarded by political masters, not necessarily for reasons of military competency. So it will be reasonable to conclude the Fonseka episode has its seeds in politics of power; after all the government has not shown the same alacrity shown in prosecuting the General to put on the dock even a single hardened LTTE leader held in custody for over a year.
This is evident if we see the sequence of events after the war ended and General Fonseka was hailed as a national hero, sharing the victory banners alongside the President. Politicians were a little unnerved at the soaring popularity of the General after the war and a subdued campaign sideline his contribution in the Eelam War was launched.
The campaign within the government against the General gained more decibels when he spoke of his plans to expand the army, making the politicians even more nervous. Though his plan was not accepted, the government’s mind on his future became clear when it decided not to extend his tenure as Chief of Staff after December 2009 when it ended. The process of cutting down the war hero to size was truly in place when the government offered him the job of secretary in the ministry of sports after his retirement!
The point of no return was probably reached when he developed political ambitions and decided to throw his gauntlet against President Mahinda Rajapaksa seeking his second term as president. The situation was further aggravated when the deeply divided opposition rallied together to put him up as their common candidate against Rajapaksa. In the run up to the presidential poll, Fonseka’s campaign threw a scare, though ultimately he polled fewer votes than Ranil Wickremesinghe did in the presidential election 2005.
The presidential election campaign saw the transformation of the General, generally considered a Sinhala hawk, into a champion of Tamil problem. And it was anachronistic to see that elements of Tamil Diaspora that had supported the LTTE, which tried to kill him, were his election bedfellows! Even as the pre-election campaign gathered momentum, political screws against the General were tightened. Conspiracy theories of military coup and take over abounded, Gajaba regiment troops deployed for his security were withdrawn for suspected personal loyalty to the General and serving officers considered loyal to Fonseka were given the walking papers. Even the retired servicemen who supported him were not spared. And in a clear break from the past even some elements of army joined the tar brush brigade to paint Fonseka as a villain during the election campaign. The smear campaign had three parts; prosecution of the General on the legal cases relating to three aspects.
The army and civil intelligence sleuths have "discovered" a whole range of offences committed by the General during his tenure as army commander. Presumably there was a prima facie case at least in some of them. But their inaction in showing the same diligence they later displayed when he became political loose cannon is rather intriguing.
Thus in an oblique way it was the General’s rapid rise in national popularity charts that did him in. It led him to the bogs of party politics and he quickly got entangled in its culture of intrigues and character assassination. Otherwise he would have probably ended up enjoying his well earned retirement, expanding on his concept of counter terrorism warfare in haloed portals of military learning everywhere.
But his prosecution has shown the weakness of Sri Lankan system in action where checks and balances of government action appear to have been sacrificed to serve political interest. While this is inevitable in party-politics it is detrimental to the long term interest of healthy growth of democracy. At present Sri Lanka is involved in a serious exercise of revising its constitution. A key dilemma is the changeover of the present presidential system to a Westminster type parliamentary democracy, limiting the powers of executive president. A compromise is likely to be struck - to have the cake and eat it in typical South Asian style - by retaining the presidential system while clipping his powers. But constitution largely remains a document in parchment unless political parties and the people are able to exercise full powers guaranteed to them in the constitution. Will they be allowed to do this or become victims of maelstrom of power? This question has to be confronted not only by politicians and the civil society but the intelligentsia as well. Otherwise mere changes in constitutional structure will be a cosmetic surgery that does not cure the underlying maladies.
Courtesy: South Asia Analysis Group, August 29, 2010
Sunday, 15 August 2010
President’s clear vision, key factor in eradicating terrorism
By Shanika Siriyananda
* Gotabaya - one of three leaders who crushed LTTE
* Lanka’s successful strategy - a valuable lesson
* Arrest of KP, a great success
* Indo-Lanka Accord had lots of loose ends
A specialist on South Asian military intelligence, Colonel R. Hariharan said that apart from lack of international support, including India to the LTTE to survive the final battle, the prime factor for the demise of the LTTE was President Rajapaksa’s clear political determination to eliminate Prabhakaran and the LTTE.
In an interview with the Sunday Observer Col. Hariharan, who served as the Head of the intelligence for the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka between 1987 and 1990, said President Rajapaksa’s political leadership had geared the entire government machinery to achieve the single goal - annihilation of the LTTE.
