Col R HARIHARAN
Courtesy: AAKROSH Asian
Journal of Terrorism & Internal Conflicts |April 2019 Volume
22 Number 83 |
INTRODUCTION
Gruesome serial
suicide attacks by local radical Islamic outfit - National Thowheed Jamath
(NTJ) t|argeting three churches and three luxury hotels on Easter Sunday, April
21, 2019 in Sri Lanka killing 258 people and injuring over 500 has left the
country in disarray. People were shocked when they came to know that the government
failed to prevent the attacks though Sri Lanka had received information from
India 12 days in advance about terrorist plans to carry out the attack on
Easter Day.
In a video released
a week after the attacks, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, the elusive chief of the
Islamic State (IS), claimed responsibility for the Sri Lanka serial blasts.[1] The IS video said that it was a “small part of
the response prepared by the Islamic State” in retaliation for the loss of
Baguz, the last IS stronghold in Syria.[2] The IS also released a
video of showing seven men said to be the NTJ bombers, swearing allegiance to
the terrorist organisation. Only the face of Zahran Hashim, the NTJ leader, was
not covered in the video.
President Donald
Trump speaking to American troops in February 2019 in Alaska had said the IS
was 100% percent defeated.[3] Abu Bakr’s video seems to
remind everyone that the IS might be down but not out. As Brookings Blog ‘Order
from Chaos’ says though the Caliphate was gone, “the Islamic State is not….As
thousands of its surviving fighters disperse, the group has gone underground –
for now.”[4]
According to the International Centre for the Study of
Radicalisation (ICSR) at Kings College, London, report of July 2018, 41,490
people including 32,809 men, 4,761 women and 4,640 children from 80 countries
were affiliated to IS. This probably included 39 people from Sri Lanka, 69 from
Maldives and about 150 from India earlier reported to have had joined the IS.
After the defeat of IS, around 31,000 foreigners were in the process of returning
to their countries.[5]
The
ICSR researchers had found that at least 7,366 foreigners affiliated with IS
had travelled back to their own countries, including 256 women and up to 1,180
children. By June 2018, 3,906 had returned to countries in the Middle East and
North Africa, 1,765 to Western Europe, 784 to Eastern Europe, 338 to Central
Asia, 308 to South-Eastern Asia, 156 to Southern Asia, 97 to the Americas,
Australia and New Zealand and 12 to Sub-Saharan Africa.[6] South Asian cadres returning home would
presumably include Sri Lankans as well, though the government does not appear to
have kept track of their return.
According to the UN
Security Council’s 1267 Al Qaeda Sanctions Committee report which sanctioned the
ISIS South Asia Branch on May 14, 2019 for its links with al-Qaeda and
involvement in several deadly attacks in Afghanistan and Pakistan that killed
over 150 people, the ISIS South Asia Branch was formed in 2015. It is also known as the IS in Iraq and the
Levant-Khorasan ISIL-K, the ISIL Khorasan, and Islamic State’s Khorasan Province
and the South Asian Chapter of ISIL.[7]
According to a research study of Pakistan Institute
of Conflict and Security Studies in October 2018 quoted by Pakistan Today, the
‘Wilayat-e-Hind’ (WeH), a new chapter of the IS “promoting its extremist
ideology” was attracting educated youth in India, Bangladesh and Pakistan.[8] The Study says Indian
citizens, especially from Kerala State, found IS more attractive than any other
group and at least 54 people from the state announced joining the IS during the
past three years [2016-18]. “Those who
have joined the WeH are well educated and most of them are engineers, doctors
and MBA degree holders. Indians are mostly joining the Khorasan chapter of
Daesh than the core group in Syria or Iraq” it added
The IS group’s
website “Amaq” announced the establishment of ‘Wilayat al-Hind’ (IS province in
India) after security forces killed IS commander Abu Nader al-Kashmiri in
Amshipora area in Shopian in J and K on May 10, 2019.[9]
According to a report of the
Islamic Theology of Counter Terrorism, which specializes in analyzing IS
activities, earlier IS referred to its
franchise in J and K as ‘Islamic State in Jammu Kashmir’ or ISJK, but for the
first time IS appears to have casually announced a province in India dubbed
WeH. The
report said in April 2019 the IS had revealed the name of a new branch in
Central Africa, after an attack in Democratic
Republic Congo. Similarly in another recent video IS Chief Abu Bakr was
seen reading a file title Wilayat Turkiye (Turkey Province).[10]
Despite these reports, there is
widespread scepticism about the possibility of IS spreading in South Asia
including India. Sufi Islam, the more tolerant and popular face of the
religion, is well established among Muslims of the region. They had been
resisting the spread of the IS brand of Salafist ideology.[11]
However, the strong presence of
Taliban and its armed cadres of Al Qaeda and its clones for three decades in parts
of Af-Pak region show the limitations of moderate Islam in stopping the spread
of Islamic radicalism. In fact, Salafists have been providing inspiration to
perpetuate jihadi extremists, not only in Af-Pak region, but also in India,
Bangladesh, Maldives and Sri Lanka and beyond, even in Southeast Asia.
