Thursday, 14 November 2019

In the time of terror threats, let the best man win Lanka polls


Col R Hariharan  |TNN| Times of India, Chennai| Updated: Nov 12, 2019


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CHENNAI: Amid the excitement of the Ayodhya verdict and opening of the Kartarpur corridor to Indian devotees of Nankana Sahib, the Sri Lanka Presidential election to be held on November 16 finds little space in the media, not even in Tamil Nadu. The election will decide who will be at the helm in Sri Lanka in the next five years.

Internationally, Sri Lanka has emerged as the strategic pivot for China to assert its military and economic power in South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). China’s influence is to make further headway with the progress of the Belt and Road infrastructure initiative in the region.  These developments have become a source of major concern to India as its national security is tied with Sri Lanka by geography.  Growing Chinese power in IOR has increased the concern to the USA and its East Asian and European allies, dominating the Indo-Pacific.

The election is being held at a time when the country’s governance has taken a beating ever since President Maithripala Sirisena made an abortive effort in October 2018 to replace the Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe with former president Mahinda Rajapaksa. The infighting between the two exposed serious deficiencies in national security with the April 21 Easter Sunday attacks costing more than 253 lives. The anti-Muslim backlash that followed highlighted the potential threat of religious extremism getting out of hand. These events overshadowed some of the achievements of the government, which came to power promising good governance, rule of law and greater accountability. The country is facing severe economic pressure compounded by growing debt servicing load, high cost of living and unemployment. Alleged war crimes and forced disappearance issues after the Eelam War continues to hang fire delaying efforts to bring ethnic amity. The election will also decide whether former president Mahinda Rajapaksa will emerge powerful again.

Of the 35 candidates, the real contest is between 70-year-old Gotabaya Rajapaksa, the controversial former defence secretary and brother of former president Mahinda Rajapaksa and Sajith Premadasa, 52, housing minister and son of former president Ranasinghe Premadasa.   Gotabaya, fielded by the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP) led by Mahinda, has Sinhala Buddhist nationalists as his support base. On the other hand, Gotabaya’s reputation as an authoritarian figure with disdain for democratic norms, humanitarian laws and rule of law dogs him.  Gotabaya’s manifesto released on Oct 25 focuses on national security and restoring stability after the failure the present regime to prevent the Easter Sunday attacks. The government plans to work with India for regional security and engage with SAARC and BIMSTEC groupings. 

In contrast, Sajith Premadasa, deputy chairman of the ruling United National Party (UNP), fielded by New Democratic Front (NDF) is a non-controversial personality. Tamil National Alliance (TNA) chief His father Ranasinghe Premadasa came from humble beginnings rose up to become PM and then President. Since 2000, Sajith has been elected to parliament four times. Sajith has followed his father’s footsteps by focusing on development youth, and the downtrodden. Apart from the UNP, which usually enjoys the support of a third of voters, Sajith is supported by two prominent Muslim parties — Sri Lanka Muslim Congress and All Ceylon Makkal Congress, the Tamil Progressive Alliance formed by Tamils of Indian origin and the Jathika Hela Urumaya, popularly known as monks party. Former president Chandrika Kumaratunge and her group within the SLFP has also pledged their support to Sajith.  

Sajith’s manifesto appeared to have more depth, having learned from the aberrations of the outgoing Sirisena government’s failure to deliver on its promises. The manifesto pledged a new constitution to create a strong nation with a judiciary independent of the government, independent public prosecutor appointed by the Constitutional Council. The manifesto also envisaged the creation of an upper house comprising provincial council representatives. Other promises include creation of a national security advisor, adopting a zero-tolerance policy on drugs and extremism, and set up special anti-narcotic courts with special prosecutors. Of interest to minorities are the introduction of new laws to monitor religious extremism, penalising hate speech, resettlement of war displaced persons and “meaningful devolution” of powers to provinces.  

As a neighbour, India would prefer a politically and economically stable Sri Lanka, to build upon existing cooperation in national security and trade between the two countries. At the same time, India is wary of China’s use of Sri Lanka as a springboard to further its military advantage as well as commercial edge in South Asia. The Easter Sunday attacks have shown the need for close cooperation and coordination of combating terrorism between the nations. The Rajapaksa rule had shown a tilt towards China ostensibly to develop infrastructure projects using its help; however, the country has been burdened by huge debts. So if Gotabaya wins India may have to get Sri Lanka strike a balance in its relationship with India and China. 

