Sarkar: Making Sense of Censorship

The Tamil film, Sarkar, rakes in the big bucks, but not before its producers bow to pressure from the ruling AIADMK,  send it for re-censorship and agree to chop off controversial scenes

By Col R Hariharan |Politics | Civil military relations|                                              India Legal February 26, 2018  http://www.indialegallive.com/politics/sarkar-making-sense-of-censorship-57411

After two aging heroes of Tamil cinema—Kamal Haasan and Rajinikanth—churned up the political waters of Tamil Nadu with their entry, it seems to be the turn of yet another movie hero, Thalapathi (Commander) Vijay, to jump into the fray, riding the political controversy generated in the wake of his Diwali blockbuster, Tamil movie Sarkar.

Award-winning director AR Murugadoss, well-known for his blockbuster movies, including the Aamir Khan starrer, Ghajini (2008), in Hindi, has directed Sarkar. His two earlier films with Vijay as the hero—Thuppaki (2012) and Katthi had also run into controversy.

Thuppakki’s problem was related to allegations of showing the minority community in bad light, while Katthi faced the wrath of Tamil fringe groups as the producer was a close associate of former Sri Lanka president Mahinda Rajapaksa.

Gautaman Bhaskaran in a review described Sarkar  as “unashamedly a propaganda vehicle for Vijay”. The superhero techie flies into Tamil Nadu to cast his vote, finds someone has voted in his place. Then he gets into action singlehandedly to cleanse the corrupt political system, to take over the reins of the government.

The ruling All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazagham (AIADMK) party was not amused with scenes featuring a political party distributing freebies before elections, its signature method of electioneering. It also objected to naming one of the antagonists of the movie as Komalavalli, name of the party’s icon the late J Jayalalithaa before she joined movies.

Tamil Nadu information minister Kadambur Raju asked the producer Sun Pictures and director AR Murugadoss to remove the objectionable scenes from Sarkar. He said, “The Sarkar scenes showing people throwing the Tamil Nadu government free appliances into fire should be removed voluntarily from the movie. If not, the government will take necessary steps to remove it.”

Other ministers dubbed the movie as a propaganda against the party because producer Kalanithi Maran’s family connections with the DMK.  Hundreds of AIADMK supporters went on a rampage particularly in Madurai. They tore down hoardings and posters showing the baby-faced hero Vijay, posing in his signature stance a la Superman.

The director, Murugadoss, received death threats; he sought anticipatory bail after an individual lodged a complaint with the Commissioner of Police stating that the director should be booked under acts of terrorism.  The producers bowed to the pressure from exhibitors and agreed to remove the so-called objectionable scenes from the movie. Ironically, the AIADMK fighting internal wrangles, used the Sarkar controversy as a rallying point for its cadres.

The Sarkar controversy has both political and constitutional dimensions relating to fundamental freedoms.  Politically, there is a power vacuum in Tamil Nadu after the exit of two powerful leaders—Jayalalithaa and M Karunanidhi of rival DMK. The ruling AIADMK party is in a self destructive three-way leadership power struggle, while MK Stalin, who inherited the DMK leadership, is flexing his muscles in the wings to capture power.

Already, all political parties are wary of the entry of Kamal Haasan and Rajinikanth into active politics, who might end up poaching their cadres to fulfil their own political ambitions. So Vijay’s entry into the fray adds to their political apprehensions as he has a networked fan base like Kamal Haasan and Rajinikanth.

Vijay has been nurturing political ambitions for some time now. In 2008, he flew to New Delhi and met Rahul Gandhi to join the Youth Congress. Since then he had been dropping hints about his imminent political entrance. However, he sounded more ominous during the audio release function of Sarkar in October 2018. When the anchor asked him whether he would become a real-life CM, he replied, “If I become the CM, then I won’t just act like one, but do my job sincerely.” Commenting on politics, he said,

The first thing I want to change if I become the chief minister is corruption. The state needs a good leader, only when the leader is corruption-free, others below him will also be without corruption.” The film producers could not walk the talk. The film raked in the big bucks, but only after, bowing to political pressure, its producers agreed to remove some of the objectionable scenes.