Moreover, the IS has proved its
ideological commitment is more than other Jihadi organisations. Shadi Hamid,
Senior Fellow-Foreign Policy, Centre for Middle East Policy, says “ISIS draws on, and draws strength from, ideas that
have broad resonance among Muslim-majority populations. They may not agree with
ISIS’s interpretation of the caliphate, but the notion of a caliphate—the
historical political entity governed by Islamic law and tradition—is a powerful
one, even among more secular-minded Muslims.”[12]
The
IS strong commitment to its Salafist belief makes it not only a great survivor
even in adversity, but also the most dangerous among Jihadi terror groups. As
Shadi Hamid says “In this most basic
sense, religion—rather than what one might call ideology—matters. ISIS fighters
are not only willing to die in a blaze of religious ecstasy; they welcome it,
believing that they will be granted direct entry into heaven. It doesn’t
particularly matter if this sounds absurd to most people. It’s what they believe.”[13]
It seems the Easter
Day attack in Sri Lanka is part of the IS new tactic in action. According to a
Reuters report of May 2019 analyzing IS’ new guerilla tactic, the IS has
claimed more operations in Nigeria and “dozens of similar attacks” in recent
weeks in Afghanistan, Niger, Somalia, Egypt, Pakistan, Chechnya and Sri Lanka.[14] The report adds that in
many cases the group published pictures of arms and equipment said to have been
collected from soldiers.
Analysis of reports of
activities of suspected sympathisers and members of IS chapters and affiliates
in Pakistan, India, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka has shown extensive use of social
media to ideologically inspire small number of educated local Muslims,
particularly from Kerala State, to join its fold even after IS defeat in Iraq
and Syria. According to a June 3, 2019 media report,
Rashid Abdullah, head of the Kerala IS module in Afghanistan was killed during
bombing by the US forces.[15]
The IS role in the
suicide attacks raises a few questions:
·
Sri Lanka has not fully recovered
from three decades of fighting Tamil separatist insurgency that ended a decade
ago. In its aftermath, the island nation is mired in political and economic
instability. It is struggling to revamp its structural frame work to make it
more democratic and accountable to all sections of people. In this murky environment
of ethnic, religious and linguistic aberrations, how can Sri Lanka successfully
handle IS terrorist threat?
·
Will the IS threat to Sri Lanka
impact South Asia and IOR and the international security environment?
TRANSFORMATION OF ISLAMIC RADICALISM
Sri Lanka’s investigations
after the blast have followed two streams: investigation by law enforcement
agencies and the parliamentary select committee (PSC) deliberations and a
smaller presidential inquiry to look at systemic failure and individual accountability
for the failure. Both lines of investigation have unraveled socio-political
aberrations that encouraged, if not condoned, the evolution of NTJ as a hate
spouting radical Islamic outfit and its transformation into an IS clone. It has
also revealed the strong influence of radical Thowheed ideology between Tamil
Nadu and Sri Lanka on the one hand and the role of IS sympathisers in India and
other countries in transforming NTJ into an active IS-inspired outfit.