(Col R Hariharan, a retired MI officer, is associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies, South Asia Analysis Group and the International Law and Strategic Analysis) 



Wednesday, 30 October 2019

India-Sri Lanka Relations: New Challenges


Debate : India-Sri Lanka Relations: New Issues and Perspectives
India-Sri Lanka Relations: New Challenges

R Hariharan* | Courtesy: Indian Foreign Affairs Journal Vol. 14, No. 1, January- March 2019, 1-57

Foreign relations have occupied an important place in Narendra Modi’s vision for India during his just concluded first term as Prime Minister. In fact, ‘Neighbourhood First’ was the central theme when he started off as Prime Minister, inviting the Heads of State of SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) countries for his inaugural function in 2014. However, Pakistan’s continued refusal to give up the use of extremist jihadi outfits operating from its soil to bleed India has prevented SAARC from evolving into a full-fledged effective regional grouping. So, India’s relations with its  neighbours have, perforce, been bilateral rather than multilateral.

However, after his resounding victory in the May 2019 general elections, Prime Minister Modi invited the heads of BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal Initiativefor Multi-Sectoral Technical Economic Cooperation) countries - Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Nepal and Bhutan - for his swearing in ceremony on 30 May 2019. This probably indicates Prime Minister Modi’s shift of focus from ‘Neighbourhood First’ to ‘Act East’ involving the BIMSTEC nations. In fact, Prime Minister Modi is slated to visit the Maldives to address the Majlis (parliament), followed by a visit to Sri Lanka within the first ten days of assuming office for the second term. This seems to indicate that India’s foreign policy priority will now be to build strong relations with its IOR neighbours, particularly Sri Lanka and Maldives.

This will also be in keeping with Prime Minister Modi’s SAGAR (Security and Growth for All), launched in 2015, for developing the blue economy of Indian Ocean Rim Countries. The maritime initiative seeks to create a climate of trust and transparency, respect for international maritime rules and increase in maritime cooperation with Sri Lanka, Maldives, Mauritius, Seychelles, and Bangladesh. Though SAGAR has had moderate success, its importance is increasing more than ever before. The growing strategic power play between China and the USA and its allies in the Indo-Pacific is affecting the strategic interests of India and the BIMSTEC countries.

India-Sri Lanka relations are moving away from traditional concerns and collaborations due to the dynamic changes in the strategic environment in South Asia and the IOR. Sri Lanka has emerged as an important partner of China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) -its strategic economic infrastructure project. The BRI includes the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR), which aims at strengthening maritime infrastructure between China and Asia, Africa and Europe.

China took the risk of making huge investments in economically unviable projects in Sri Lanka at the end of two and half decade long war between Sri Lankan government and Tamil separatists represented by LTTE. Sri Lanka now owes China US$ 8 billion and finds it difficult to service the debt. After the US$ 1.6 billion Hambantota port proved a burden, Sri Lanka signed an agreement with the state-owned China  Merchants Ports Holdings Company (CMPort) which agreed to pay US$ 1.12 billion for 85 percentshare of Hambantota port for 99 years. India has been watching with concern China gaining control of Hambantota port as it legitimises its strategic presence within India’s sphere of influence in the Indian Ocean. The Colombo Port City project (originally conceived as part of Western Region Megapolis) was started in 2014. However, the project - to be built by Chinese contractors at a cost of US$ 1.5 billion on 112 hectares of reclaimed land in Colombo’s Galle Face promenade - courted a lot of controversy. It went through a series of conceptual changes, and has now been rechristened as Colombo International Financial Centre, a self contained smart city project. It is expected to be completed in October 2019. However, to be profitable, all these projects would need Indian participation. 
The Chinese are aware of this requirement, and will always factor in this aspect while negotiating with Indian counterparts. Using Sri Lanka as a takeoff point, China is now gaining not only a military advantage but also a commercial edge in South Asia. When the China- Sri Lanka free trade agreement (FTA) comes through, Chinese business is capable of using India’s FTA with Sri Lanka to gain backdoor entry into Indian markets. 

In this complex environment, two main issues emerge: managing China’s strategic power play in Sri Lanka, and managing the Jihadi terrorist threat in Sri Lanka.

The first issue is Sri Lanka emerging as a pivot in the IOR as a result of China’s growing strategic assertion in the IOR, and the flexing of its naval power in the Indo-Pacific. China’s show of force to assert its sovereignty over the whole of South China Sea has become a source of international concern not only for India but also for the USA and its East Asian and European allies. India has maintained its strategic autonomy in dealing with this issue, while trying to strengthen its maritime and naval cooperation with the USA, Japan, and France to protect its national interests in the Indo-Pacific. In this environment, how should India build a win-win relationship with Sri Lanka?