“In brief, he provided the critical support needed for the success of military operations the national leadership”, he said.
The military intelligence specialist said that Sri Lanka’s successful war strategy would definitely provide many valuable lessons for all nations.
Col. Hariharan said Kumaran Pathmanathan’s (KP) arrest was a great success for Sri Lanka’s efforts to curb the resurgence of LTTE internationally and would have a big impact on the future of overseas LTTE operations.
According to Col. Hariharan, though the LTTE remnants are trying to ‘stage’ a come back, it will not be a reality as the internationally activated pro-LTTE groups are split into two factions - political and military.
He said that though there were some LTTE sympathizers who appreciate its militancy, it was doubtful that they have the capability of mastering the support of the Tamil Nadu’s mainstream politics.
Following are the excerpts of the interview:
Q: The government is credited for annihilating the LTTE. What were the main factors that contributed to the victory?
A: I have written extensively on this. I would summarize my reasons as follows, not necessarily in the order of priority:
1. President Rajapaksa’s clarity of objective - to eliminate Prabhakaran and the LTTE and providing leadership support to combine policy making, planning and executing actions not only the armed forces or the ministry of defence but the entire government machinery to achieve this goal. This enabled the government to cash in on the weaknesses of the LTTE not only on the military front but also politically and internationally. In brief, he provided the critical support needed for the success of military operations, the - national leadership.
President Rajapaksa’s efforts to transform the armed forces into fighting machines should not be ignored. To reach his goal he created a politico-administrative structure to help the armed forces achieve their military objectives, unmindful of its enormous cost in terms of finance, manpower, governance and international relations. He also provided the much needed political support for the armed forces.
2. Maintaining close relations with India and thereby ensuring that the LTTE does not gain either large scale political or other clandestine support from India, interfering politically or otherwise both internally and internationally to affect the Sri Lanka government actions or operations.
3. Allowing the armed forces to plan and execute their operations without political interference is achieved. Providing all out support to them to maintain military superiority all through the operations. This enabled the armed forces to build adequate fire power and carry out its offensive successfully.
4. Making full use of the global anti-terror environment to fight the LTTE. This made it possible to gain valuable international support - notably from the U.S. to conduct military operations, though there were critical moments towards the end of the war due to their human rights concerns.
The President in a strategic ploy identified his campaign against the LTTE as part of the global war against terrorism. India and the U.S. started providing regular intelligence inputs and technical support on the movement of LTTE’s shipping logistics. The LTTE was banned in 32 countries particularly after the assassination of Sri Lankan foreign minister Lakshman Kadirgamar. Consequently the foreign assistance to Sri Lanka in its war against the LTTE gained legitimacy.
5. Mounting a high profile information and publicity campaign on the war, which the LTTE could never match. This enabled to garner large scale public support for the war which was lacking in earlier campaigns as the LTTE propaganda organs were more effective.
Q: Where do you think was the turning point of the LTTE’s fall?
A: As a military analyst, I think the LTTE lost the war, when they could not break the army’s stranglehold of Elephant Pass-Paranthan-Kilnochchi area that started after the logistic shipping support was destroyed. The LTTE could not launch any sizeable counter attacks to break the investment.
Q: What went wrong for the LTTE?
A: Before the war the lack of political strategy was LTTE’s problem. In 2002, they were controlling most of what they called the ‘Tamil Eelam’, yet they could not take advantage of the peace process and strike a win-win deal with Sri Lanka. Similarly they never made up with India, where they were dependent upon weak political parties for support.
During the conflict LTTE choice of fighting a conventional war instead of fighting an insurgency battle which is their strength, was a big strategic error. They just did not have the numbers or fire power to fight a conventional battle with Sri Lanka, particularly after they lost recruiting bases in Tamil areas in the East when Karuna broke away. When they were overwhelmed by army, they did not have a responsive strategy in place.
Q: Still the LTTE’s remnants are trying to show that they are alive. Can they make an impact in the present environment?
A: I doubt very much that they can carry out any spectacular terrorist attack within Sri Lanka in their present state. However, they may have the capability to do something more visible overseas. We should remember it took Prabhakaran two decades to build the LTTE into a powerful force. They have neither a leader like Prabhakaran to lead them nor a global environment that would help them as it did in the 90s to stage a powerful comeback.