The Hindu’s Colombo
correspondent Meera Srinivasan’s detailed report on the month-long
investigations by Criminal Investigation Department (CID) and Terrorist
Investigation Division (TID) into the Easter Day attacks, presents interesting
details on how the network of Jihadi extremists was formed and ultimately
carried out the attacks.[16]
In all, nine extremists including a woman in the age
group of 20 to 30 were involved. They belonged to the NTJ and the less ‘formal’
Jamathei Millathu Ibrahim (JMI) which mostly operated through social media. Apparently
they were mentored by Zahran Hashim (33), a radical preacher, belonging to Kattankudy
in Batticaloa district of Eastern province. He was attracted to the creed of Thowheed - meaning “oneness of God” – monotheism which
is central to Islam and decries praying at the tomb of Islamic saints (dargah)
which is common among Sufis, the more tolerant majority among Muslims in Sri
Lanka.
The Hindu article also reveals details of
international IS linkages of some of the suicide bombers. Typical is the case
of Abdul Latheef Jameel Mohammed, one of the suicide bombers killed in the
attack. The ‘normal’ youngster pursued aeronautical engineering at Kingston
University in London (2006-07) and later went to Melbourne to pursue
post-graduation. He left Australia in 2013 and probably made a failed attempt
to go to Syria as he could go only up to Turkey. In 2014, he “returned to Sri
Lanka a different man” according to his sister quoted in the media.
In Australia, the police had noted Jameel’s
terrorist leanings based on the evidence linking him to the well known
Australian IS recruiter Neil Prakash.[17] However, some others believe Jameel was
radicalized in the UK where he met Anjem Choudary, the radical Islamist
preacher and UN listed IS terrorist, convicted in Britain for inviting support
for the IS. According to investigators, Jameel returned to Sri Lanka in 2014
after a failed attempt to reach Syria.
Investigations have revealed that P Jainul Abideen
(popularly known as PJ), a powerful Tamil Nadu fundamentalist preacher was
instrumental in influencing Zahran’s and helping the spread of the Thowheed
movement in Sri Lanka. Initially PJ was
associated with the Tamil Nadu Muslim Munnetra Kazhagam (TNMMK), a
politico-religious organisation formed in 1995. However, he fell out with the
TNMMK due to political and radical theological
differences and formed the Tamil Nadu Thowheed Jamath (TNTJ) in 2004.
Since then TNTJ had been propagating the Thowheed creed through preaching and
carrying out social work and disaster relief.
Jainul Abideen’s preaching influenced not only
Zahran Hashim but also two Sri Lankan Muslims, Abdhur Razik and Rasmin, who
came in touch with him. They formed the Sri Lanka Thowheed Jamath (SLTJ) in
2005. However, local Muslims in Sri Lanka found Abideen’s fundamentalist views
unacceptable and pressurised Sri Lanka government to deport him when he came to
preach in Sri Lanka. Moderate elements among Thawheed followers broke away to
form Ceylon Thowheed Jamath (CTJ). Again in 2015, when the SLTJ invited Abideen
to preach in Sri Lanka, powerful members of the Muslim community fearing his
presence in the island would disturb intra-Muslim and inter-religious harmony aske
the government to cancel his visa. This would indicate the links between the
Thowheed organizations in the two countries has been going on for over a
decade.
Three years ago, moderate
sections of Sri Lanka Muslims had raised alarm with Sri Lanka intelligence
agencies about Zahran’s extremist activities. A report in Nikkei Asian Review
quoted Hilmy Ahamed, Vice President of the Muslim Council of Sri Lanka “All his
[Zahran’s] You Tube videos of hate speech were uploaded in India” from a base
he had either in Chennai or Bangalore.[18]
According to Abdul Razik, a
leader of the moderate CTJ, during 2018 Zahran Hashim, “has been openly calling
for the killing of non-Muslims." He added that they had asked the
intelligence agencies to take down the Facebook page of Zahran “because he was
polluting the minds of Sri Lankan Muslims." The All Ceylon Jamiyyathul
Ulama (ACJU), the central body of the country’s clerics had also alerted Sri
Lanka's security establishment of the activities of Hashim and his acolytes. But
intelligence agencies said it was “better to allow him to have the page so that
the authorities could keep an eye on what he was doing."