China’s maritime assets created in the IOR, including Hambantota, extend now from Djibouti in the west to the South China Sea in the east. This is a challenge to not only to India’s strategic construct but also that of the USA, Japan, and its Pacific allies. They are coming together to build their collective strength to face the challenge posed by an increasingly assertive China. With these moves, the centre of gravity of global strategic power is shifting slowly to the IOR.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abeenjoy a close rapport in shaping India-Japan strategic relationship. “Towards a Free, Open and Prosperous Indo-Pacific” - the title of the joint statement issued during PM Shinzo Abe’s visit to India on 14 September 2017 – eloquently underlines the strategic focus of the relationship between the two countries. The recent example of Sri Lanka, Japan, and India signing an agreement to jointly develop the East Container Terminal (ECT) at the Colombo Port is a very good example of Indo-Japan collaboration taking on China’s economic challenge in Sri Lanka. The project is estimated to cost US$ 500 to 700 million. Unlike Hambantota, the Sri Lanka Ports Authority (SLPA) retains 100 percent ownership of the ECT.

From the Indian point of view, the more sinister issue will be China trying to influence elections in Sri Lanka as it is said to have done in support of Mahinda Rajapaksa during the 2015 presidential election through Chinese companies. An investigative article on the controversial Hambantota port project in the New York Times (25 June 2018) gave details on such Chinese assistance. The article “How China Got Sri Lanka to Cough up a Port” by Maria Habi-Abib explained how China dictated terms on utilising  Sri Lanka’s need for financing the Hambantota port,  not only to benefit Chinese state owned companies, but also to further China’s strategic interests. Mahinda Rajapaksa played an important role in furthering Chinese strategy in Sri Lanka. 

The report gives details of how China corrupted the electoral process to ensure President Rajapaksa’s election in the 2015 election (of course, it failed). Internal investigation reports give the details of China Harbor’s bank account, which “dispensed” at least US$ 7.6 million t o the affiliates of Rajapaksa. The report says that, ten days before the polls, US$ 3.7 million was distributed in cheques to buy gifts (including saris) for supporters, print campaign promotional material, and the paying of US$ 38000 to a “popular Buddhist monk” and to volunteers. The report said that most of the payments were made from China Harbor’s sub account named “HPDP Phase 2” - an acronym for the Hambantota Port Development Project.

The second issue pertains to the terrorist jehadi threat. Nine members of a local Muslim radical outfit - the National Thowheed Jamaath (NTJ) – carried out in all nine blasts in three churches and three luxury hotels in Sri Lanka on Easter Day (21 April 2019), killing 253 people and injuring over 500. A week later, the Islamic State (IS) claimed responsibility for the attack. Although India had passed on information 12 days in advance to Sri Lanka regarding the planned attack (including the names of persons involved) both President Sirisena and Prime Minister Wickremesinghe said they had no knowledge of the information. Evidently, the schism between the two leaders, which started in October 2018 after the President made a vain bid to sack Prime Minister Wickremesinghe, seems to be affecting government functioning in matters of national security. A further probe has revealed that Zaharan Hashim, the leader of the NTJ, probably had links with IS suspects in Kerala and Karnataka. Buddhist fringe elements took the opportunity to carry out massive anti-Muslim riots in North-western province, even as the police watched.

 Intelligence and security personnel from India, the USA, and the UK have reached Sri Lanka to help the investigation into the IS inspired terrorist strike. According to a Daily Mirror columnist, China - perhaps unnerved by the US and UK security agents landing in Sri Lanka in the wake of the blasts - sent “a message” for President Sirisena from Chinese President Xi Jinping. He has said that President Sirisena should come to Beijing, and President Sirisena has confirmed he would. In what is a very significant development, when he arrived in Beijing, President Xi chaired a joint Sri Lanka-China bilateral meeting on security co-operation with Colombo. One of the key decisions taken was on “strengthening co-operation in the defence sector and sharing intelligence between Sri Lanka and China” - an aspect that has been incorporated into the new defence agreement. President Sirisena briefed the meeting on the Easter Sunday massacres carried out by pro-IS Muslim extremist groups.