Censorship of films has a long history dating back to 1920 when the Indian Cinematograph Act came into force. Censor Boards were placed under police chiefs in Madras, Bombay, Calcutta, Lahore and Rangoon. After independence Central Board of Film Censors came to being in 1952. Film certification rules were revised in 1963 and the Central Board of Film Censors (CBFC) was renamed as the Central Board of Film Certification.

The CBFC guidelines for certification containing 20 clauses are elaborate and all-embracing. It covers a whole range of “anti-social activities” like not glorifying or justifying violence, method of operation of criminals to scenes justifying and glamorising drinking, drug addiction and use of tobacco. But some guidelines like “dual meaning words as obviously cater to baser instincts are not allowed” are too vague. Even guidelines on “visuals or words which promote communal, obscurantist, anti-scientific and anti-national attitude” are open to interpretation.

Even after CBFC clearance, some of the movies face the wrath of local governments which bow to populist or political pressure to block their screening. The Padmaavat controversy is a very good example of this aberration. In Tamil Nadu, the release of Kamal Haasan’s Viswaroopam was held up by the state government ostensibly in the interest of public order and security.

So censor certification continues to be a major bugbear of film fraternity. This is more so in Tamil Nadu where politics has umbilical links with movies ever since playwright CN Annadurai founded the DMK with another playwright, Karunanidhi, in 1949. Since then, there had been no stopping of political propaganda, ostensibly carrying the message of social reform, finding its way into Tamil movies.

Movies also provide platform for filmstars to leverage their popularity to make it big in politics. Perhaps, the biggest of them all were Karunanidhi, actors MG Ramachandran and Jayalalithaa who ended up as successful chief ministers. Of course, some superheroes like Sivaji Ganesan failed to make the grade in politics. The yin and yang of the relationship between politicians and actors affects the fortunes of political leaders as much as filmstars.

Inevitably, this adds to the film certification woes of producers and exhibitors in Tamil Nadu. It also raises the larger issue of censorship in the country.  It involves suppression of speech or public communication regardless of freedom of speech protected in the Indian Constitution. On the other hand, the constitution also places some restrictions on freedom of expression for maintaining communal and religious harmony.

While this is understandable, it is difficult to accept objectionable content, as per the Information Technology Rules 2011. These include anything that “threatens unity, integrity, defence, security or sovereignty of India, friendly relations with foreign states or public order”.  It is rules such as these, that are more prone to misuse, that made Freedom House in its annual Freedom of the Press index give India a freedom rating of “Partly Free” in 2016.

—The writer is a retired Military Intelligence specialist on South Asia, and is associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies and International Law and Strategic Studies Institute.

Sri Lanka Perspectives: October 2018

Col R Hariharan | 31-10-2018 |

Courtesy: South Asia Security Trends, November 2018 | www.security-risks.com

President Sirisena's constitutional coup

President Maithripala Sirisena in a dramatic move on October 26 installed former president Mahinda Rajapaksa as Prime Minister, in place of his coalition partner Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe, leader of the United National Party (UNP). Evidently, political expediency prompted the President to ignore the inconvenient fact that it was the support of Wickremesinghe and the UNP that enabled him to come to power, defeating Rajapaksa in the presidential election.

The President’s surprise action was well orchestrated with his Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP)-led United Peoples Front Alliance (UPFA) and the pro-Rajapaksa Joint Opposition (JO) group withdrawing support to the Wickremesinghe government. After sacking the incumbent PM Wickremesinghe, the President prorogued the parliament till November 16, preventing Wickremesinghe from seeking a vote of confidence in parliament. By November 16, the Sirisena-Rajapaksa government probably hopes to secure majority support in the 225-member parliament. Karu Jayasuriya, the speaker of parliament objected to the President’s action as it was unconstitutional, and requested him to convene the parliament early for a vote of confidence. 

The Western world was stunned by the developments in Sri Lanka as it had been supporting Maithripala-Ranil duo to keep Rajapaksa out of power. They had felt Rajapaksa, already in their black books for his questionable standards of governance, was getting too cosy with China for their comfort. They supported the speaker’s request for convening the parliament immediately to seek a vote of confidence. The President after meeting the speaker has now agreed to convene the parliament on November 5. Probably he is confident that by then Rajapaksa would be able get majority support.