Q: What is your comment on post-war Sri Lanka?
A: While military success has been achieved, the charged atmosphere built up during the war needs to be defused. This would require people affected by the conflict resuming normal life as early as possible. While this is a huge national challenge, it has to produce more visible results. Modern governance demands ensuring people enjoy fundamental freedoms. As it is a notion in the minds of people, it is they who should feel a sense of security and trust in the government.
Q: What do you have to say about President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s military strategy?
A:Military strategy is only a part of national strategy when a nation goes to war. This was provided by President Rajapaksa and he gave enough space to armed forces to come into full bloom to carry out their campaign.
Q: The force behind the entire military manoeuvre was Defence Secretary, Gotabhaya Rajapaksa. How do you see his commitment?
A: Of course, he was fully committed to achieve the President’s objectives; that was why he was appointed for the job. The President had always been the supreme commander of the three services. While Basil Rajapaksa provided the political interface for the war, Gotabaya Rajapaksa provided the government interface for military operations. But as Defence Secretary he provided vital interface between the national leadership and military leadership so that the entire campaign was conducted smoothly. I am sure his military background was a great help in this. So I would rate him as one of the three key leaders who helped Sri Lanka win the war.
Q: Out of 11,000 ex-LTTE cadres, over 8,000 are still in state custody undergoing rehabilitation. How best do you think the government can train them to become useful citizens?
A:They should find a place in society to live a meaningful life without fear of deprivation. This requires more than a few months of training. It requires an environment where they can look forward to the future rather than go back to the past.
Q: How do you see the arrest of KP? Did it make a huge impact on the LTTE’s future in the international sphere?
A:It is a great success for Sri Lanka’s efforts to curb the resurgence of LTTE internationally. Yes, it will have a big impact on the future of overseas LTTE.
Q: How vital is his contribution to the post conflict Sri Lanka?
A:It is too early to assess.
Q: What is your assessment of the LTTE’s international network?
A: It is not united but split into two major groups the ideologues of Eelam who want to politically keep the Eelam struggle alive and the militant elements. I don’t know whether they will join together in the near term.
Q: What are your observations on the LTTE’s activities in Tamil Nadu and how do you view the pro-LTTE views expressed by certain politicians and sympathizers of the outfit?
A:The LTTE activities in Tamil Nadu are neither visible nor assertive. There are some LTTE sympathizers who appreciate its militancy. But the Eelam issue has a wider appeal. The plight of Tamils in war zones affects a very large number of people. There are issues which some of the political parties are trying to cash in. But I doubt whether they have the capability to make a strong on Tamil Nadu’s mainstream politics.
Q: Do you agree that India made a blunder by grooming LTTE in early 80s?
A: I am against arming any insurgent groups either locally or internationally. I had made this clear in my own military channels in the 80s, though army was not involved in the training of Tamil militants.
Q: How vital was the India’s stance on defeating the LTTE and do you agree that Prabhakaran had much hopes that the international community including India would save him at the last minute?
A: I think India’s intelligence, political and international support was one of the winning factors for Sri Lanka. I believe Prabhakaran overestimated the readiness of the international community to bail him out. Of course, political support in India for him was not sufficiently strong to do this job. Apparently he failed to realize this.
Q: Why did he fail to convince them? What went wrong?
A:Three things in his conduct were instrumental in losing international credibility over a time: killing Rajiv Gandhi, willful disregard for international efforts to make the peace process a success, and global war on terror after 9/11 the world was not prepared to accept terrorism as a tool to fight for ethnic or other rights.
Q: Did the IPKF fail in defeating the LTTE?
A:The IPKF was not sent to defeat LTTE. It was to help Sri Lanka government to enforce the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement in which the disarming of Tamil militants was provided for. That was how it got embroiled in war with LTTE.
Q: What were the difficulties the IPKF faced in dealing with the LTTE?
A:I can only give a strategic analyst’s perspective but it might disappoint those expecting political brownie points. The IPKF at the beginning faced three problems - lack of role clarity, inadequate information, and security forces’ own structural snags.