According to the article, before he left Colombo, President Sirisena explained that Sri Lanka did not have the technological expertise and equipment “to trace persons who were promoting terrorism and spreading false information. President Xi agreed to provide both expertise and equipment. He will also send a technical team to Sri Lanka to train personnel.” President Sirisena also agreed to a government-to-government deal for the hi-tech surveillance of Colombo City on the lines of “smart cities.” The article said this would also cover the Hambantota Port and the Colombo Port City, both constructed with heavy Chinese funding.

Under these circumstances, India will have to work hard to improve cooperation and coordination of counter terrorism strategies at the operational level. This would include networked real time exchange of information, exchange of data and details, and the tracing of the movement of people and money using electronic surveillance. Some of the specific areas to be addressed include the following:

·         Developing a counter narrative against Jihadi terrorists using social media. It has been noticed that the IS uses social media to carry out decentralized control of various affiliates in countries across the continents from Syria to Central Africa to South Asia to the Philippines. Blocking social media is a near impossible method except for short periods. So India and Sri Lanka, along with other like-minded countries, can develop a technology hub to study and train personnel to establish and operate such hubs for real time intelligence collection, identify grey and black propaganda, block fake news.

·          Prevent money laundering, the smuggling of arms, drugs and people.

·          Exchange identity details to identify suspects transiting between countries on a real time basis using digital technology.

·          Specific training for handling terrorist situations, and standardized drillsfor fast response.

·          Form joint teams where necessary to carry out follow up action seamlessly across the borders. Carry out periodic reviews and assess developing situations to provide better understanding.

Indo-Sri Lanka relations are heading for an eventful period because Sri Lanka is undergoing a period of political instability due to rival power centres headed by Mahinda Rajapaksa, President Sirisena, and Prime Minister Wickremesinghe who are all eyeing the next presidential poll, to be announced towards the end of the year. The draft Constitution - which was to usher in yahapalana (good governance), is still in incubation - like many other ideas. The vexed issues of ethnic reconciliation and the free and fair investigation into the allegations of war crimes against the Sri Lankan army towards the end of the Eelam War 2009 (as required by the UN Human Rights Council) are still hanging fire. The economy is in shambles, with mounting debt restricting the government’s freedom of action. Under these circumstances, Sri Lanka will require a lot of understanding and hand-holding from India, which is “family,” while China is a “friend” - as former President Rajapaksa once remarked. *

***************

* The Author, Col. R. Hariharan, a retired MI officer, contributed this article  on June 1, 2019. He served as the head of Intelligence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka from 1987 to 90. He is associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies, South Asia Analysis Group, and the International Law and Strategic  Studies Institute.

Tuesday, 22 October 2019

China, like US, is not dependable and trustworthy'


Courtesy: Rediff.com/News/October 18, 2019

'Only when China treats India as an equal can we consider them real friends.'