According to the Hindu, as on October 30, both Sirisena-Rajapaksa combine and Wickremesinghe’s UNP front enjoyed the support of 100 members each. So the support of Tamil National Alliance (TNA), which has 16 members in parliament, has become crucial for Rajapaksa. He is said to have met TNA leader R Sampanthan and asked for his support.

The Tamil leader sought a “specific plan, a time frame and the manner of implementation” on the Tamil question from Rajapaksa before TNA MPs and Allinace partners could consider the request. So the jury is still out on whether Rajapaksa would be able to muster majority support when the parliament votes on November 5.

The brand ‘Yahapalana’ (good governance) was coined to promote the rise of Maithripala-Ranil to keep the corrupt Rajapaksa family out of power and people voted to elect them. Now Yahapalana has become mockery; more than that, it is a betrayal of the people, who believed in Maithripala’s election promises.

The presidential action was not unexpected as he had met Rajapaksa more than once. They had reportedly discussed the future course of the Sirisena-led SLFP as trust deficit and friction with Wickremesinghe and the UNP had reached the point of no return. However, the timing of his action surprised everyone including the ousted PM.

The Sirisena-Rajapaksa duo probably decided to act after their earlier effort  to unseat PM Wickremesinghe through a no confidence motion failed in April 2018. As the much delayed provincial council elections are to be held shortly, they probably decided to bury the hatchet to regain SLFP’s credibility, particularly after the drubbing received by both UNP and SLFP in the local elections.

A suspected plot to assassinate President Sirisena and former defence secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa, hinting at Indian intelligence agency RAW’s involvement hand surfaced, seems to have further aggravated the Preident’s suspicion about a conspiracy hatched by the UNP. According to a media report, President Sirisena had talked about the plot at a cabinet meeting. Later he spoke to Prime Minister Narendra Modi to clarify that he never alleged India was behind the assassination plot. However, President Sirisena seems to have been upset by the lack of quick response to the report from Wickremesinghe, particularly after there were loud hints of involvement of a minister behind the plot.

Legalities apart, President Sirisena’s action of not extending even the normal courtesy of informing PM Wickremesinghe before he sacked him, indicated the degree of bitterness in their personal equation. This was dramatically illustrated when Ranil was served with an ultimatum to vacate his official residence, followed by reduction of his 1008-strong security detail to ten and the sacking of his secretary at the PM’s office.

In any case, it is now evident that the so-called National Unity Front of SLFP-UNP combine was a marriage of inconvenience formed only to cash upon popular sentiments against Rajapaksa family’s insensitive and corrupt rule. While SLFP is left-of-centre, UNP may be called right-of-centre; so their perceptions on free economy, private sector etc differ. This has always made it difficult for them to act cohesively in cohabitation government.

So the coalition’s actions lacked sincerity on key issues like cleaning up the corrupt system, investigation of corruption cases including the Bond scam, ending the executive presidency and drafting a new constitution that would satisfy minority aspirations.  

President's action seems to have vertically divided the nation. Civil society leaders and legal pundits for and against President Sirisena’s action are battling it out in media columns quoting the same Constitutional article 45(4). The Colombo daily Daily Mirror online poll has reported that 72 percent of voters considered the President’s action incorrect. However, this probably reflects urban middle class view, rather than the rural masses on the political change. But it certainly reflected that influential sections of society is not reconciled to the idea of Rajapaksa as PM.   

Apart from the unfulfilled political expectations, Sirisena-Wickremesinghe coalition had come in for sharp criticism over mismanaging the debt-ridden national economy. The rise in global oil prices and the fall in the value of Sri Lankan rupee resulted in sharp rise in fuel and food prices affecting the common man. PM designate Rajapaksa in his first media interaction on October 31 has focused on this aspect, perhaps because it affects the people most.