The testimony of Moulavi KRM
Sahlan, Secretary of the Al Haj Abdul Jawad Alim Waliyullah Trust, before the
PSC, laid bare the activities of Zahran.[19] He said
his organisation had submitted a written complaint to the President’s office
when Zahran called upon Muslims to kill people of other faith in a public
speech on March 27, 2017. He said “we had submitted CDs containing these
speeches and warned that there could be a disaster if Zahran was allowed to
continue in that manner.” He further said copies of the same complaint was sent to the PM’s
office, the offices of ministers of law and order, justice and state defence
minister as well as the Attorney General’s Department and the Director, TID.
According to Sahlan, Zahran
published a monthly magazine called Towheed from 2013 attacking the Sufis,
calling them not true Muslims. He said “in 2016 and 2017, we lodged 11
complaints with the Kattankudy police station against Zahran’s group.” In 2015,
in response to Sufi complaints Maj Gen Lal Perera summoned Zahran and warned
him to refrain from attacking other religious groups. But the NTJ continued to
attack Sufis.
The reason f0r laxity shown by
the administration in taking strong action against Zahran could be his group’s
work in support of Maithripala Sirisena and against Mahinda Rajapaksa during
the 2015 presidential election, as stated in Sahlan’s PSC testimony.
Apparently complaints about
Zahran were treated by the police in a routine manner. This is evident from the
statement of officer in charge of Kattankudy. He said when Zahran’s brother
Rilwan was injured while testing a bomb in March 2018, he was taken to Colombo
National Hospital and treated for his injuries. He lost sight in one eye and a
few fingers in the accident. Neither anyone checked him on his eight hour
journey to Colombo nor the doctor’s treating him made a report to the police.[20]
It is surprising that Zahran
Hashim carried out all these activities in spite of many Muslim organisations
like the ACJU and prominent Muslim political leaders like Azath Sally warning
the security agencies about the NTJ leaders activities. In fact, the chief of national intelligence
Sisira Mendis told the PSC that Zahran’s arrest when he was reported for hate
speech could have averted the attacks. “He had come to the attention of
authorities before the attacks. Police could have at least detained him for
questioning when there were reports against him.”
Former head of the TID Nalaka
Silva in his testimony before the PSC
had said the TID had obtained a open warrant from the Colombo court as
well as a blue notice from the Interpol in July 2018 to apprehend Zahran. After
anti-Muslim riots in Digana in 2018, there was a surge in Zahran’s social media
activity and “we saw he was moving from extremism to violent extremism.” He had
begun to endorse the activities of IS and was promoting IS videos through his
Facebook and websites.[21]
The National
Investigation Agency (NIA) in India had been keeping an eye on suspected IS
followers in Tamil Nadu and Kerala for some time. [22]Their follow
up action upon information from Sri Lanka about social media links of NTJ chief
Zahran with IS sympathisers in
Coimbatore in Tamil Nadu have led to their arrest. The NIA arrested Mohammed
Azharudeen, said to be the mastermind of the IS Tamil Nadu module on June 12,
2019. He was a Facebook friend of Zahran.[23] Sri
Lanka police have arrested five Sri Lankans including Mohammad Milhan, one of
the NTJ suspects who fled to Dubai after the blast, and brought them back to
Colombo.[24] Similarly, five Sri Lankans with suspected IS
links have been brought back to Sri Lanka from Saudi Arabia.
In the follow up action, Kattankudy police have
arrested 60 youth “trained” by Zahran Hashim. According to the police the youth
were taken on a free tour ostensibly to
hear a “moulavi” in this case Zahran Hashim, who welcomed them at a hideout in
Hambantota town and preached his extreme Islamic philosophy. Two persons Milhan
and an army veteran Mohideen taught the group how to use handguns, behead
people and use handguns in the next two days. They were also shown IS training
videos.[25] In
the training camp the youth were not allowed to speak to each other. However,
at the end of the training they were assigned a nickname to identify each other
by that name, apparently to ensure the secrecy.