Was the second informal meeting between Prime Minister Narendra Damodardas Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping successful?
"The 'unequalness' in the India-China relationship is partly due to our conduct. We are not vision-driven like China," Colonel R Hariharan, an associate with the Chennai Centre for China Studies, tells Rediff.com's Shobha Warrier.
What impact will the informal meeting have on the India-China relationship?
If I were to rate the meeting, I will give it 3/5. The meeting was cordial. Both leaders met in a friendly atmosphere and discussed long term strategic issues of global and regional importance.
The informal meet was able to repair the slightly fractured relationship after China's conduct at the UN security council in support of Pakistan after India abolished Article 370.
After Imran Khan met Xi in China on October 9, Xi said China would continue to firmly support Pakistan on issues concerning its core interests and of major concern to it.
Normally, China uses the words 'core interests' when it refers to territory. For example, China uses 'core interests' in case of reference to Taiwan, Tibet and Hong Kong.
This is the first time Xi has used the term 'core interests' in relation to Pakistan.
China has made contrarian statements on the Kashmir issue, not only now but in the past also. It has said it should be settled bilaterally as also settling through the UN etc.
But this time, before the informal summit, India took pains to explain to China that abolishing of Article 370 was an internal matter, related to amending the Constitution.
After this explanation, China went to the UN security council to help Pakistan out, though no resolution on Kashmir was brought as it could not muster adequate support.
That itself showed China was favouring Pakistan on Kashmir. After that the Chinese ambassador in Pakistan made a very serious statement in support of Pakistan.
Xi's use of the term 'core interest' shows China has taken a position to support Pakistan.
India, unhappy with the development, had sent another strong signal by participating in the ministerial level meeting of the US, Australia, Japan and India to formalise the Quadrilateral alliance, which had been a loose network to formulate collective strategies in the Indo-Pacific.
These developments sent negative vibes before the meeting, just like what happened after the Doklam standoff before the Wuhan meeting. The external affairs ministry in a statement said Kashmir was an internal matter and India would not like any external interference.
So Xi probably thought Modi might bring it up Kashmir issue at the informal summit.
Do you feel Modi deciding not to raise the Kashmir issue is to India's credit?
Modi did the right thing by not raising the Kashmir issue after maintaining it was an internal issue. And the comfort level for Xi increased when Modi did not raise the issue.
India had also kept quiet about Hong Kong.
So, you can say India while being firm, took a number of measures to improve the comfort level between the two leaders.
China noticed the signals. The mood of the leaders at the meeting was quite good, enabling them to cordially discuss larger issues.
It seems trade and trade deficit dominated the summit. Does that mean Modi and Xi considered trade as the most important issue to discuss?
I will view it slightly differently. The same subject came up at Wuhan also. After the Wuhan meeting China agreed to India's export of sugar and non-Basmati rice.
In the current year, our exports to China have slightly gone up though still (it is) low. Imports have also come down.
Perhaps encouraged by this, the two sides discussed trade issues and agreed to setting up a high level mechanism headed by Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman and Chinese Vice Premier Hu Chunhua to look in detail at trade, investment and services. So, there is hope that there would be positive gains.
Against the background of the US-China trade war, would China be looking at India as a huge market? Would India also want to have a share in the huge Chinese market?
Exactly. The problem is China restricts imports from India. For example, in the pharmaceutical industry, though India imports organic chemicals for manufacture of drugs from China, China does not allow the import of Indian drugs.
China wants India to join the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership free trade agreement between the 10 member States of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and its six FTA partners (China, Japan, India, South Korea, New Zealand and Australia).
India has been negotiating hard on the terms as it could result in Chinese imports going up. This issue also came up at the summit.
There was a lot of emphasis on trade. There was an effort on India's part to create a congenial atmosphere to take these issues forward. Issuing long term visas for the Chinese is one such effort.
Chinese tourists are not coming in large numbers to India unlike Sri Lanka where they top the number of foreign tourists. There is a great opportunity for India in promoting tourism.
Many experts say China cannot be trusted.
Personally, I am of the opinion that no nation should trust any other nation 100%.
In the case of China, it has more meaning. India has very close defence relations with both France and Russia and both have proved they are dependable. Though Russia has sold weapons and France sold submarines to Pakistan, we can trust them.
But China, like the US, is not dependable and trustworthy.
China is brazenly self-centred. China is probably the only country which has gone to war with almost all of its neighbours over border disputes.
China has been investing heavily in all of India's neighbours. Is it to isolate India?
The basic difference between India and China is India's dream is regional and China's dream is global.
Chinese investment in our neighbouring countries serves China in two ways: It furthers China's quest to become a global power. At the same time, it can strategically contain India, which is a potential challenger to China in Asia because of its size and growing economic power.
It is not easy to isolate India which dominates the sea lanes of communication in the Indian Ocean. China has developed a blue water navy to protect its maritime trade as China is a very big importer of petroleum and other mineral resources.
How much will such informal summits help build a better relationship between India and China?
The advantage of an informal meeting is you do not have to come out with a joint statement.
Though they say there was no fixed agenda, the ministers accompanied them shows they have an agenda. It is not a formalised agenda, but a free-flowing one. So this creates a friendly atmosphere, to further the understanding of each other.
The body language of both leaders showed that they were quite comfortable with each other...
Xi came to power a year earlier than Modi. After Modi came to power, they have met 18 times which means in five years, they have met on an average more than three times a year.
These meetings were both formal and informal, summits as well as on the sidelines of international conferences. So, they seem to have built a rapport and appear to be quite comfortable with each other.
Can India and China ever be true friends?
Only when China treats India as an equal can we consider them real friends.
Unfortunately, the Chinese try to equate themselves with the Americans. The 'unequalness' in the India-China relationship is partly due to our conduct too. We are not vision-driven like China.
Also, China is a highly materialistic, Confucius-driven, society where the ruler is accepted as all powerful. So they are able to realise their vision better.
Yes, we are two different systems, but we have to co-exist. Like Vajpayee said, you can choose your friends, not your neighbours.
SHOBHA WARRIER / Rediff.com