Usually, India is the fall guy responsible for any crisis in Sri Lanka politics because it looms large in Sri Lankan politics. This time also was no exception. There was some bad mouthing of India because all the three stake holders in current political muddle – Rajapaksa, Sirisena and Wickremesinghe - had visited New Delhi before the crisis unfolded. All the three of them had called upon Prime Minister Narendra Modi. When Rajapaksa met the Indian PM, he sought to assure that he had nothing against New Delhi, in a bid to reduce the trust deficit.

The allegations against India were gingered up when an Indian hand was suspected behind the plot to kill the President and Gotabaya Rajapaksa, though it was officially denied.  So it was not surprising that India stayed “disengaged” as the controversial situation unfolded.

During his latest visit to New Delhi, Rajapaksa had reminded in an interview had hinted that India and Western powers had helped formation of the coalition to defeat him in the 2015 presidential election. Indian media has now reported that Rajapaksa was trying to contact New Delhi for its support as he was still short of 15 MPs for a majority. However, New Delhi had shown no interest; after all between Rajapaksa and Ranil, the latter had a better new equation in the Indian capital. 

On the other hand, China was happy to see Rajapaksa, its favourie Sri Lankan leader, staging a comeback in power. China’s ambassador in Colombo Chen Xueyuan was one of the first diplomats to meet Rajapaksa soon after he was sworn in; he presented a congratulatory message from PM Li Keqiang.  So it was not surprising to see social media flogging China for supporting Rajapaksa. China clarified that it did not intend to interfere in Sri Lanka’s internal affairs.

Chinese foreign ministry spokesman said that China was closely following the changes in the situation in Sri Lanka. “We have maintained communication with the relevant political parties in Sri Lanka. The Chinese ambassador met Wickremesinghe and the new PM Rajapaksa” he added. In simple terms, India’s strategies in Sri Lanka have become a little more complicated with Rajapaksa back in power supported by President Sirisena. China already established in Sri Lanka, can be expected to be even more assertive now.

Col R Hariharan, a retired MI officer, served as the head of Intelligence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka from 1987 to 90. He is associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies, South Asia Analysis Group and the International Law and Strategic Analysis Institute, Chennai. E-mail: haridirect@gmail.com  Blog: http://col.hariharan.info

Why India and China need to build ‘trust’ and not just ‘confidence’ in their relationship

Beijing does not appear to be in a hurry to change its stand on trans-border terrorism.

POLITICS | 6-minute read | 26-10-2018

COLONEL R HARIHARAN @colhari2

The series of follow-up decisions taken together by India and China after the informal summit between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping at Wuhan in July 2018  seem to indicate both are trying to mend their relations frayed in the wake of the 2017 military standoff at Doklam. But much will depend upon how soon their mutual confidence building measures are turned into trust building actions.

Perhaps, the most significant move was the signing of an agreement between the two countries on internal security cooperation to “strengthen and consolidate discussions and cooperation in the areas of counter-terrorism, organised crimes, drug control and other relevant areas”. It could be path-breaking if pursued in earnest. (The caveat is Chinese official statements frequently contain the word “relevant” to suit the country’s ambivalent stand on some of the related issues.)

The internal security agreement was signed at the first-ever India-China high-level meeting on bilateral security chaired jointly by Union home minister Rajnath Singh and the visiting state counsellor and minister for public security Zhao Kezhi.

A notable feature was China’s grudging acceptance  of minister of state for home Kiren Rijiju presence as part of the Indian delegation. Rijiju, who hails from Arunachal Pradesh (claimed by the Chinese as their territory), drew the wrath of the neighbouring country when he accompanied the Dalai Lama, who was invited to participate in a religious ceremony at Tawang (Arunachal Pradesh) in April 2017.

The apparent acceptance of Rijiju’s presence indicates nothing more than China’s situational management of its “traditional” objections to suit its specific requirement. It would be facile to interpret this as an indication of a possible change in China’s stand on territorial claims in the Northeast.

Equally significant is China not accepting India’s request to support its long pending application to the UN to include Masood Azhar, chief of the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) and mastermind of the 2016 Uri attack, in the global list of terrorists. China’s foreign office has categorically stated that there was no change in its stand to decide on the issue on its “merits”.