The Indian army had very little warning to prepare for its overseas deployment. Nobody was very clear what its role in Sri Lanka would be because the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord had a lot of loose ends. India was signing a third party undertaking to do its bit for an internal problem of Sri Lanka. So it was bristled with uncertainties as the two signing powers and the Tamil militants who were non-signatories had to conform to the Accord to make it a success. So the troops were initially sent only as a token force to show solidarity with Sri Lanka rather than fight a pitched battle with the LTTE.
Secondly, the Indian security forces had very little information available on Sri Lanka’s political and militancy problems. This might be surprising as many accuse India of plotting the whole thing. This is far from true. So the Indian army went there without adequate preparation.
It had obsolete maps and an inadequate knowledge of Sri Lanka. To top it all, it was supposed to meet the continuous demands of Sinhalese and Tamils who had built high expectations. Military Intelligence had a few assets - both information and sources - when it landed. (Information sharing among intelligence agencies in all nations is minimal for fear of compromise of sources.)
Structurally, when the war started, a joint services command had to be created to conduct an insurgency operation in a foreign country. This was totally a new experience for the three services. Troops had to be flown in and they were not familiar with either the terrain or ground situation when they were put directly from Jaffna airport to join the operations. However, the three services rose to the occasion and improvised command and control structure and improved it as operations progressed.
Q: Do you think the LTTE became stronger with the withdrawal of the IPKF?
A:The LTTE was at its weakest when the IPKF left. It was confined to a small space in Vanni. It had suffered heavy casualties - losing most of the junior leaders. That was why it desperately built bridges with President Premadasa which resulted in the pull out of the IPKF at a crucial stage for LTTE. In fact, it provided the oxygen the LTTE needed for survival and stage a comeback in the North and parts of East where it massacred a few hundred policemen. So it became stronger by default.
Q: Who were the main LTTE leaders who came across during your stay in Sri Lanka? How do you see Prabhakaran’s militant mind?
A:When we were in talking terms initially in August 1987, I have seen all the top leaders of the LTTE including Prabhakaran, Kittu, and Mahatthaya etc. I had no rapport with them but they knew who I was. Prabhakaran as a militant believed in the overwhelming power of the gun to achieve his goals. This led to his downfall as he failed to seize the opportunities the peace process offered in 2002.
Q: How do you recollect your three -year stay in Sri Lanka as the intelligence head of the IPKF?
A: As a Tamil, Sri Lanka was never a foreign country for me. So it pained me more to see the great human tragedy that was turning the country - one of the most beautiful ones I had seen - into a battleground. I found the people of Sri Lanka - Tamils, Sinhalese, Muslims and everyone warm hearted and more easy-going than Indians. When I visited Colombo I was amazed everyone revelling as though they had nothing to do with the war in the North!
Q: Sri Lanka’s military strategy that ended the Asia’s longest civil war will be a case study for other nations threatened with internal conflicts?
A:Of course; even failed operations teach us many things. So a successful war like Sri Lanka’s definitely provides many valuable lessons for all nations.
Q: The Maoists and the Naxalites have increased their attacks in India. Do you think the LTTE cadres who are believed to have escaped from Sri Lanka are supporting them?
A: No. There were some marginal contacts between Maoists and the LTTE when the latter was powerful. To my knowledge, even these were commercial deals between two ‘fraternal’ organizations. Now there are safer pastures for fleeing LTTE elements to seek refuge than the hotbeds of Maoist violence in India.
Q: Where are these safer pastures for fleeing LTTEers?
A: I can only conclude that they would mix with families fleeing Sri Lanka as refugees; of course that does not make all those refugees LTTEers. I am sure Canadian and Australian intelligence also some of the countries like Indonesia would be doing this.
Q: No doubt, intelligence played a vital role in defeating the LTTE. How vital is strengthening the intelligence networks locally and in the post conflict era?
A:Intelligence is a silent shield. It does not distinguish between war time and peace time. At all times it has to be functional. As it provides foreknowledge, it is vital to prevent wars as much as to win them.
Courtesy: Sunday Observer, August 15, 2010
* Gotabaya - one of three leaders who crushed LTTE
* Lanka’s successful strategy - a valuable lesson
* Arrest of KP, a great success
* Indo-Lanka Accord had lots of loose ends
A specialist on South Asian military intelligence, Colonel R. Hariharan said that apart from lack of international support, including India to the LTTE to survive the final battle, the prime factor for the demise of the LTTE was President Rajapaksa’s clear political determination to eliminate Prabhakaran and the LTTE.