Monday, 9 September 2019

De-radicalisation in J&K 2.0: Unfang the Terrorists

With the Jammu & Kashmir in a socio-political flux, it is an attractive rallying point for militants. This has led to increased radicalisation of youth


J&K has morphed into J&K 2.0 after Parliament passed a resolution abolishing Articles 370 and 35(a) of the Constitution in August. It not only deprived J&K of its special status, but downgraded it to a Union Territory. This was a watershed moment in India’s seven-decade-long quest to fully integrate J&K with the rest of India on equal terms.
Unfortunately, the abolition of Article 370 provides an attractive rallying point for militants, particularly when there is a socio-political flux. In other words, J&K 2.0 can bloom into a “Paradise on Earth” only if jihadi terrorism and separatism cease to be extra-constitutional agents interfering with the socio-political life of the average Kashmiri.
Islamist militancy and separatism are not new to J&K. However, when the J&K Liberation Front gave a call for azadi, Nizam-e-Mustafa (Rule of Muhammad) became the call of Hizbul Mujahideen and Jamaat-e-Islami militants supported by Pakistan’s ISI and gingered up by Afghan militants. This led to escalated violence in 1989-90 and resulted in the coercive eviction of Kashmiri Pandits from the Valley with the state government soft-pedalling the situation.
Since then, though separatism has taken a backseat, Islamic radicalism continues to condition the socio-political discourse in the state. This has been taken advantage of by PoK-based jihadi groups like the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) to create a climate of fear as well as to attract young people to their fold.
Globally, there has been a qualitative change in Islamist terrorism after the advent of the Islamic State (IS), a clone of Al Qaeda. With its ruthless tactics and superior net-based propaganda technique, the IS dethroned Al Qaeda from the leadership of jihadi terrorism. Though it was defeated in Iraq and Syria over 2018-19, it still remains a potent force attracting educated Muslim youth from all over the world. Its successful lone wolf attacks and use of social media for propaganda and recruitment have set new standards in refining jihadi terrorist operations, particularly in J&K.
According to Shadi Hamid, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Centre for Middle East Policy, the IS “draws on, and draws strength from, ideas that have broad resonance among Muslim-majority populations. They may not agree with its interpretation of the caliphate, but the notion of a caliphate—a historical, political entity governed by Islamic law and tradition—is a powerful one, even among more secular-minded Muslims”.
Pakistan had been using AQ affiliates like the LeT and JeM operating from sanctuaries on the Pakistan side of the LoC to carry out attacks in J&K. This is part of the Pakistan Army’s strategy to “bleed India” to compensate for limitations of its security forces. Pakistan PM Imran Khan had admitted recently that there were 40,000 jihadi terrorists in the country, while claiming that his country too is a victim of terrorism.
It is not surprising that in the charged environment, radicalisation of young people, including some well-educated and employed youth, has been taking place for quite some time now. Their numbers had gone up from 131 youths who joined terrorist outfits in 2017 to over 200 in 2018. Some new terrorist outfits such as ISIS–Kashmir and Ansar Ghazwat-ul-Hind, aligned respectively with the IS and Al Qaeda, have come up in the past few years.
So any master plan for J&K 2.0 must have de-radicalisation (DR) at its core. It should be holistic and not merely confined to militants in captivity. DR should not be confused with the Army’s Operation Sadbhavana carried out since 1998. Under this programme, the Army has tried to improve the quality of life of people in five focus areas: education, infrastructure development, health and sanitation, women and youth empowerment and community development.  During the last decade, the Army has spent over Rs 550 crore in J&K under the programme and runs 50 Army Goodwill Schools and health clinics and improved communication in remote areas.
But DR goes beyond this to remove the effects of radicalisation. Radicalisation is a product of protracted psychological conditioning of minds. It is carried out through madrassas, mosques, political propaganda, and print and social media. Such venues of radicalisation need to be sanitised vigorously. DR requires an enduring strategy that focuses not just on targeting the external and internal actors who fuel radicalisation, but also on the processes through which it is carried out.  The International Centre for the Study of Islamic Radicalisation and Political Violence of King’s College, London, studied DR programmes in eight Muslim majority states. It covered Algeria, Bangladesh, Egypt, Jordan, Malaysia, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Radicalisation of the population in these countries and the techniques adopted varied from soft to hybrid to hard approaches. Though the study was done in January 2012, just before the advent of the IS, the six “general lessons” it provides are useful while designing the DR effort in J&K.
·        The need for a national consensus for such policies is the first priority. So in J&K, a national consensus will have to be evolved for undertaking DR, which has to be sustained over a period of time. Building a consensus is likely to take time but it is a must. Saudi Arabia’s success with DR is attributed to the national consensus.
·        Secondly, successful DR policies need committed and charismatic leadership for initiating a change of approach to violent extremism. The study recommends “soft” policies to build confidence and trust to create and maintain a consensus around them. Bangladesh and Egypt carried out DR with the support of the government.
·         The State alone does not have all the tools necessary to counter violent extremism. Engagement with society through civil society organisations with wide experience and resources is likely to provide new ideas and reinforce the State’s efforts. The Bangladesh DR relies heavily on NGOs to get in touch with vulnerable groups in local communities.
·         Violent extremists in prison require “a professional, comprehensive and financially sustainable” DR programme. It should be designed as part of prison policy to prevent hardening of radicals and attempts to radicalise other prisoners.