China’s on Masood Azhar is a show of solidarity with Pakistani perceptions on the Jihadi terrorist despite China’s own heavy crackdown on Uyghur Muslim population in Xinjiang under the pretext of fighting Uyghur separatists. The Azhar case would probably “merit” favourable action from China, when it seeks a “trade off” from India, ie, when a Uyghur separatist seeks refuge in India.

At the talks, India had also requested China not to give shelter to United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) leader Paresh Baruah, who had been on the run. Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson’s terse comment on the request was that there was no change in China’s adherence “to the principle of non-interference in internal affairs of other countries”. By early 1990s, China officially abandoned its policy of supporting insurgent groups in India’s Northeast and Myanmar.

However, Chinese-made weapons continue to find their way to Naga hostiles and Manipuri and ULFA extremists holed up in sanctuaries in parts of Myanmar close to the Indian border. Apart from this, China is increasingly influencing the politics in India’s neighbourhood. In such an environment, China’s much avowed “principle of non-interference in internal affairs of other countries” lacks credibility. So Paresh Baruah is likely to be held as yet another trump card of minor value in China’s suite in its dealings with India.

It would seem that despite the rhetoric on strengthening and consolidation of “cooperation in the areas of counter-terrorism, organised crimes, drug control and other relevant areas” contained in the internal security agreement, China does not appear to be in a hurry to change its stand on trans-border terrorism. So, we can expect this to continue to be an irritant in the relations between the two countries.

Even otherwise, the fundamental asymmetry between India and China in tackling the terrorist threat can come in the way of furthering cooperation. China has introduced draconian counterterrorism laws; these are heavily loaded against Uyghur Muslim separatists denying the entire population freedom to practice their religion and culture. China has brazenly justified curbs against Islamic and Tibetan Buddhist religious practices and the brutal suppression of Uyghur minority’s struggle to preserve their cultural and linguistic identity.

On the other hand, India is a strong functional democracy that guarantees freedom of expression and religion. Government actions to curb insurgency and terrorism are frequently challenged by civil society activists and human rights watch dogs. India’s strong judiciary continues to be the guardian of citizens’ rights and freedom of expression. In this environment, the moot question is can India meaningfully cooperate with or learn from China in countering terrorism except for symbolic military training in counter insurgency?

In this respect, the decision to conduct the seventh edition of Hand in Hand, the annual joint military drill in November 2018 in Chengdu in China is only restoring the joint training exercise which was disrupted in the wake of Doklam standoff. The military drill continues to be more symbolic than substantive in scope and size. Military cooperation has the potential to be scaled up as Indian and Chinese armies are now working together in UN forces and exercising jointly in groupings like the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). Better understanding at forces level could help avoid a flare up of the Doklam-kind along India’s troubled border. Hopefully, it would also hasten the process to establish direct one-to-one communication between the two armies at the top level.

The launching of the first ever India-China joint training programme for Afghan diplomats is one of the joint projects Modi and Xi had agreed upon at Wuhan. It is significant that India has replaced the US with which China had earlier agreed to conduct the joint training of Afghan diplomats. It indicates China’s acknowledgment of India’s role in Afghanistan, in spite of Pakistan’s objections to Indian presence there. It also recognises India’s contribution in developmental activity in Afghanistan.

However, multi-national initiatives involving China had not progressed well in Afghanistan in the past. Probably, China would like to avail of the widespread goodwill India enjoys in Afghanistan, to further its presence in the war torn country.

The controlled handling of the Maldivian elections and its aftermath by India and China, despite their clash of interests, shows both the countries are prepared to factor in each other’s interest in their decision-making. However, how far and how long they can maintain such a spirit remains a question. Both countries face strong internal pressures in their own way; both are also subject to the dynamics of strategic environment and realpolitik in the Indo-Pacific region.

This makes it imperative for both countries to deliberate upon their actions if they want sustained peace in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region. That would require not allowing their age-old trust deficit to overtake their decision-making; so they will have to go beyond confidence building to build trust.