According to report in Ceylon Today, seven months ago Zahran had purchased 25-acre
property for Rs five million close to remote town of Rithihenna for constructing
a training camp. Police searched the
area and recovered 25 sticks of gelignite, some cans of ammonium nitrate, used
as agricultural fertilizer used in making improvised explosive devices.[26]
Thus security investigations
have revealed a few things clearly regarding the Easter Sunday attacks:
·
The NTJ leader Zahran Hashim
was attracted to Thowheed radicalism propagated by Tamil Nadu Thowheed preacher
Jainul Abideen. Over a decade long association with like minded people,
reinforced his beliefs and provided the ideological moorings for transformation
to IS extremism.
·
Zahran’s links with IS
sympathisers in Tamil Nadu and Kerala enabled him to use social media,
particularly You Tube, to propagate his doctrine of hate, attract and motivate
his followers .
·
Using the social media, Zahran
was able to attract educated young people, who were influenced by the IS
recruiters abroad, to join him.
·
Moderate Muslim leaders were
alarmed at the growing influence of Zahran, as his anti-Buddhist activities was
disturbing ethnic peace, they had complained to the authorities to shut him up.
But influential Muslim politicians did not hesitate to use him to political
advantage during elections.
·
Police and intelligence
agencies had treated complaints against Zahran in a routine manner presumably
because his group had supported President Sirisena during the presidential
election in 2015.
SYSTEMIC FAILURES
Sri Lanka government had been a divided house due to schism
between the President and the PM ever since President Sirisena made an abortive
attempt to remove PM Wickremesinghe from the government in October 2018. Apparently this has resulted in lack of
coordination between the ministries and different arms of the government. This was evident when immediately after the
attacks, both President Sirisena and PM Wickremesinghe denied any prior
knowledge of the information about the impending attack received from Indian
sources and disseminated by the State Intelligence Services (SIS), 12 days
before the attack.
After the attacks, the President declared a state of emergency,
sacked Defence
Secretary Hemasiri Fernando and asked the IG of Police
Pujith Jayasundara to resign for their failure to prevent the attacks. The IG
refused to do so and was sidestepped by posting another police officer in his
place. After some administrative hiccup NTJ and TMI were proscribed. The President also appointed a presidential
inquiry into the attacks. The SIS chief Sisira Mendis, resigned after
the attack on health reasons.
The controversy over Karu
Jayasuriya, speaker of the parliament’s call for a PSC to probe the
attacks delayed its start by five weeks. The move to constitute the PSC was opposed not
only by the President, but also the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and Joint
Opposition, on grounds of compromise of national security. The President said
he would not allow intelligence officers to testify before the Committee.
However, testimonies made by former Defence Secretary Fernando,
sacked IG Jayasundara and the former SIS chief Mendis have revealed serious gaps in communication and coordination between
the SIS and other security arms of the government though all of them functioned
under the President.
Former
defence secretary Fernando in his testimony said he was a ‘helpless’ Defence
Secretary who had to wait for weeks to get an appointment with the President.
In his testimony, Mendis said that though he had briefed the
defence secretary on the impending terrorist attack, the National Security
Council (NSC) had not met.
He said the last NSC meeting was held on February 19, 2019, two
months before the attack, implying that if it had been held the NSC could have taken
measures to avert it. Mendis informed the IGP in a letter giving the
information about the plans for the attack and follow up action as advised by the
defence secretary. Mendis further added that the impending attack was not even
discussed at regular intelligence coordinating meeting attended by the defence
secretary, the three service chiefs and IG Jayasundara.[27]
The suspended IG Jayasundara
filed a complaint before the Supreme Court accusing President Sirisena of
failing to prevent the Easter bombings.[28] In his complaint, Jayasundara said he had
been sidelined by the President since the political rift between the President
and PM Wickremesinghe in October 2018. He further added that he refused a
diplomatic post offered to him if he agreed to step down, as he was not
responsible for “the catastrophic intelligence failure.”
He also added
that the SIS which reports directly to the President wanted the TID to stop all
inquiries into extremist Muslim factions including NTJ, which was involved in
the Easter Sunday bombings.
President Sirisena who is also
defence minister, issued a statement refuting Mendis’ testimony and said he
held NSC meetings twice a week. It is significant the PM was not invited to
participate in the NSC meetings. The President said he met the national police chief and
his top brass 13 days
before the Easter Sunday attacks and no officer raised warnings received from
India. Overall, the President’s handling of national security was presented in
poor light by the testimonies.