In an interview with the Sunday Observer Col. Hariharan, who served as the Head of the intelligence for the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka between 1987 and 1990, said President Rajapaksa’s political leadership had geared the entire government machinery to achieve the single goal - annihilation of the LTTE.
“In brief, he provided the critical support needed for the success of military operations the national leadership”, he said.
The military intelligence specialist said that Sri Lanka’s successful war strategy would definitely provide many valuable lessons for all nations.
Col. Hariharan said Kumaran Pathmanathan’s (KP) arrest was a great success for Sri Lanka’s efforts to curb the resurgence of LTTE internationally and would have a big impact on the future of overseas LTTE operations.
According to Col. Hariharan, though the LTTE remnants are trying to ‘stage’ a come back, it will not be a reality as the internationally activated pro-LTTE groups are split into two factions - political and military.
He said that though there were some LTTE sympathizers who appreciate its militancy, it was doubtful that they have the capability of mastering the support of the Tamil Nadu’s mainstream politics.
Following are the excerpts of the interview:
Q: The government is credited for annihilating the LTTE. What were the main factors that contributed to the victory?
A: I have written extensively on this. I would summarize my reasons as follows, not necessarily in the order of priority:
1. President Rajapaksa’s clarity of objective - to eliminate Prabhakaran and the LTTE and providing leadership support to combine policy making, planning and executing actions not only the armed forces or the ministry of defence but the entire government machinery to achieve this goal. This enabled the government to cash in on the weaknesses of the LTTE not only on the military front but also politically and internationally. In brief, he provided the critical support needed for the success of military operations, the - national leadership.
President Rajapaksa’s efforts to transform the armed forces into fighting machines should not be ignored. To reach his goal he created a politico-administrative structure to help the armed forces achieve their military objectives, unmindful of its enormous cost in terms of finance, manpower, governance and international relations. He also provided the much needed political support for the armed forces.
2. Maintaining close relations with India and thereby ensuring that the LTTE does not gain either large scale political or other clandestine support from India, interfering politically or otherwise both internally and internationally to affect the Sri Lanka government actions or operations.
3. Allowing the armed forces to plan and execute their operations without political interference is achieved. Providing all out support to them to maintain military superiority all through the operations. This enabled the armed forces to build adequate fire power and carry out its offensive successfully.
4. Making full use of the global anti-terror environment to fight the LTTE. This made it possible to gain valuable international support - notably from the U.S. to conduct military operations, though there were critical moments towards the end of the war due to their human rights concerns.
The President in a strategic ploy identified his campaign against the LTTE as part of the global war against terrorism. India and the U.S. started providing regular intelligence inputs and technical support on the movement of LTTE’s shipping logistics. The LTTE was banned in 32 countries particularly after the assassination of Sri Lankan foreign minister Lakshman Kadirgamar. Consequently the foreign assistance to Sri Lanka in its war against the LTTE gained legitimacy.
5. Mounting a high profile information and publicity campaign on the war, which the LTTE could never match. This enabled to garner large scale public support for the war which was lacking in earlier campaigns as the LTTE propaganda organs were more effective.
Q: Where do you think was the turning point of the LTTE’s fall?
A: As a military analyst, I think the LTTE lost the war, when they could not break the army’s stranglehold of Elephant Pass-Paranthan-Kilnochchi area that started after the logistic shipping support was destroyed. The LTTE could not launch any sizeable counter attacks to break the investment.
Q: What went wrong for the LTTE?
A: Before the war the lack of political strategy was LTTE’s problem. In 2002, they were controlling most of what they called the ‘Tamil Eelam’, yet they could not take advantage of the peace process and strike a win-win deal with Sri Lanka. Similarly they never made up with India, where they were dependent upon weak political parties for support.
During the conflict LTTE choice of fighting a conventional war instead of fighting an insurgency battle which is their strength, was a big strategic error. They just did not have the numbers or fire power to fight a conventional battle with Sri Lanka, particularly after they lost recruiting bases in Tamil areas in the East when Karuna broke away. When they were overwhelmed by army, they did not have a responsive strategy in place.