#Kiren Rijiju, #Uyghur muslims, #Doklam, #India-China Relations

Col R Hariharan, a retired Military Intelligence specialist on South Asia, has rich experience in terrorism and insurgency operations. 

Courtesy: India Today opinion portal DailyO

https://www.dailyo.in/politics/india-china-relations-doklam-uyghur-muslims-uyghur-muslims-kiren-rijiju-rajnath-singh/story/1/27413.html          

Why China’ Colombo Port City project in Sri Lanka is unsettling for India

Most of India’s container traffic is handled by Colombo port.

VARIETY | 6-minute read | 03-09-2018

COLONEL R HARIHARAN @colhari2

China's ambitious 269-hectare (660-acre) Colombo Port City (CPC) project is poised to take off when the reclamation of land from the sea is completed by June 2019. Skyscrapers, luxury hotels, shopping malls and a marina of the newly created city-within-the-city, are set to change Colombo's scenic Galle Face Green overlooking the sea. At the same time it will also change Sri Lanka's geostrategic landscape with China gaining an overbearing foothold in the Sri Lankan capital.

The $1.4 billion infrastructure project being executed by China Harbour Engineering Construction Corporation (CHEC), a subsidiary of state-owned China Communications Construction Company (CCCC), had courted controversy ever since President Mahinda Rajapaksa and Chinese President Xi Jinping, launched it on September 17, 2014. Issues of sovereignty, lack of transparency, allegations of corruption and environmental concerns dogged the project right from the word go. When President Maithripala Sirisena's government came to power in 2015, he put the project on hold till the allegations were investigated.

The government investigated allegations and carried out a supplementary environmental impact assessment before starting the project again, after signing a new agreement in 2016. Under this agreement, the entire 269 hectares of reclaimed land has been handed over to the Colombo Port City Holdings Ltd on 99-year lease.

The jarring note is the Chinese, with 99-year lease of the city in their pocket, will call the shot and dictate their own rules of the game. How it will impact Sri Lankans socially, economically and environmentally is a question still bothering many Sri Lankans.

CPC and South Asia

Geography dictates that national security concerns of India and Sri Lanka are interlinked and as a corollary South Asia's strategic security as well. Neither of the countries can afford to ignore this geostrategic fact when they take up major development projects to improve the quality of life of their citizens. The geo-strategic implications of the CPC have to be understood in this backdrop.

Unlike the Hambantota project, which was taken up by Sri Lanka with Chinese loan, the Chinese are directly investing $1.4 billion in the CPC project. The CPC dominates the Colombo port complex, which is Sri Lanka's most valuable strategic and economic asset figuring in the top 35 busiest ports in the world. 

The Chinese are already in control of the Colombo port terminal. The CPC will have its own authority and laws favourable to trade and investment within the newly created city.

The CPC project includes development of an international financial centre, added as an afterthought to the original CPC project. The centre is to be developed into a major financial hub rivalling Singapore and Dubai. Such a financial centre would provide direct access to South Asia's under serviced markets. But its success would be largely dictated by its competitive ability against Dubai and Singapore, which are internationally well established.

However, if imaginatively packaged, the CPC in tandem with Colombo port could add a competitive edge to maritime trade.

Most of India's container traffic is handled by Colombo port. So, India's active participation would ensure the profitability of the CPC including the international financial centre. Already, the promoters are wooing Indian investors to take part in the project. However, India's growing strategic security concerns in the Indian Ocean region need to be addressed by both China and Sri Lanka to create an environment to encourage India's participation in the project.

When the CPC becomes fully functional in the next two years, multifaceted Chinese investment is likely to flow into the financial, commercial, trade, entertainment and residential infrastructure. With the US slapping high import tariff to cut down imports from China, Beijing is working hard to boost its trade in other big global markets — EU, India and South Asia and ASEAN. According to the promoters, the project is expected to generate 80,000 jobs in the next four years. However, the moot point is how many locals would benefit.

Already, there are indications of both China and India trying to keep their perennial geostrategic disputes at manageable levels in order to improve their working relations. Under such a dynamic environment, CPC can become an important "third party" (if you ignore the large Chinese ownership) link in progressing non-military relations between the two giant Asian neighbours to their mutual benefit. But India can ill afford to ignore the strategic advantage China has gained in Sri Lanka so close to peninsular India. 