It is evident everyone in the
bureaucratic chain had treated the information about the planned attack without
the urgency it deserved. The newly appointed Defence Secretary General Shantha
Kottegoda told the PSC that the suicide bombings could have been averted had
the extremist organizations been proscribed on the basis of intelligence
reports received in 2014.
It is evident the intelligence
structure that helped the country to successfully defeated powerful LTTE
insurgents a decade ago does not exist now.
This is not surprising as a number of cases of misuse of intelligence
and police resources to serve personal and political ends during President
Mahinda Rajapaksa rule are now pending in various stages of prosecution.
In an apparently well organized
move, Sinhala hardliners seemed to have used the public outrage in the wake of
the blasts to fan anti-Muslim hate campaign. Anti-Muslim backlash broke out a
week after the Easter Day attacks mobs brought in trucks from other places
attacked Muslim owned shops and houses in three towns in Northwestern province
while police watched on helplessly.
Strident demand was made for
removal of Muslim governors Azath Salley and MLAM Hizbullah and cabinet
minister Rishad Bathiudeen for alleged support to the NTJ even though the
allegations were not borne out by evidence. After a Buddhist monk Athurelive
Rathana Thero, went on indefinite fast in Kandy with the demand and thousands of
people marched in support, the two Muslim governors and nine ministers resigned
en masse. A lot of uneasiness prevails among Muslims as they feel the security
measures taken after the attacks are being used to curb normal life of Muslims
in the name of fighting extremism.
In these circumstances,
President Sirisena sent a wrong message by pardoning the well known Muslim
baiter Gnanasara Thera, leader of the Buddhist fringe group Bodhu Bala Sena,
who was serving a six year sentence for contempt of court. The prelate of Asgiriya Chapter, one of the
most influential Buddhist orders in the country, addressing a temple ceremony
in Kandy accused Muslims of destroying the country and called for a boycott of
Muslim run shops and businesses. He said “don’t eat from those [Muslim owned]
shops.” Except for finance minister Mangala Samaraweera, who came down heavily
on the prelate for his comments against Muslims and urged ‘true Buddhists’ to
unite against “Talibanisation” of the religion, other political leaders have
been muted in their response.
This has kindled a feeling of
déjà vu among liberal segments and civil society that political priorities are
once again overtaking the urgent need for ethnic and religious amity in Sri
Lanka. This does not augur well for the country as it provides space for the
spread of IS extremism.
INTERNATIONAL
DIMENSION
PM Narendra Modi was the first
foreign leader to visit Sri Lanka after the deadly Easter Day terror attacks at
the start of his second tenure. His trip indicated India’s show of solidarity
with Sri Lanka in times of distress and assured
the neighbourhood will continue to be India’s foreign policy priority. During
his brief visit, PM Modi held discussions with all the main actors including
the President, the Prime Minister and the Leader of Opposition and also
addressed the Indian community. He met with President Sirisena and the two
sides agreed that terrorism is a “joint threat” that needs collective and
focussed action. Translating the
“jointness” is likely to be the priority of both countries in their fight
against terrorism.
In this context, the signing of
Sri Lanka, Japan and India agreement to jointly develop the East Container
Terminal (ECT) at the Colombo Port in May 2018 assumes significance as the
countries had been negotiating the deal since last year. The ECT is located
some 3 km away from the China-backed international financial city, known
popularly as “port city”, being built on reclaimed land on Colombo’s sea front.
Intelligence and security
personnel from India, the US and UK have reached Sri Lanka to help the
investigation into the IS inspired terrorist strike. According to a Daily
Mirror columnist, China perhaps unnerved by the US and UK security agents
landing in Sri Lanka in the wake of the blasts, sent “ a message for President
Sirisena from Chinese President Xi Jinping asking him to visit Beijing. When
he arrived in Beijing, President Xi
chaired a joint Sri Lanka-China bilateral meeting on security co-operation with
Colombo. One of the key decisions taken was on “strengthening co-operation in
the defence sector and sharing intelligence between Sri Lanka and China” — an
aspect that has been incorporated into the new defence agreement. President
Sirisena briefed the meeting on the Easter Sunday massacres carried out by
pro-IS Muslim extremist groups.”