Without an environment of governance, successful DR cannot be carried out. Such an environment requires the ability to sustain high growth rate, check corruption and inequity. Any deficiencies and grievances, particularly in socio-economic conditions, are usually exploited by extremists.
According to the study, religious dialogue and counselling alone will not curb violent extremism. Other non-ideological, social, economic and political factors also may contribute to radicalisation. In an increasingly globalised world, national DR programmes cannot be framed in isolation. This is very much relevant in J&K as Pakistan continues to be an external source of support for radicalisation. With the US-Taliban talks in the final stage, we can expect the US to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan, legitimising the role of the Taliban in the power-sharing arrangement. Its fallout on jihadi terrorism is not known; however, this will have to be factored in in India’s overall plans for J&K.
Successful DR has to be consistent with J&K’s culture and be sensitive to “what is acceptable and not acceptable in their societies” as the study says. In tandem with DR, a counter narrative has to be developed for countering radical and extremist propaganda, particularly through social media.
—The writer is a military intelligence specialist on South Asia, associated with the Chennai Centre for Chin

Friday, 6 September 2019

Sri Lanka Perspectives - August 2019


Col R Hariharan| 31-8-2019| Courtesy: South Asia Security Trends, Aug 2019 | www.security-risks.com |

Gota in presidential race  

The decision of the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP) to field Gotabaya Rajapaksa, former defence secretary and brother of former president Mahinda Rajapaksa, as its candidate for the presidential election due in December 2019 was not unexpected. However, it indicates President Maithripala Sirisena’s hope of SLFP joining hands with SLPP to nominate a common candidate to fight the UNP has ended. Joint Opposition(JO) leader Mahinda Rajapaksa has said talks with SLFP will not change the SLPP decision on Gotabaya’s candidacy. 

UNP deputy leader and Minister Sajith Premadasa is making a strong bid for UNP nomination. He is banking on his father Ranasinghe Premadasa’s   long association with UNP. The elder Premadasa served as PM from 1978 to 1988 and President from 1988 to 1993, during the crucial years when Indian forces were fighting the LTTE in Sri Lanka.  Sajith has made clear of his intention to contest the presidential election. 

However, the party chief Ranil Wickremesinghe does not seem to be keen to nominate Sajith as there are other senior leaders like Karu Jayasurya, with rich political experience. Forty UNP MPs out of the party’s 77 members are said to have signed a letter requesting the UNP chief to nominate Sajith. MP Hesha Withanage speaking on behalf of the Sajith group, has said UNP legislators functioning as ministers at different levels would give up their position unless Premadasa was named as the party candidate. However, the UNP chief seems to be still undecided. The delay in UNP picking its candidate has given Gotabaya a head start in the presidential race.  

As architects of victory over the Tamil insurgent group LTTE, Gotabaya and Mahinda enjoy wide popularity among the people, particularly among Sinhala nationalist segment.  The last time people went to polls - the local government elections in 2015 - the SLPP-Joint Opposition (JO) polled 42 percent of the votes indicating that Mahinda has retained his support base, despite losing the presidential election. Gotabaya would build upon this Rajapaksa-loyal segment for his election campaign.