Some of the concerns of CPC

The foremost concern for Sri Lanka would be to ensure that the project does not result in any action detrimental to its sovereignty, environment and society. There are too many agencies — both commercial and governmental agencies involved in managing the CPC - in which two unequal nations are participating. So when CPC gets going, it is likely to generate a host of issues related to governance including law enforcement, public services like health and infrastructure, fiscal issues like taxation and security of international financial transactions and trade specific issues of export and import. The success of the CPC will depend upon how Sri Lanka and China cooperate to ensure smooth conduct of joint mechanisms to run the project.

The possibility of China using the CPC to go on a security overdrive appears remote at present. However, China's power assertion in Indian Ocean littorals, particularly Sri Lanka, is bound to grow. As Chinese presence is already impacting the strategic configuration in the Indo-Pacific, Sri Lanka will have to be on guard to ensure its security interests are not affected with the Chinese taking control of the CPC and Colombo port. Sri Lanka cannot afford to forget that the Colombo port is its irreplaceable naval asset, apart from being a major maritime and financial hub.

CPC's importance for the Belt and Road Initiative

China has always maintained the CPC as one of the important projects of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Almost all Chinese media reports and CPC press releases on its website (www.portcitycolombo.com) stress this aspect. Sri Lanka is a valuable asset in China's 21st Century maritime Silk Road as it occupies a unique place, mid-way in sea lanes of Indian Ocean's east-west trade.

If CPC succeeds, it could become a model for the Chinese to adopt elsewhere in BRI.

So, we can expect the Chinese to ensure the success of CPC project, particularly if the reclamation work is completed by June 2019 as per schedule. And it is inevitable India's strategic interests would be impacted by the CPC.

#Hambantota  #India-China relations #China #Colombo port city

Col R Hariharan, a retired Military Intelligence specialist on South Asia, has rich experience in terrorism and insurgency operations. 

Courtesy: India Today opinion portal DailyO         https://www.dailyo.in/variety/colombo-port-city-china-india-china-relations-galle-face-green-hambantota-belt-and-road-initiative/story/1/26418.html

Sri Lanka Perspectives: August 2018

Col R Hariharan | 31-8-2018 | Courtesy: South Asia Security Trends, September 2018 | www.security-risks.com

PC election issues

The failure of the parliament to ratify the Delimitation Committee Report (DCR) introduced by the government on August 24 illustrates confusion in the ranks of the ruling national unity coalition. In a rare show of unanimity, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and the United National Party (UNP), Tamil National Alliance (TNA), Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) and the Joint Opposition (JO) voted against the report. There was not a single vote in favour of the DCR, which required the support of two-thirds of members present in parliament. Though Local Government Minister, Faiszer Musthapha while presenting the report in parliament was vociferous in saying those who vote against the DCR would be despised as betrayers of the country, he changed his mind and voted against it! 

The episode once again demonstrated the disconnect between Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe and President Maithripala Sirisena, who had appointed a five-member committee, chaired by Dr K Thavalingam, to carry out the delimitation of Provincial Councils required for conducting elections by January 2019. According to media commentators Prime Minister Wickremesinghe had spearheaded the opposition to the report. However SLFP spokesman Mahinda Samarasinghe dismissed such attempts to blame the PM for the vote against the report. He said all political parties were opposed to the report and there was no consensus among them.

The PC elections are to be held under the PC Election Amendment Act No 17 enacted last year. The elections would be held on the new 50:50mixed voting system, with 50 percent of the members elected under the First-Past-Post (FPP) system and 50 percent on the district level Proportional Representation (PR) system. Though the failure of the DCR to pass muster is explained as part of the ruling coalition’s new political strategy, the real reason is perhaps the new mixed voting system to be used in the PC elections.  After suffering a severe drubbing in the local government elections held under the mixed system earlier this year, most of the political parties want the PC elections to be held under the existing PR system. 

Finance minister Mangala Samaraweera had described their poor performance in LG polls as a “timely wake-up call to Yahapalana [good governance] government to get back on track.” 