According to the article,
before he left Colombo, President Sirisena explained that Sri Lanka did not
have the technological expertise and equipment “to trace persons who were
promoting terrorism and spreading false information. President Xi agreed to
provide both expertise and equipment. He will also send a technical team to Sri
Lanka to train personnel.” President Sirisena also agreed to a
government-to-government deal for hi-tech surveillance of Colombo City on the
lines of “smart cities.” The article said this will also cover the Hambantota
Port and the Colombo Port City, both constructed with heavy Chinese funding.
CONCLUSION
To summarise, Sri
Lanka is probably now part of IS’ decentralized Syria centric operations to
expand its footprint into South Asia using local affiliates. South Asian
countries, particularly India and Bangladesh, had been facing the threat of
Pakistan-supported Jihadi terrorist groups for long and are highly vulnerable
to any escalation of Jihadi threat.
Investigations carried out in the wake of Sri Lanka suicide
bombings show that attacks must have been planned well in advance to inflict maximum
casualties. The IS modules in Kerala and Tamil Nadu seem to have been using the
social media actively in tandem with the NTJ leader Zahran in propagating IS
radicalism in both countries. Action to dismantle such threat would require not
only greater coordination and cooperation between security agencies of both
countries but also policy convergence. Sri Lanka would also require technology
support from India in fighting terrorist threat.
Sri Lanka was probably selected because there is around 10
percent Muslim population with wide exposure to radical Wahhabi philosophy at
home and among expatriates working in Gulf countries. Apart from reasons of
real politick, Sri Lanka had probably been soft pedaling on the issue of
Islamic extremism for political reasons
as major parties are wooing Muslim minority for support. Collectively these
factors have enabled the NTJ to carry out its suicide bombings successfully.
Under these circumstances, there is an urgent need for political
parties to curb their tendency to whip up anti-Muslim sentiments through Sinhala nationalist fringe elements. The Sirisena-Wickremesinghe duo will have to
redeem their credibility which has been tarnished by their tardy handling of
national security apparatus that led to the Easter Day attacks. This has caused
enormous damage to the image of the country. They will also have to push
through the reforms they had promised during the run up to the elections, including
the drafting of a new constitution that meets the aspirations of everyone and
upgrading of accountability in governance including rule of law and human
rights.
The
IOR and as a corollary Sri Lanka has become the focus of the ever increasing global power play between China and
the US and its allies as well as India, the dominant naval power in the region.
Escalation of IS-inspired terrorist threat in Sri Lanka could affect IOR. Greater cooperation in enforcing counter
terrorism measures among not only Sri Lanka, India, China and the US and its
allies, but also other Indian Ocean Rim Countries, has now become a necessity
to discourage further growth of terrorist threat.
Col R Hariharan, a retired MI specialist on
South Asia and terrorism, served as the head of Intelligence of the Indian
Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka from 1987 to 90. He is associated with the
Chennai Centre for China Studies, South Asia Analysis Group and the
International Law and Strategic Analysis Institute, Chennai. Email: haridirect@gmail.com Blog: https://col.hariharan.info
Notes &
References
[1] The term Islamic State used in this
article refers to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), also known as the
Islamic State in Levant (ISIL) and Daesh in Arabic
[7] ‘ISIS’ South Asia
Branch comes under UN radar; sanctioned’, May 16, 2019, One India web news
[14] Instructions from
headquarters: Islamic State's new guerrilla manual,
[16] Meera Srinivasan, ‘The inside
story of the 9 suicide bombers behind
Sri Lanka’s savage Easter attacks’, 25 May 2019 The Hindu
[17] Neil
Christopher Prakash (known as Abu
Khaled al-Cambodi in the IS) whose Australian citizenship was revoked in
December 2018 for his role as an active member of the IS. Member. In March
2019, Prakash was convicted in a Turkish court of membership in a terrorist
organisation. He is serving a six year sentence in prison. ‘Neil Prakash:
Australian Jihadist stripped of citizenship’ https://www.bbc.com/news/world-australia-46706710
[27] ‘Easter carnage PSC: NSC
didn’t meet till April 21 attacks’ May 29, 2019 The Island www.island.lk