Q: Still the LTTE’s remnants are trying to show that they are alive. Can they make an impact in the present environment?
A: I doubt very much that they can carry out any spectacular terrorist attack within Sri Lanka in their present state. However, they may have the capability to do something more visible overseas. We should remember it took Prabhakaran two decades to build the LTTE into a powerful force. They have neither a leader like Prabhakaran to lead them nor a global environment that would help them as it did in the 90s to stage a powerful comeback.
Q: What is your comment on post-war Sri Lanka?
A: While military success has been achieved, the charged atmosphere built up during the war needs to be defused. This would require people affected by the conflict resuming normal life as early as possible. While this is a huge national challenge, it has to produce more visible results. Modern governance demands ensuring people enjoy fundamental freedoms. As it is a notion in the minds of people, it is they who should feel a sense of security and trust in the government.
Q: What do you have to say about President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s military strategy?
A:Military strategy is only a part of national strategy when a nation goes to war. This was provided by President Rajapaksa and he gave enough space to armed forces to come into full bloom to carry out their campaign.
Q: The force behind the entire military manoeuvre was Defence Secretary, Gotabhaya Rajapaksa. How do you see his commitment?
A: Of course, he was fully committed to achieve the President’s objectives; that was why he was appointed for the job. The President had always been the supreme commander of the three services. While Basil Rajapaksa provided the political interface for the war, Gotabaya Rajapaksa provided the government interface for military operations. But as Defence Secretary he provided vital interface between the national leadership and military leadership so that the entire campaign was conducted smoothly. I am sure his military background was a great help in this. So I would rate him as one of the three key leaders who helped Sri Lanka win the war.
Q: Out of 11,000 ex-LTTE cadres, over 8,000 are still in state custody undergoing rehabilitation. How best do you think the government can train them to become useful citizens?
A:They should find a place in society to live a meaningful life without fear of deprivation. This requires more than a few months of training. It requires an environment where they can look forward to the future rather than go back to the past.
Q: How do you see the arrest of KP? Did it make a huge impact on the LTTE’s future in the international sphere?
A:It is a great success for Sri Lanka’s efforts to curb the resurgence of LTTE internationally. Yes, it will have a big impact on the future of overseas LTTE.
Q: How vital is his contribution to the post conflict Sri Lanka?
A:It is too early to assess.
Q: What is your assessment of the LTTE’s international network?
A: It is not united but split into two major groups the ideologues of Eelam who want to politically keep the Eelam struggle alive and the militant elements. I don’t know whether they will join together in the near term.
Q: What are your observations on the LTTE’s activities in Tamil Nadu and how do you view the pro-LTTE views expressed by certain politicians and sympathizers of the outfit?
A:The LTTE activities in Tamil Nadu are neither visible nor assertive. There are some LTTE sympathizers who appreciate its militancy. But the Eelam issue has a wider appeal. The plight of Tamils in war zones affects a very large number of people. There are issues which some of the political parties are trying to cash in. But I doubt whether they have the capability to make a strong on Tamil Nadu’s mainstream politics.
Q: Do you agree that India made a blunder by grooming LTTE in early 80s?
A: I am against arming any insurgent groups either locally or internationally. I had made this clear in my own military channels in the 80s, though army was not involved in the training of Tamil militants.
Q: How vital was the India’s stance on defeating the LTTE and do you agree that Prabhakaran had much hopes that the international community including India would save him at the last minute?
A: I think India’s intelligence, political and international support was one of the winning factors for Sri Lanka. I believe Prabhakaran overestimated the readiness of the international community to bail him out. Of course, political support in India for him was not sufficiently strong to do this job. Apparently he failed to realize this.
Q: Why did he fail to convince them? What went wrong?
A:Three things in his conduct were instrumental in losing international credibility over a time: killing Rajiv Gandhi, willful disregard for international efforts to make the peace process a success, and global war on terror after 9/11 the world was not prepared to accept terrorism as a tool to fight for ethnic or other rights.
Q: Did the IPKF fail in defeating the LTTE?
A:The IPKF was not sent to defeat LTTE. It was to help Sri Lanka government to enforce the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement in which the disarming of Tamil militants was provided for. That was how it got embroiled in war with LTTE.
Q: What were the difficulties the IPKF faced in dealing with the LTTE?