Three PCs - Eastern, North Central and Sabaraagamuwa are already under governor’s rule after the expiry of their term last year. The terms of three more PCs – Northern, Northwestern and Central – are ending in October 2018. The Western, Southern and Uva PCs will be completing their terms in 2019. Thus PC elections are expected to act as the performance score card of the unity government. So the unity coalition is probably buying time to shore up its image before going ahead with the PC elections. Civil society organizations have described the delay in conducting the elections as a denial of democratic rights of the people.

The President has repeatedly said the PC elections would be held by January 2019. However, the failure of the parliament to ratify the DCR would mean further delay in finalizing the delimitation process and the voting system. In a bid to clear the logjam, the speaker has appointed a five-member committee of ‘intellectuals’ headed by the Prime Minister for its recommendations on conducting the PC elections. However, the success of the ‘committee strategy’ would only work if and when the SLFP and UNP leadership are ready for it.

Japan’s strategic interest in Sri Lanka  

Japan’s defence minister Itsunori Onedera made his first-ever visit to Sri Lanka from August 20 to 22 as part of Japan’s continuing effort to strengthen strategic cooperation with Sri Lanka. The Japanese minister called upon President Sirisena and Prime Minister Wickremesinghe. He visited Trincomalee port, where a Japanese naval ship Ikazuchi was on a friendly visit. According to a NHK television interview with the defence minister after he met with the Sri Lankan president and prime minister, the minister is said to have raised the issue of Hambantota coming under Chinese control. The NHK quoted Onedera as saying, “despite the lease [of Hambantota] there was an agreement that the port remains free of military activities.” This would indicate China looming large in Japan’s efforts to build close relations with Sri Lanka.

Japan has been one of Sri Lanka’s main development partners and largest donors. Japan’s interest in building strategic relations with the island nation increased earlier this year with the visit of Admiral Katsutoshi Kawano, chief of staff of Japanese Self Defence Forces to Sri Lanka. During President Sirisena’s visit to Japan in March 2018, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe sought to further strengthen cooperation with Sri Lanka as part of Japan’s  Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy to counter China’s increasingly muscular assertion in the region. It was welcomed by President Sirisena.

The Japanese strategy aims at enhancing connectivity between Asia and Africa to promote stability and prosperity of the region a whole. Areas of cooperation include counterterrorism, capacity building of law enforcement authorities and countermeasures against violent extremism. Japan has agreed to help Sri Lanka’s maritime training and capacity building.

By virtue of its location astride sea lanes of Indian Ocean, Sri Lanka occupies an important place in Japan’s Indian Ocean strategy for securing Indian Ocean sea lanes of shipping. India also shares similar concern. So it was not surprising that Japan invited Sri Lanka to participate as an observer in the joint exercise of coast guards of Japan and India. This would indicate the importance Japan attaches to maritime security in its relationship with Sri Lanka.

The US is also a partner in Japan’s Indo-Pacific strategy. Interestingly, around the same time as the Japanese defence minister’s visit USS Anchorage, a US amphibious ship was exercising with Sri Lanka Navy ships off Trincomalee. Recently, the US had announced that the US would be funding Sri Lanka to the tune of $14 million as part of more than $100 million that would be allotted to South Asia. The focus of the funding would be on issues like maritime security, humanitarian assistance, disaster response, peace keeping capabilities and countering transnational crime, which were “key for a free and open Indo-Pacific.”

Tailpiece: A Colombo magistrate has directed the police to detain Admiral Ravindra Wijegunaratne, Chief of the Defence Staff, for allegedly helping Chandana Hettiarachchi, a naval intelligence officer, accused of leading a hit squad that kidnapped 11 young men between 2008 and 2009 during the Eelam War. According to the criminal investigation department there was evidence of Admiral’s role in allowing the accused to evade arrest. 

Col R Hariharan, a retired MI officer, served as the head of Intelligence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka from 1987 to 90. He is associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies, South Asia Analysis Group and the International Law and Strategic Analysis Institute, Chennai. E-mail: haridirect@gmail.com  Blog: http://col.hariharan.info