In the run up to the election, Gotabaya is likely to flaunt his achievement in ending the Tamil insurgency in contrast to the security failure of the government to prevent the Easter terrorist blasts despite advance information. With his reputation as a strongman and disciplinarian, Gotabaya will capitalize on the fear psychosis among sections of the people after the Easter attacks. Accepting his nomination Gotabaya  at a party conference  aid “I will accept responsibility to your safety and the safety of your children and your loved ones,”

Infighting between President Sirisena and PM Wickremesinghe has introduced an element of instability in the performance of the government. The backlash against Muslims after the attack has brought back the incendiary mixture of national security and ethnic confrontation to the political centre stage. So Gotabaya’s campaign is likely to be built around the themes of security and political stability, rather than weightier issues like abolition of executive presidency and fundamental rights.

However, there is a seamier side to Gotabaya’s candidature. His reputation as an authoritarian figure with disdain for democratic norms and rule of law dogs him.  Doubts have been raised about his Sri Lankan nationality as he has renounced his US citizenship only recently. There are also reports of immigration irregularity when he served as the defence secretary under President Mahinda Rajapaksa. In utter disregard to humanitarian laws, he is alleged to have ordered the execution of LTTE cadres holding white flag to surrender in the final stages of Eelam War in 2009.   

During his tenure as defence secretary, his name was linked in some of the infamous white van abductions. A CID report presented on at a Mt Lavinia magistrate’s court March 20, 2017 said  Gotabaya led a unit that was accused of assassinating Lasantha Wickrematunge, editor of Sunday Leader newspaper. The report said "Testimony from the former army commander [Sarath Fonseka] shows that there was a special secret unit outside his authority and controlled by Gotabhaya Rajapaksa through the then-chief of national intelligence Kapila Hendawitharana." The report further added “the unit was operated outside the army command structure and was used to target journalists and other dissidents."

Conscious of these allegations, Gotabaya addressing a lawyers convention said he proposed “to lead a future government that will always revere and uphold democracy, and always safeguard the rights of the public” Describing the allegations of human rights violations in the last stage of the war against terrorism as false narrative, he said it “blithely ignores the many delays in the pursuit to victory that arose from our strong commitment to protect and uphold human rights.” He said they chose to use only light arms instead of using heavy artillery, because 300,000 innocent Tamil civilians were entrapped by the LTTE. And this resulted in thousands of war heroes sacrificing their lives. 

Gotabaya’s chances of getting elected as president are high at present. However, his weak spot is lack of support among minority Tamils and Muslims. Already the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) has decided not to support him as bitter memories of the forcibly disappeared and war crimes  continue to haunt Tamils. Similarly, Muslims would remember how under President Rajapaksa’s rule Buddhist fringe groups carried out attacks on Muslim homes, madrasas and shops in Aluthgama in June 2014. These memories are likely to enable UNP-led front to garner most of the minority votes in the presidential poll.   

Controversy over army chief’s  appointment

President Sirisena appointed Lieutenant General Shavendra Silva as Commander of the Sri Lanka Army on August 18. As commander of 58 Division during the Eelam war General Silva was credited with capturing LTTE strongholds including Elephant Pass, Kilinochchi, and Puthudkudiiruppu. However, in the final stages of the war in May 2009, he was implicated in an incident when white-flag carrying LTTE cadres who were surrendering were alleged to have been executed after they were assured safety. After the war, he served as Sri Lankan ambassador and the Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN Headquarters.

Not unexpectedly, his appointment as army commander has triggered strong reaction from civil society both at home and abroad The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet in a statement said she was “deeply troubled” by his appointment, “despite the serious allegations of gross violations of international human rights and humanitarian law against him and his troops during the war.”

The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights referred to alleged human rights violations linked to 58 Division. She said his appointment as Army Commander severely compromises Sri Lanka’s commitment to promote justice and accountability in the context of the Human Rights Council Resolution of 2015 co-sponsored by Sri Lanka and undermines reconciliation efforts. She said it sets back security sector reforms.

The US embassy in Colombo has also issued a statement expressing its deep concern at his appointment. It said the appointment undermined Sri Lanka’s international reputation and its commitment to promote  justice and accountability “at a time when the need for reconciliation and social unity is paramount.”

President Sirisena’s appointment of General Shavendra Silva as army commander is only reiteration of his known stand against bringing to book army officers considered as heroes of the Eelam for alleged war crimes. With the presidential election to be held in the next quarter, he probably considers it not prudent to even consider it. This is also evident from PM Wickremesinghe’s pregnant silence on the appointment. 

Col R Hariharan, a retired MI officer, served as the head of Intelligence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka from 1987 to 90. He is associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies, South Asia Analysis Group and the International Law and Strategic Analysis. Email: haridirect@gmail.com Blog:: https://col.hariharan.info