A:I can only give a strategic analyst’s perspective but it might disappoint those expecting political brownie points. The IPKF at the beginning faced three problems - lack of role clarity, inadequate information, and security forces’ own structural snags.
The Indian army had very little warning to prepare for its overseas deployment. Nobody was very clear what its role in Sri Lanka would be because the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord had a lot of loose ends. India was signing a third party undertaking to do its bit for an internal problem of Sri Lanka. So it was bristled with uncertainties as the two signing powers and the Tamil militants who were non-signatories had to conform to the Accord to make it a success. So the troops were initially sent only as a token force to show solidarity with Sri Lanka rather than fight a pitched battle with the LTTE.
Secondly, the Indian security forces had very little information available on Sri Lanka’s political and militancy problems. This might be surprising as many accuse India of plotting the whole thing. This is far from true. So the Indian army went there without adequate preparation.
It had obsolete maps and an inadequate knowledge of Sri Lanka. To top it all, it was supposed to meet the continuous demands of Sinhalese and Tamils who had built high expectations. Military Intelligence had a few assets - both information and sources - when it landed. (Information sharing among intelligence agencies in all nations is minimal for fear of compromise of sources.)
Structurally, when the war started, a joint services command had to be created to conduct an insurgency operation in a foreign country. This was totally a new experience for the three services. Troops had to be flown in and they were not familiar with either the terrain or ground situation when they were put directly from Jaffna airport to join the operations. However, the three services rose to the occasion and improvised command and control structure and improved it as operations progressed.
Q: Do you think the LTTE became stronger with the withdrawal of the IPKF?
A:The LTTE was at its weakest when the IPKF left. It was confined to a small space in Vanni. It had suffered heavy casualties - losing most of the junior leaders. That was why it desperately built bridges with President Premadasa which resulted in the pull out of the IPKF at a crucial stage for LTTE. In fact, it provided the oxygen the LTTE needed for survival and stage a comeback in the North and parts of East where it massacred a few hundred policemen. So it became stronger by default.
Q: Who were the main LTTE leaders who came across during your stay in Sri Lanka? How do you see Prabhakaran’s militant mind?
A:When we were in talking terms initially in August 1987, I have seen all the top leaders of the LTTE including Prabhakaran, Kittu, and Mahatthaya etc. I had no rapport with them but they knew who I was. Prabhakaran as a militant believed in the overwhelming power of the gun to achieve his goals. This led to his downfall as he failed to seize the opportunities the peace process offered in 2002.
Q: How do you recollect your three -year stay in Sri Lanka as the intelligence head of the IPKF?
A: As a Tamil, Sri Lanka was never a foreign country for me. So it pained me more to see the great human tragedy that was turning the country - one of the most beautiful ones I had seen - into a battleground. I found the people of Sri Lanka - Tamils, Sinhalese, Muslims and everyone warm hearted and more easy-going than Indians. When I visited Colombo I was amazed everyone revelling as though they had nothing to do with the war in the North!
Q: Sri Lanka’s military strategy that ended the Asia’s longest civil war will be a case study for other nations threatened with internal conflicts?
A:Of course; even failed operations teach us many things. So a successful war like Sri Lanka’s definitely provides many valuable lessons for all nations.
Q: The Maoists and the Naxalites have increased their attacks in India. Do you think the LTTE cadres who are believed to have escaped from Sri Lanka are supporting them?
A: No. There were some marginal contacts between Maoists and the LTTE when the latter was powerful. To my knowledge, even these were commercial deals between two ‘fraternal’ organizations. Now there are safer pastures for fleeing LTTE elements to seek refuge than the hotbeds of Maoist violence in India.
Q: Where are these safer pastures for fleeing LTTEers?
A: I can only conclude that they would mix with families fleeing Sri Lanka as refugees; of course that does not make all those refugees LTTEers. I am sure Canadian and Australian intelligence also some of the countries like Indonesia would be doing this.
Q: No doubt, intelligence played a vital role in defeating the LTTE. How vital is strengthening the intelligence networks locally and in the post conflict era?
A:Intelligence is a silent shield. It does not distinguish between war time and peace time. At all times it has to be functional. As it provides foreknowledge, it is vital to prevent wars as much as to win them.
Courtesy: Sunday Observer, August 15, 2010
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